


AFSC PUB 1



The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1991

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THE PURPLE SUIT

The Purple Suit concept, reflected in the color of this publication's cover, represents an important metaphor of joint and combined planning. Service members involved in joint and combined operations dissociate themselves from the inherent biases of parochial concerns to work together for the common good. The color purple symbolizes the intermingling of all the whites, blues, greens, tans, reds, gold, and silver found in Service uniforms and insignia. Purple is joint and combined: the Purple Suiter is an officer who embodies the motto on the Armed Forces Staff College Seal--"That All May Labor as One."



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
**NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
ARMED FORCES STAFF COLLEGE
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA 23511-6097**

AFSC Pub 1

The mission of the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) is to prepare mid-career and senior officers for joint and combined duty. AFSC Pub 1 is an even more important document now that joint professional military education is a shared responsibility, with Phase I taught at the Service schools and Phase II taught at AFSC. AFSC Pub 1 is the basic textbook at the college and the single most important document we use to carry out our mission. Several other colleges and institutions have adopted Pub 1 for their curriculum, and it has become a prominent reference book for operators and planners throughout the military community.

Pub 1 is a unique document. It offers a perspective on joint planning that is not found elsewhere. It presents the "big picture" of the process, synthesizing essential elements from a wide range of sources, presenting them in a systematic manner. No other single publication so completely treats the subject of jointness.

Because Pub 1 is derived from many sources, official and unofficial, AFSC has no monopoly on its contents. The process of joint planning is dynamic, so Pub 1 must be dynamic. It is a product of study and analysis, logic and common sense, and perhaps even a little wishful thinking. To keep it useful and current, however, we depend on input from the experts--the users of this book--who labor every day to solve the problems of joint planning in the "real world." Therefore, we solicit not only official comments from your commands, but also unofficial comments from you, the reader.


Stanley Kwieciak, Jr.
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Commandant

"Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort."

Dwight D. Eisenhower





JOINT SERVICE SCHOOLS

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

The National Defense University (NDU) was established by the Department of Defense on 16 January 1976. The three institutions of NDU, the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (co-located at Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.), and the Armed Forces Staff College (Norfolk, Virginia), maintain their separate identities, however. The university was created in response to recommendations made by the DOD Committee on Excellence in Education and is the senior joint educational institution operating under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Since two senior Service colleges were co-located on the post, the committee realized that close affiliation of the two institutions would reduce administrative cost, streamline duplicate functions, permit better use of people and resources, and promote a constructive dialog benefiting both colleges. This affiliation enabled students from each college to enroll in elective courses taught at both schools, and to share in other educational opportunities not possible in the past. It also permitted use of faculty expertise in both colleges for the benefit of all university students. On 12 August 1981, the Armed Forces Staff College was also brought under NDU with the same objectives in mind.

THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE


The National War College (NWC), one major component of the National Defense University, is a unique military educational institution. It is the only senior Service college offering a ten-month course of study in national security policy formulation. The NWC mission is to conduct a senior-level course of study and associated research in national security policy, with emphasis on its formulation and future directions, in order to enhance the preparation of selected personnel of the Armed Forces, the Department of State, and other U.S. Government departments and agencies for the exercise of joint and combined high-level command and staff policy functions in formulating and implementing national security strategy.

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

The Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) is a major component of the National Defense University. It is the only senior Service college dedicated to the study of management of resources for national security. The ICAF mission is to conduct senior-level courses of study and associated research in mobilization and in the management of resources in support of national security in order to enhance the preparation of selected military officers and senior career civilian officials for positions of high responsibility and trust in the Federal Government.

ARMED FORCES STAFF COLLEGE

The Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) was established on 13 August 1946 as a joint educational institution operating under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. AFSC was placed under the auspices of NDU on 12 August 1981. The college is composed of two schools: the Joint Command, Control, and Electronic Warfare School (JCEWS) and the Joint and Combined Staff Officer School (JCSOS). The JCEWS deals with facets of command and control communications, operations, and countermeasures, and with electronic warfare. The JCSOS offers Phase II training for Joint Specialty Officer nominees. JCSOS focuses on joint and combined operations planning with emphasis on strategic deployment, joint employment, and sustainment. The curriculum is designed to promote a spirit of cooperation and understanding that is critical to any joint or combined endeavor.



The Armed Forces Staff College

HISTORY

In the 1930s few officers were qualified to engage in joint or combined operations. The demands of World War II highlighted the shortfall of not having trained officers who could easily plan for joint and combined actions by ground, sea, and air forces. To overcome this shortfall and to alleviate the friction and misunderstanding resulting from lack of joint experience, the Joint Chiefs of Staff established an Army/Navy Staff College (ANSCOL) in 1943. ANSCOL conducted four-month courses to train officers for joint command and staff duties.

In the mid-1940s a joint military committee prepared a directive for a new school. This directive was approved on 28 June 1946 and established the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) as the primary military institution to train officers assigned to joint and combined duty. Responsibility for the operation and maintenance of its facilities was charged to the Chief of Naval Operations. Following a temporary residence in Washington, D.C., AFSC was established in Norfolk, Virginia, on 13 August 1946 on the site of a former U.S. Naval Receiving Station. The faculty was composed of officers with joint experience in all theaters of World War II. There were 150 students in the first class, which began on 3 February 1947. AFSC conducted two classes of about six months' duration each year.


AFSC began a period of growth in size and prominence. Classes were expanded to include civilian students from DOD agencies and officers from allied nations to further promote the joint and combined experience. With the construction of Normandy Hall in 1962, the college completed its transition from a temporary to a permanent institution. AFSC became part of the National Defense University on 12 August 1981.

In 1978 AFSC assumed responsibility for teaching the Joint Command, Control, and Communications Staff and Operations Course, and the formation of two schools within the college began. The Joint and Combined Staff Officer School (JCSOS) accommodated the original charter of the college, while the Joint Command, Control, and Electronic Warfare School (JCEWS) accepted responsibility for this additional course plus two more: the Joint Electronic Warfare Staff Officer Course in 1982 and the Joint Command, Control, and Communications Countermeasures Staff Officer Course in 1989.

Until 1990 the AFSC JCSOS graduated two classes each year. In July 1990 the school changed to one where the curriculum is taught in a nine-week course for "intermediate-level" officers who interact with those in an associated five-week course for "senior-level" officers. Tentative plans call for the course to be expanded to 12 weeks beginning in the summer of 1991.

MISSION

The mission assigned to the Armed Forces Staff College by the Joint Chiefs of Staff is to prepare selected mid-career officers for joint and combined staff duty. The college accomplishes this mission through two schools: the Joint and Combined Staff Officer School and the Joint Command, Control, and Electronic Warfare School.



INSIGNIA

The red of the shield symbolizes the Army, the silver the Air Force, and the blue the Navy. The nebuly lines link the three military departments into an inseparable whole. The torch is a symbol of leadership showing the way; the book is a symbol of scholastic work; the wreath represents achievement. The scarlet circle bearing the name of the college is symbolic of a sword belt, indicating that only officer personnel attend the college.

FOREWORD

AFSC Pub 1 is the primary AFSC textbook. Pub 1 brings together official procedures and adds necessary details in explaining the complex process of joint planning. It serves as a compendium of guidance from many sources, including Joint Publications, Service publications, technical reports, and person-to-person reports received from staff officers working in the field. To further assist the reader, Pub 1 cites authoritative sources as needed.

There are many changes in this revision of Pub 1. Procedures, terminology, and even the organization of the joint planning and execution community continue to change, so we must keep pace to remain effective staff officers and planners. It is impossible to keep the material in this publication current without information from those of you who read and use it. Please mail suggestions for improvements, changes, or corrections to

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
ARMED FORCES STAFF COLLEGE
Joint and Combined Staff Officer School
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Norfolk, Virginia 23511-6097

REQUESTS FOR COPIES. Pub 1 is distributed to resident students of the Joint and Combined Staff Officer School and the Joint Command, Control, and Electronic Warfare School; attendees at the Joint Planning Orientation Course and the Joint Planning and Execution Course; the Joint Staff, the military Service headquarters, the unified commands and their Service component commands, the specified commands, the subordinate unified commands, and National Defense University. Many commands and agencies have elected to attach their needs to the initial AFSC contract. Other commands, agencies, schools, and individuals may purchase copies of Pub 1 through the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

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All have my sincere thanks.

JOHN E. MAGNESS, Lt Col, USAF
AFSC Pub 1 Editor

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Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1949 - 1990)

	From	To
General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, USA	8/16/49	8/14/53
Adm. Arthur W. Radford, USN	8/15/53	8/14/57
Gen. Nathan F. Twining, USAF	8/15/57	9/30/60
Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA	10/01/60	9/30/62
Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, USA	10/01/62	7/03/64
Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, USA	7/03/64	7/02/70
Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, USN	7/03/70	6/30/74
Gen. George S. Brown, USAF	7/01/74	6/20/78
Gen. David C. Jones, USAF	6/21/78	6/18/82
Gen. John W. Vessey, Jr., USA	6/18/82	9/30/85
Adm. William J. Crowe, Jr., USN	9/30/85	9/30/89
Gen. Colin L. Powell, USA	10/01/89	

Chapter 1

The Joint Staff Officer

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The Joint Staff Officer

100. PURPOSE AND PERSPECTIVE

a. The **purpose** of *The Joint Staff Officer's Guide*, AFSC Pub 1, is to be a single, useful volume to help you understand joint operation planning. It does not stand alone; it is a textbook to supplement the instruction of the Joint and Combined Staff Officer School at the Armed Forces Staff College. While no single volume can fully cover the entire subject, our purpose here is to give you many of the fundamental principles of the joint planning system. Pub 1 is also a compendium of the many references used by the staff officer. Its organization and content were selected to offer

- the "big picture" of the complex system of joint operation planning used by the U.S. military;
- an introduction to joint and combined organizations and their command relationships;
- a description of the tools and responsibilities of action officers on a joint staff; and
- references and detailed guides that give the joint staff officer a place to turn for additional material.

b. We have found that our readers' **perspectives** vary widely. Professionally, the readers may be staff officers well versed in military planning or they may be new to this complex and challenging work. Operationally, their organization may be employment oriented or they may work at a level concerned with strategic matters. Each point along the spectrum has different expectations and places different demands on the joint planning process.

c. Pub 1 offers a view of all the players in the planning community that helps you to better understand the entire process and, thus, your role in it. We will outline the processes and cite references so that the serious student can go to the source for an indepth discussion of an issue. To assist you in developing skill in military planning we will place Service planning procedures in the context of the overall concept of the joint planning process.

d. Your view of the overall process may also improve by studying military history, strategy, tactics, logistics, and the principles of war. That helps to compensate for a lack of previous work in the field of planning and gives you a broad perspective not limited to your work experience. Such study will give you a broader and deeper understanding of the factors that influence military operations and will also illuminate past mistakes.

101. THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

a. As you develop your professional base of experience in joint planning, you will have to filter from the ocean of information some key lessons learned or certain guiding principles that have universal application. In our profession, the principles of war represent some of those fundamental truths that have stood the test of time. Students who have reviewed and researched warfare over the years still have not reached consensus on a single list of principles of war; but they all will attest that such principles are a good starting point for evaluating military strategy and tactics, and form the foundation for operation planning.

b. An indepth discussion of our current principles of war can be found in Service publications such as Army Field Manual No. 100-1, *The Army*, Air Force Manual 1-1, *Basic Doctrine of the U.S. Air Force*, and Fleet Marine Force Manual FMFM 6-4, *Marine Rifle Company/Platoon*. Excellent articles about the principles of war can be found in *Military Review* (May 1955 and September 1981) and *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* (November 1986). Figure 1-1 summarizes these Service publications and references. As you can see, the principles of war differ from country to country.

THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

UNITED STATES	GREAT BRITAIN AUSTRALIA	SOVIET UNION "PRINCIPLES OF MILITARY ART"	FRANCE	PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
OBJECTIVE	SELECTION & MAINTENANCE OF AIM			SELECTION & MAINTENANCE OF AIM
OFFENSIVE	OFFENSIVE ACTION			OFFENSIVE ACTION
MASS	CONCENTRATION OF FORCE	MASSING & CORRELATION OF FORCES	CONCENTRATION OF EFFORT	CONCENTRATION OF FORCE
ECONOMY OF FORCE	ECONOMY OF FORCE	ECONOMY/ SUFFICIENCY OF FORCE		
MANEUVER	FLEXIBILITY	INITIATIVE		INITIATIVE & FLEXIBILITY
UNITY OF COMMAND	COOPERATION			COORDINATION
SECURITY	SECURITY			SECURITY
SURPRISE	SURPRISE	SURPRISE	SURPRISE	SURPRISE
SIMPLICITY				
TIMING & TEMPO LOGISTICS COHESION	MAINTENANCE OF MORALE	MOBILITY & TEMPO SIMULTANEOUS ATTACK ON ALL LEVELS PRESERVATION OF COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS INTERWORKING & COORDINATION	LIBERTY OF ACTION	MORALE MOBILITY POLITICAL MOBILIZATION FREEDOM OF ACTION

Adapted from FM 100-1, AFM 1-1, and FMFM 6-4,
Military Review, May 1955, and *Soviet Battlefield Development Plan*

Figure 1-1

102. PROFESSIONAL READING LIST. As a framework for expanding your professional knowledge in this area, the following professional reading list on classical military thought is recommended. For a more complete list, see the bibliographies listed in many of the following publications and in professional military journals. For the study of military classic literature, see the historical bibliography #8 compiled by Dr. Robert H. Berlin of the Combat Studies Institute, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6800. For the study of the "Great Captains," see special bibliography #279 compiled by Air University Bibliography Branch, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

Bond, Brian. *Liddell-Hart: A Study of his Military Thought*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1976. 289 pp.

Brodie, Bernard. *Strategy in the Missile Age*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959. 423 pp.

Clausewitz, Karl von. *On War*. Ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976. 717 pp.

Corbett, Sir Julian Stafford. *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1911. 317 pp.

Douhet, Giulio. *The Command of the Air*. New York: Coward-McCann, 1942. 394 pp.

Eccles, Henry Effingham. *Logistics in the National Defense*. Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Co., 1959. 347 pp.

----- . *Military Power in a Free Society*. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1979. 275 pp.

Eisenhower, Dwight D. *Crusade in Europe*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1948. 559 pp.

Fehrenbach, T.R. *This Kind of War*. New York: MacMillan Co., 1963. 689 pp.

Foch, Marshal Ferdinand. *The Principles of War*. London: Chapman and Hall, 1918. 351 pp.

Guderian, Heinz Wilhelm. *Panzer Leader*. Trans. Constantine Fitzgibbon. New York: Dutton, 1952. 528 pp.

Jessup, J.E., and Coakley, R.W., eds. *A Guide to the Study and Use of Military History*. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1979. 507 pp.

Jomini, Henri. *Jomini and His Summary of the Art of War*. A condensed version, edited and with an introduction by Lt Col J. D. Little. Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing Co., 1947. 161 pp.

Liddell-Hart, Basil Henry. *Strategy, the Indirect Approach*. New and enlarged edition. London: Faber and Faber, 1967. 430 pp.

Machiavelli, Niccolo. *The Art of War*. Albany, NY: H.C. Southwick, 1815. 349 pp.

Mahan, Alfred Thayer. *Mahan on Naval Warfare*. Ed. Allan Westcott. Boston: Little, Brown, 1943. 372 pp.

Manchester, William. *American Caesar*. Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1978. 793 pp.

Millet, Allan R., and Peter Maslowski. *For the Common Defense: a Military History of the USA*. New York: the Free Press, 1984. 621 pp.

Morrison, Wilbur H. *Fortress Without a Roof, the Allied Bombing of the Third Reich*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982. 322pp.

Summers, Harry Glenn. *On Strategy: The Vietnam War In Context*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1981. 137 pp.

Sun-Tzu. *The Art of War*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963. 197 pp.

Van Creveld, Martin L. *Supplying War: Logistics From Wallenstein To Patton*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977. 284 pp.

Vegetius Renatus, Flavius. *The Military Institutions of the Romans*. Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing Co, 1944. 114 pp.

103. ORIGINS OF AMERICAN MILITARY STAFF PRACTICE

a. **European origin.** The staff practice and philosophy of the Armed Forces of the United States are almost completely of European origin. The modern general staff was developed in Prussia during the nineteenth century. Distinctive features of this staff system included

- the staff's semi-independent position within the Prussian War Ministry,
- the staff's special concern with military theory and doctrine as well as with the higher military education of senior officers, and
- the exchange of officers of the general staff corps between positions on the general staff and duties with field units.

The general staff gave commanders the ability to better control the field operations of mass armies. These advantages eventually brought about the adoption of a staff system by all major western powers.

b. **The United States and the general staff concept.** Major General Friedrich von Steuben, the first Inspector General of the Continental Army of the United States, introduced the staff practices of Frederick the Great into Washington's army during the American Revolution. His well-drawn estimates of the military situation were of significant value to the American cause. Although American military leaders failed to develop the staff concept further during the years following the Revolution, the military staff saw rapid development in Europe during the first half of the nineteenth century.

c. The American Civil War exposed many of the conceptual weaknesses of our military staff. Why General George G. Meade failed to follow up his advantage at Gettysburg and pursue Lee in his retreat has been the subject of endless debate. Only a few historians have noted that Meade really lacked a staff with the training and resources to prepare and disseminate plans and orders quickly for such a complex operation. On the evening of 3 July 1863, a well-trained staff with adequate resources might have changed the course of history had it presented Meade with a well-conceived and ready-to-execute plan for pursuing Lee. The brilliant campaigning of Lee and Jackson was performed without detailed, exhaustive formal planning. It was more in keeping with the American style of the time, and it caught the imagination of the military the world over. War, however, was becoming too complex, too industrialized to be fought without extensive use of the staff system. Isolated from Europe and concerned mainly with internal affairs during the nineteenth century, the United States did not adopt the military staff system for the Armed Forces until the beginning of the twentieth century.

104. STAFF DEVELOPMENT IN THE INDIVIDUAL MILITARY SERVICES. Today, a number of functions common to all the Services have developed from the National Security Act of 1947 and its amendments, and most recently from the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Figure 1-2 describes these common functions.

The following pages discuss the evolution of military staffs within each of the Services and the specifics related to their current functions. The accompanying illustrations describe some of the major functions of the individual Services as discussed

in DOD Directive 5100.1. Additional information is in CM-44-89 "Report on Roles and Functions of the Armed Forces."

COMMON FUNCTIONS OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

THE MAJOR FUNCTIONS OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS, UNDER THEIR RESPECTIVE SECRETARIES, ARE TO

- prepare forces and establish reserves of manpower, equipment, and supplies for the effective prosecution of war and military operations short of war and plan for the expansion of peacetime components to meet the needs of war;
- maintain in readiness mobile reserve forces, properly organized, trained, and equipped for employment in emergency;
- recruit, organize, train, and equip interoperable forces for assignment to unified and specified combatant commands;
- prepare and submit budgets for their respective departments;
- develop, garrison, supply, equip, and maintain bases and other installations and furnish administrative and logistic support for all forces and bases; and
- assist each other in the accomplishment of their respective functions.

Adapted from DOD Directive 5100.1

Figure 1-2



FUNCTIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

The Army is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war and military operations short of war, and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war. The Army, within the Department of the Army, includes land combat and service forces and any organic aviation and water transport assigned.

SOME OF THE MAJOR FUNCTIONS OF THE ARMY ARE TO

- organize, train, and equip forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations on land—specifically, forces to defeat enemy land forces and to seize, occupy, and defend land areas;
- organize, train, equip, and provide forces for appropriate air and missile defense and space control operations;
- develop airborne doctrine, procedures, and equipment that are common to the Army and Marine Corps;
- organize, equip, and provide Army forces for joint amphibious, airborne, and space operations and train such forces, in accordance with joint doctrines;
- organize, equip, and provide forces for the support and conduct of special operations;
- organize, equip, and provide forces for the support and conduct of psychological operations;
- furnish forces for the occupation of territories abroad;
- perform functions relating to the management and operation of the Panama Canal; and
- conduct the authorized civil works program, including projects for improvement of navigation, flood control, beach erosion control, and other water resource developments in the United States.

A collateral function of the Army is to train forces to interdict enemy sea and air power and communications through operation on or from land.

Adapted from DOD Directive 5100.1

Figure 1-3

a. The U.S. Army

(1) **Origin.** From its birth in 1775 until the early 1800s, young America's army staff patterned itself after the British system: control of the small Regular Army was split between the Commanding General, who was responsible for military discipline and control of field forces, and the Secretary of War, who guided administration and support with a staff bureau system. This bureau system divided authority between the Secretary of War and the Commanding General of the Army and lacked the mechanism to develop coordinated, long-range plans. Though suited to the efficient administration of a small peacetime force, the bureau system was incapable of coping with the demands placed on the twentieth-century Army, a situation that became clear in the Spanish-American War (1898).

(2) **Development in the twentieth century**

(a) In 1899, a civilian lawyer, Elihu Root, was appointed Secretary of War. At the time, he expanded the Army's missions to include pacification and administration of the island territories recently acquired from Spain; in addition, he responded to public criticism of the logistical and operational confusion that had plagued Army performance in the Spanish-American War. He undertook reform of the Army command and staff system patterned on the British system. In 1903 Congress passed legislation creating a modern U.S. Army General Staff. The War Department General Staff corps of 44 officers, who were relieved of all other duties, was functionally organized to prepare plans for the national defense and mobilization of troops. The legislation also replaced the ranking military position, Commanding General of the Army, with a War Department Chief of Staff. The Chief of Staff (COS) supervised all Army forces and the staff departments that had been responsible to the Secretary of War. It was not until 1918, though, that it was clearly resolved that the Chief of Staff was the ranking member of the Army when General Pershing, then Commander of the American Expeditionary Force, was made subordinate to the COS. The Root reforms were the beginning that gave the Army the basis for a unified command and staff system.

(b) Today the **Army Staff** is an executive component of the Department of the Army. It exists to assist the Secretary of the Army in his responsibilities, and includes

- Chief of Staff;
- Vice Chief of Staff;
- Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Personnel, Intelligence, Operations and Plans, and Logistics;
- Assistant Chiefs of Staff (positions authorized by law but not used);
- Special Staff: Chief of Engineers; Surgeon General; Judge Advocate General; Chief of Chaplains; Chief of National Guard Bureau; and Chief of Army Reserves.



FUNCTIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

The Department of the Navy is responsible for the preparation of the Navy and Marine Corps forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war and military operations short of war and, under the integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime component of the Navy and Marine Corps to meet the needs of war. Within the Department of the Navy, the Navy includes naval combat and service forces and such aviation as may be organic.

SOME OF THE MAJOR FUNCTIONS OF THE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS ARE TO

- organize, train, equip and furnish Navy and Marine Corps forces for the conduct of **prompt and sustained combat** incident to operations at sea, including operations of sea-based aircraft and land-based naval air components--specifically, forces to seek out and destroy enemy naval forces and to suppress enemy sea commerce, to gain and maintain general naval supremacy, to establish and maintain local superiority in an area of naval operations, to seize and defend advanced naval bases, and to conduct such land, air, and space operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign;
- organize, equip, and furnish naval forces, including naval close air support and space forces, for the conduct of **joint amphibious operations**;
- organize, train, equip, and provide forces for **strategic nuclear warfare** to support strategic deterrence;
- organize, train, equip, and provide forces for **reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, protection of shipping, aerial refueling and minelaying, and controlled minefield operations**;
- furnish the afloat forces for **strategic sealift**;
- furnish **air support** essential for naval operations;
- organize, train, equip, and provide forces for appropriate air and missile defense and space control operations, including forces required for the **strategic defense of the United States**, under joint doctrines;
- organize, train, equip, and furnish forces to **operate sea lines of communication**;
- organize, train, equip, and furnish forces for the **support and conduct of special operations**; and
- coordinate with the Department of Transportation for the **peacetime maintenance of the Coast Guard**.

Collateral functions of the Navy and Marine Corps are to

- interdict enemy land power, air power, and communications through operations at sea;
- furnish close air and naval support for land operations;
- prepare to participate in the overall air and space effort; and
- establish military government pending transfer of this responsibility.

Adapted from DOD Directive 5100.1

Figure 1-4

b. The U.S. Navy

(1) **Origin.** The Department of the Navy was established in 1798. The early department was entirely in the hands of civilian appointees, while naval officers served at sea. Growth in size and complexity of Navy business in the first quarter of the 1800s led to creation of a Board of Naval Commissioners to give professional advice to the civilian appointees on constructing, repairing, and equipping ships and superintending shipyards. It was a bilinear arrangement, since employment of forces and discipline of troops was retained by the Secretary of the Navy. By 1842 the Navy Department had shifted from a predominantly personnel service, like its Army counterpart, to a predominantly materiel service deeply involved in complex and expanding technical problems. Five individual bureaus under the Secretary of the Navy were created for yards and docks; construction, equipment, and repairs; provisions and clothing; ordnance and hydrography; and medicine and surgery. The creation of additional bureaus specifically for navigation and equipment and for recruiting (enlisted personnel matters) was the response to the weaknesses of the bureau system that were discovered during the Civil War. When necessary, special boards were formed to consider specific technical problems, such as strategy, inventions, and new vessels. By the close of the nineteenth century, the size and complexity of the Service, as well as the pressing need to ensure adequate preparation for war, became too much for control by a single manager. This, compounded by the intra-Service as well as the inter-Service experiences in the Spanish-American War, furnished motivation for Congressional and administrative change in the early 1900s.

(2) Development in the twentieth century

(a) In 1909 a General Board of the Navy was established to serve as an advisory body to the Secretary on matters of personnel, operations, materiel, and inspections. Legislation in 1915 created the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) that was charged with the operation of the fleet and preparation and readiness of war plans. In the 1920s the responsibilities for operation of the fleet were assigned to the newly created position of Commander in Chief of the U.S. Fleet. In March 1942 the positions of Commander in Chief of the U.S. Fleet and CNO were consolidated; once again the total direction and support of the U.S. Navy operating forces were under a single person. By the 1960s the CNO as military chief had complete responsibility for operations as well as supporting logistics and administration.

(b) Today the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations within the Department of the Navy assists the Secretary of the Navy in executing his responsibilities. This office includes

- Chief of Naval Operations;
- Vice Chief of Naval Operations;
- Deputy Chiefs of Naval Operations for Manpower, Personnel, and Training;
- Logistics; Plans, Policy, and Operations; and Program Planning;
- Assistant Chiefs of Naval Operations for Undersea Warfare, Surface Warfare, and Air Warfare;
- Directors of Staff Offices: Naval Intelligence, Surgeon General, Space, Command & Control, Naval Reserve, Oceanographer, Chief of Chaplains, and Research and Development Requirements, Test and Evaluation.



FUNCTIONS OF THE MARINE CORPS

Specific responsibilities of the Department of the Navy toward the Marine Corps include the maintenance of not less than three combat divisions and three air wings and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein.

SOME OF THE MAJOR FUNCTIONS OF THE MARINE CORPS ARE TO

- organize, train, and equip to provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign;
- furnish security detachments and organizations for service on naval vessels of the Navy;
- furnish security detachments for protection of naval property at naval stations and bases;
- perform other duties as the President may direct; and
- develop landing force doctrines, tactics, techniques, and equipment that are of common interest to the Army and Marine Corps.

Adapted from DOD Directive 5100.1

Figure 1-5

c. The U.S. Marine Corps

(1) **Origin.** The Marine Corps staff had its origin in 1798 in the Act for the Establishment and Organization of the Marine Corps. For a time the Commandant was a one-man staff; his chief duty was recruiting Marines for service with the fleet. As the number of recruits began to increase, however, the Commandant expanded the staff to include an adjutant to assist with musters and training, a quartermaster to procure supplies, and a paymaster to pay the troops. An administrative staff of three to five officers carried the Marine Corps through the nineteenth century.

(2) **Staff growth in the twentieth century.** The emergence of the United States as a world power after the Spanish-American War greatly expanded Marine Corps employment. As additional staff officers were assigned to aid the adjutant, quartermaster, and paymaster, their offices became known as departments. Change first occurred outside the staff departments in what came to be called the "Immediate Office of the Commandant." The initial step was taken in 1902, when an officer was assigned to headquarters as aide-de-camp to the Commandant. He formed the nucleus for staff expansion in the Office of the Commandant. The position of Chief of Staff was added in 1911 to assist the Commandant with matters of training, education, equipping the troops, and organization, distribution, and assembly at embarkation for expeditionary duty.

(3) Between World War I and the 1970s, the Marine Corps headquarters staff evolved into the staff that is seen today. In the early years of the twentieth century, there was the strong influence of the American Expeditionary Force and the development of the Army staff. Through World War II, the headquarters staff retained a line planning staff and functionally organized staff divisions for administrative, technical, supply, and operations functions. In the 1950s the staff was reorganized along general staff divisions, G-1 through G-4, and several technical staff divisions. The position of Chief of Staff was redefined in 1957 to assist the Commandant in his responsibilities to supervise and coordinate the headquarters staff. Even through the early 1970s, there was a composite staff arrangement with a distinction in line and staff functions. In 1973 headquarters was reorganized along functional lines with Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Manpower, Installations and Logistics, Requirements and Programs, and Plans and Operations. These new directorates replaced the general staff sections. Marine Corps field units continued to use a combination of a functionally organized general and executive staff and a staff of technical experts.

(4) **The Headquarters, Marine Corps,** is in the executive part of the Department of the Navy. Its functions are to furnish professional assistance to the Secretary of the Navy, accomplish all military department support duties that deal with the Marine Corps, coordinate the action of Marine Corps organizations, prepare instructions for the execution of approved plans, and investigate and report efficiency of the Marine Corps in support of combatant commands. Its current organization includes the following:

- Commandant of the Marine Corps
- Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps
- Chief of Staff of the Marine Corps
- Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Aviation, Installation and Logistics, Manpower, Plans Policies and Operations, Research Development, Reserve Affairs, Requirements and Programs, and Training.



FUNCTIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

The Department of the Air Force is responsible for the preparation of the air forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war and military operations short of war and, under integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime component of the Air Force to meet the needs of war. Within the Department of the Air Force, the Air Force includes combat and service aviation forces.

SOME OF THE MAJOR FUNCTIONS OF THE AIR FORCE ARE TO

- organize, train, equip, and provide forces for the conduct of **prompt and sustained combat operations** in the air--specifically, forces to defend the United States against air attack, gain and maintain general air supremacy, defeat enemy air forces, conduct space operations, control vital air areas, and establish local air superiority;
- organize, train, equip, and provide forces for appropriate **air and missile defense and space control operations**, including forces for the strategic defense of the United States, in accordance with joint doctrines;
- organize, train, equip, and provide forces for **strategic air and missile warfare** ;
- organize, equip, and provide forces for **joint amphibious, space, and airborne operations**;
- organize, train, equip, and provide forces for **close air support and air logistic support** to the Army and other forces, including airlift, air support, resupply of airborne operations, aerial photography, tactical air reconnaissance, and air interdiction of enemy land forces and communications;
- organize, train, equip, and provide forces for **air transport** for the Armed Forces;
- develop doctrines, procedures, and equipment for **air defense** from land areas;
- furnish **launch and space support** for the Department of Defense;
- organize, train, equip, and furnish land-based tanker forces for the **in-flight refueling support** of strategic operations and deployments of aircraft of the Armed Forces and Air Force tactical operations;
- organize, train, equip, and furnish forces to **operate air lines of communication**; and
- organize, train, equip, and furnish forces for the support and conduct of **special operations**.

Collateral functions of the Air Force include

- surface sea surveillance and antisurface ship warfare through air operations,
- antisubmarine warfare and antiair warfare operations to protect sea lines of communications,
- aerial minelaying operations, and
- air-to-air refueling in support of naval campaigns.

Adapted from DOD Directive 5100.1

Figure 1-6

d. The U.S. Air Force

(1) **Origin.** The earliest staff organization in the Air Force reflected the general staff organization in the Army in the years before World War II. Before 1935 the War Department General Staff was responsible for planning, coordinating, and controlling the Air Corps. In 1935 the General Headquarters Air Force was formed and operated under the Army Chief of Staff and the War Department. By June 1941 the Army Air Forces had a recognized Office of the Chief of the Air Force. Reorganization throughout the war years resulted in experimenting with a variety of staff organizational arrangements: the Army-style general staff organization; double-deputy staff that produced a two-prong functional general staff identified as operations and administration; and a tridirectorate staff that recognized personnel and administration, materiel and logistics, and plans and operations.

(2) **Growth since 1947.** With the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, the U.S. Air Force was created as a coequal partner in the National Military Establishment. At first, the U.S. Air Force retained the multiple directorate organization used when it was the Army Air Corps. Stuart Symington, the first Secretary of the Air Force, was sworn in on 18 September 1947. The Secretary, along with the first several Chiefs of Staff, developed what was to become the foundation of today's headquarters staff. The current organization is a multiple directorate staff: the traditional personal and specialist staff subdivisions plus a coordinating staff of personnel, comptroller, operations, and materiel.

(3) Since its inception, the U.S. Air Force has been organized along functional rather than area lines. The Chief of Staff is the military head of the Air Force. The Deputy Chiefs of Staff may speak for the Chief of Staff at any time on any subject within their functional areas, according to the authority delegated by the Chief of Staff. Each deputy in turn presides over a family of directorates, and each directorate is functionally oriented. In the Air Staff, decisions are made at the lowest level that has access to sufficient information and the requisite delegated authority.

(4) The **Air Staff** is an executive part of the Department of the Air Force. It serves to assist the Secretary of the Air Force in carrying out his responsibilities and is organized as follows:

- Chief of Staff of the Air Force;
- Vice Chief of Staff;
- Deputy Chiefs of Staff for personnel, logistics and engineering, plans and operations, and programs and resources;
- Assistant Chiefs of Staff for information systems, intelligence, and studies and analyses;
- Special Staff including Surgeon General, Judge Advocate General, Chief of Chaplains, Chief of National Guard Bureau, etc.



FUNCTIONS OF THE COAST GUARD

The Coast Guard is a military Service and a branch of the Armed Forces of the United States at all times. It is a Service in the Department of Transportation except when operating as part of the Navy on declaration of war or when the President directs.

SOME OF THE MAJOR PEACETIME FUNCTIONS OF THE COAST GUARD ARE TO

- enforce or assist in enforcement of the law with power to arrest, search, and seize persons and property suspected of violations of Federal law, including drug interdiction;
- administer laws and enforce regulations for the promotion of safety of life and property on and under the high seas and waters subject to U.S. jurisdiction;
- coordinate marine environmental protection response;
- enforce port safety and security;
- enforce commercial vessel safety standards and regulations;
- regulate and control ship movement and anchorage;
- acquire, maintain, and repair short-range aids to navigation;
- establish, operate, and maintain radio navigation;
- develop, establish, maintain, and operate polar and U.S. icebreaking facilities;
- organize, equip, and furnish forces for maritime search and rescue;
- engage in oceanographic research; and
- maintain a state of readiness to function as a specialized Service in the Navy.

SOME OF THE MAJOR WARTIME FUNCTIONS OF THE COAST GUARD ARE TO

- continue peacetime missions;
- plan and coordinate U.S. coastal defense for the Fleet Commanders through assignment as commanders of U.S. Maritime Defense Zone Atlantic and Pacific; and
- perform naval wartime missions of inshore undersea warfare, mine countermeasures, harbor defense, ocean escort, etc., occurring in the U.S. littoral sea.

Adapted from

Titles 10 and 14 U.S. Code and

Navy and Coast Guard Board, *Review of Coast Guard Wartime Taskings*, dated 19 March 1981

Figure 1-7

e. The U.S. Coast Guard

(1) **Origin.** The Coast Guard, the nation's oldest continuing seagoing Service, was established in 1790 as "a system of cutters" in the Treasury Department. First called the Revenue Marine and later the Revenue Cutter Service, the Coast Guard was primarily a law enforcement agency responsible for collecting customs duties from ships entering U.S. waters, enforcing embargoes, hunting pirates, and enforcing quarantines. However, by 1797 the strength of the Treasury Department's cutters had been increased to "defend the sea coast and repel any hostility to vessels and commerce"; Congressional authorization established the role of the Coast Guard in national defense.

(2) **Expansion of responsibility.** In 1915 the U.S. Lifesaving Service, an organization of local stations scattered along U.S. coasts, merged with the Revenue Cutter Service to form the U.S. Coast Guard, and with that was born its traditional image, the "lifesavers." During World War I responsibilities were added for port safety and security, commercial vessel safety, icebreaking, and marine environmental protection. Joined in 1939 by the Lighthouse Service, the Service assumed responsibility for establishing and maintaining aids to navigation. In 1967 the Coast Guard became part of the newly formed Department of Transportation. A comprehensive review of wartime missions was performed in 1981 by the Navy and Coast Guard Board. In a 1984 Memorandum of Understanding between the Secretaries of Navy and Transportation, Coast Guard area commanders were assigned as commanders of the newly formed U.S. Maritime Defense Zones (MDZ). These commanders are responsible to the Atlantic and Pacific Fleet commanders for planning and coordinating U.S. coastal defense, preparing operational plans, conducting exercises, and training reserve forces. MDZs will be activated as a deterrent option to ensure port safety and the initial safety of seaborne deployments.

(3) **Organization.** The command and control structure of the Coast Guard is based on ten autonomous districts and two Maintenance and Logistics Commands (MLCs) that report to the Atlantic and Pacific area commanders. The Commandant of the Coast Guard reports directly to the Secretary of Transportation in peacetime. On declaration of war, or when directed by the President, the Coast Guard becomes a Service within the Navy with the Commandant reporting to the Secretary of the Navy; he reports to the CNO for military functions concerning organization, training, and readiness of operation forces assigned to the Navy.

(4) **The Headquarters, U.S. Coast Guard,** under the Commandant reports in peacetime to the Secretary of Transportation. The Commandant is assisted in the direction of policy, legislation, and administration by a functional organization headed by Chiefs of Offices:

Commandant

Chief of Staff

Chiefs of Offices:

Acquisition; Chief Counsel; Civil Rights; Command, Control, and Communications; Resource Director/Comptroller; Engineering; Health Services; Marine Safety, Security, and Environmental Protection; Navigation; Operations; Personnel; and Readiness and Reserves.

105. THE JOINT SPECIALTY OFFICER (JSO)

a. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 requires the Secretary of Defense to establish policies, procedures, and practices for the effective management of officers of the military Services who are particularly trained in, and oriented toward, joint matters. "Joint matters" are defined in the law as "the integrated employment of land, sea, and air forces," and this includes national military strategy, strategic and contingency planning, and command and control of combat operations under unified command. There are no restrictions on the number of officers who may hold the joint specialty; however, sufficient numbers must be designated to meet Joint Duty Assignment (JDA) requirements. Approximately 9,000 billets are currently designated as JDAs.

b. The Secretary of Defense designates as JSOs officers who are educated in and experienced in the employment, deployment, and support of unified and combined forces to achieve national security objectives. To qualify as a JSO, an officer must complete an approved program of Joint Professional Military Education (JPME), at which time the officer receives the designation of Joint Specialty Officer nominee. The officer receives the designation of JSO after completing a full JDA. The Secretary of Defense can waive some of the JSO requirements on a case-by-case basis.

c. Both Service PME and JPME contribute essential qualities to the educational development of a JSO nominee. Accordingly, to be eligible for JSO nomination, an officer must complete a Service PME course (Phase I) and the JPME follow-on course (Phase II) at the Armed Forces Staff College or be a graduate of the National War College or the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

d. A JDA is a designated position in a multi-Service or multinational command or activity that is involved in the integrated employment or support of the land, sea, and air forces of at least two of the three military departments. Such involvement includes, but is not limited to, matters relating to national military strategy, joint doctrine and policy, strategic planning, contingency planning, and command and control of combat operations under a unified command. At least 1,000 JDAs are designated as critical. Current law requires that critical billets be filled with JSOs to the maximum extent possible. After 1 January 1994 critical billets must be filled with JSOs unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff approves an exception.

e. For further information on the JSO program, see JCS Admin Pub 1.2 (Joint Officer Management) and the Military Education Policy Document (CM-344-90, 1 May 1990).

106. SERVICE SCHOOLS

a. Major organizational changes in the late 1800s and early 1900s laid the foundation for a modern staff system in the U.S. Armed Forces. The continuing professional education of military officers was an important element and included Service staff and war colleges. European experience had shown that, without a sound and vital school system, the staffs themselves could not function properly. The Naval War College was established in 1884 and the Army War College in 1901.

b. World War I led to the creation of a widespread system of field staffs in the Army and a growth of staff consciousness in the other Services. Soon after the war, the U.S. military Services began to evolve the functional staff patterns that remain in use today. The Service colleges reached officers destined for Service leadership, educating them in the fundamentals of staff practice and enlarging on the body of knowledge that was to become Service doctrine.

c. By the 1920s the U.S. Armed Forces had a distinctively American staff system that had been drawn from elements of Prussian, British, and French military organizations. For example, contrary to some European practices, the United States did not adopt the concept of a permanent staff corps. Rather, officers constituting U.S. staffs are members of their own Service and are assigned to staff duty only periodically throughout their careers.

d. After World War II command and staff education for field-grade officers was further developed. While command and staff courses for company and field-grade officers in the Army (1901), Marine Corps (1920), and Navy (1923) had long been in existence, the schools now emphasized education in staff subjects and field application. Attendance at the Services' schools rose to a level not possible during the war. The Air Command and Staff College began at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, in 1946.

107. JOINT AND COMBINED SCHOOLS. The school system that accompanied the early twentieth-century military reforms was reconstituted and enlarged to meet post-World War II requirements. Shortly after the war, three joint Service colleges were established: the Army Industrial College, redesignated the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) in April 1946, and the National War College (NWC) in August 1946, both at Ft. McNair in Washington; and the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) in April 1947 in Norfolk, Virginia. All colleges have now been incorporated under the National Defense University (NDU), the NWC and ICAF in 1976, and AFSC in August 1981. Today NDU is assigned the task of preparing selected military officers and civilian officials for command, management, and staff responsibilities. The senior colleges emphasize national security formulation, military strategy development, mobilization, management of resources for national security, and planning for joint and combined operations. Effective July 1990, the Armed Forces Staff College became the single point for completion of Joint Professional Military Education for prospective Joint Specialty Officer Nominees. This was mandated by Congress. The Service intermediate and senior schools will teach the first phase of a joint track for selected officers. The Armed Forces Staff College will teach the follow-on phase at the application level with a curriculum and environment specifically designed to nurture a joint perspective. For further information on JPME, see Appendix VI, JCS Admin Pub 1.2 (Joint Officer Management) and JCS Memo SM-73-89, Implementation of the JCS Program for Joint Professional Military Education (JPME).

108. THE AFSC PERSPECTIVE

a. Planning for joint forces is a team effort, and that team must be carefully balanced. The staff comes from the represented Services and brings not only Service doctrine but also the technical expertise from a range of functional areas within the Services.

b. The ultimate purpose of staff officers is to make sound recommendations to a commander and then clearly communicate the commander's decision to the chain of command. This publication has been developed to help members of a joint staff work more effectively as action officers, understand the joint planning process, and interpret and prepare products of the planning process.

c. AFSC Pub 1 has evolved over the years from many sources. Wherever possible, JCS publications have been used. When these do not cover the particular subject, we have adapted material from applicable Service manuals. AFSC Pub 1 traces its roots to the following publications:

- (1) Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*
- (2) Joint Pub 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*
- (3) Joint Pub 1-03, *Joint Reporting Structure (JRS)*
- (4) Joint Pub 4, *Organization and Functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*
- (5) Joint Pub 4-01, *Joint Logistics Policy and Guidance*
- (6) Joint Pub 4-04, *Mobility System Policies, Procedures, and Considerations*
- (7) Joint Pub 5-02, *Joint Operation Planning System, (JOPS Volumes I through IV)*
- (8) CJCS MOP 7, "The Joint Strategic Planning System"
- (9) JCS MOP 136, "JCS, CINC, and OJCS Involvement in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System"
- (10) JCS *Unified Command Plan (UCP)*
- (11) JCS *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)*
- (12) U.S. Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 11, *Naval Operational Planning*
- (13) U.S. Marine Corps Manual FMFM 3-1, *Command and Staff Action*
- (14) U.S. Air Force Regulation (AFR) 28-3, *USAF Operation Planning Process*
- (15) JCS *Action Officer Orientation*, 7 June 1988
- (16) American Forces Information Service, DOD, *The Armed Forces Officer*, 1975
- (17) U.S. Army Field Manual 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations*
- (18) Joint Admin Pub 1.2, *Joint Officer Management*
- (19) *Military Education Policy Document*, CM-344-90
- (20) Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986, Title IV, *Joint Officer Management*
- (21) National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1990
- (22) Report of the Panel on Military Education, U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, 21 April 1989

d. The chart at the end of the chapter illustrates the rank insignia of the military Services, the "joint team."

OFFICER INSIGNIA OF THE UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES

0-1	0-2	0-3	0-4	0-5	0-6	0-7	0-8	0-9	0-10	SPECIAL
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	------	---------

NAVY

ENSIGN	LIEUTENANT JUNIOR GRADE	LIEUTENANT	LIEUTENANT COMMANDER	COMMANDER	CAPTAIN	REAR ADMIRAL (LOWER HALF)	REAR ADMIRAL (UPPER HALF)	VICE ADMIRAL	ADMIRAL	FLEET ADMIRAL

MARINES

SECOND LIEUTENANT	FIRST LIEUTENANT	CAPTAIN	MAJOR	LIEUTENANT COLONEL	COLONEL	BRIGADIER GENERAL	MAJOR GENERAL	LIEUTENANT GENERAL	GENERAL	

ARMY

SECOND LIEUTENANT	FIRST LIEUTENANT	CAPTAIN	MAJOR	LIEUTENANT COLONEL	COLONEL	BRIGADIER GENERAL	MAJOR GENERAL	LIEUTENANT GENERAL	GENERAL	GENERAL OF THE ARMY

AIR FORCE

SECOND LIEUTENANT	FIRST LIEUTENANT	CAPTAIN	MAJOR	LIEUTENANT COLONEL	COLONEL	BRIGADIER GENERAL	MAJOR GENERAL	LIEUTENANT GENERAL	GENERAL	GENERAL OF THE AIR FORCE

WARRANT

NAVY	MARINES	ARMY	AIR FORCE
WARRANT OFFICER	WARRANT OFFICER	WARRANT OFFICER	WARRANT OFFICER
CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER W-1	CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER	CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER	CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER
CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER W-2	CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER	CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER	CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER
CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER W-3	CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER	CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER	CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER
CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER W-4	CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER	CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER	CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER

COAST GUARD




Figure 1-8

ENLISTED INSIGNIA OF THE UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES











































E-1	E-2	E-3	E-4	E-5	E-6	E-7	E-8	E-9	
NAVY									
 SEAMAN RECRUIT	 SEAMAN APPRENTICE	 SEAMAN	 PETTY OFFICER THIRD CLASS	 PETTY OFFICER SECOND CLASS	 PETTY OFFICER FIRST CLASS	 CHIEF PETTY OFFICER	 SENIOR CHIEF PETTY OFFICER	 MASTER CHIEF PETTY OFFICER	 MASTER CHIEF PETTY OFFICER OF THE NAVY
MARINES									
(no insignia) PRIVATE	 PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	 LANCE CORPORAL	 CORPORAL	 SERGEANT	 STAFF SERGEANT	 GUNNERY SERGEANT	 FIRST SERGEANT	 SERGEANT MAJOR	 SERGEANT MAJOR OF THE MARINE CORPS
							 MASTER SERGEANT	 MASTER GUNNERY SERGEANT	
ARMY									
(no insignia) PRIVATE	 PRIVATE	 PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	 CORPORAL	 SERGEANT	 STAFF SERGEANT	 SERGEANT FIRST CLASS	 FIRST SERGEANT	 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR	 SERGEANT MAJOR OF THE ARMY
			 SPECIALIST 4				 MASTER SERGEANT	 SERGEANT MAJOR	
AIR FORCE									
(no insignia) AIRMAN BASIC	 AIRMAN	 AIRMAN FIRST CLASS	 SENIOR AIRMAN	 STAFF SERGEANT	 TECHNICAL SERGEANT	 MASTER SERGEANT	 SENIOR MASTER SERGEANT	 CHIEF MASTER SERGEANT	 CHIEF MASTER SERGEANT OF THE AIR FORCE

Figure 1-9

Chapter 2 Joint Organization and Staff Functions

● INTRODUCTION	2-2
● ORGANIZATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY	2-2
● ORIGINS OF THE JOINT CONCEPT	2-7
● ORIGINS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF	2-8
● THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TODAY	2-9
● ORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF	2-13
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Joint Organization and Staff Functions

200. INTRODUCTION. Numerous governmental organizations are involved in the implementation of U.S. national security. This chapter will focus primarily on those organizations and agencies responsible for the planning and execution of military operations, their organizational structure, and their command relationships.

201. ORGANIZATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY. Knowledge of relationships between elements of the national security structure is essential to understanding the role of joint staff organizations. Figure 2-1 illustrates the principal officials and organizations who make and execute national security decisions.

a. National Command Authorities (NCA)

(1) Constitutionally, the ultimate authority and responsibility for the national defense rests with the President.

(2) Since passage of the National Security Act of 1947, the President has used his Secretary of Defense as his **principal assistant** in all matters relating to the Department of Defense. It is now clear that the Secretary has statutory authority, direction, and control over the military departments and is responsible for the effective, efficient, and economical operation of the department.

(3) The **National Command Authorities (NCA)** are the President and Secretary of Defense together or their duly deputized alternates or successors. The term NCA is used to signify constitutional authority to direct the Armed Forces in their execution of military action. Both movement of troops and execution of military action must be directed by the NCA; by law, no one else in the chain of command has the authority to take such action.

b. National Security Council (NSC). The National Security Council was established by the National Security Act of 1947 as the principal forum to consider national security issues that require Presidential decision. Its membership now includes only four **statutory members**: the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Director of Central Intelligence serve as **statutory advisers** to the NSC. The history of the NSC and its organization are discussed in Chapter 5.




Figure 2-1

c. Department of Defense (DOD)

(1) **History.** The Joint Board of the Army and Navy was established in 1903 as the first attempt to use a regularly constituted agency to coordinate the actions of the Army and the Navy. Since the beginning of our nation's history, the single focus for coordination between the War Department and Navy Department has been the President. During the 1920s and 1930s, Congress made several fiscally motivated studies that intended to reorganize the administrative branch of government. In fact, one such report of a joint Congressional committee in June 1924 recommended that a single Department of Defense be formed under one cabinet officer; no action was taken on the

report. Interestingly, the most significant support for a single executive department responsible for national defense came from Congressional desires to limit the size of the executive departments during the Depression. In 1932 the House considered a bill that would have permitted the President to establish a Department of National Defense and, as the President saw fit, subject to approval of Congress, transfer and consolidate functions of executive departments. Little resulted from the initiative. The establishment of a single defense department was rejected by the House, and the sweeping reorganization recommendations made by President Hoover were eventually rejected by a lame-duck Congress. During the period, opposition among the military appears to have been strong. The Joint Board of the Army and Navy accepted a staff report dated May 1933 and said "The Joint Board is unable to recommend an organization for a Department of National Defense that would be more efficient or more economical than the present separate departmental organizations. In the opinion of the Board, amalgamation of the two Departments would be a grave error."

(2) The history of the creation of a single executive department responsible for national defense is one marked by indecision and, from some circles, open hostility. But World War II and its aftermath furnished the necessary impetus for unification of the military departments under a single cabinet-level secretary. Anticipating the needs of a peacetime military organization, an indepth review by Congressional, executive, and military groups began even before the end of the war. Overwhelmingly, the studies were influenced by parochial Service interests that reflected the opinions of experienced wartime military and civilian leaders with vastly different views of the postwar era. Issues that dominated the search for a consensus included retention of air power in the Navy, maintenance of a separate Marine Corps, and the form and substance of the new military department of the Air Force.

(3) **National Security Act of 1947.** The National Security Act of 1947 was monumental legislation. After almost 50 years that included wartime lessons beginning with the Spanish-American War, a modern military organization had come into existence: unification of the Services was law, the powers of the Secretary of National Defense were identified but subject to broad interpretation, and the roles and missions of the military Services were defined by Executive Order but would not be Congressionally stated until 1958. The act created the National Military Establishment (NME) under the leadership of a civilian Secretary and created co-equal cabinet-level Secretaries for the new Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

(4) In 1949 the National Security Act was amended to change the name of the NME to Department of Defense and recognize it as an executive department. Further, it changed the role of the Services to military departments within DOD. The **Reorganization Act of 1958** asserted the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense over the executive department and clarified the **operational chain of command** that runs from the President and Secretary of Defense to the combatant forces.

(5) DOD functions today are outlined in DOD Directive 5100.1 and illustrated in Figure 2-2. The Department of Defense is composed of the

Office of the Secretary,
 Joint Chiefs of Staff,
 Joint Staff,
 defense agencies (13),
 Department of Defense field activities (7),
 Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and
 unified (8) and specified (2) combatant commands.



FUNCTIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

As prescribed by the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the Department of Defense maintains and employs the Armed Forces to

- support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic;
- ensure, by timely and effective military action, the security of the United States, its possessions, and areas vital to its interest; and
- uphold and advance the national policies and interests of the United States.

Reference: DOD Directive 5100.1

Figure 2-2

(6) The role of the **Secretary of Defense** has changed since the position was established in 1947. Originally, the Secretary had only general authority over the department, an authority he shared with the civilian secretaries of the military departments. In 1949 his position was strengthened with his appointment as head of an executive department, reduction of the role of military department heads, and his assumption of budgeting responsibilities. Today he is the principal assistant to the President for all matters relating to the Department of Defense. He has undisputed authority, direction, and control over the entire department; this is sole and ultimate power on any matter on which he chooses to act. Moreover, the DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 makes clear his position in the operational chain of command. Figure 2-3 illustrates the organization that reports to the Secretary of Defense.




Figure 2-3

d. Military departments

(1) The military departments are separately organized, each under a civilian secretary who supervises the Service chief (or chiefs) in matters of a Service nature. By law they are not in the operational chain of command. Basically, their functions are as follows:

- | | |
|---|--------------|
| • recruit | • organize |
| • supply | • equip |
| • train | • service |
| • mobilize | • demobilize |
| • administer | • maintain |
| • construct, outfit, and repair equipment | |
| • construct, maintain, and repair buildings | |

(2) The history of the military departments has been significantly altered by legislation and executive order since the National Security Act of 1947. The **Key West Agreement of March 1948** clarified the residual roles left to the military departments and amplified their responsibilities. In 1953 the President and Secretary of Defense agreed to designate a military department to function as "executive agent" for the unified commands. The **Reorganization Act of 1958** removed the military departments from the operational chain of command and clarified their support and administrative responsibilities.

202. ORIGINS OF THE JOINT CONCEPT

a. **History before 1900.** American history reflects the importance of joint operations. MacDonough's operations on Lake Champlain were a vital factor in the ground campaigns of the War of 1812; the teamwork displayed by General Grant and Admiral Porter in the Vicksburg Campaign of 1863 stands as a fine early example of joint military planning and execution. However, instances of confusion and lack of coordinated, joint military action received public criticism in the Cuban campaign of the Spanish-American War (1898). By the turn of the century, war had become too complex for joint planning to be successfully done on an ad hoc basis.

b. **History through World War I.** As a result of the performance of the U.S. military establishment in the Spanish-American War, a joint board composed of the professional heads of the Army and the Navy and the chief planner of each Service was established in 1903. The Joint Army and Navy Board was to be a continuing body that could plan for joint operations and resolve problems of common concern to the two Services. Unfortunately, the Joint Board accomplished little. Its charter gave it no actual authority to enforce its decisions. It was denied the capacity to originate opinions, being limited to commenting on problems submitted to it by the secretaries of the two military departments. It was described as "a planning and deliberative body rather than a center of executive authority." As a result, it had little or no impact on the conduct of the first World War. It is understandable that there would be confusion in the command of joint forces. Even as late as World War I, seniority and command relationships between the Chief of Staff of the Army and American Expeditionary Forces in Europe were just being resolved.

c. **History through World War II.** After World War I, the two Service secretaries agreed to reestablish and revitalize the Joint Board. Membership was expanded to six: the professional chiefs of the two Services, their deputies, and the Chief of War Plans Division for the Army and Director of Plans Division for the Navy. More important, a working staff (named the Joint Planning Committee) made up of members of the plans divisions of both Service staffs was authorized. The new Joint Board could initiate recommendations on its own. Unfortunately, the 1919 board was given no more legal authority or responsibility than its 1903 predecessor; and, although its 1935 publication, *Joint Action Board of the Army and Navy*, gave some guidance for the unified operations of World War II, the board itself was not influential in the war. The board was officially disbanded in 1947.

203. ORIGINS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

a. Soon after Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, at the Arcadia Conference in Washington, established the Combined Chiefs of Staff as the supreme military body for strategic direction of the Anglo-American effort. But the United States in 1941 had no established agency to furnish U.S. input to such a committee. The British Chiefs of Staff Committee, on the other hand, had long been giving effective administrative coordination, tactical coordination, and strategic direction to British forces. The British committee had planning and intelligence staffs to coordinate the ongoing war effort as well as serve as a "corporate" body for giving military advice to the War Cabinet and the Prime Minister. The collective responsibility of the British committee was set by the Prime Minister in 1924 and given to each new member as a directive:

"In addition to the functions of the Chiefs of Staff as advisers on questions of sea, land or air . . . each of the three Chiefs of Staff will have an individual and collective responsibility for advising on defense policy as a whole, the three constituting, as it were, a Super-Chief of a War Staff in Commission."

b. In response to the need for coordinated staff work, the concept described by Admiral Leahy as a "unified high command" was adopted by the United States in 1942; that group came to be known as the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff. This first Joint Chiefs of Staff worked throughout the war without legislative sanction or even formal Presidential definition, a role that President Roosevelt believed preserved the flexibility required to meet the needs of the war. The first members of the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff were the "opposite numbers" to the British Chiefs of Army, Navy, and Royal Air Force (an autonomous and co-equal military organization): Admiral William D. Leahy, President Roosevelt's special military adviser, with a title of Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy; General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army; Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations and Commander in Chief of the U.S. Fleet; and General Henry H. Arnold, Deputy Army Chief of Staff for Air and Chief of the Army Air Corps. Each was promoted in December 1944 when the grades of General of the Army and Fleet Admiral of the United States Navy were established.

c. The Arcadia Conference also gave formal definition to the terms **JOINT**, "involving two or more Services of the same nation," and **COMBINED**, "applying to organizations, plans, and operations of two or more nations."

d. Under President Roosevelt's leadership, this new U.S. military body steadily grew in influence and became the primary agent in coordinating and giving strategic direction to the Army and Navy. In combination with the British Chiefs of Staff, it mapped and executed a broad strategic direction for both nations.

e. At the end of World War II, the continued need for a formal structure of joint command was apparent; the wartime Joint Chiefs of Staff offered a workable example. The first legislative step was the passage of the National Security Act of 1947. That legislation formally established the Joint Chiefs of Staff and laid the foundation for the series of legislative and executive changes that produced today's defense organization. However, the road to a formal unified command organization was controversial. The debate over the most recent Congressional action, the 1986 DOD Reorganization Act, illustrates that controversy is alive even today. As seen in Figure 2-4, significant legislative changes and executive decisions have altered and refined the influence and position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since 1947.

204. THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TODAY

References: Title 10 United States Code (as amended)
DOD Directive 5100.1, "Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components"
Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Action Officer Orientation Handbook

a. **Composition.** The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) consist of the Chairman, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. The collective body is headed by the Chairman, who since 1956 sets the agenda and presides over JCS meetings. Responsibilities as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff take precedence over duties as the chiefs of military Services.

b. **Executive authority.** The executive authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has been changed as different organizational approaches have been implemented.

(1) In World War II, the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff were executive agents for theater and area commanders. But the original National Security Act of 1947 saw the Joint Chiefs of Staff as planners and advisers, not as commanders of combatant commands. In spite of this, the 1948 Key West Agreement that was appended to DOD Directive 5100.1 allowed members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to serve as executive agents for unified commands, a responsibility that allowed the executive agent to originate direct communication with the combatant command. This authority was reversed by Congress by a 1953 amendment to the National Security Act.

(2) Today, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have no executive authority to command combatant forces. The issue of executive authority was clearly resolved by the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986: "[T]he Secretaries of the military departments shall assign all forces under their jurisdiction to unified and specified combatant commands to perform missions assigned to those commands ...";

LEGISLATIVE CHANGES TO THE JCS

LEGISLATION	PROVISIONS
1947 NATIONAL SECURITY ACT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DESIGNATED SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE TO EXERCISE GENERAL AUTHORITY, DIRECTION, & CONTROL • CREATED THE NATIONAL MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT • ESTABLISHED USAF • ESTABLISHED CIA AND NSC • GAVE MILITARY DEPARTMENT HEADS CABINET RANK AND APPOINTED THEM TO MEMBERSHIP ON NSC • ESTABLISHED JCS AS PERMANENT AGENCY • JCS BECAME PRINCIPAL MILITARY ADVISERS TO PRESIDENT & SECRETARY OF DEFENSE • ESTABLISHED UNIFIED/SPECIFIED COMMANDS
1948 KEY WEST AGREEMENT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • JCS MEMBERS FUNCTION AS EXECUTIVE AGENTS FOR UNIFIED COMMANDS • SERVICE ROLES DEFINED
1949 AMENDMENT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MILITARY DEPARTMENT HEADS LOSE CABINET RANK AND ARE REMOVED FROM NSC • RENAMED NME THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE • CREATED OFFICE OF CHAIRMAN
1952 AMENDMENT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GAVE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS (CMC) CO-EQUAL STATUS ON JCS ON MARINE CORPS ISSUES
1953 AMENDMENT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • REMOVED JCS FROM EXECUTIVE AGENT STATUS, I.E., HANDLING DAY-TO-DAY COMMUNICATIONS & SUPERVISION OVER UNIFIED COMMANDS • ESTABLISHED MILITARY DEPARTMENTS AS EXECUTIVE AGENTS FOR UNIFIED COMMANDS
1958 AMENDMENT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GAVE CHAIRMAN THE VOTE • REMOVED MILITARY DEPARTMENTS AS EXECUTIVE AGENT • JOINT STAFF HAS NO EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY BUT ASSISTS THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE IN EXERCISING DIRECTION OVER UNIFIED COMMANDS
1978 AMENDMENT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MADE CMC A FULL MEMBER OF JCS
1986 AMENDMENT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DESIGNATED CHAIRMAN PRINCIPAL MILITARY ADVISER • TRANSFERRED DUTIES OF CORPORATE JCS TO CHAIRMAN • CREATED POSITION OF VICE CHAIRMAN • SPECIFIED OPERATIONAL CHAIN OF COMMAND TO RUN FROM PRESIDENT TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TO UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMBATANT COMMANDERS

References: National Security Act of 1947, as amended;
Reorganization of the National Security Organization,
 Report of the CNO Select Panel, dated March 1985

Figure 2-4

and the chain of command "runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense; and from the Secretary of Defense to the commander of the combatant command."

c. **Military advice.** Today the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the **principal military adviser** to the President, National Security Council (NSC), and Secretary of Defense. However, all JCS members are, by law, military advisers, and they may respond to a request or voluntarily submit advice or opinions to the President, NSC, or Secretary of Defense.

d. **Immediate military staff.** DOD Directive 5100.1 assigns the Joint Chiefs of Staff, supported by the Joint Staff, as the immediate military staff of the Secretary of Defense. This designation is not found in Title 10 U.S. Code, but is a clear statement that the Secretary of Defense will turn to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for staff support on military matters.

e. **Chairman**

(1) The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 identifies the Chairman as the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the senior ranking member of the Armed Forces. As such, the Chairman is now the **principal** military adviser to the President. He may seek the advice of and consult with the other JCS members and combatant commanders; when he presents his advice, he presents the range of advice and opinions he has received along with any individual comments of the other JCS members.

(2) Under the 1986 DOD Reorganization Act, the secretaries of the military departments assign all forces to unified and specified combatant commands except those assigned to carry out the mission of the Services, i.e., recruit, supply, equip, train, service, etc. The chain of command to these combatant commands runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense directly to the commander of the combatant command. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff alone **"functions within the chain of command by transmitting communications** to the commanders of the combatant commands from the President and Secretary of Defense." That position is now clearly stated in DOD Directive 5100.1. The Chairman **does not exercise military command** over any combatant forces; that issue was clarified in the 1953 amendment to the National Security Act of 1947.

(3) The law also transfers to the Chairman the functions and responsibilities previously assigned to the corporate body of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The broad functions of the Chairman are set forth in the amendments to Title 10, United States Code, and detailed in DOD Directive 5100.1. They are summarized in Figure 2-5. In carrying out his duties, the Chairman is charged to consult with and seek the advice of the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders, as he considers appropriate.

f. **Vice Chairman.** As a result of the DOD Reorganization Act of 1986, there is now a Vice Chairman, who performs such duties as the Chairman may prescribe. By law, he is the second ranking member of the armed forces and replaces the Chairman in his absence or disability. The Vice Chairman is not, by definition, a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but he may participate in all meetings. He votes on matters before the Joint Chiefs of Staff only when acting in the capacity of Chairman.

g. **Military Service chiefs.** The military Service chiefs are often said to "wear two hats." As members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, they offer **advice** to the President, NSC, and Secretary of Defense. As the chiefs of the military Services, they are



FUNCTIONS OF THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense. Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President and Secretary of Defense, the Chairman is responsible for the principal functions listed below:

- **STRATEGIC DIRECTION**
furnish strategic direction of the Armed Forces
- **STRATEGIC PLANNING**
prepare strategic plans
prepare joint logistic and mobility plans to support those strategic plans
perform net assessments of the capabilities of the Armed Forces
- **CONTINGENCY PLANNING**
provide for preparation and review of contingency plans
advise on critical deficiencies and strengths in force capabilities
- **REQUIREMENTS, PROGRAMS, AND BUDGET**
advise on the priorities of requirements
advise on program recommendations and budget proposals
assess military requirements for defense acquisition programs
- **DOCTRINE, TRAINING, AND EDUCATION**
develop doctrine for joint employment
formulate policies for coordinating military education and training
- **OTHER MATTERS**
 - ..exercise exclusive direction of the Joint Staff
 - ..as directed by the President, attend and participate in meetings of the NSC
 - ..advise and assist the NCA on establishing combatant commands
 - ..transmit communications between the NCA and combatant commands
 - ..review plans and programs to determine adequacy and feasibility
 - ..as the Chairman considers appropriate, consult with and seek the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and combatant commanders

References: DOD Reorganization Act of 1986
DOD Directive 5100.1

Figure 2-5

responsible to the secretary of the military department for **management** of the Services. The Service chiefs serve for four years. By custom, the vice chiefs of the Services are delegated authority to act for their chiefs in most matters having to do with day-to-day operation of the Services. The duties of the Service chiefs as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff take precedence over all their other duties.

205. ORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

References: JCS Admin Pub 1.1, *Organization and Functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*
 Title 10 United States Code (as amended)
 DOD Directive 5100.1, "Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components"

a. JCS Admin Pub 1.1, *Organization and Functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, outlines

- Joint Chiefs of Staff,
- Joint Staff,
- joint boards, commissions, & committees,
- National Defense University,
- defense agencies, and
- other supporting organizations.

b. **Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).** The composition and role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were discussed in section 204. There are two recognized groups who greatly assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the execution of their role.

(1) In the joint arena, a body of senior flag or general officers assists in resolving matters that do not require JCS corporate-body attention. Each Service chief appoints an operations deputy who works with the Director of the Joint Staff to form the subsidiary body known as the **Operations Deputies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OPSDEPs)**. The OPSDEPs are generally the three-star chiefs of operations for the Services: Army Deputy Chief of Staff (DCOS) for Operations and Plans, Navy Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (DCNO) for Plans, Policy, and Operations, Air Force DCOS for Plans and Operations, and Marine Corps DCOS for Plans, Policy, and Operations. They meet in sessions chaired by the Director of the Joint Staff to consider issues of lesser importance on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or to screen major issues before they reach the Joint Chiefs of Staff. With the exception of the Director, this body is not considered part of the Joint Staff.

(2) Similarly, there is a subsidiary body known as the **Deputy Operations Deputies, JCS (DEPOPSDEPs)**, composed of a chairman, who is the Vice Director of the Joint Staff, and a two-star flag or general officer appointed by each Service chief. Currently, the DEPOPSDEPs are the Service directors of plans: Army Assistant Deputy COS (ADCOS) for Operations and Plans for Joint Affairs, Navy ADCNO for Plans, Policy, and Operations, Air Force Director of Plans, and the Marine Corps Director of Plans. Issues come before the DEPOPSDEPs to be either settled at their level or forwarded to the OPSDEPs. Except for the Vice Director of the Joint Staff, the DEPOPSDEPs are not considered part of the Joint Staff.

(3) Matters come before these bodies under policies prescribed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Memorandum of Policy (MOP) 133. The Director of the Joint Staff is authorized to review and approve issues when there is no dispute between the Services, when the issue does not warrant JCS attention, when the proposed action is in conformance with JCS policy, or when the issue has not been requested by a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Actions completed by either the OPSDEPs or DEPOPSDEPs will have the same effect as actions by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

c. Joint Staff

(1) The term "Joint Staff" is not specifically defined in the Reorganization Act of 1986, but the act did restrict the staff's size to **1,627 military and civilian personnel**. This number includes personnel assigned or detailed to permanent duty on the Joint Staff. The staff is composed of approximately even numbers of officers from the Army, Navy and Marine Corps, and Air Force. In practice, the Marines make up about 20 percent of the number allocated to the Navy.

(2) Each amendment to the NSA of 1947 states that the Joint Staff is not to operate or be organized to be an overall Armed Forces General Staff; therefore, it has **no executive authority** over combatant forces.

(3) The Joint Staff assists the Chairman with

unified strategic direction of the combatant forces;
unified operation of the combatant commands; and
integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces.

(4) Figure 2-6 illustrates the history of the Joint Staff as the directorates, agencies, and staff members have varied with administrative and statutory demands. Currently, JCS Admin Pub 1.1 defines the Joint Staff to include the following:

- Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Office of the Director of the Joint Staff
- Joint Secretariat
- Directorate for Information and Resource Management (DIRM)
- Agencies and Representatives of CJCS
- Office of the Inspector General
- Manpower and Personnel Directorate (J-1)
- Operations Directorate (J-3)
- Logistics Directorate (J-4)
- Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5)
- Command, Control, and Communications Systems Directorate (J-6)
- Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J-7)
- Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment Directorate (J-8)


In addition, the Directorate for JCS Support (JS) of the DIA is the channel through which DIA intelligence and intelligence staff support are furnished to the Joint Staff. This is a functional relationship; JS staff are not members of the Joint Staff. The Joint Staff is illustrated in Figure 2-7.

(5) The Chairman, after consultation with other JCS members, selects the **Director, Joint Staff**, to assist in managing the Joint Staff. By law, the direction of the Joint Staff rests exclusively with the Chairman. The Joint Staff also assists the other JCS members and the Vice Chairman in carrying out their responsibilities.

JOINT STAFF

LEGISLATION OR DIRECTIVE	CHANGES
1947 NATIONAL SECURITY ACT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • LIMITED SIZE OF JOINT STAFF TO 100 OFFICERS • ORGANIZED JOINT STAFF INTO STRATEGIC PLANS, INTELLIGENCE, LOGISTIC PLANS (JOINT SECRETARIAT WAS NOT PART OF THE JOINT STAFF)
1949 AMENDMENT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CREATED OFFICE OF CHAIRMAN • LIMITED JOINT STAFF TO 210 OFFICERS
1953 AMENDMENT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ASSIGNED RESPONSIBILITY FOR MANAGING JOINT STAFF TO CHAIRMAN
1957 AMENDMENT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • REORGANIZED JOINT STAFF INTO STRATEGIC PLANS, INTELLIGENCE, LOGISTIC PLANS, COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS, SUBSIDIARY ACTIVITIES, AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE AFFAIRS
1958 AMENDMENT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • LIMITED JOINT STAFF TO 400 OFFICERS • REORGANIZED JOINT STAFF TO TAKE PLANNING & OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES; DIVIDED STAFF INTO PERSONNEL, INTELLIGENCE, OPERATIONS, LOGISTICS, PLANS AND POLICY, COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS • CHAIRMAN SELECTS DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF IN CONSULTATION WITH JCS • CHAIRMAN MANAGES JOINT STAFF ON BEHALF OF JCS
1963 INTERNAL REORGANIZATION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FORMALIZED POSITION OF OPERATIONS DEPUTIES • ESTABLISHED POSITION OF DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF • ESTABLISHED NMCC OUTSIDE OF JOINT STAFF • DISESTABLISHED INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE; TRANSFERRED RESPONSIBILITIES TO DIA
1964 INTERNAL REORGANIZATION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ESTABLISHED ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES DIRECTORATE • TERM OJCS CAME INTO USE TO INCLUDE JOINT STAFF AND ALL AGENCIES UNDER THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
1976 INTERNAL REORGANIZATION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DISESTABLISHED J-1 & J-6, INCORPORATING FUNCTIONS INTO J-5 AND J-3
1979 INTERNAL REORGANIZATION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ESTABLISHED COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS DIRECTORATE
1981 INTERNAL REORGANIZATION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • REESTABLISHED J-1 AS MANPOWER & PERSONNEL DIRECTORATE
1984 DOD AUTHORIZATION ACT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ESTABLISHED STRATEGIC PLANS AND RESOURCE ANALYSIS AGENCY (SPRAA)
1986 AMENDMENT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CREATED POSITION OF VICE CHAIRMAN • CREATED J-7 AND J-8 DIRECTORATES • LIMITED JOINT STAFF TO 1,627 MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

References: National Security Act of 1947, Title 10, U.S. Code, as amended; Figure 2-6
JCS Admin Pub 1.1, *Organization and Functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*




References: MOP 39, "Release Procedures for JCS Papers and Information"
JCS Admin Pub 1.1, *Organization and Functions of the JCS*

Figure 2-7

d. Agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

(1) **Organizations reporting to CJCS.** The diversity of offices within the Joint Staff and other organizations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff illustrates a wide range of functions and responsibilities. Among organizations reporting to the Joint Chiefs of Staff are the JCS representatives to international negotiations, e.g., Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR), Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), and activities involved with politico-military affairs and defense in the Western Hemisphere, e.g., U.S. representation to the United Nations Military Staff Committee and the Military Committee of NATO. Other activities consist of the National Defense University (NWC, ICAF, and AFSC), the Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocations Board, and the Joint Transportation Board. Figure 2-8 illustrates the organizations that report to CJCS.




References: MOP 39 & JCS Admin Pub 1.1

Figure 2-8

(2) **Organizations reporting to the Secretary of Defense through CJCS.** The combatant commanders have been directed by DOD Directive 5100.1 to communicate to the Secretary of Defense and President through the CJCS. Several defense agencies that report to the Secretary of Defense also support CJCS. The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, is the intelligence staff officer to the Joint Chiefs of Staff; CJCS has operational responsibilities for the Defense Communications Agency, the Defense Nuclear Agency, and the Defense Mapping Agency; and CJCS gives policy guidance and direction to other supporting organizations, including the Joint Tactical Command, Control, and Communications Agency, the Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis Center, the Military Communications-Electronics Board, and the Joint Doctrine Center. The Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for mission accomplishment and reports through CJCS. Figure 2-9 illustrates the organizations that report to the Secretary of Defense through CJCS and those that, like the DOD agencies and activities, have functional relationships to the Joint Chiefs of Staff through CJCS.

ORGANIZATIONS REPORTING TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE THROUGH THE CHAIRMAN, JCS



Reference: adapted from JCS Admin Pub 1.1

Figure 2-9

206. UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS

a. History

Reference: *Staff Report to the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, October 16, 1985, U.S. GPO, Washington, 1985*

(1) The history of our current unified command arrangement begins with the lessons learned in the Cuban campaign of the Spanish-American War. Between 1903 and 1942, the Joint Army and Navy Board sought cooperation between the Army and Navy but accomplished little in the way of improving joint command. In effect, decisions on joint matters in dispute between the Services went to the level of the commander in chief. The President was the single "commander" who had a view of the entire military theater and authority over both the Army and Navy on-site commanders.

Interestingly, one product of the Joint Board, an agreement on "mutual cooperation" in joint operations, was in effect at the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Early in World War II, General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, realized that a unified command arrangement, not mutual cooperation, had been made necessary because of the complexity of modern warfare.

(2) The experiences of World War II fully supported the theory and practice of unified command. Then, quite unlike today, the unified commanders reported to their executive agents on the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff. The executive agents have alternately been the military chiefs of Services (World War II and 1948) and the civilian secretaries of the military departments (1953-1958). Confusion rose from the understanding that the suppliers of the support and administration, the military departments, should also share in the direction of the forces in combat.

(3) As discussed earlier, the National Security Act (NSA) of 1947 was the first definitive legislative statement "to provide for the effective strategic direction of the armed forces and for their operation under unified control and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces." The act went on to say that it was the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to "establish unified commands in strategic areas when such unified commands are in the interest of national security," and the President would establish unified and specified combatant commands to perform military missions. The military departments would assign forces to the combatant commands; the responsibility for their support and administration would be assigned by the Secretary of Defense to a military department. Forces not assigned would remain under the authority of the military department. Now, it was thought, the nation could make more effective use of its military resources.

b. **Definitions.** Unified and specified combatant commands were first described by statute in the NSA of 1947. Neither definition of the combatant commands has changed since then:

Unified Combatant Command. A command which has broad, continuing missions and which is composed of forces from two or more military departments.

Specified Combatant Command. A command which has broad, continuing missions and which is composed of forces from a single military department.

For the purposes of this publication, the term **combatant command** means a unified or specified command. The commander of a combatant command is designated **commander in chief (CINC)**.

c. **Chain of command.** Congressional intent in the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 was to **clarify the command line** to the combatant commanders and **preserve civilian control** of the military. The Reorganization Act clearly states that the operational chain of command runs from the **President to the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders**. However, a provision of the Act permits the President to authorize communications through CJCS. By that authority, DOD Directive 5100.1 dated 25 September 1987 places CJCS in the **communications chain of command**; communications between the NCA and the combatant commander now pass through CJCS. Further, the Secretary of Defense is permitted wide latitude to

assign oversight responsibilities to CJCS in the Secretary's control and coordination of the combatant commanders. This has been exercised in DOD Directive 5100.1.

(1) From the beginning of the unified command concept there appears to have been confusion about the chain of command. Problems of the following sort arose:

- de facto influence of Service departments resulted from their resource support and personnel assignment responsibilities;
- DOD Directive 5100.1 of 31 December 1958 assigned the Joint Chiefs of Staff to a role in the operational chain of command that conflicted with their statutory authority; and
- executive agents were assigned to positions of command between the National Command Authorities and the combatant commander (1948, 1953, and 1958).

(2) Until the 1986 Reorganization Act, there had been confusion over the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the chain of command. The NSA of 1947 stated that "combatant commands . . . are responsible to the President and to the Secretary (of Defense) for such military missions as may be assigned to them by the Secretary (of Defense). . . ." This had been interpreted to cloud the statutory command authority of the Secretary of Defense and the subsequent role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Further complications arose in 1958 when the Joint Chiefs of Staff, contrary to statute, were placed in the chain of command between the NCA and the combatant commanders. Commanders involved in the Pueblo Incident, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and Vietnam have been quoted as saying that they understood that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were in the operational chain of command.

d. Authority

References: DOD Directive 5100.1, "Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components"
Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*

(1) The effective use of the nation's armed forces requires a unity of effort in the operation of diverse military resources. This goal will be achieved through

- strategic direction of the armed forces,
- operation under unified command,
- integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces,
- prevention of unnecessary duplication of efforts or resources,
- coordination of operations, and
- effective combined operations.

Commensurate with the responsibility placed on combatant commanders to achieve unity of effort, they have been given increased authority by law (Title 10, U.S.Code, as amended) and DOD Directive.

(2) The DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 makes commanders responsible to the NCA for the performance of their assigned missions. With this responsibility comes the assignment of all authority, direction, and control that Congress considers necessary to execute that responsibility. The act defines the command authority of the CINC to

- give **authoritative direction** to subordinate commands, including all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics;
- prescribe the **chain of command** within the command;
- **organize commands and forces** to carry out assigned missions;
- **employ forces** necessary to carry out assigned missions;
- coordinate and approve **administration, support, and discipline**; and
- exercise authority to **select subordinate commanders** and combatant command staff.

(3) This authority is termed "combatant command" and resides only in the unified and specified combatant commander. **Combatant Command (COCOM)** is the command authority over assigned forces vested in the CINCs by **Title 10, U.S. Code Section 164**, and is not transferable. It is defined in Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*:

"COCOM is exercised only by the commanders of unified and specified combatant commands. COCOM is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. COCOM should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through the Service component commander. COCOM furnishes full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the CINC considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions."

(4) COCOM is a concept that is not shared with other echelons of command. Combatant commanders **exercise COCOM through Service component commanders, functional component commanders, subordinate unified commanders, commanders of single-Service forces, and commanders of joint task forces.**

(5) In the past, **directive authority for logistics** has been an issue for contention. Much of this may have been resolved by the more definitive statement on the subject in the December 1986 edition of UNAAF:

- Directive authority for logistics supports the combatant commander's responsibility to effectively **execute operational plans, maintain effectiveness and economy of operation, and prevent duplication of facilities and resources.**
- Military departments are still responsible for logistics and administrative support of forces assigned or attached to the combatant commands.

- In **peacetime**, the CINC has responsibilities that are consistent with legislation, military department and Service policy, budgetary considerations, and local conditions. Disputes are referred to the military department for consideration; failure to receive timely resolution there allows the CINC to forward the matter through CJCS to the Secretary of Defense for resolution.
- During **crisis or war**, the CINCs' authority and responsibility are understandably expanded to include use of facilities and supplies of all forces under their command. Joint logistic doctrine developed by CJCS establishes wartime logistic policy.
- The CINCs have approval authority over Service logistics programs that affect operational capability or sustainability within their theaters, e.g., base adjustments, force beddowns, etc. Disputes in this area may be settled by the Secretary of Defense through CJCS.

(6) **Operational control (OPCON)** is another level of authority used frequently in the execution of joint military operations. OPCON is authority **delegated** to echelons below the combatant commander. Normally, this is authority **exercised through** the commanders of established subordinate commands and the Service component commanders. Limitations on OPCON as well as additional authority not normally included in OPCON can be specified by a delegating commander. OPCON is defined in UNAAF.

"Operational Control (OPCON). The authority **delegated** to a commander to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving the composition of subordinate forces, the **assignment of tasks**, the **designation of objectives**, and the **authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission**. OPCON includes directive authority for joint training. OPCON should be exercised through the commanders of assigned normal organizational units or through the commanders of subordinate forces established by the commander exercising OPCON. OPCON normally provides full authority to organize forces as the operational commander deems necessary to accomplish assigned missions, and to retain or delegate OPCON or tactical control as necessary. OPCON may be limited by function, time, or location. It does not, of itself, include such matters as administration, discipline, internal organization, and unit training."

(7) The term **tactical control (TACON)** is used in operation execution and is also defined by UNAAF: "The detailed and usually local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned."

(8) "Command" and "control" are used in slightly different contexts in the combined arena. Those definitions are given in Joint Pub 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.

e. **Role of CJCS.** The role of CJCS in the chain of command of the combatant commands is threefold.

(1) As stated before, **communications** between the NCA and the combatant commanders pass through CJCS. The DOD Reorganization Act permits the President to establish this communications chain of command; DOD Directive 5100.1 of 25 September 1987 directs it. With this communications responsibility come the myriad duties associated with assisting the President and Secretary of Defense in the direction and control of the combatant commanders: strategic direction, strategic planning, and contingency planning and preparedness.

(2) **Oversight** of the activities of combatant commands in matters dealing with the statutory responsibility of the Secretary of Defense falls to CJCS. This includes recommending changes in assignment of functions, roles, and missions to achieve maximum effectiveness of the armed forces.

(3) CJCS is **spokesman** for the combatant commanders, including the summary and analysis of requirements, programs, and budget.

f. **Forces.** The 1986 change to Title 10 U.S. Code, Armed Forces, requires that all forces under the jurisdiction of the military departments be assigned to the unified and specified combatant commands with the exception of forces assigned to perform the mission of the military department, i.e., recruit, supply, equip, maintain, etc. In addition, all forces within a CINC's geographic area of responsibility will be under the command of the combatant commander.

g. **Organizational relationships**

References: *Unified Command Plan*
 MOP 173, "Joint Manpower Management"


(1) The system of unified and specified commands was changed as a result of the DOD Reorganization Act of 1986. Figure 2-10 illustrates the current unified combatant command relationships.

(2) Five combatant commanders have **geographic area responsibilities**. The CINCs are assigned an area of operations by the *Unified Command Plan* (UCP) and are responsible for all joint operations within their designated areas: Atlantic Command, European Command, Central Command, Pacific Command, and Southern Command.

(3) The CINCs of the remaining combatant commands have worldwide **functional responsibilities** not bounded by any single area of operations: U.S. Space Command, U.S. Transportation Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, and the specified combatant commands, Strategic Air Command and Forces Command.

(4) General responsibilities of the CINCs are spelled out in UCP.

(5) Charts of the command relationships of the combatant commands are shown on the following pages. The charts show only major subordinate organizations and indicate formal associations with combined commands, because some commanders serve in more than one capacity; the shaded areas illustrate multi-hat responsibilities. The Service of the current CINC is shown; MOP 173 is the JCS manning statement that identifies which Service will be represented in that position.



Reference: adapted from UCP

Figure 2-10

h. **Summary charts.** Figures 2-11 and 2-12 summarize the basic differences found in UNAAF between combatant commands and their subordinates.

SUMMARY OF JOINT ORGANIZATIONS

	UNIFIED COMBATANT COMMAND	SPECIFIED COMBATANT COMMAND	SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMAND
ESTABLISHING AUTHORITY	PRESIDENT THROUGH THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WITH ADVICE & ASSISTANCE OF CJCS	PRESIDENT THROUGH THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WITH THE ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE OF CJCS	UNIFIED COMMANDER, WHEN AUTHORIZED BY CJCS
MISSION CRITERIA	EITHER OR BOTH • BROAD CONTINUING MISSION TWO OR MORE SERVICES SINGLE STRATEGIC DIRECTION • TWO OR MORE SERVICES WITH COMBINATION OF (1) LARGE-SCALE OPERATION LARGE & COMPLEX FORCE REQUIRES CONTROL OF TACTICAL EXECUTION (2) LARGE AREA SINGLE RESPONSIBILITY FOR COORDINATION (3) COMMON USE OF LIMITED LOGISTICS	• BROAD CONTINUING MISSION	• CONDUCT OPERATIONS ON A CONTINUING BASIS PER CRITERIA OF A UNIFIED COMMAND
COMMANDER'S RESPONSIBILITIES	• MAINTAIN SECURITY OF THE COMMAND AND PROTECT THE U.S. • MAINTAIN PREPAREDNESS TO CARRY OUT ASSIGNED MISSIONS • CARRY OUT ASSIGNED MISSIONS • ASSIGN TASKS AND DIRECT COORDINATION TO ENSURE UNITY OF EFFORT • COMMUNICATE WITH SERVICES, SECDEF, & SUBORDINATE ELEMENTS • ADVISE CJCS OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS THAT OCCUR IN AOR	• SAME RESPONSIBILITIES AS UNIFIED COMMANDER	• RESPONSIBILITIES SIMILAR TO THE UNIFIED COMMANDER'S
FORCES	• SIGNIFICANT ASSIGNED FORCES OF TWO OR MORE SERVICES	• NORMALLY COMPOSED OF FORCES OF ONE SERVICE • MAY INCLUDE UNITS FROM OTHER SERVICES IF A LONG-TERM ASSIGNMENT, UNIFIED COMMAND WOULD NORMALLY BE ESTABLISHED	• SIGNIFICANT ASSIGNED FORCES OF TWO OR MORE SERVICES
AUTHORITY OF THE COMMANDER	OPERATIONAL COMMAND, I.E., • GIVE AUTHORITATIVE DIRECTION FOR LOGISTICS/JOINT TRAINING • PRESCRIBE CHAIN OF COMMAND • ORGANIZE COMMANDS/FORCES • EMPLOY FORCES • ASSIGN COMMAND FUNCTIONS • COORDINATE/APPROVE ADMIN & SUPPORT • SELECT COMMANDERS & STAFF • IN AN EMERGENCY, ASSUME OPCON OF ALL FORCES IN AREA • IN AN UNUSUAL SITUATION, MAY EXERCISE DIRECT OPCON OF SUBORDINATE ELEMENTS	• SAME AS UNIFIED COMMANDER'S EXCEPT NO AUTHORITY TO ESTABLISH A SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMAND	• SIMILAR TO UNIFIED COMMAND WITHIN THE ASSIGNED AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY
NOTES	• EXERCISES OPCOM THROUGH SERVICE COMPONENTS FUNCTIONAL COMPONENTS SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMANDS SINGLE-SERVICE FORCES JOINT TASK FORCES ATTACHING ELEMENTS OF ONE FORCE TO ANOTHER AND DIRECTLY TO SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL FORCES • COMMANDER'S STAFF KEY STAFF POSITIONS REPRESENTED BY SERVICES ASSIGNED • BALANCED BY COMPOSITION OF FORCES & CHARACTER OF OPERATIONS	• EXERCISES OPCOM THROUGH SERVICE COMPONENTS FUNCTIONAL COMPONENTS SINGLE-SERVICE FORCES JOINT TASK FORCES AND ATTACHING ELEMENTS OF ONE FORCE TO ANOTHER • COMMANDER'S STAFF MAY INCLUDE REPRESENTATION FROM OTHER SERVICES	• EXERCISES OPCOM THROUGH SERVICE COMPONENTS SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMANDS SINGLE-SERVICE FORCES JOINT TASK FORCES ATTACHING ELEMENTS OF ONE FORCE TO ANOTHER AND DIRECTLY TO SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL FORCES

Reference: Joint Pub 0-2, UNAAF

Figure 2-11


SUMMARY OF JOINT ORGANIZATIONS

	SERVICE COMPONENT COMMAND	JOINT TASK FORCE	FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT COMMAND
ESTABLISHING AUTHORITY		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SECRETARY OF DEFENSE • CINC OF U/S COMMAND • SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMAND • EXISTING JTF 	UNIFIED COMMANDER, WHEN AUTHORIZED BY CJCS
MISSION CRITERIA		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SPECIFIC LIMITED OBJECTIVE • DOES NOT REQUIRE CENTRALIZED CONTROL OF LOGISTICS • REQUIRES CLOSE INTEGRATION OF EFFORT • REQUIRES COORDINATION OF LOCAL DEFENSE OF SUBORDINATE AREA 	
COMMANDER'S RESPONSIBILITIES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RECOMMEND PROPER EMPLOYMENT OF SERVICE FORCES • ACCOMPLISH OPERATIONAL MISSIONS • SELECT UNITS FOR ASSIGNMENT TO SUBORDINATE FORCES • CONDUCT JOINT TRAINING • INFORM CINC OF PROPOSED CHANGES IN LOGISTIC SUPPORT • UNDER CRISIS ACTION OR WARTIME, IMPLEMENT CINC'S LOGISTIC DIRECTIVES • DEVELOP PROGRAM AND BUDGET REQUESTS THAT COMPLY WITH CINC'S GUIDANCE • INFORM CINC OF PROGRAM AND BUDGET DECISIONS THAT AFFECT PLANNING • SERVICE FUNCTIONS: INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION AND DISCIPLINE, TRAINING, LOGISTIC FUNCTIONS, SERVICE INTELLIGENCE • FURNISH FORCE DATA TO SUPPORT CINC-ASSIGNED MISSIONS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RECOMMEND PROPER EMPLOYMENT OF ASSIGNED FORCES • ACCOMPLISH ASSIGNED OPERATIONAL MISSIONS • JOINTLY TRAIN ASSIGNED FORCES 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PROPER EMPLOYMENT OF FORCES • ACCOMPLISHING ASSIGNED OPERATIONAL MISSIONS • JOINT TRAINING
FORCES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ALL SERVICE INDIVIDUALS, UNITS, DETACHMENTS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND INSTALLATIONS UNDER THE COMMAND ASSIGNED TO THE UNIFIED COMMAND 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ASSIGNED FORCES OF TWO OR MORE SERVICES ON A SIGNIFICANT SCALE • ASSIGNED BY ESTABLISHING AUTHORITY 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NORMALLY, BUT NOT NECESSARILY, FORCES OF TWO OR MORE SERVICES
AUTHORITY OF THE COMMANDER		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EXERCISES OPCON THROUGH ASSIGNED & ATTACHED FORCES 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EXERCISES OPCON THROUGH ASSIGNED AND ATTACHED FORCES IN PEACETIME OR WARTIME
NOTES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COMMANDER IS SENIOR OFFICER OF SERVICE SELECTED WITH CONCURRENCE OF CINC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • JTF IS DISSOLVED WHEN PURPOSE HAS BEEN ACHIEVED • COMMANDER MAY BE A SERVICE COMPONENT COMMANDER SELECTED WITH CONCURRENCE OF CINC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PERFORMS OPERATIONAL MISSIONS OF LONG OR SHORT DURATION • COMMANDER DESIGNATED BY ESTABLISHING AUTHORITY MAY BE SERVICE COMPONENT COMMANDER SELECTED WITH CONCURRENCE OF CINC

Reference: Joint Pub 0-2, UNAAF

Figure 2-12

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS: U.S. ATLANTIC COMMAND



COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS: U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND




Figure 2-14





Figure 2-15



COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS: U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND




Figure 2-17

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS: U.S. SPACE COMMAND




Figure 2-18

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS: U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND




Figure 2-19

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS: U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND




Figure 2-20

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS: FORCES COMMAND




Figure 2-21

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS: STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND




Figure 2-22

207. A JOINT STAFF

Reference: Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*

a. **Introduction.** As seen in the summary of Service functions and staff history in Chapter 1, each of the military Services has developed a different concept of how its staff should be organized. However, the fundamental staff concept is consistent among all Services: the commander has a staff, a group of assistants, that is not in the operational chain of command. Joint commanders choose a staff system that satisfies their needs, one that can be used effectively by officers from the different Services who make up their staffs. The concept of the joint staff is seen throughout the combatant commands. The basic organization is seen in combatant commands, joint task forces, Service component commands, and joint agencies.

b. **Definition.** A joint staff is defined in UNAAF as the staff of a commander of a unified command, specified command, joint task force, or subordinate joint component of these commands that is composed of significant elements of more than one Service. There are key elements that describe a joint staff:

(1) The purpose of the staff is to ensure that the joint commander understands the tactics, techniques, capabilities, needs, and limitations of the component parts of the force.

(2) Positions on the staff are divided so that Service representation and influence generally reflect the Service composition of the force; consideration is given to the character of the contemplated actions of the command.

c. **Principles.** UNAAF outlines the principles and doctrine that govern joint activities and the performance of the Armed Forces.

(1) Members of the joint staff are responsible to the joint force commander.

(2) The joint force commander should ensure that the recommendation of any member of the staff receives consideration.

(3) Authority to act in the name of the commander is specifically prescribed.

(4) Orders and directives to subordinate units are issued in the name of the commander and, generally, to the next subordinate command, rather than directly to elements of that subordinate command.

(5) Authorization is generally given to communicate directly between appropriate staff officers of other commands to expedite execution of orders and directives and to promote teamwork between commands.

(6) Each staff division must coordinate its action and planning with the other staff divisions.

(7) The joint force commander is authorized to organize the staff and assign responsibilities to ensure unity of effort and accomplishment of assigned missions.

d. **Staffing.** The establishing authority of a joint activity provides for the furnishing of necessary staff personnel. As on any staff, the number of people should be kept to the minimum and matched to the assigned task. Staff members should be detailed for sufficiently long periods to gain and use the required experience. The officers on the joint staff must be competent to advise the commander in areas concerning their respective Services.

e. **Organization.** Figure 2-23 illustrates the broad functional subdivisions of a typical joint staff organization that are outlined in UNAAF. The commander's staff is broadly categorized into personal staff, special staff, and general or joint staff divisions.

(1) The **personal staff group** is directly responsible to the commander. It includes any assistants needed to handle matters requiring close personal control by the commander. The commander's aide or aide-de-camp, legal adviser, public affairs adviser, inspector general, and international affairs adviser (or political affairs adviser) are generally on the commander's personal staff.


(2) The chief of staff (COS) is the **principal staff officer**. He coordinates and directs the work of the staff divisions. For the internal administrative matters, he may be assisted by a secretary of the joint staff. In addition, some staffs have deputy chiefs of staff to assist the COS.

(3) The principal functional divisions of the commander's staff are known as general or **joint staff**. The function of the joint staff is to execute the responsibilities of the commander, e.g., developing policy, preparing and coordinating plans, and overseeing all functions assigned to the commander. Depending on the staff, the staff subdivision may be headed by an assistant chief of staff or director. The joint staff may also be known as a **coordinating staff group**, **executive staff group**, or **supervisory staff group**. Recently, there has been a growth of new subdivisions to handle the new responsibilities of the joint force commander. Undoubtedly, this trend will continue and the following list will expand.

Manpower and personnel division (J-1). This division manages personnel, develops personnel policies, administers military and civilian personnel within the command, and administers prisoners of war.

Intelligence division (J-2). The J-2 division's function is to ensure that the joint command has sound intelligence on the area of operations and the location, activities, and capabilities of enemy. J-2 emphasis is on the enemy. Activities may include HUMINT and counterintelligence, target identification and selection, and electronic intelligence gathering and analysis.

A JOINT STAFF ORGANIZATION



Reference: Joint Pub 0-2, UNAAF

Figure 2-23

Operations division (J-3). The operations division directs and controls current operations. Its work begins with the initial planning and extends through the integration and coordination of joint operations. The division may be charged with the conduct of special operations, including PSYOPs and special warfare, joint training, and coordination of joint exercises.

Logistics division (J-4). The division develops logistic plans and coordinates and supervises supply, maintenance, repair, evacuation, transportation, construction, and related logistics activities. Responsibilities may include weapons surety, civil engineering support, transportation management, etc. Because logistics support is a Service responsibility, the primary thrust of joint logistics operations may be to

coordinate Service programs and integrate them with the joint commander's concept of support. Knowledge of Service policies and doctrine is essential.

Plans and policy division (J-5). J-5 division does the long-range planning. The division prepares campaign, concept, and operation plans and the associated Commander's Estimate of the Situation. Often, the J-5 is responsible for special weapons planning. In commands without a separate J-5 division, the function is performed by the operations division.

Command, control, and communications division (J-6). This division may be found with a variety of names and designators: Command, Control, Communications Systems; Communications-Electronics and Automated Systems Division; etc. They use organizational codes such as J-6, C3, C3S, etc. The functions of the division include command responsibilities for communications and frequency control, tactical communications planning and execution, and management and development of electronics and automatic information systems.

Nontraditional divisions are also found in many commands.

Security assistance division. The mission of supporting military and economic aid to countries within a joint commander's area of operations is complex and vitally important to U.S. foreign policy. This function may be found in a separate division or as a part of the logistics division.

Interoperability division. The responsibility for joint planning, plans evaluation and analysis, development of joint doctrine, coordinating joint education and training, and the conduct of joint training exercises may be separate from the other divisions.

Forces structure, resources, and assessment division. The Reorganization Act of 1986 brought added responsibility to many joint commands for critical involvement in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System. The specialized nature of this work and the coordination required with Service components has created a need for dedicated staff support.

Psychological operations and civil affairs

A more detailed description of the basic functions of the principal joint staff divisions is shown in Figure 2-24.

(4) The **special staff group** assists the commander and his joint staff with technical, administrative, or tactical matters, e.g., comptroller, facility engineering, medical, weather, quartermaster, and transportation affairs. The special staff is usually small, with experts found on the Service component staffs or within the joint staff divisions.

f. **Variations in joint staff divisions.** The commander may organize the staff as necessary to carry out duties and responsibilities. Many combatant commands have taken advantage of this flexibility as illustrated in the internal staff diagrams on Figures 2-13 through 2-22. For example, EUCOM and CENTCOM have consolidated the security

FUNCTIONS OF JOINT STAFF DIVISIONS

DIRECTORATE OR DIVISION	RESPONSIBILITIES
MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL (J - 1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MANAGE MANPOWER • FORMULATE PERSONNEL POLICIES • SUPERVISE ADMINISTRATION OF PERSONNEL, INCLUDING CIVILIANS AND PRISONERS OF WAR
INTELLIGENCE (J - 2)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ENSURE AVAILABILITY OF SOUND INTELLIGENCE ON AREA AND ENEMY LOCATIONS, ACTIVITIES, & CAPABILITIES • DIRECT INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS ON PROPER ENEMY ITEMS OF INTEREST • ENSURE ADEQUATE INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE & RESPONSE • DISCLOSE ENEMY CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS
OPERATIONS (J - 3)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ASSIST IN DIRECTION AND CONTROL OF OPERATIONS • PLAN, COORDINATE, AND INTEGRATE OPERATIONS
LOGISTICS (J - 4)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FORMULATE LOGISTIC PLANS • COORDINATE & SUPERVISE SUPPLY, MAINTENANCE, REPAIR, EVACUATION, TRANSPORTATION, CONSTRUCTION, & RELATED LOGISTIC MATTERS • ENSURE EFFECTIVE LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR ALL FORCES IN THE COMMAND
PLANS & POLICY (J - 5)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ASSIST COMMANDER IN LONG-RANGE OR FUTURE PLANNING • PREPARE CAMPAIGN & OUTLINE PLANS • PREPARE ESTIMATES OF THE SITUATION <p>J-5 FUNCTIONS MAY BE INCLUDED IN OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE</p>
COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS or COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS & AUTOMATED SYSTEMS [J-6]	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ASSIST COMMANDER WITH RESPONSIBILITIES FOR COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS & AUTOMATED DATA SYSTEMS • PREPARE COMMUNICATIONS & DATA SYSTEMS PLANS TO SUPPORT OPERATIONAL AND STRATEGIC CONCEPTS • FURNISH COMMUNICATIONS TO EXERCISE COMMAND IN MISSION EXECUTION <p>J-6 FUNCTIONS MAY BE INCLUDED IN OPERATIONS OR IN THE SPECIAL STAFF</p>
SPECIAL STAFF	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GIVE TECHNICAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, & TACTICAL ADVICE • PREPARE PARTS OF PLANS, ESTIMATES, AND ORDERS • COORDINATE & SUPERVISE STAFF ACTIVITIES <p>SPECIAL STAFF MAY BE INCLUDED AS BRANCHES OF DIRECTORATES</p>
PERSONAL STAFF	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RESPONSIBLE DIRECTLY TO THE COMMANDER • SPECIAL MATTERS OVER WHICH THE COMMANDER CHOOSES TO EXERCISE CLOSE PERSONAL CONTROL • USUALLY INCLUDES THE POLITICAL ADVISER & PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Reference: Joint Pub 0-2, UNAAF

Figure 2-24

assistance function with J-4, TRANSCOM has consolidated the J-3 and J-4 functions, and SPACECOM has consolidated logistics (J-4) and systems integration (J-6).

g. **Terminology.** Joint Pub 1-02, *The Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, uses the term "general staff" to describe the divisions explained in the preceding. While there is consistency in the functional subdivisions of a staff into personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, planning, etc., the staff designations vary between Services and with the size of organization supported. The Army and Marine Corps may use G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4 to identify personnel, intelligence, operations, and logistics staff divisions; the Navy may use N-1, N-2, N-3, etc.; while the Air Force uses letter designations. Figure 2-25 illustrates just some of the possible staff designations.

U.S. STAFF DESIGNATIONS

	PERSONNEL	INTELLIGENCE	OPERATIONS	LOGISTICS	PLANNING	COMMUNICATIONS
ARMY COMPONENT HQ	DCS PERSONNEL	DCS INTELLIGENCE	DCS OPERATIONS AND PLANS	DCS LOGISTICS DCS ENGINEER DCS RESOURCE MANAGEMENT		DCS COMMUNICATIONS- ELECTRONICS DCS SYSTEMS AUTOMATION
ARMY DIVISION HQ	ACOS PERSONNEL (G1)	ACOS INTELLIGENCE (G2)	ACOS OPERATIONS (G3)	ACOS LOGISTICS (G4)		
AIR FORCE COMPONENT HQ	DCS PERSONNEL (DP)	DCS INTELLIGENCE (IN)	DCS OPERATIONS (DO)	DCS LOGISTICS (LG)	DCS PLANS (XP)	DCS COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS (SC)
AIR FORCE WING	included in COMBAT SUPPORT GROUP	included in DO as DOI	DEPUTY COMMANDER OPERATIONS (DO)	DEPUTY COMMANDER MAINTENANCE (MA) DEPUTY COMMANDER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (RM)	included in DO and LG as DOX & LGX	DEPUTY COMMANDER COMMUNICATIONS (SC)
NAVY COMPONENT HQ	ACOS ADMINISTRATION (N1)	ACOS INTELLIGENCE (N2)	ACOS OPERATIONS (N3)	ACOS LOGISTICS (N4)	ACOS PLANS (N5)	ACOS COMMUNICATIONS (N6)

ABBREVIATIONS: DCS - DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
ACOS - ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF

Figure 2-25

References: ARMY FM 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations*
AIR FORCE Publication 53-21, *USAF Staff Organization Chartbook*
NAVY NWP 11, *Naval Operational Planning*

h. **History.** Joint staffs are organized on the conventional staff model. The advent of extensive joint operations during World War II and the institution of unified commands after the war posed the question of which type of staff organization would be best suited to such commands. For a variety of reasons, the general staff organization adapted by General Pershing from the French in World War I and developed by the Army and Marine Corps evolved as the model for the U.S. joint staff. This is reasonable, because joint operations nearly always include ground forces, and a majority of the joint staff will be familiar with the concept. The term **joint staff** or conventional staff will be used in lieu of **general staff** to avoid confusion with General Staff, a unique organizational concept. The General Staff is a senior, professional military staff with command authority, an arrangement expressly forbidden in the creation of the U.S. military establishment in 1947 and in every legislative change since.

208. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN JOINT STAFFS

a. **Intrastaff relationships.** Each joint staff division coordinates its actions and planning with the other divisions. Information on progress and problems is shared regularly throughout the staff. As issues or problems come to the attention of a commander, a single joint staff division is assigned primary responsibility over the action. That division assumes responsibility for coordinating the work among the other divisions and agencies within the headquarters.

b. **Interstaff relationships.** A commander may authorize staff officers to communicate directly with the staff officers of subordinate commands for coordination. When formal orders and directives are issued, however, they are issued in the name of the commander to the commander of the subordinate command--not directly to elements of that command. There are restrictions on the command authority of a combatant commander that affect the relationship of the joint staff with the subordinate commanders. The combatant commander is primarily concerned with broad operational matters and, in general, leaves problems associated with administration and support mainly to the Service components. On the other hand, with COCOM, the combatant commander has **directive authority** to accomplish the mission. By law, directive authority covers all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics. UNAAF contains definitive guidance in the area of logistics, since the Services are assigned by law the primary responsibility for that support.

c. A joint staff assists the commander in the exercise of command. The functions that relate to joint operations will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters.

209. COMBINED COMMANDS

a. A combined command is a force under a single commander that is composed of sizable assigned or attached **elements of two or more allied nations**.

b. The organizational principles already discussed have equal validity when applied to combined commands. The concepts of command authority and the responsibilities of unified commanders are generally applicable to combined commanders. However, since combined commands are binational or multinational, their missions and responsibilities (including command responsibilities) must be established and assigned to conform to binational or international agreements. Organizational questions about combined commands are often more difficult to answer than national organizational questions. The primary source of difficulty is the lack of precedent and an absence of combined doctrine. Normally, a combined command operates under the terms of a treaty, alliance, or bilateral agreement between or among the nations concerned. The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), Combined Forces Command Korea (CFC), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are examples of multinational alliances.


210. NATURE OF COMBINED STAFF DUTY. The normal types of staff problems are magnified on a combined staff. There are psychological and sociological problems created by differences in customs, religions, and standards of living. These factors point

to the need for a different mental approach to combined staff duty. Just after the Allied Forces Southern Europe had been formally established in August 1951, Admiral Carney as CINCSOUTH wrote the following memorandum to his staff:

"To those of you who have only worked in the framework of your own particular Service, and thus have not been exposed to the necessary give and take of unification, much that you see will appear to be lacking in order and logic; to those of you who have not had previous experience in inter-Allied dealings, the modus operandi may appear even more obscure. Working within the framework of one's own Service is a simple matter because the Service procedures have been long established and all of one's colleagues speak the same language and are guided by the same indoctrination. Joint efforts, be they on the staff or in the field, invariably require mutual adjustments; these adjustments may be radical but with people of good will and good spirit the Services can truly work as a team.

"When inter-Allied factors are superimposed, the effects are frequently unpredictable. Politics are politics the world over and many times we encounter difficulties and objections which are illogical from the military standpoint but which stem from political factors that are very real to the officeholders, the voters, and the taxpayers of the countries concerned. It is to be expected that we will frequently encounter problems of obscure and puzzling origin, and an awareness of the probability should help to foster the patience and flexibility necessary."

This memorandum, written more than three decades ago, demonstrates the timelessness of certain principles relating to the human element of organizations. The advice is as good today as it was then.



OBLIGATIONS OF JOINT AND COMBINED STAFF DUTY

The nature of joint and combined staff duty gives rise to some obligations that should be observed. Lieutenant General D.M. Schlatter, USAF, former Commandant of the Armed Forces Staff College (July 1954 to July 1957), and an experienced officer in joint and combined commands, used to advise future joint and combined staff officers as follows.

The first obligation I'm going to give you sounds like a cliché. It isn't when you really examine it. **Be objective, avoid bias and prejudice.** None of us can avoid bias and prejudice one hundred percent. We can't possibly do it, no matter how hard we try. Each of us has a varying background of knowledge, education, beliefs; and there's a certain inherent bias we can never get rid of completely; but we must keep on trying, even though we realize that we can't get rid of it entirely.

Second, **avoid emotion.** Emotion tends to clog up the thinking processes.

Third, **stick to facts whenever possible.** This is not always possible. In many cases you must rely on opinion or judgment and a vague thing called common sense. In these cases, you should listen to other competent judges. You should avoid extremes. Above all, don't express your opinion unless you know what you are talking about.

Fourth, **stick to the subject at hand.** This is a very hard thing to do in a group discussion. Sometimes, of course, it's downright dull and it suggests that old anecdote about never letting facts interfere with a good story. But if you want to reach a decision, you should stick to the subject at hand.

Fifth, **avoid personalities.** Like emotion, personalities clog up the thinking apparatus. If you can't be complimentary, at least don't say too much. You can always damn a man, you know, by faint praise. Someone has said the best treatment for a man with a chip on his shoulder is to pat him on the back until the chip falls off.

Sixth, and probably the most important obligation of a staff officer, **be honest and accurate.** There is an essential requirement for rugged honesty, particularly in combat effectiveness reporting. To shade the truth in any way in this vital subject is, to my mind, the cardinal military sin. There are two kinds of enthusiasm. A commander with enthusiasm will fire a military unit up to the point it can do more than it ever thought was possible. This is very necessary, but it is a different kind of an enthusiasm from the second kind. This second kind is usually a detriment, for it can induce unjustified optimism. You can get so enthusiastic and proud of your Service or your unit that you will brag that it can do many things it can't possibly do. Above all, here is another good place to be quiet unless you are sure of your facts. In staff work, to recommend a course of action and tell all the pros of the matter and express none of the things against it is to do yourself and your commander an injustice.

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Figure 2-26

Chapter 3 Staff Work: Methods and Applications

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Staff Work: Methods and Applications

300. STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES

a. Every military organization has a commander who alone must accept responsibility for what the unit does or fails to do. The commander must authorize all plans, policies, and basic decisions before they are put into effect. All orders from a higher command to a subordinate unit are issued by or for the commander of the parent unit and are given to the subordinate commanders. By this means, authority and responsibility are fixed and the channels of command are established.

b. It should be apparent, however, that the day-to-day operation of any organization involves hundreds of details. As the size of the organization increases, the number and variety of the details increase. The commander cannot devote personal attention to all of them. **A staff is an aid to command.** It serves to ease the commander's workload by furnishing basic information and technical advice by which he or she may arrive at decisions.

c. A properly functioning staff extends the eyes, ears, and will of a commander by

- **learning the commander's policies** and working within them;
- **keeping the commander informed** of pertinent information;
- **developing** basic decisions into **adequate plans**;
- **anticipating future needs** and **drafting tentative plans** to meet them;
- **translating plans into orders**, and transmitting them to subordinate commanders;
- **ensuring compliance** with these orders through constructive inspection and observation; and
- **supplementing the commander's efforts** to secure unity of action throughout the command.

301. PROBLEM SOLVING

a. The responsibilities of the commander it serves determine the exact nature of the work done by a military staff. The staff of a joint task force commander assigned to assault an enemy beach faces problems significantly different from those of a unified commander charged with the peacetime military security of a broad area and protection of U.S. interests from attack.

b. No matter how significantly joint staffs vary, there are, nevertheless, common features we can identify. A military commander continually faces problems that involve uncertainties and alternative possibilities in their solution. Since the purpose of a staff is to assist the commander in the exercise of command, the work of the staff, as well, revolves around the solution of problems.

c. Problem solving, in any field of endeavor, can be reduced to five logical steps:

- recognize the problem
- collect necessary information
- develop possible solutions
- analyze and compare possible solutions
- select the best solution

d. Over the years, military staffs have evolved a number of logical and orderly processes to assist them in problem solving. As shown later in this book, the joint planning process uses a variation of the basic problem-solving method as an approach to finding military solutions to situations that threaten U.S. national security interests.

302. THE ROLE OF THE STAFF ACTION OFFICER

a. A staff action officer is designated at the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a unified or specified command, a Service headquarters, or a major command to work on a particular action or series of related actions requiring decision or consideration. It is the responsibility of the action officer (AO) to develop, coordinate, and complete the required analysis; formulate recommendations; present the action for decision; and, ultimately, prepare a message or other correspondence implementing the recommendations. The responsibility continues during the internal routing of the implementing document and ends only when that document has been dispatched or when competent authority decides that further action is not required.

b. Pride of authorship is a curse. While the AO is responsible for "working the problem," the final solution is derived from the knowledge, experience, study, and foresight of the entire staff. The AO should coordinate and consult by the quickest and most informal method available, using discussions, personal visits, and telephone calls as much as possible. When practicable, such actions should be taken during draft stages to avoid revision of final copy.

c. A good staff officer will stand up and be counted--on issues, not on trivialities. There is no room in briefings or staff action papers for emotion or personal views.

d. Good solutions to the wrong problem get an AO nowhere. Even when the problem has been carefully identified at the outset, the AO must be ever alert to changes and modifications as time passes.

e. A good staff action officer continually cultivates close, informal contacts with a wide range of officers with similar or related areas of interest inter-departmentally and internationally. An AO solicits ideas from everywhere.

303. MILITARY BRIEFINGS

a. Truly effective performance in one of the military Services requires communication skills that are most exacting. The need for accuracy and thoroughness on one hand and brevity and quick response on the other has given rise to a highly specialized and stylized type of speech. This type of speech has been designated the "military briefing." It requires specific techniques with respect to the role of the briefer, the purpose it serves, and the nature of the required response.

b. At all levels, commanders and staff officers communicate and exercise control using the military briefing. The military briefing is used so extensively that it has become an accepted staff procedure. The primary reasons for its frequent use are to save time for the senior officer, to enable that officer to question the briefer and clarify points, and to facilitate a rapid, coordinated response, all of which serve to reduce reaction time.

c. The principles and techniques of effective speaking apply to the military briefing just as to any other type of speech. However, the military briefing is more concise, usually limited to bare, unglossed facts--the minimum needed for comprehension. There are no "attention-getters"; the essentials are delivered in a purely objective manner. The military briefing often is a one-time-only presentation of facts, with reference to enough familiar material to establish a basis for understanding by the listeners. Briefers often will be required to discuss a very broad subject in a very limited time. Some briefing officers find themselves giving daily or weekly briefings, but AOs most often find their briefings situational--oriented to a specific listener or audience and dealing with a specific subject in which they have expertise.

304. TYPES OF BRIEFINGS

a. The term "briefing" has been applied loosely to almost every form of oral communication in which a military person is involved or in which a military subject is discussed. There are four recognizable types of military briefings: information briefing, decision briefing, staff briefing, and mission briefing. Although there are elements common to all, each type is distinct, and the briefer must understand precisely what is required in each situation.

b. Each type of briefing is designed to accomplish a specific purpose: to impart information, to obtain a decision, to exchange information, or to review important details. The objective common to every briefing is to facilitate a rapid, coordinated response.

(1) **The information briefing.** The purpose is to present facts to the listeners--to keep them abreast of the current situation or to supply specific requested information. It does not require a decision; the desired response is comprehension.

(2) **The decision briefing.** This briefing contains the elements of the information briefing, but it is usually more comprehensive in scope, and it is presented for an entirely different purpose. The specific response to the decision briefing is an answer to a question or a decision about possible courses of action to be taken.

(3) **The staff briefing.** The staff briefing is, perhaps, the most widely used form of military briefing. It is designed for the rapid oral exchange of information within a group of people and is, in this sense, similar to the information briefing. It is also similar to the decision briefing whenever it leads to a command decision. It is known and used at every military echelon to keep a commander and staff mutually informed of the current situation. The anticipated response is a coordinated effort.

(4) **The mission briefing.** This briefing is designed especially for combat operations. It is also used to brief training missions that simulate combat conditions. Its purpose can be a combination of any or all of the following: to impart last-minute information, to give specific instructions, or to instill an appreciation of the overall mission. The desired response is a thorough and up-to-date understanding of operational conditions that could affect the successful execution of the mission. It, too, is closely related to the information briefing.

c. An AO must remember a couple of things while briefing.

(1) Be prepared psychologically and mentally to cope with any audience reaction. It can range from passive acceptance to strong objection and heated discussion. The AO must remain objective, answer questions without emotion, and promise a quick response if additional information must be gathered.

(2) Be prepared to do your best on every briefing occasion. Successful briefing ability comes from mastery of fundamental speaking skills and briefing techniques, from practice and study, from good judgment, and from being aware of the audience's feedback.

305. STAFF ACTION PAPERS: THE TOOLS OF THE TRADE

a. If AOs are the eyes and ears of a commander or senior staff officer, the obvious question is, "How do they perform these duties?" Biologically, AOs have their own eyes and ears to perform the job, but, realistically, their principal tools are pen, paper, and telephone. To be more formal, action officers create staff action papers.

b. If your organization were fairly small and the turnover of people relatively light, you could probably operate by merely sending handwritten notes back and forth. In short, you could "wing it." But an organization the size of the DOD can't operate this way. This is especially true when working in the joint arena. The joint environment, whether it is a unified command or the Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves, demands consistency and uniformity to be efficient.

c. There are, of course, some differences and peculiarities of each command's forms; they reflect the unit's mission and that of the parent organization of the CINC. In general, you will not find **major** differences among the commands' forms, nor will you find **major** differences between your own Service's forms and the joint forms. It is essential that you master the use of whatever forms your command uses. Each form represents a preferred method that the organization uses to operate in the staff environment and is the vehicle by which most of the communication travels. Typical examples are shown in the following paragraphs.

306. INFORMATION PAPERS. These papers normally are used to pass information to the boss (CINC, Deputy CINC, and chief of staff of a unified or specified command), to pass information between staff offices when no reply is expected, and to issue directives from the boss to directors and chiefs of special staff offices.

a. **Fact Sheets** (generic) convey information to an informed principal. They are used to update the CINC returning from trips; to furnish material for a Congressional hearing; to submit material for briefing books for a trip; or to answer a query. There is no established format; the only mandatory information is writer's name, rank, division, directorate, phone number, and date of presentation. They should be limited to one page and normally are used to give a rapid updating on a specific topic with which the user is familiar. Brevity is the keynote in preparation.

b. **Memorandums for Record** (JCS) are used to record an action taken that would not otherwise be recorded, and are normally limited to one page. For example, they may be used to record the minutes of a meeting, a telephone conversation, or information from a one-time source.

c. **Memorandums** (USEUCOM, USPACOM) normally are limited to one page. When necessary, enclosures such as itineraries and schedules may be attached. They are never endorsed in USEUCOM. USCINCPAC uses this paper for informal memorandums to individual staff members in the daily conduct of routine business, but they are not used for staff distribution.

307. DISCUSSION OR POSITION PAPERS. The purpose of these papers is to give the user a short outline guide for discussions during consultations, meetings, and command visits. They may contain substantiation of the command position, opposition to other command views, questions, or any other material that would be useful in discussions.

a. On the Joint Staff, three types of papers are used. The **Position Paper** is used to summarize an issue, including its status and any recommendations. The Paper is

written in simple narrative style using direct, active sentences and is no more than two pages in length. Level of detail is determined by knowledge level of the intended user. A **Talking Paper** is prepared in "bullet" format and is intended to be used in oral discussions for an audience that is intimately familiar with the subject. An **Information Paper** is used to convey information in preparation of a meeting or briefing. Facts should be presented in clear, concise wording using "tick" and "bullet" format. Additional guidance is found in JCS Joint Administrative Instruction 5711.6L, *Action Processing*.

b. **Point Papers** (USPACOM) guide USCINCPAC in discussions outside the command. They should not exceed two pages. An abbreviated sentence structure is desirable, but clarity must be maintained. Point papers often are compiled into books for use during trips, command visits, discussion with visitors, and conferences. Additional guidance is found in USCINCPACINST 5216.7A, *Correspondence Manual*:

Outline:

- **background** - essential events or actions
- **discussion** - be brief, consider reader's position, be specific
- **important points** - one page, may include enclosures, respond on time
- **staff comment** - you are the expert, be positive in tone, state critic's position

c. **Position Papers** (USEUCOM) present the USEUCOM position on unresolved issues, with necessary background information to substantiate that position and to oppose contrary views. They may include a talking paper as an enclosure, if a discussion is anticipated and it would assist the user in covering the subject.

Outline:

- **purpose** - reason for the paper, e.g., paper was requested by..., paper required for a meeting, etc.
- **discussion** - tailor to level of reader's knowledge, identify key points, avoid telegraphic messages and technical or military jargon, etc.
- **recommendation** - logical recommendation that flows from purpose and discussion

d. **Discussion Papers** (USPACOM) are prepared for subjects on which discussion could be initiated, to obtain views or decisions, extend a USCINCPAC commendation, emphasize a command position, or other appropriate reasons. A good discussion summary advises the CINC about the discussion objectives, subjects to avoid, and the recommended position to take.

e. **Background Papers** (USEUCOM) give chronological background data, the current status, and actions to be accomplished for a particular problem or subject. Frequently they will be used as backup and background material for members of the command group and staff at meetings and conferences and during visits. If practical, they should be limited to one page. A condensed outline style, rather than complete sentences and paragraphs, should be used to achieve brevity and clarity. Additional details may be in enclosures identified as tabs to the basic paper.

308. COORDINATION PAPERS. These are used to coordinate routine actions within the staff.

a. **Summary Sheets (JCS)** are informal means of communicating with the various elements of the Joint Staff. Their format is self-explanatory. The Joint Staff uses Form 136, a specialized summary sheet indicating the level of staff and service coordination which has taken place on the accompanying action paper.

b. **Staff Summary Routing Sheets** are standard multipurpose forms to serve as referral slips, memorandums, summaries of action, and permanent records of the internal coordination on an action. Action papers submitted to the USEUCOM command group are forwarded under such sheets, as are copies of routine correspondence submitted for information.

309. DECISION PAPERS. These are papers used to present staff recommendations for decision and/or formal approval.

a. **Summary Sheets (generic)** must include the substantive points necessary to reach a logical decision without excessive recourse to enclosures or the study they summarize. They must clearly state the problem or action requiring decision, the limitations that will affect the solution, the logical courses of action that could be followed, the effects of the various courses of action, and the recommended action to be taken.

b. **Action Summaries** are memorandums, preferably no more than one single-spaced page, that accompany correspondence or messages to be signed or released by USCINCPAC or the Chief of Staff. Summaries contain the problem, facts, discussion, and conclusions. A recommendation drawn from the attached correspondence or message is clearly stated as the last element of a summary.

310. THE JCS STAFF STUDY FORMAT

a. The staff study is one of the more flexible problem-solving procedures available to a staff. Mainly used for administrative and managerial problems where operational considerations are not immediately involved, the staff study lists conclusions and recommendations on a specific, clearly stated problem. Many organizations use staff studies--some more than others. Their broad outline is illustrated in Figure 3-1, where it is compared with the rational steps of the problem-solving process.

b. The staff study is a formal paper that follows a prescribed format. It is flexible in content and can be applied to a variety of problems. Although mainly confined to use within the staff, the staff study is not merely a dressed-up staff memorandum.

c. We can best understand the staff study by discussing its five (or six) main paragraph headings.

A COMPARISON:

STAFF STUDY	PROBLEM SOLVING
• <i>PROBLEM</i>	• <i>RECOGNIZE THE PROBLEM</i>
• <i>ASSUMPTIONS</i> • <i>FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM</i>	• <i>COLLECT NECESSARY INFORMATION</i>
• <i>DISCUSSION</i>	• <i>DEVELOP POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS</i> • <i>ANALYZE AND COMPARE POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS</i>
• <i>CONCLUSIONS</i> • <i>RECOMMENDATIONS</i>	• <i>SELECT THE BEST SOLUTION</i>

Figure 3-1

(1) **The problem.** Stating the problem concisely and accurately is one of the more difficult tasks in any problem-solving process. A correct statement is the foundation for all that follows. The problem may be stated as a question, a statement of need, or an infinitive phrase.

(2) **Assumptions** (Include this paragraph only when it is needed.)

(a) Assumptions are important, but they can be dangerous in military staff work. They constitute the reasonable suppositions that must be made to work out a problem logically. In effect, they are artificial devices to fill gaps in actual knowledge. You should be sure that the assumptions are valid and necessary. The validity of a staff study is tied directly to the validity of the assumptions.

(b) Do not make assumptions that are essentially self-evident.

(3) **Facts bearing on the problem**

(a) A list of every fact related to the study is, in most cases, too lengthy and involved. Select those that need to be highlighted and list them in logical sequence (preferably the order in which they will be used in the discussion to follow).

(b) Facts also may be introduced in the discussion paragraph itself. Whether they are singled out for listing in this paragraph or introduced in the course of the discussion, they must be authenticated. Practice varies in this detail. The annexes are the appropriate place to expand on facts, if detailed explanations are necessary.

(4) Discussion

(a) The discussion is the heart of the staff study; it is where the problem is analyzed and the options are considered. One method is to describe the advantages and disadvantages of possible solutions, introducing facts and reasoning sequences as necessary. Another technique is to list criteria and test each possible solution against each criterion.

(b) If a full discussion requires more than two or three typed pages, include it as an annex. However, an annex should not be used merely to avoid the labor of making the discussion concise and logical. The purpose of a staff study is to save the commander's time by doing a careful job of writing; referring to a long, rambling discussion annex is not doing the job properly.

(5) Conclusions

(a) This paragraph is where the best solution to the problem is selected. The conclusions must follow logically from the discussion and should contain a brief restatement of the superior solution.

(b) The writer must be careful not to include new material or new viewpoints in the conclusion paragraph.

(6) **Recommendations.** This paragraph explains how the conclusions can be implemented. If a letter, memorandum, or message is needed to implement the conclusions, it is customarily attached as enclosure "A." All that should remain for the commander to do is to approve and, if necessary, sign the enclosure.

d. The basic question that must be answered is, "If the commander buys the recommendation, will the problem be solved?"

311. LETTERS. Frequently, a letter is the recommended action and is attached to a decision paper for approval, signature, and dispatch. Commands are free to choose the style of letter for their use. For example, USEUCOM follows the correspondence procedures contained in Army Regulation 340-15. USPACOM follows the procedures contained in SECNAVINST 5216.5C.

312. MESSAGES

Reference: Joint Pub 6-04, *Joint Doctrine for Message Text Formatting Program*

a. Some actions may recommend dispatching a message. Messages may be transmitted electrically, or they may be sent by mail or courier, depending on requirements for speed of delivery and security. Precedence categories indicate the relative order in which a message is processed in the telecommunications system and the speed with which it must be handled during internal headquarters processing. The time objective established as a general guide is indicated below.

Precedence	Code	Time Objective
Flash	ZZ	As fast as possible (less than 10 minutes)
Immediate	OO	30 minutes
Priority	PP	3 hours
Routine	RR	6 hours

b. Whenever a message is prepared that includes the word "not"--where the accidental omission of the "not" would produce the opposite or other action than that desired--add the words, "repeat not," e.g., "Execution will not repeat not be made pending receipt of further orders."

c. References should be listed in messages. All references should be briefly summarized in the first paragraph of the message so that the message stands alone and can be completely understood without reading the other documents. Avoid the use of NOTAL references whenever possible.

313. ESTIMATES

References: Joint Pub 1-03.8, *Joint Reporting Structure, Situation Monitoring*
FM 101-5, AFM 28-3, FMFM 3-1, NWP 11

a. Most discussions of the staff study imply that for every problem, there is a neat and tidy solution. Experienced action officers will suggest that, in reality, that is simply not the case. The best staff studies may have to conclude that there is no feasible solution to the stated problem and that, at least for the time being, the best "course of action" is to do nothing. Normally, however, operational military situations do not permit doing nothing. Although the commander often is faced with so many uncertainties and so wide a variety of alternative courses of action that the overall problem seems unsolvable, only rarely--if ever--is the luxury of postponing decisions or deferring action until the situation clears possible. For better or for worse, the operational commander must have the best available estimate of how to proceed--and often must have it in a short time.

b. A device that has evolved over years of military experience is the **estimate of the situation**. This is the operational counterpart to the staff study and, although it has several forms, we can identify two distinct categories:

- (1) the Commander's Estimate (of the Situation)
- (2) the staff estimate

Staff estimates are discussed with deliberate planning, Chapter 6; Commander's Estimates are discussed in both deliberate planning and crisis action planning, Chapters 6 and 7 of this book.

314. NONQUANTIFIABLE FACTORS IN STAFF WORK

a. Staff officers must remain objective in their work. It's easy to conduct a study to find the best solution when the "right answer" is known even before the study begins. Unfortunately, people are usually blind to their own prejudices and parochialisms, so the obvious solution may be a poor one, indeed.

b. If experience is the best teacher, then experience must be considered an important resource that can be used to help solve problems. Experience is far more than just knowing facts and figures. It includes that all-important human factor: a "feel for the problem." Even though science cannot define how the human-experience factor works, a planner should appreciate its value, actively seek out a source of experience, and consider (but not blindly follow) advice based on experience.

c. "Gut feeling" is not a formally recognized part of the problem-solving method, but it, too, can be helpful in staff work. Even when action officers have done their work according to the book, quantified the process, and come up with the optimal solution, an inside alarm can go off and say, "Wait a minute, something's not quite right yet." If that happens, the planner should review all the data one more time, see if all important factors have been identified and considered, and determine whether the recommended solution really makes sense. This "gut feeling" can be especially helpful if the planner has attempted to use a purely analytical method. Automated systems, used carefully and correctly, can be helpful in analyzing data, but they must not be allowed to make decisions. Human beings are responsible for their decisions; a computer is not.

d. Staff officers must look beyond all the traditional factors that may favor a particular course of action, and call the attention of the commander to several other considerations that cannot be quantified. This is true because, when the time finally comes for commanders to make final decisions on a piece of completed staff work, they must wrestle with these issues that are not easily measured or defined. They must consider the questions of law, morals, ethics, aesthetics, politics, culture, and history, any or all of which may play an important role in this final decision.

315. YOUR EFFECTIVENESS AS AN AO

a. Your ability to express your thoughts clearly, both orally and in writing, will most often determine your effectiveness as a staff officer. Many commanders have said during AFSC interviews that their action officers need to learn how to communicate more effectively. There are many fine Service publications, as well as civilian sources, available to assist you in improving in these areas. For instance, there is Army Pamphlet 600-67, *Effective Writing for Army Leaders*, or *Guide to Effective Military Writing* by William A. McIntosh (Stackpole Books), or *Revising Business Prose* by Richard Lanham (Scribner's) among many others. Use them! Figure 3-2 summarizes some key rules from the Army reference.

— STYLE RULES —

**PUT THE RECOMMENDATION, CONCLUSION, OR REASON FOR
WRITING IN THE FIRST OR SECOND PARAGRAPH**

USE THE ACTIVE VOICE

USE SHORT SENTENCES (15 WORDS OR LESS)

USE SHORT WORDS (THREE SYLLABLES OR FEWER)

WRITE PARAGRAPHS NO MORE THAN 1 INCH DEEP

USE CORRECT SPELLING, GRAMMAR, AND PUNCTUATION

USE "I," "YOU," AND "WE" AS SUBJECTS OF SENTENCES

Reference:

Department of Army Pamphlet 600-67

Figure 3-2

b. Effective speaking or writing does not mean using long, infrequently used words that require listeners or readers to break out their dictionaries; on the contrary, the most effective communication contains the everyday words that best express your meaning.

c. Your role as an effective action officer is to give senior officers accurate and adequate information to make a decision and to implement a plan or program. In effect, your job is to do the "leg work" so that the senior officer can merely approve or "sign off" on the project.

Chapter 4

Joint Publications

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Joint Publications

400. INTRODUCTION

a. It is not easy to attain the level of military professionalism required of an effective staff officer. A broad background of education and military experience is helpful; knowledge of certain documents and reporting systems is fundamental. This chapter will highlight some of the joint publications that are frequently used by joint staff officers. The numbering system of the revised Joint Publication System (JPS) will be used throughout this volume.

b. Joint Pub 5-02.1 (JOPS Volume I) lists references used by military staffs in joint operation planning. The list is keyed to specific functional areas within the joint staff organization. It serves as a catalog from which staff officers can select a working library of relevant publications to better understand their jobs.

c. Memorandums used to implement CJCS decisions are described in Joint Administrative Instruction 5711.6, "Action Processing":

(1) **Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum (CJCSM).** This memorandum is addressed to agencies or individuals **outside** the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the military Services, for example, Office of the Secretary of Defense or a level comparable to that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is prepared for the signature of the **Chairman or Vice Chairman** of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the **Director of the Joint Staff**.

(2) **Secretary's Memorandum (SM).** A memorandum transmitting directives of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to subordinate agencies or individuals, Services, or combatant commands, this is prepared for the signature of the **Secretary, Joint Staff**.

(3) **Memorandum, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (MCJCS).** This memorandum is signed by the **Director of the Joint Staff** or the **head of a JCS directorate** in the name of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).

(4) **Memorandum of Policy (MOP).** Statements of policy approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and issued for the guidance of the Services, combatant commands, and the Joint Staff are published and circulated as consecutively numbered **memorandums of policy**. They are sometimes referred to as policy memorandums.

d. MOP 39, "Release Procedures for CJCS Papers and Information," prohibits unauthorized release or disclosure of information from CJCS papers by giving guidelines for their release after initial distribution. This document is important to a joint staff officer who uses a variety of CJCS papers.

e. JCS papers include written communications conveying a CJCS decision; a decision made in the name of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the decision or advice of CJCS or the Director, Joint Staff; or the action of the Secretary, Joint Staff, within the terms of authority delegated or directed by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

401. JOINT PUBLICATION SYSTEM (JOINT DOCTRINE AND JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES (JTTP) DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM)

Reference: Joint Pub 1-01 (with Changes 1 & 2)

a. The purpose of the Joint Publication System (JPS) is to enhance the combat effectiveness of U.S. forces. The JPS furnishes principles, guidelines, and the conceptual framework to initiate, validate, develop, coordinate, evaluate, approve, and maintain joint doctrine and JTTP for joint activities of the Armed Forces. The Director, JCS J-7, manages the joint doctrine and JTTP program for CJCS. Implementing the Joint Doctrine Master Plan, Joint Pub 1-01 does the following:

- initiates a process to identify voids in joint doctrine and implements a comprehensive program to initiate joint doctrine projects;
- transfers joint doctrine publications previously approved by the four Services to the Joint Publication System;
- revises the Joint Publication System to separate joint doctrine and JTTP from administrative publications; and
- organizes a systematic hierarchy to link doctrine to procedures under a single joint publications capstone manual.

b. The joint publications hierarchy offers a framework for organizing joint doctrine and JTTP publications into the functional series illustrated in Figure 4-1.

c. The functional series structure follows traditional joint staff lines of responsibility. Each series, except the 0 and 1 series, uses a keystone manual as the first publication in the series to furnish its doctrinal foundation. The functional field structure is organized as follows:

- **0 Series, CAPSTONE Joint Warfare Doctrine - links joint doctrine to national strategy** and the contributions of other government agencies and alliances. UNAAF continues to establish the basic organization and command and control relationships for effective joint operations.
- **1 Series, Joint Reference Publications - includes publication guide and index and the general reference publications.**
- **2 Series, Intelligence Support of Joint Operations - establishes the joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for intelligence support**, including direction, planning, collection, processing, production, and dissemination.




Figure 4-1

- 3 Series, Joint Operations - establishes the joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for directing, planning, and executing joint military operations.
- 4 Series, Logistics Support of Joint Operations - establishes the joint doctrine, techniques, and procedures for directing, planning, and carrying out logistics support of joint operations.
- 5 Series, Planning of Joint Operations - establishes joint planning processes relating to the conduct of joint military operations.
- 6 Series, C3 Systems Support of Joint Operations - establishes joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for C3 systems support of joint operations.

d. Publications approved by CJCS for inclusion in the JPS will be referred to as "joint publications." Publications that involve two or more Services but have not been reviewed and approved by CJCS for inclusion in the JPS are referred to as "multi-Service publications." Because joint publications state the U.S. position for joint and combined doctrine, doctrine in Service and multi-Service publications must be consistent with the respective doctrine in the JPS.

- e. Identification of joint publications is based on three numerical groups:
- the first identifies the functional field to which the publication belongs;
 - the second, preceded by a hyphen, places the publication within a functional field (A zero here indicates that the publication is the keystone manual); and

- the third, preceded by a period, designates publications that contain supporting or expanded doctrine or JTTP for **sequenced manuals within a functional field.**

For example, Joint Pub 3-02.1, *Joint Doctrine for Landing Force Operations*, is in the joint operations functional field (3), deals with amphibious operations (-02), a major mission area in joint operations, and furnishes the supporting doctrine (.1) concerning the landing force operations.

402. SELECTED JOINT PUBLICATIONS

a. ***Unified Command Plan (UCP).*** The UCP (currently JCS SM-712-89) is not a joint pub, but needs to be mentioned because it is the document that establishes the combatant commands. It is approved by the President, published by CJCS, and addressed to the commanders of combatant commands. The UCP identifies geographic areas of responsibility, assigns primary tasks, defines authority of the commanders, establishes command relationships, and gives guidance on the exercise of combatant command.

b. ***Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).*** UNAAF is a valuable reference that sets forth the principles and doctrines governing the activities of the Armed Forces of the United States when two or more Services are operating together. It includes guidance governing exercise of command by the CINCs and joint force commanders, explains the functions of the CJCS and military departments in support of joint operations, furnishes guidance for the military departments and subordinate commands in the preparation of their respective detailed plans, and describes the command functions of joint commands. UNAAF has its genesis in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended; Titles 10 and 32, U.S. Code, as amended; and DOD Directive 5100.1, "Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components."

c. ***Joint Pub 1-02, The DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.*** The DOD Dictionary contains definitions of commonly used military terms. The standardization of military terminology is a major step toward effective communication and common understanding within the Department of Defense, between the United States and its allies, and within the civilian-military community.

d. ***Joint Pub 1.1 (administrative numbering system), Organization and Functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.*** Joint Pub 1.1 is an administrative publication that contains organization charts, mission statements, and function descriptions of Joint Staff divisions and agencies. The document is used by Service personnel who deal with the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their information and planning.

e. ***Joint Pub 3-01.1, Joint Doctrine for the Defense of the United States Against Air Attack,*** gives basic guidance to elements of the Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps engaged in planning and conducting the air defense of the United States as prescribed in UNAAF. It also gives guidance for defense elements of other nations committed through mutual defense agreements to planning and conducting air defense operations in support of or closely related to air defense of the United States.

f. ***Joint Pub 3-01.2, Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair Operations (from Overseas Land Areas),*** establishes joint doctrine and furnishes guidance to unified

commanders and joint task force commanders for conducting counterair/antiair warfare requiring the integration of Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps assets on or near overseas land areas.

g. **Joint Pub 3-01.3, *Joint Doctrine for Air Defense (from Overseas Land Areas)***, prescribes the doctrine and principles governing the activities and performance of the Armed Forces engaged in planning and conducting air defense operations from overseas land areas. The doctrine is broadly stated to fit the widely varying situations and areas where air defense may be undertaken.

h. **Joint Pub 3-05, *Joint Special Operations Policy, Concepts, and Procedures***, outlines the joint aspects of special operations (SO) and associated support requirements, identifies responsibilities and roles in conducting joint SO, and gives guidelines for conducting, supporting, and directing joint SO activities. It also describes joint SO doctrine and operational concepts, relationships with other agencies, and missions and capabilities of Army, Navy, Air Force, and joint special operations organizations.

i. **Joint Pub 3-51, *SIGINT and EW Support Measures for Joint Operations***, states the doctrine and furnishes the procedures for exploiting the opposing force's electromagnetic emissions through the use of SIGINT and electronic warfare support measures.

j. **Joint Pub 3-51.1, *Electronic Warfare in Joint Military Operations***, gives guidance to U.S. forces for planning and conducting electronic warfare (EW) in joint military operations. It covers concepts, procedures, and organizations for integrating EW in joint operations and discusses the authority and responsibilities of commanders and staffs of joint forces.

k. **Joint Pub 3-54, *Joint Doctrine for Operations Security***, contains joint policy, concepts, and standards for the conduct of operations security (OPSEC) activities. This publication applies to all military departments and fosters a unified understanding of the OPSEC function. It recognizes that each Service and command may require a unique approach to OPSEC, but that there are basic concepts that are essentially the same for every military organization.

l. **Joint Pub 3-56, *Tactical Command and Control Planning Guidance and Procedure for Joint Operations (Information Exchange Planning Guidance)***, gives guidance for information exchange, procedural standardization, and interoperability in developing Service tactical command and control systems.

m. **Joint Pub 3-56.1, *Tactical Command and Control Planning Guidance and Procedures for Joint Operations (Procedures and Formats)***, outlines procedures and formats for tactical command, control, and communications within a joint environment including artillery, Naval gunfire support, air intercept, close air support, and intelligence reporting.

n. **Joint Pub 3-56.20 series, *Tactical Command and Control Procedures for Joint Operations - Joint Interface Operational Procedures (Planning Guide - Description and Procedures - Air Control - Message Text)***. These volumes give guidance and procedures to ensure compatibility, interoperability, and effectiveness of tactical command and control systems in joint operations.

o. **Joint Pub 4-05, *Mobilization***, describes the major aspects of planning and executing mobilization in DOD. Specifically, it identifies the general responsibilities of the CJCS, the Services, the combatant commands, USTRANSCOM, and DOD agencies for mobilization planning and its relationship with deployment planning for operation plans.

p. **Joint Pubs 5-02.1 through .4, *Joint Operation Planning System***. These four volumes cover deliberate and crisis action planning procedures, OPLAN and CONPLAN formats, and associated ADP support. See Chapters 6 and 7 for additional information.

q. **Joint Pubs 6-03.10 through .15, *WWMCCS Objectives and Management Plan***, etc. This series is published in six volumes to describe the management of WWMCCS in terms of its requirements, definition, improvement, and acquisition.

r. **Joint Pubs 6-03.16, .17, and .2, *WWMCCS Objectives and Management Plan, WWMCCS ADP Concept of Operations*, and *Concept of Operations for the Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network***, describes the WWMCCS mission, the functional aspects of the system, and its elements in support of the mission.

s. **Joint Pub 6-03.3, *WWMCCS Objectives and Management Plan, WWMCCS Objectives***, contains guidance for planners concerned with the improvement of WWMCCS.

t. **Joint Pub 6-03.4, *WWMCCS Objectives and Management Plan, WWMCCS Performance Criteria***, describes broad qualitative and quantitative performance criteria established for WWMCCS.

u. **Joint Pub 6-03.5, *WWMCCS Objectives and Management Plan, WWMCCS Composition***, is a compendium of the WWMCCS facilities, ADP equipment, warning systems, communications networks and systems, supporting organizations and systems, and executive aids. It also gives a system overview and highlights the WWMCCS interfaces.

v. **Joint Pub 6-04.1, *U.S. Message Text Formatting Program***, outlines in six volumes the uniform reporting procedures and standards, and prescribes the rules and conventions governing message text formats for all joint reporting systems. It includes uniform procedures used in peacetime and crises to permit the exchange of information between U.S. and allied commands and reduce dual reporting.

403. JOINT PUB 1-03, *JOINT REPORTING STRUCTURE (JRS)*

a. The Joint Reporting Structure is described in Joint Pub 1-03, and is directed for use throughout the military community. It is designed to furnish

- military information to the NCA;
- a central catalog of recurring reports to support command decisions on military operations and, therefore, minimize duplication;

- **standardization** in reporting systems of the Joint Staff, Services, and DOD agencies; and
- **central management** and standard rules for the application of message text formatting to reporting systems.

b. The JRS creates reports and reporting systems that have wide application in command and control, operation and support planning, plan execution, and analysis. It portrays essential data on personnel, materiel, and equipment status; operational and logistic planning; and the overall military situation. It establishes

- **procedures** for preparing reports,
- **the framework for reporting systems** for transferring data between participating commands and agencies, and
- **the standards for automatic data processing** within the structure.

c. Joint Pub 1-03 series is divided into numerous volumes, each concerned with a particular functional area.

(1) **Joint Pub 1-03** contains general instructions and defines reporting responsibilities.

(2) **Joint Pubs 1-03.1 through .20** contain a description of joint reports and reporting systems, give administrative instructions and formats for data documentation, and define the data elements.

1-03.1 & .2	<i>Standing Operating Procedures for Coordination of Atomic Operations (CAO SOP)</i>
1-03.3 -.5	<i>Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS); Operational Status, Force Status and Identity; and Operational Status Reports</i>
1-03.6	<i>Event or Incident Reports</i>
1-03.7	<i>Nuclear Weapons Reports (NUREP)</i>
1-03.8	<i>Situation Monitoring</i>
1-03.9	<i>Reconnaissance</i>
1-03.10	<i>Communications Status</i>
1-03.11	<i>Communications-Electronics</i>
1-03.12 -.14	<i>Military Installation Status</i>
1-03.15	<i>Intelligence</i>
1-03.16	<i>Joint Operation Planning System</i>

1-03.17	<i>Personnel</i>
1-03.18	<i>Logistics</i>
1-03.19	<i>General Use or Miscellaneous</i>
1-03.20	<i>Joint Deployment System (JDS)</i>

(3) **Joint Pub 1-03.21** cataloges the unique Service reports and reporting systems of the Air Force and Marine Corps. Each report is described in terms of subject and purpose, originating agency, receiving agency, frequency, method of transmission, and specific data elements.

d. **Intelligence reports.** In Joint Pub 1-03.15, the JRS outlines five intelligence reports.

(1) **Defense Intelligence Notice (DIN).** The purpose of the DIN is to give the CJCS, the combatant commands, the military Services, and selected U.S. Government agencies timely, finished intelligence about developments that could have a significant effect on current and future planning and operations. DIA prepares this narrative report, and it normally covers a single activity, event, or situation. The primary objective of the DIN is to report on key developments, explain their occurrence, and assess their impact on the United States and/or its interests.

(2) **Special Defense Intelligence Notice (SDIN).** The purpose of the SDIN is to give the CJCS, the combatant commands, the Services, and selected U.S. Government agencies timely intelligence about events that could have an **immediate and significant** effect on current planning and operations. DIA prepares this report. The narrative format does not contain specific content requirements.

(3) **Spot Intelligence Report (SPIREP).** The purpose of the SPIREP is to give the CJCS, the National Military Intelligence Center (DIA), the combatant commands, the military Services, and selected U.S. Government agencies timely intelligence information on developments that could have an **immediate and significant** effect on current planning and operations. This narrative report is submitted to the national level by combatant commands, military Services, and military organizations of divisional (two-star) level whenever critical developments appear imminent or are of potentially high interest to U.S. national-level decisionmakers. The content includes the nature of the event, where and when the event occurred, the source of the information, and remarks. The SPIREP is transmitted to the national level not later than one hour after the receipt of critical information. The initial SPIREP will not be delayed to verify the information or to get more details; rather, amplifying or clarifying information should be transmitted in a followup SPIREP.

(4) **The Daily Intelligence Summary (DISUM).** DISUMs give the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Military Intelligence Center (DIA), the military Services, and selected U.S. Government agencies a **daily** analysis of an actual or simulated (training exercise) crisis and a summary of relevant intelligence information produced during the preceding 24-hour period. The minimum required information includes subject, general hostile situation, hostile operations during period, other

intelligence factors, and the counterintelligence situation. The DISUM is submitted to the national level by unified and specified commands.

(5) **DIA Periodic Intelligence Summary (DIA INTSUM).** The DIA INTSUM furnishes the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the combatant commands, the military Services, U.S. military commanders worldwide, and selected U.S. Government agencies with timely, periodic intelligence summaries about an actual or simulated (training exercises) foreign crisis that could have an immediate effect (actual or simulated) on U.S. planning and operations. The summary contains the subject, situation summary/highlights, military activity, political issues, collection posture, and outlook.

e. **Commander's Situation Report (SITREP).** Joint Pub 1-03.8 describes the format used by combatant commanders to evaluate significant factors that substantially improve or diminish the operational readiness of their commands. The purpose of the SITREP is to keep the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCs, Services, and agencies of the government advised of

- critical national and international situations;
- existing political, military, and operational situations and plans;
- the readiness of combatant commanders to meet the requirements of CJCS-approved plans;
- the progress of ongoing large-scale military exercises; and
- any significant intelligence event.

(1) The SITREP is a narrative report formatted at the discretion of the submitting commander and submitted per Joint Pub 6-04.1, *U.S. Message Text Formatting Program*; it includes data described in Joint Pub 1-03.8 as follows:

- own situation/disposition/status of forces
summary update of changes to force locations, mission readiness deteriorations; proposed deployments, changes of operational control, and projected additional force requirements;
- situation overview
brief overall assessment of situation, including conditions that increase or detract from capability and readiness of forces;
- operations
description and results of offensive or defensive operations, information on the operation of allied forces, summary of planned operations for next 24 hours, and deviations from previously reported plans;
- intelligence/reconnaissance
brief overview of situation, order of battle, capabilities, and threat changes, reference to significant Spot Intelligence Reports submitted in last 24 hours;

- **logistics**
brief overview of logistic sustainability by class of supply, highlighting significant deficiencies affecting planned operations and problem areas beyond the commander's capability to overcome;
- **communications/connectivity**
significant outages, incompatibilities, quantitative equipment deficiencies, and their impact;
- **personnel**
factors affecting readiness of forces or units, daily battle casualties, and the effect on command mission of casualties sustained;
- **significant political/military/diplomatic events not reported by OPREP-3 PINNACLE but that may result in public reaction, results of government decisions made by key allies, civil unrest, etc; and**
- **Commander's Estimate/CINC's/Service chief's assessment summary of key points from preceding paragraphs highlighting areas requiring CJCS or NCA action or decision, intentions on execution, etc.**

(2) The **SITREP** is submitted daily effective 2400Z to ensure receipt in Washington no later than 0400Z the following day. The contents of the 30 September and 31 March **semiannual SITREPs** and **SITREP updates** are described in MOP 172 and CJCS messages.

(3) Duplicate reporting between the **SITREP**, the **OPREP**, and other **JRS** reports is discouraged. Information required by a specific implementing directive to be reported via another **JRS** report is not included in the **SITREP**; instead, reference is made to the appropriate **JRS** report.

f. Commander's Operational Report (OPREP), Joint Pubs 1-03.4, .5, and .6

(1) **Introduction.** The **OPREP** is the reporting system used to advise the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCs, Services, and U.S. Government agencies of an **event or incident** that may attract national interest; current operations and recommended operation plans describing the deployment or employment of military units; and the **results of activities** associated with military operations. The system is designed to satisfy all echelons of command with a single reporting system.

(2) **Description and use.** The **OPREP** is usually a narrative report that may be formatted at the discretion of the originator. Report samples and a description of the type of data to be included are contained in applicable volumes of the Joint Pub 1-03 series. Both **AUTODIN** and **WIN** are accepted as record transmittals; however, the situation may demand initial communication via telephone. **OPREP** consists of five reporting categories:

- **OPREP-1, Operation Planning Report**, is used to describe planned operations for current situations. It is discussed in detail in Chapter 7 of this volume.

- **OPREP-2, Operation Start Report**, is used to advise that an operation has started or to direct execution of a plan or fragment of a plan.
- **OPREP-3, Event/Incident Report**, is used to notify the National Military Command Center (NMCC) immediately of any event or incident that may attract national attention. Guidelines are in Joint Pub 1-03.6.
- **OPREP-4, Operation Stop Report**, is used to report the completion of an operation or a phase of an operation.
- **OPREP-5, Operation Summary Report**, is used to give a statistical summary.

(3) Only the **OPREP-3** is implemented worldwide continually. It is transmitted directly to the NMCC by any command level having knowledge of an incident and access to a communications network capable of relaying it into communications systems serving the NMCC. OPREPs 1, 2, 4, and 5 are submitted by commanders designated by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, that is, the combatant commanders, or the Services. These OPREPs are transmitted when operations justify them.

(4) Operation reporting is related directly to the command and control function of the military organization. It contributes to the identification of problem situations and is an essential tool in the supervision of the planned action. When operations do not justify use of OPREPs 1, 2, 4, and 5, plans and operations data normally associated with these reports are submitted via SITREP.

g. Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS)

Reference: Joint Pub 1-03.3

(1) **Introduction.** By unit category levels C-1 through C-5, SORTS describes each registered unit in terms of personnel, equipment and supplies on hand, equipment condition, and training. The category level compares current status with the required resources and training to undertake the full wartime mission for which the unit is organized or designed. SORTS is a primary data source of **force availability** to meet current operation planning. It is an **automated WWMCCS data file** that contains the identity of worldwide organization resources keyed to each unit's individual Unit Identification Code (UIC). These data **support operation planning and command and control** functions within the Joint Staff, the combatant commands, the Services, Service major commands, Service component commands, and DOD agencies. The perishability of status information requires that reports be **prepared when the status changes and forwarded without delay**. SORTS data are useful in support of planning only when unit information is timely and accurate.

(2) **Definition.** DOD Directive S-5100.44, "Master Plan for the National Military Command System," directs that the National Military Command Center have access to all information required for normal operations and for an analysis of any emergency situation. The level and condition of unit resources and level of training will be reported using SORTS, described in Joint Pub 1-03.4 as the automated reporting system used by the DOD to pass authoritative basic unit identity and status information to the NCA and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was established to report the

registration of each unit of the Armed Forces; unique unit identity and status information; basic identity data elements (BIDEs) of units; and changes to support and status of selected, registered organizations of foreign nations that are committed to combined operations.

(3) Within SORTS, the **unique data requirements** are met for the Services, commanders of combatant commands, Service major commands, and Service component commands. Organization and unit identity and status information is accumulated, refined, updated, and filed for rapid recall. The SORTS information is **submitted by subordinate units** and compiled at higher echelons of command. SORTS inputs originated by Service major commands and Service component commands are routed to the appropriate combatant command where they may be entered into the WWMCCS either manually or automatically, depending on the capability at the site. The SORTS submissions are made via AUTODIN with WIN used as a backup system. SORTS information is **forwarded simultaneously to the Joint Staff, unified and specified commanders, and Service headquarters.**

(4) Computer processing demands precise formatting and strict adherence to administrative guidelines. Reporting **format, data element definitions, and rules for their use** are contained in Joint Pub 1-03 series. SORTS reports contain **basic identity**, such as unit description, organization name, unit type code, unit level code, etc., **general status, personnel strength, combat readiness, equipment and crew status**, and other elements that present a picture of the unit and its daily readiness and capabilities. As SORTS input is received, the status data are processed and entered into the SORTS File to keep it current. The **Director for Operations, J-3**, maintains the master SORTS File.

(5) **Relationships between SORTS and other systems.** SORTS interfaces with the Specified Geolocation Code File (GEOFILE), the Type Unit Data File (TUCHA), and the Major Equipment Code File (MEQPT), a SORTS equipment status file. Through the WIN, SORTS supports JOPS and JDS. The JDS database is automatically updated by unit identifier from the JCS SORTS file.

h. JOPS Reporting System (JOPSREP)

References: Joint Pub 1-03.16, *JRS, Joint Operation Planning System*
Joint Pub 5-02.3 (JOPS Volume III)

(1) **Definition.** The JOPSREP is an information reporting system structured to support deliberate and crisis action planning. It describes standard procedures for reporting the information required to develop the TPFDD and the Summary Reference File (SRF). It defines standard element descriptions, criteria for editing, and report procedures; specifies formats; and defines information to solve planning problems.

(2) JOPSREP is used among commands and agencies involved in joint operation planning to develop, review, coordinate, revise, and approve OPLANs; identify movement constraints that result from lack of resources, port reception/throughput capabilities, and POL storage limitations; identify shortfalls in resources to meet OPLAN requirements; and improve the accuracy of planning data. Data are entered directly into the computer (tape or disk storage) through the WWMCCS terminal or workstation. The data elements making up the database are arranged into **functional**

categories that use logical data relationships as well as assign organizational responsibilities for data preparation.

Chapter 5 Defense Department Systems and Processes

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- NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SYSTEM 5-3
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- DOD ACQUISITION SYSTEM 5-16
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Defense Department Systems and Processes

500. OVERVIEW

a. **Introduction.** At both national and departmental levels, various processes and systems have been developed to handle the complex problems of setting strategic direction, determining national military policy, requesting resources to execute that policy, and translating the funded military capability into plans for military operations. The joint planning process is one link in a long and complex chain. This chapter will describe many of the systems that influence joint staff officers in their role as joint operation planners.

b. **Background.** Before focusing on the processes or systems used by DOD for joint planning, we need to set the stage. Since our primary goal is to be able to relate the systems to the joint arena, the background of our study is a basic understanding of the joint purpose these systems serve. The purpose of joint operation planning is to use effectively the military arm of national power to protect U.S. interests. Our national strategy is the starting point for joint planning. You will see that joint planning is a process, a systematic series of actions or procedures, used by a commander to determine the best method of accomplishing assigned tasks. There are six major systems and one major subsystem used by DOD that affect joint planning and operations:

- **National Security Council (NSC) System,**
- **Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS),**
- **Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS),**
- **DOD Acquisition System,**
- **Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS).**
- **National Military Command System (NMCS), and**
- **Joint Operation Planning System.**

501. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SYSTEM

References: **National Security Act of 1947, as amended**
 NSDD 2, "National Security Council Structure" dated 12 January 1982
 NSDD 266, "Implementation of the Recommendations of the
 President's Special Review Board" dated 31 March 1987
 NSDD 276, "National Security Council Interagency Process"
 dated 9 June 1987

a. **Function.** The National Security Council was established by the National Security Act of 1947 as the principal forum to consider national security issues that require Presidential decision. The NSC gives advice on integrating domestic, foreign, and military policies as they relate to national security. Congress envisioned that the NSC would allow the military and the civilian government departments and agencies to work more effectively on national security matters. Its original charter was to recommend to the President objectives and commitments and assess risks to the United States related to our military power and to consider matters of common interest to the government concerning national security. Its composition, influence, and schedule of meetings since 1947 have varied considerably with each President, the personality of his key advisers, and his view of the organization. While the NSC organization has been altered numerous times by Presidential decree, its statutory description has remained essentially unchanged since the membership was last modified by Congress in the mid-1950s.

b. **Organization**

(1) In 1949 the NSC was placed in the **Executive Office of the President**. Its membership includes only four **statutory members**: the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Director of Central Intelligence serve as **statutory advisers** to the NSC. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (the National Security Adviser) is responsible for the day-to-day operation of the council and the interagency coordination. The statutory members and advisers plus the National Security Adviser attend all meetings of the NSC. They are joined at the invitation of the President by Directors of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the U.S. Information Agency, who are special statutory advisers. The Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Chief of Staff to the President, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, heads of the other executive departments and agencies, and senior officials of the Executive Office of the President may attend NSC meetings at the special invitation of the President. The advisers to the President, whether or not statutory members of the NSC, may influence national security affairs in a way that can neither be legislated by Congress nor consistently explained by Presidential decree.

(2) **Interagency groups** constitute the mechanism for developing advice and policy for Presidential consideration. Since June 1987 the following senior interagency groups recommend, coordinate, and monitor implementation of national security policy: the National Security Planning Group, a senior committee of the NSC; the Senior Review Group, a cabinet-level interagency group; and the Policy Review Group, a senior sub-cabinet-level interagency group. In addition, regional and functional interagency groups have been used to promote an effective NSC process: Senior

Interagency Groups (SIGs) for intelligence (SIG-I), foreign policy formulation (SIG-FP), and defense policy formulation (SIG-DP).

(3) The Executive Secretary heads the NSC staff that assists the National Security Adviser in every aspect of the role of adviser to the President. This staff is small and broadly experienced in national security affairs; it does not have authority to execute or implement national security policies of the President. The staff is now augmented by a legal advisor.

c. Under the Reagan Administration, Presidential decisions were communicated by intelligence findings, National Security Decision Directives (NSDD), etc. Past administrations have used National Security Action Memorandums, Presidential Directives, and even Executive Orders.

502. DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT—A JOINT PERSPECTIVE

Reference: DOD Instruction 7045.14, "Planning, Programming, and Budgeting,"
CJCS MOP 7, 30 Jan 90, "Joint Strategic Planning System "

INTRODUCTION

a. The purpose of the Department of Defense (DOD) Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) is to produce a plan, a program, and a two-year budget for the DOD with the ultimate objective of furnishing the warfighting commander in chief with the best mixture of forces, equipment, and support attainable within fiscal constraints. The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) is the formal means by which the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), discharges his responsibility to give strategic plans and direction to the Armed Forces and to interact with the PPBS. See Figure 5-1.




Figure 5-1

b. Taken together, the two systems have the combined purpose of furnishing the best possible mixture of missions, forces, equipment, and support to the CINCs. The joint perspective therefore demands that the systems be looked at as one system beginning and ending with the CINCs. Viewed in this manner, as can be seen in the sketch below, the entire process is a three-year cycle. It is important to note that a new three-year cycle begins every other year, thus creating overlap of cycles and instilling a measure of flexibility, because what happens in one cycle may affect others. For example, as an action office begins work on a new budget submission, shortfalls from the last budget submission two years (or in some cases one year) earlier are looked at and perhaps incorporated. See Figure 5-2.




Figure 5-2

c. The following discussion centers on those documents/processes that influence both the PPBS and the JSPS. For convenience, the discussion is divided into the processes: I. Planning, II. Programming, and III. Budgeting. Under each division is a discussion of respective documents and subprocesses. Each major document and subprocess is related to the system it supports.

I. PLANNING

JOINT STRATEGY REVIEW (JSR)—JSPS

The Joint Strategy Review (JSR) initiates the strategic planning cycle. The JSR is the JSPS process for gathering information, raising issues, and facilitating the integration of the strategy, operational planning, and program assessments. During the JSR process deliberations, a series of papers and briefings (intermediate products) are developed by the Joint Staff, staffed with the Services and unified and specified combatant commands, and presented to the Chairman and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These papers and briefings, along with the views of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CINCs, are consolidated into a single document by the Joint Staff. The final product of the JSR process is the Chairman's Guidance (CG). It contains the principal initial guidance and support for developing the next National Military Strategy Document (NMSD), Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), and Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA). At the least, the JSR includes the following intermediate products in addition to the Chairman's Guidance:

a. JSR Administrative Instructions. This document (J-5 lead)

(1) concisely summarizes existing positions on national military objectives, national military strategy, and planning guidance as stated in the previous Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) and other appropriate national security documents;

(2) establishes the appropriate references for examining national military strategy and force planning guidance;

(3) refers to the Illustrative Planning Scenarios and Illustrative Evaluation Scenarios (from the previous Defense Planning Guidance) and the Secretary of Defense's Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA) for developing and evaluating designated forces and programs, in addition referring to strategic nuclear force scenarios to create the framework for developing the strategic nuclear force required for planning; and

(4) includes specific guidance with respect to the responsible agency, scope, format, length, milestones, and forwarding of the inputs to support development of all subsequent JSPS briefings and documents and their annexes.

b. The Intelligence Assessment. This paper (J-2 lead) does the following:

(1) Contains the baseline intelligence threat assessments for developing the subsequent JSPS documents and their annexes. The intelligence assessment primarily covers the defense planning period, but also supports the NMSD Long-Range Planning Annex (14 years beyond the defense planning period). It forms the basis for the tailored intelligence assessments published in both the NMSD and the JSCP for their respective planning periods.

(2) Assesses potential issues and situations that could affect U.S. national security interests and objectives or U.S. military forces. It is a detailed assessment of threats associated with terrorism, low-intensity conflict, regional crises and security issues, and global war. The CINCs' areas of responsibility are assessed in order of established U.S. national priorities.

(3) Deals with topically relevant issues and situations with potential impact on U.S. national security policies and objectives. This assessment particularly emphasizes the beginning and ending years of the defense planning period. The point of departure for all regional estimates is the set of relevant National Intelligence Estimates on that region.

(4) Recommends a prioritized military intelligence collection, production, and support requirements statement.

(5) Is reviewed annually (between biennial deliveries) for currency and accuracy and supplemented as appropriate.

c. **CINCs' Strategic Priorities.** This concise paper (J-7 lead) summarizes CINCs' input from their most recent Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs) and CINC Preparedness Assessment Reports (CSPARs). Mission areas are established against which capabilities, shortfalls, and prioritized requirements (including Security Assistance recommendations) will be documented in the NMSD.

d. **Changes in the Global National Security Environment.** This concise paper (J-5 lead) includes a summary of the significant changes in the global national security environment. The paper is based on a review of current NCA policy guidance, the previous National Military Strategy Document, the Defense Planning Guidance, the Chairman's Program Assessment, and the Global Family of OPLANs Assessment Report.

e. **Risk Evaluation Force Structure.** One important product of the JSR process is the Joint Staff's Risk Evaluation Force for the last year of the six-year planning period. It is based on force structure recommendations solicited from the CINCs and the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under JSR Administrative Instructions. The development of the Risk Evaluation Force (J-8 lead) begins early in the JSR process, and this force is adjusted and finalized during the NMSD development and assessment process.

(1) The Risk Evaluation Force is the force that would be necessary to achieve U.S. national military objectives with a reasonable assurance of success. It is derived by developing active and mobilized Reserve forces of the United States and its allies capable of meeting this criterion against the mobilized Soviet Union and its allies. The Risk Evaluation Force assumes a Soviet initiation of industrial preparation described in the Illustrative Planning Scenario (IPS). An excursion is developed assuming a Soviet long-term deliberate military and industrial mobilization before war. This excursion is a basis for examination of the military and industrial mobilization capability of the Soviet Union and its allies and the United States and its allies.

(2) The Risk Evaluation Force offers a theoretical yardstick for measuring the relative risk of other force levels (notably, the programmed force).

(3) The Illustrative Planning Scenarios (IPSs), the Illustrative Evaluation Scenarios (IESs) for general-purpose forces (conventional and special), the strategic nuclear force scenarios, and a long-term mobilization scenario originally published during the JSR are used to develop the Risk Evaluation Force structures and any excursion.

(a) The Risk Evaluation Force describes a fully structured, manned, trained, and supported force (active and reserve) developed by analyzing and assessing force structures recommended by the CINCs and the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The CINCs and the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff furnish force structures, based on their respective responsibilities, that they believe are required to achieve national security objectives with a reasonable assurance of success. Guidance for preparing these force structure recommendations, including the excursion, as well as suspenses for submission, is delineated in the JSR Administrative Instructions.

(b) The Risk Evaluation Force is determined through analysis and assessment of the CINCs' and JCS members' inputs and includes simultaneous military operations in major theaters, prioritizing missions, sequencing force deployment and employment, and eliminating duplicate threat data. The analysis also considers the contributions of allied and friendly capabilities. The level of acceptable risk is ultimately determined by the Chairman, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CINCs.

(c) The Risk Evaluation Force is developed without regard to potential arms control agreements. However, a discussion of the possible impact of successful, in-progress, arms control negotiations is included.

(4) Description of the Risk Evaluation Force includes a summary of sealift and airlift requirements as determined by the mobility analysis, the level of pre-positioning used in the analysis, a discussion of significant risks and shortfalls in comparison to programmed mobility assets, and appropriate mobility tradeoffs.

(5) In order to assess military and industrial mobilization, the capability of the United States to produce the Risk Evaluation Force (excursion included) is determined. This assessment includes an evaluation of various levels of investment in industrial preparedness and evaluates how to improve the premobilization industrial base.

(6) The Risk Evaluation Force is presented by the Joint Staff to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CINCs, and approved by the Chairman by 1 February of odd-numbered years (approximately five months before the next finalized NMSD). It contains separate sections for

(a) strategic offensive and defensive forces (including space-based systems whose primary mission is active strategic defense),

(b) space forces (excluding active space-based strategic defenses),

(c) general-purpose forces (including identification of the subset of nonstrategic nuclear forces), and

(d) special operations forces.

CHAIRMAN'S GUIDANCE (CG)—JSPS

The Chairman's Guidance (CG) is the final product of the Joint Strategy Review and it conveyss guidance to the Joint Staff and information to the Secretary of Defense, the CINCs, and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the framework

for building the National Military Strategy Document (NMSD). The CG serves as a bridge between the initial assessments and views developed during the Joint Strategy Review (JSR) process and the specific process that builds the NMSD. The CG includes

- a. CJCS-recommended strategic priorities for the defense planning period,
- b. CJCS framework for developing the National Military Strategy Document and the strategy and force options, and
- c. CJCS policy guidance supporting development of Defense Planning and Resources Board (DPRB) issues, the NMSD, Program Planning Objectives, and the Defense Planning Guidance.

The CG is structured specifically to give CJCS top-down guidance to support preparation of military strategy, the strategy and force options, and force recommendations in the NMSD, and is completed on the schedule established in the JSR Administrative Instructions. The CG is a concise (6 to 10 pages) memorandum published by 15 December of even-numbered years. The Joint Staff (J-5 lead) prepares this memorandum for CJCS signature. The Chairman consults with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with the CINCs before issuing the CG.

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY DOCUMENT (NMSD)—JSPS

The National Military Strategy Document (NMSD) conveys the advice of the Chairman, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CINCs, to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense as to the recommended national military strategy and fiscally constrained force structure required to support the attainment of the national security objectives during the defense planning period covered by the next Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). The NMSD and the National Military Strategy (NMS), a summary of the NMSD, are forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for his review. After Secretary of Defense review and approval, the NMS is forwarded to the President for approval. The NMSD may be used to determine the CJCS position on matters of strategic importance for use in NCA-directed actions. The NMSD also gives the Secretary of Defense supporting documentation for consideration during the preparation of the DPG. The NMSD consists of

- a. the National Military Strategy, which is forwarded to the President for approval and is designed for inclusion in the next DPG once it is approved by the President;
- b. the contextual setting, summarized from the Joint Strategy Review (JSR), in which the National Military Strategy was formulated, including an appraisal of U.S. defense policy, as stated in the current DPG, and recommendations for change;
- c. a statement of recommended national military objectives derived from national security objectives;
- d. an updated intelligence appraisal from the JSR of the range of threats to U.S. national security;

e. recommended fiscally constrained force levels that conform to the fiscal guidance from the Secretary of Defense;

f. a presentation of military strategy and force options, including security assistance recommendations, to frame the President's decision on the military strategy;

g. the Chairman's Net Assessment for Strategic Planning (CNASP), which assesses the recommended strategy, forces, and military options, including a force capabilities assessment comparing U.S. and allied forces with those of potential adversaries during the defense planning period, assessment data for use in developing strategic advice for the Secretary of Defense's consideration in preparing the DPG, assessments of military options, assessments of the security assistance grant or credit strategy recommended by Department of State, and other options directed for assessments;

h. an evaluation of the risks associated with the recommended strategy, forces, and military options; and

i. the Risk Evaluation Force, in tabular form, for the last year of the planning period.

DEFENSE PLANNING GUIDANCE (DPG)—PPBS

In OSD, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) takes the lead in drafting the DPG. The previous year's DPG, Program Decision Memorandums (PDMs), and budget are considered along with the NMSD. The DPG Steering Group, chaired by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (DUSD(P)), helps develop and coordinate the DPG. The development of the DPG relies on extensive dialog between OSD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CINCs, and the Services.

As drafts of chapters of the DPG are produced, they are circulated to the military departments and others for review and comment. At that time, the Services use the draft DPG as guidance to begin development of their programs. The draft DPG is reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CINCs and by the Defense Planning and Resources Board (DPRB) until the final DPG is issued. The DPG generally is considered to be the link between planning and programming; it gives the official planning guidance to the military departments for developing their Program Objective Memorandums (POMs).

II. PROGRAMMING

In January the President approves and sends to OSD and the Services Fiscal Forecasts and Guidance (FFG) developed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The Services need this information about the value of a dollar and forecast availability so they know how much they can buy.

PROGRAM OBJECTIVE MEMORANDUMS (POM'S)—PPBS

The military departments' POMs are sent to the Secretary of Defense in May. The CINCs give their warfighting requirements to the Services during POM development. The CINCs' highest priority needs also are sent to the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by means of Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs).

POMs are based on the strategic concepts and guidance stated in the DPG and include an assessment of the risks associated with the current and proposed forces and support programs. POMs express total program requirements for the years covered in the DPG and describe the rationale for proposed changes from the approved Six-Year Defense Program (SYDP). The force approved by the Secretary of Defense is reflected in the SYDP. The SYDP is a database with the structure shown at Figure 5-3.




Figure 5-3

The SYDP is updated formally three times during the cycle shown in Figure 5-4.




Figure 5-4

Dollar totals must be within the fiscal guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense. Major issues that must be resolved during the year of submission are identified. Supporting information for the POMs is published per the annual POM preparation instructions. The Services are required to include special annexes that show how their POMs respond to the needs of the CINCs.

CHAIRMAN'S PROGRAM ASSESSMENT (CPA)—JSPS

The Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA) contains the Chairman's assessment of the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) force to assist the Secretary of Defense in decisions on the defense program after receipt of the POMs. Based on comprehensive assessments and prepared in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CINCs, and the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, the CPA presents the views of the Chairman on the balance and capabilities of the POM force and the support

levels to attain U.S. national security objectives. In addition, the CPA assists the Chairman in fulfilling his statutory duty to

a. advise the Secretary of Defense of the extent to which the next fiscal year's program recommendations and budget proposals of the military departments and other DOD components, including the defense agencies, conform with the priorities established in strategic plans and with the priorities established for the CINC's requirements;

b. submit to the Secretary of Defense alternative program recommendations and budget proposals, within projected resource levels and guidance from the Secretary of Defense, in order to achieve greater conformity between the program recommendations and budget proposals of the military departments and other DOD components, including defense agencies, with the priorities established in strategic plans for the CINCs' requirements; and

c. advise the Secretary of Defense of the extent to which the major manpower programs of the Armed Forces conform with strategic plans. The CPA also serves as a key input to the Joint Strategy Review to begin the subsequent strategic planning cycle.

The CPA is a comprehensive assessment of the adequacy and capabilities of the total forces contained in the military department and defense agency POMs and the risks inherent in those force capabilities. The CPA is developed in memorandum format and includes the following:

(1) An analysis of current U.S. forces. The analysis compares the capabilities of the current POM force with those of the Risk Evaluation Force for that planning period for the purpose of assessing risk. This force analysis is used to evaluate the military department and defense agency POMs.

(2) An assessment of the overall balance of the composite POM force.

(3) An assessment of how the POMs conform with CINC Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs), CINC Preparedness Assessment Reports (CSPARs), and the priorities established in CINC OPLANs and the CJCS Global Family of OPLANs Assessment Report (GFOAR), with regard to immediate warfighting shortfalls.

(4) Recommendations on actions to improve overall defense capabilities.

(5) An analysis to assess the capability of POM mobility forces to meet deployment requirements and to assess the risks associated with that level of capability.

(6) Recommendations for changes to military department or defense agency POMs and/or budgets to ensure greater conformity with priorities established in strategic plans and CINC requirements for consideration by the Secretary of Defense during the program and budget review process, if judged appropriate by the Chairman. CINCs are invited to comment on the military department and defense agency POMs as they relate to current DPG strategy, their IPLs, and CSPARs.

ISSUES

Meanwhile, the OSD staff prepares a set of potential issues, i.e., alternatives to some of the programs included in the POMs. Other potential issues are prepared by the CINCs and OMB. All potential issues are examined by the Program Review Group, which agrees on a set of candidate issues to be considered by the DPRB. The DPRB makes the final selection from the list of candidates, and the OSD staff begins to prepare individual papers summarizing each selected issue. The Services and OMB help to formulate the issue papers, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CINCs also supply inputs. Each issue paper consists of a discussion section followed by alternatives. The individual issues are combined into eight issue books (IBs, sometimes called main issues or program review books): policy and risk assessment, nuclear forces, conventional forces, modernization and investment, readiness and other logistics, manpower, intelligence, and management initiatives. These books are then considered by the DPRB, the DOD's "Board of Directors." Before the DPRB meetings, the issue books are circulated to other OSD staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CINCs, and the Services for review and comment. Comments are included with the issue book package considered by the DPRB.

PROGRAM DECISION MEMORANDUMS (PDM'S)—PPBS

The DPRB has many meetings over a two-to-three-week period to resolve the issues. The CINCs are invited when their issues are under consideration. The Service chiefs and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff attend DPRB meetings. Each issue book is the subject of one two-to-three-hour meeting, after which the Deputy Secretary of Defense reaches a tentative decision. After all the books have been reviewed individually, a wrap-up meeting is held to evaluate the total effect of the tentative decisions on the program. Open issues are resolved, and final decisions are reached and recorded in PDMs around the beginning of August.

III. BUDGETING

BUDGET ESTIMATE SUBMISSION (BES)—PPBS

Each of the military departments and defense agencies forwards its Budget Estimates Submission (BES) to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (ASD (C)). The BES is traditionally due in September. It includes the prior year, current year, budget year, and budget year plus one (more for authorized programs) data per the Budget Guidance Manual and supplementary memorandums. Budget Estimates are prepared and submitted based on the approved program as well as current economic assumptions contained either in the PDMs or in detailed budget guidance issued each year. On receipt of the submission, the Comptroller's program and budget office begins the joint OSD and OMB hearings to review the submission. These hearings, jointly conducted by OSD and OMB representatives, are attended by appropriate members of the Joint Staff and OSD staffs. The military departments make presentations concerning their submissions and respond to questions. The DPRB meets when appropriate.

PROGRAM BUDGET DECISIONS (PBD'S)—PPBS

The hearings are conducted to obtain additional information needed to draft Program Budget Decisions (PBDs). The entire budget is reviewed to ensure that the requests are properly priced, program schedules are appropriate, and estimates are

consistent with the objectives of the Secretary of Defense. Approval of the estimates for inclusion in the President's Budget is documented by PBDs. These decisions evaluate, adjust, and approve all resources in the budget request. Although the responsible budget analyst has the lead in developing the PBD, other OSD staff personnel furnish appropriate recommendations and support. When each individual PBD is written, it is coordinated with OMB and the Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries of Defense. Each PBD consists of a discussion of the area, issues, and a series of alternatives. PBDs are sent with a covering memorandum that identifies any unresolved issues to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, who then chooses one of the alternatives or directs a new one, and the signed PBD goes to the military department and CINCs.

If the department appeals a PBD, the reclama is processed through the same channels as was the PBD. The Deputy Secretary of Defense makes the final decision. An opportunity is offered as near the end of the review cycle as possible for the military department secretaries and Service chiefs to discuss with the Secretary of Defense those major budget issues that merit his personal review. During this final phase of PPBS, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CINCs assess the impact of PBDs on warfighting capabilities of the unified and specified commands. The concerns of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CINCs are presented to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, who discusses them with the Secretary of Defense.

DEFENSE BUDGET—PPBS

If at the end of the process, OMB or DOD feels that unresolved differences remain, these issues are raised when the Secretary of Defense and Director, OMB, meet with the President. Once all the final budget decisions are made, the DOD budget then becomes a part of the President's Budget that will be submitted to the Congress in January. Once the President signs Congress's appropriation act into law, OMB can begin apportioning funds to the federal departments. The Services execute the budget, new forces and capabilities are procured, and the CINCs prepare to execute their OPLANs.

JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN (JSCP)—JSPS

After the DPG is published, the Joint Staff (J-5 lead), prepares the next JSCP for the approval of CJCS the next January. The JSCP contains guidance to the commanders of unified and specified commands and the chiefs of the Services for the accomplishment of military tasks in the short-range period (two years). These assignments are based on the capabilities of available forces, intelligence information, and guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense. The JSCP directs the development of plans to support national security objectives by assigning tasks and apportioning major combat forces to the commanders of unified and specified commands. As a capabilities planning document, it represents the **last phase** of resource management. It tells how to use the output from the PPBS.

The JSCP is published biennially by CJCS by 15 February and updated between planned publications when significant events or changes dictate. For example, any new or modified tasks assigned after its publication would be considered significant. Updates or interim changes are issued as page changes or, if required, by message.

503. DOD ACQUISITION SYSTEM. The DOD acquisition system is used to plan, design, develop, acquire, maintain, and dispose of all equipment, facilities, and services in DOD. The system has been revised to streamline the acquisition process, provide for formal risk analysis, and reduce/eliminate costly changes later in the production cycle.

a. The principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense on acquisition is the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE), who is the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition (USD(A)). The DAE chairs the **Defense Acquisition Board (DAB)**, which assists with milestone and program reviews, policy formulation, and acquisition resource recommendations. The DAB is supported by the ten acquisition committees shown in Figure 5-5 that oversee selected areas.





Figure 5-5

b. A key concept of system acquisition is the designation of a single Program Manager (PM) to be responsible for all the technical and business aspects of a program. A PM works for a Program Executive Officer (PEO), who administers a number of acquisition programs. The PEO is responsible to a Service Acquisition Executive (SAE).

c. A program is defined as a **Major Defense Acquisition Program** if

- it has been so designated by the Secretary of Defense because of urgency of need, development risk, joint funding, or significant Congressional interest, or
- the total expenditure for research, development, testing, and evaluation is more than \$200 million or the eventual total expenditure for procurement is more than \$1 billion, based on FY 1980 constant dollars.

d. The acquisition process is shown in Figure 5-6. It is normally divided into **four phases** that can be tailored to fit each acquisition to minimize acquisition time and life-cycle costs, consistent with the urgency of need and degree of technical risk involved.



Reference: DOD Instruction 5000.2

Figure 5-6

(1) **Concept exploration/definition phase**

(a) An assessment of the current or projected U.S. military capability to perform assigned missions, called a **Mission Area Analysis (MAA)**, is conducted before a new acquisition starts. The MAA evaluates threat, friendly capabilities, technological opportunities, doctrine, and new defense interests. The primary objective is to identify deficiencies and determine a more effective means of performing assigned tasks. The MAA may result in recommendations to

- initiate new acquisition programs,
- change U.S. and allied concepts and doctrine,
- use existing military or commercial systems,
- modify or improve an existing system, or

- enter into a **cooperative research and development program** with one or more allied nations.

(b) If the MAA results in the recommendation to initiate a new acquisition program, a **mission need statement (MNS)** is submitted to the DAE with or before the POM submission in which funds are requested (milestone 0).

(c) The starting point of a major system acquisition is the DOD approval granted through the PDM. It advises Congress of major commitment of funds needed in out years and becomes the basis for Congressional review. Having received a program initiation decision at milestone 0, the program manager must begin to identify alternative concepts to satisfy the mission need. During the phase of **concept exploration/definition**, the PM, working through private industry, identifies reasonable system alternatives that may satisfy the mission requirement and selects for further development those that meet cost, schedule, performance, and readiness objectives. The PM prepares

- the **Systems Concept Paper (SCP)**, a summary of the results of the concept exploration phase, and
- the **Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP)**, a broad plan that sets out the testing and evaluation to be accomplished in each program phase.

(d) A **milestone I** decision is made to enter into the next phase that establishes broad goals and thresholds in the areas of program cost, schedule, and operational effectiveness and suitability. This gives the PM maximum flexibility to develop innovative and cost-effective solutions. The decision is made by the Secretary of Defense and is documented in an **Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM)**.

(2) **Concept demonstration/validation phase.** During this phase

- feasibility of competing alternatives is demonstrated and the most capable system for fulfilling the mission is selected,
- prototype systems are fabricated to support both design development and testing and evaluation to identify areas of risk, and
- operational and developmental testing are conducted in a realistic operational environment with extensive user participation.

(a) The program office updates life-cycle costs, sends annual funding input into the PPBS, and prepares documentation to assist in the milestone II decision. The TEMP is updated and the **Decision Coordinating Paper (DCP)** is prepared. The DCP summarizes the results of the concept demonstration/validation phase, identifies program alternatives, and establishes explicit goals and thresholds for program cost, schedule, and operational effectiveness and suitability.

(b) The Secretary of Defense makes the **milestone II** decision and documents it in an ADM granting approval to proceed with the full-scale development phase.

(3) **Full-scale development phase.** During this phase the PM completes system development to the point where an economic decision can be made to produce the system in quantity. The PM demonstrates that all technical, operational, and resource requirement thresholds have been met and that adequate resources are available to support production and deployment.

(a) In preparation for milestone III, the DCP and TEMP are updated to describe program changes since milestone II and to propose goal and threshold revisions, if appropriate.

(b) The milestone III decision of the Secretary of Defense, recorded in an ADM, grants approval to proceed with the full-rate production and deployment phase.

(4) **Production and deployment phase.** During the production and deployment phase, the PM ensures that systems are produced and deployed according to plans. Operational testing and evaluation, user training, and logistical support are key activities during this phase. A formal review is scheduled one to two years after initial deployment of a system to ensure that operational readiness and support objectives are being met.

(a) The results of this review are presented for consideration for the milestone IV decision, which identifies actions and resources needed to ensure that objectives are achieved and maintained.

(b) Milestone V is an MAA that occurs five to ten years after initial deployment. The review of the system's current state of operational effectiveness, suitability, and readiness determines whether major upgrades are necessary or deficiencies warrant consideration of replacement. A milestone V decision may result in a milestone 0 decision for a new system acquisition.

504. THE WORLDWIDE MILITARY COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM (WWMCCS)

a. Overview

(1) **Definition.** Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*, defines the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) as "the system that provides the means for operational direction and technical administrative support involved in the function of command and control of U.S. military forces." WWMCCS furnishes a multipath channel of secure communications to transmit tactical warning and intelligence information to the President and Secretary of Defense, and the channel from them to give direction to U.S. combatant commanders. The system's goal is to establish effective connectivity among the members of the defense organization.

(2) WWMCCS is made up of

- the National Military Command System,
- the command and control systems of the unified and specified commands,
- the WWMCCS-related management/information systems of the

headquarters of the military departments,

- the command and control systems of the headquarters of the Service component commands, and
- the command and control support systems of DOD agencies.

b. **History.** The basic requirement for WWMCCS originated with the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. WWMCCS is described in DOD Directive 5100.30 and Joint Pub 6-03 series, which establish the command and control mechanism to support the NCA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and major field commanders.

c. **System operation.** The primary mission of WWMCCS is to support the national-level command and control function. On a noninterference basis, the system is available to support combatant commanders in their command and control responsibilities.

(1) A conceptual view of WWMCCS includes five basic elements:

- **Warning Systems** are the tactical warning systems that notify operation command centers of the occurrence of a threatening event.
- **WWMCCS Communications** include the general- and special-purpose communications capabilities to convey information, hold conferences, and issue orders.
- **Data Collection and Processing** is the collection and handling of data to support information requirements of WWMCCS.
- **Executive Aids** are the WWMCCS-related documents, procedures, reporting structure, and system interaction that permit the user to connect with the system, enter data, and receive output records, forms, and displays.
- **WWMCCS Command Facilities** are the primary or alternate command centers.

Each of these extends through the various levels of command and control. The operation of the WWMCCS elements together forms a worldwide information system. The Data Collection and Processing element has been expanded in Figure 5-7 to show additional detail and to illustrate the relationship of JOPS III and JDS ADP to the overall system




Figure 5-7

(2) The basic requirement of WWMCCS is to transfer information. The information flow is enhanced both by formalized reporting systems defined in Joint Pub 1-03 series and by standard, compatible automatic data processing (ADP) connected together in a network of reporting systems and databases. The ADP system supports four basic functional areas: Resource and Unit Monitoring (RUM), Conventional Planning and Execution (CPE), Nuclear Planning and Execution (NPE), and Tactical Warning/Attack Assessment (TW/AA).

(3) WWMCCS users access WWMCCS programs through a visual information projection (VIP) terminal, a WWMCCS Information System (WIS) Common-User Contract (CUC) such as the IBM-PC/XT, or the newly acquired Honeywell/Macintosh WIS Workstation. These terminals and workstations are connected to one of the many Honeywell 6000 computers that, since 1973, have been the standard ADP support for joint operation planning/execution. These computers have been substantially upgraded and are now called Distributed Processing System-8 (DPS-8). The first significant rewrite of the operating system was fielded in early 1989 as the General Comprehensive Operating System-8 (GCOS-8).

d. **Interfaces.** WWMCCS is not a single system, nor are there plans for it to become one. It is a system of systems that range from the national to the theater level. Some of the component systems are WWMCCS-unique, but most are designed, developed, purchased, and used to satisfy the command and control requirements of the Services or commands that normally use them. WWMCCS is not a closed system. Figure 5-8




Figure 5-8

illustrates its contacts with other non-WWMCCS systems (for example, the Presidential Command and Control System), non-DOD agency systems, and tactical command and control systems that support subordinate military Service units.

e. With the **WWMCCS Intercomputer Network (WIN)**, users can communicate with other users, review and update data at other WWMCCS locations, and transfer data accurately and rapidly between computers. The land line and satellite connections permit real-time Top Secret communications. These capabilities are illustrated in Figure 5-9 and are described briefly in the following subparagraphs.




Figure 5-9

(1) **Telecommunication Network (TELNET)** is used to establish remote access to computer resources of another remote host in the network; that is, with proper permissions users can log on to a WWMCCS remote host computer site as if the terminal were connected to their site.

(2) **File Transfer Service (FTS)** is used to exchange large volumes of data; for example, entire TPFDD files can be passed between members of the JPEC.

(3) The WIN Teleconference (TLCF) permits up to 80 interconnected WWMCCS sites to confer and exchange textual information simultaneously. These 80 sites can accommodate 250 total users simultaneously.

505. NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND SYSTEM

a. **Purpose.** The National Military Command System is the component of the Worldwide Military Command and Control System that supports the NCA in the exercise of their military command responsibilities. It is a responsive, reliable, and survivable system that relays the warning and intelligence that permit accurate and timely decisions.

b. **Definition.** The NMCS includes the National Military Command Center (NMCC), the Alternate National Military Command Center (ANMCC), the National Emergency Airborne Command Post (NEACP), and other command centers designated by the Secretary of Defense. It also includes the communications connecting the command centers to the headquarters of the combatant commanders, Service headquarters, and other commands and agencies that support via the WWMCCS.

c. **Coordination.** Effective coordination and liaison are established and maintained with activities outside the DOD that have functions associated with the NMCS, for example, White House Situation Room, CIA Operations Center, U.S. Coast Guard Operations Center, etc. Military information is exchanged with these organizations through timely, secure, and reliable communications systems. In addition, political, intelligence, diplomatic, and economic information are received from these sources. CJCS is responsible for the coordination with activities outside the Department of Defense.

506. THE JOINT OPERATION PLANNING SYSTEM. The system used by DOD to conduct joint planning is the Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS). The "joint operational planning process" (UNAAF) is used by a combatant commander in either deliberate or crisis action situations to determine the best method of accomplishing an assigned task and to direct the action necessary to accomplish the mission. It outlines key elements that contribute to successful problem solving. The overall process includes procedures that allow consideration of factors that can significantly affect the accomplishment of the task and that permit the entire staff to estimate the influence of these factors on the contemplated courses of action. Throughout the planning process, capabilities exist to identify significant planning factors, estimate the extent of their influence on the situation, and analyze the various courses of action. This information assists the commander in making a decision.

a. **Overview of JOPS.** JOPS, the DOD-directed, JCS-specified system to conduct joint planning during peacetime and in crises, is an ordered and comprehensive set of procedures to translate an assigned task into a plan of operations. JOPS supports the strategic-direction function of CJCS and establishes procedures for developing, reviewing, and executing global and regional plans. It is oriented toward solving the complex strategic mobility problem associated with force and support deployment and sustainment. The procedures are outlined in JOPS Volumes I, II, and IV. Automatic data processing support for deliberate planning, referred to as JOPS III or JOPS ADP, is described in JOPS Volume III.

b. **History of JOPS.** Development of support for joint operation planning began in the 1960s. Originally, **different types of computers, incompatible software programs, and inconsistent planning procedures and documentation** were used to communicate between commands. The planning data, for instance, stored in a particular command's computer system were readily available only to the organization that used that computer. Transferring information to another command's computer was mechanically difficult, frustrating, and time-consuming. Moreover, the unified and specified commands had, over time, developed different formats for storing the data to support their operation plans. Plans submitted by the combatant commands were difficult to analyze, review, and approve.

(1) In 1966 the Secretary of Defense, recognizing the seriousness of the problems, directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop standardized joint planning procedures and a standardized ADP system that could be used with WWMCCS to support the new Joint Operation Planning System. The new automated system was to fulfill several needs:

- foster common understanding by using **standard procedures** throughout the planning community;
- give **standard formats** for operation plans that contain only the information necessary to understand and use the plans;
- incorporate **standard data files and common application programs** in a system compatible with all users to allow the rapid flow of information;
- permit the **identification of shortfalls** early in the planning process;
- include a mechanism for **plan refinement and review**; and
- allow **rapid conversion** of the operation plan (OPLAN) into an operation order (OPORD) during a crisis.

(2) Work began on the development of the new planning system in 1967; initial design of JOPS got formal JCS approval in 1970. The new guidance, planning procedures, and plan formats were printed in two volumes; Volume I was unclassified, Volume II, classified.

(3) By 1973, 35 new Honeywell 6000 computers had been installed to furnish the ADP support for the standardized procedures described in JOPS Volumes I and II. Unfortunately, with the replacement of the old computers, many combatant commanders lost their software programs, which were not compatible with the new computer equipment. Faced with the problem of losing previously developed ADP support for planning, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed rapid development of temporary computer programs until new software was introduced. The system was designated the JOPS Interim Software (JIS), and four unified commands were selected to design portions of it:

- U.S. Readiness Command (since disestablished) designed a computer program to build and time-phase a force list--the Force Requirements Generator (FRG).
- U.S. Pacific Command developed a method of computing the support required to sustain a military force--the Movement Requirements Generator (MRG).
- U.S. Atlantic Command developed a program to simulate the strategic deployment of forces and support--the Transportation Feasibility Estimator (TFE).
- U.S. European Command designed the utility programs to allow the other major programs to communicate and produce a meaningful OPLAN database.

(4) The JIS programs worked so well that they were adopted as the standard ADP system for joint operation planning. In 1975, JOPS Volume III was published, describing the computer support system. The JOPS ADP system is commonly called the JOPS III, taken from the name of that document, and has undergone many updates since its original version.

(5) In the early 1980s a concerted effort was undertaken to update the entire WWMCCS Information System. The effort became known as WIS, with the Air Force designated lead agent. The Air Force developed a comprehensive program that involved replacement of hardware and software systems. However, budgetary constraints caused a redirection of the effort, so that in the spring of 1989, the Air Force ceased to be the lead agent. The Defense Communications Agency (DCA), specifically the Joint Data Systems Support Center (JDSSC), took control of the part of the WIS program that was concerned with JOPS/JDS modernization. WIS ceased to exist, and DCA has designated its effort the WWMCCS ADP modernization (WAM).

c. **Guidelines.** JOPS directive documentation is organized in four volumes.

(1) Joint Pub 5-02.1, **JOPS Volume I (Deliberate Planning Procedures)** is unclassified. It contains guidance and administrative procedures for developing, coordinating, disseminating, reviewing, and approving joint operation plans during peacetime. In addition, Volume I prescribes standard formats and minimum content of operation plans, for example, a broad outline of the contents of a CONPLAN and the basic plan, annexes, appendices, tabs, and exhibits for an OPLAN.

(2) Joint Pub 5-02.2, **JOPS Volume II (Supplementary Planning Guidance)** is classified. It is functionally oriented and gives directions, procedures, and planning guidance keyed to certain plan annexes, as well as formats for classified subjects.

(3) Joint Pub 5-02.3, **JOPS Volume III (ADP Support)** is unclassified. It describes the WWMCCS standard computer-based system that supports the plan development phase of deliberate planning, specifically, the development of the Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data file. It contains descriptions of

- **standard reference files** that are a source of basic planning information;
- **JOPS standard ADP application programs** that assist in developing and time-phasing a force list, computing required resupply and replacement personnel, determining medical and civil engineering support, and simulating the strategic deployment of all movement requirements; and
- **reporting instructions and data exchange** associated with the standard reference files and ADP programs.

(4) Joint Pub 5-02.4, **JOPS Volume IV (Crisis Action Procedures)** is unclassified. It outlines guidance and procedures for joint planning during emergency or time-sensitive situations. The procedures give guidance to the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

Services, combatant commanders, and defense agencies for developing timely recommendations to the NCA.

d. **Documentation.** There are two products of JOPS--operation plans (OPLANs or CONPLANs) and operation orders (OPORDs).

e. **ADP support.** JOPS describes the process for developing OPLANs as deliberate or peacetime planning. The automatic data processing that supports deliberate planning is the WWMCCS ADP standard computer-based system known as **JOPS ADP**. The process for developing OPORDs is described as crisis or time-sensitive planning and defined by JOPS Crisis Action Procedures (CAP). The **Joint Deployment System (JDS)** has been developed to support CAP as a time-responsive system capable of handling information rapidly during a crisis.

f. **Relationship with Other DOD Systems.** Figure 5-10 illustrates the relationship among JOPS, JSPS, PPBS, and DOD Acquisition System. A review of the "pretzel chart" reveals that three of the documents in the JSPS directly influence the JOPS and PPBS, with the CPA also significantly affecting the DOD acquisition.




Figure 5-10

507. THE JOINT OPERATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM (JOPES). The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) is to replace JOPS and JDS. It

consists of the creation and integration of new capabilities associated with the functional areas of threat identification and assessment, strategy determination, course of action development, execution planning, implementation, monitoring, and simulation and analysis of related mission areas. The first three versions gave the user community initial, near-term JOPES capabilities implemented with current WWMCCS systems and technologies. Version 4 will replace the separate JOPS and JDS systems and establish a truly integrated JOPES. See Chapter 8 for a detailed discussion of JOPES.

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Deliberate Planning

600. INTRODUCTION

References: *Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*
 Joint Pub 5-02.1, JOPS Volume I, Deliberate Planning Procedures

NOTE: The ongoing incremental releases of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) will be affecting the procedures described in this chapter. Refer to Chapter 8 for detailed discussion of the JOPES implementation.

a. Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, defines the joint operation planning process as follows:

"a coordinated joint staff procedure used by a commander to determine the best method of accomplishing assigned tasks and to direct the action necessary to accomplish his mission."

The particular procedures we use in joint planning depend on the time available to accomplish them. When time is not a critical factor, we use a process called peacetime or deliberate planning. When the time available for planning is short and the near-term result is expected to be an actual deployment and/or employment of armed forces, the planner uses crisis action procedures. The overall procedures are the same for both deliberate and crisis action planning:

- receive and analyze the task to be accomplished,
- review the enemy situation and begin to collect necessary intelligence,
- develop and compare alternative courses of action,
- select the best alternative,
- develop and get approval for its concept,
- prepare a plan, and
- document the plan.

b. The next section of this chapter introduces the entire process of joint operation planning to give perspective to the planning problem. The remaining sections will describe **deliberate planning** procedures. We will discuss deliberate planning from the receipt of the assigned task to the development of a detailed transportation schedule of personnel, materiel, and resupply into the theater of military operations. The chapter also describes the procedures for maintaining the accuracy of the data in an OPLAN. We will present the phases and steps of the planning process as sequential and orderly, though in actual practice procedures may vary considerably. Some of the steps may overlap, some may be undertaken simultaneously, and some are iterative.

601. THE PROCESS OF JOINT OPERATION PLANNING

a. The staff of a combatant command must consider many factors in its planning in order to select the **best means** of performing a military mission. Understandably, this means that the the planning process will be **complex**; out of necessity the process must be **orderly and thorough**. The joint operation planning process must be flexible, as well. In peacetime, it may require 18 to 24 months to completely prepare and fully coordinate a plan; on the other hand, a crisis may demand a product in just a few days.

b. The amount of **time available** significantly influences the planning process. Two different methods of planning are described in the JCS-published *Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS)*.

(1) **DELIBERATE or PEACETIME PLANNING** is the process used when time permits the total participation of the commanders and staffs of the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC). The development of the plan, coordination among supporting commanders, reviews by the Joint Staff, and communications between the members of the JPEC take many months; preparation of a large plan may not be completed before the next two-year planning cycle begins. The procedures of deliberate planning are described in JOPS Volumes I and II; the volumes also give the administrative requirements for publishing the plan, its annexes, appendices, etc. JOPS Volume III introduces the available automatic data processing (ADP) support.

(2) **TIME-SENSITIVE or CRISIS ACTION PLANNING** is conducted during emergencies and uses the procedures described in Joint Pub 5-02.4. The overall process of time-sensitive planning parallels that of deliberate planning, but it is a more flexible system that responds to the demands of changing events. The procedures allow for a logical, rapid flow of information, timely preparation of executable courses of action, and communication of the decisions of the National Command Authorities (NCA) to the combatant commander. The ADP support for time-sensitive planning is supplied by the Joint Deployment System (JDS); the demands for plan execution and monitoring are quite different from those of deliberate planning and its support with JOPS ADP.

c. The view of **resources** is another method of describing joint operation planning.

(1) **Requirements planning** focuses on the combatant commander's analysis of the enemy threat or assigned task. The planned response determines the level of forces and the support needed to overcome that threat. These required forces and supplies may be more than the level of available resources.

(2) On the other hand, **capabilities planning** attempts to meet the threat based on the forces and support that have been funded by Congress in the current budget cycle. This level of forces, equipment, and supplies is available now or expected to be available in this planning cycle.

(3) The military solution may be constrained: the course of action may be limited by the available resources or political and diplomatic considerations. The JPEC is moving toward capabilities planning. The path is not easy, but several positive actions are being taken. Combat forces are being apportioned among the largest worldwide

operation plans, and assignment of multiple, conflicting tasks to units is being eliminated in plans expected to be conducted concurrently. The apportioning of supplies is much more difficult, but work progresses on creating contingency plans based on available supplies.

d. Still another way to define planning focuses on **command perspective**.

(1) **Strategic, global planning** is done primarily at the JCS/NCA level. Decisionmakers look at the entire world situation as it affects, or is affected by, the use of U.S. military forces.

(2) In **regional planning**, combatant commanders focus on their specific geographic regions as defined in the *Unified Command Plan*.

(3) **Functional planning** is conducted by combatant commanders with functional responsibilities, i.e., USSPACECOM, USSOCOM, and USTRANSCOM, and the Service component commanders. They view their planning problem as not being limited by geography. For instance, each subordinate component concentrates on the planning for its **Service's** entire contribution to the supported CINC's concept of operations.

(4) The perspective of the command greatly influences both the choice of course of action and the resources made available for planning. Strategic planning for simultaneous execution of a number of OPLANs outweighs the regional perspective of any single commander. Likewise, functional planning has to be subordinated to the supported CINC's concepts for the entire theater of operations.

e. Last, joint operation planning can be described in terms of its **contribution to a larger purpose**.

(1) **Campaign planning** takes a comprehensive view of the combatant commander's theater of operations and defines the framework in which an OPLAN fits. Campaign planning offers purpose and a common objective to a series of OPLANs.

(2) A successful contingency plan involves a wide spectrum of operations. Each element within the spectrum requires special consideration:

- **mobilization planning** details the mobilization of reserve forces and their movement from home to the port of embarkation;
- **deployment planning** describes the strategic movement of forces and support from the port of embarkation to the port of debarkation;
- **employment planning** describes the theater use of combat forces; and
- **sustainment planning** involves the resupply of combat forces.

(3) We will outline the entire environment of joint operations, but will focus on deployment planning and emphasize the strategic mobility problem. In large part, we will do so, first, because deployment planning is the focus of real-world JOPS and, second, because today's computer support limits the deliberate planner to this element of the total planning problem.

602. DELIBERATE PLANNING

a. To draw from the many categories we have identified, this chapter describes the planning procedures for

- developing a plan of **military action** in a **hostile environment**
- prepared by a CINC with a **regional perspective**
- by a staff in **peacetime conditions** when combat action is not imminent
- using currently available U.S. **capabilities** measured in armed forces, transportation, and supplies and
- emphasizing the strategic **deployment** of those forces, equipment, and supplies based on the CINC's concept of operations.

b. This chapter discusses the deliberate planning procedures to build a contingency plan for military action. The plan is based on **predicted conditions** that will be countered with **resources available during the planning cycle**. The product is called an operation plan, and it can be either an OPLAN or a CONPLAN, depending on the level of detail that is included.

c. Automatic data processing support is essential in the laborious process of creating and maintaining a database of the many available types of combat and support units, describing the units in terms of numbers of passengers and weight and volume of cargo, calculating the vast quantities of specific sustaining supplies needed in each of the various phases of hostile action, and simulating the movement of troops and support from their current location to the point of employment in the theater of military operations.

603. SUMMARY OF THE PLANNING CYCLE

a. The process of joint planning is continuous. It begins when a task is assigned and continues until the requirement for the plan is cancelled or the plan is implemented.

b. **Task assignment.** CJCS is responsible for preparing strategic plans and providing for the preparation of joint contingency plans. Strategic planning was discussed in Chapter 5; the contingency planning responsibility of CJCS is performed through the commanders of unified and specified combatant commands (CINCs). The task-assigning directive performs several functions: it apportions the major combat forces available for planning and specifies the product document, i.e., a CONPLAN or an OPLAN. With this the CINC has the scope of the plan, its format, and the amount of detail that must go into its preparation.

c. **Developing the concept.** In response to the task assignment, the supported commander first determines a mission statement and then develops a fully staffed concept of operations that is submitted to CJCS for review and approval. This concept is also sent to the subordinate and supporting commanders, who can then begin the detailed planning associated with the next phase.

d. **Developing the detailed plan.** Subordinate commanders use the CINC's concept and the apportioned major combat forces as the basis to determine the necessary support, including forces and sustaining supplies for the operation. The CINC consolidates subordinates' recommended phasing of forces and support and performs a transportation analysis of the movement to ensure that the entire plan can be executed as envisioned. Next, the Services identify real-world units to take part in the plan. USTRANSCOM, a supporting command, analyzes strategic sea and air transportation. Figure 6-1 illustrates the overall process of this phase: **determine the forces and cargo required; describe them in logistic terms of numbers, volume, and weight; simulate the move using apportioned lift resources; and, finally, confirm that the OPLAN is transportation feasible with the available resources and transportation schedules.** This phase is over when documentation is prepared for final review.




Figure 6-1

e. **Review of the plan.** The review process is not a single phase in deliberate planning. The Joint Staff had already reviewed and approved the CINC's concept of operations before detailed plan development began. Now the complete plan goes to the CJCS for review and approval. If all is in order, the plan will be approved (effective for execution, when directed).

f. **Preparation of the supporting plans.** The emphasis now shifts to the subordinate commanders, who are under the operational command of the supported CINC, and to the supporting commanders. They respond to the tasks identified in the approved OPLAN by preparing supporting plans and employment plans. These plans outline the actions of assigned and augmenting forces.

604. BASIS FOR MILITARY PLANNING

a. The process of planning a joint operation develops a contingency plan for military action. It begins with a national strategy stated by the President, supported with the funding of resources by Congress, and is defined by the task assignments published by the CJCS. The systems that support the translation of national interests into OPLANs are discussed in detail in Chapter 5.




Figure 6-2

b. Players in the planning process are illustrated in Figure 6-2. They include the NCA, their advisers, supporting executive-level agencies, and a group collectively called the **Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC)**. The JPEC is defined in Joint Pub 1-02 as the commands and agencies involved in the training, preparation, movement, employment, support, and sustainment of forces in a theater of operations. Examples of those organizations are listed in the JCS definition and include those shown on the lower part of Figure 6-2, i.e., CJCS, supported commanders, etc.

(1) Civilian leadership tops the pyramid in Figure 6-2. The ultimate decision on national policy, detailed development of resource levels, and overall strategic direction of the U.S. Armed Forces is given by the President and Secretary of Defense, referred to as the National Command Authorities (NCA). The NCA are supported by the executive departments, e.g., Departments of Defense and State, and organizations within the Office of the President, such as the National Security Council. The illustration also includes defense agencies, e.g., Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and Defense Logistics Agency. All these executive-level organizations have a role to play in the preliminary direction of contingency operations and approval of the final plans.

(2) Lower in the pyramid are the CJCS and the Joint Staff, who publish the task-assigning documents, review the products, and approve the final version of the peacetime OPLAN. The supported command, i.e., the unified or specified combatant command, and its subordinates are the commands principally responsible for developing the deliberate plan and, ultimately, executing it. The Services and their logistics agencies play key support roles within the community. By law, it is the responsibility of the Services to recruit, organize, supply, equip, train, and maintain forces for the combatant commands. The U.S. Transportation Command is shown separately as a supporting player in the JPEC because of its responsibilities in developing the plan, simulating the movement of resources, and finally executing the transportation schedule. The last entry on the figure is titled "Supporting Commands"; it represents all the combatant commands that supply resources to the supported command.

c. The **Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS)** is an established, orderly way of translating the task assignments into an operation plan or operation order. JOPS is directed by DOD to be used as the process for joint planning. The result is a system that is comprehensive enough to prepare a concept of military operations thoroughly and automated enough to handle enormous quantities of data. With modern computer simulation tools we can be reasonably assured that the plan will work as expected. The overall system is complex and may be difficult to understand unless we look at the process and procedures that make it up.

(1) For convenience, we will define **process** as a particular method of planning for joint operations that involves a number of steps or operations. It is the planning activity from receipt of the task to the preparation of supporting plans by subordinate and supporting commanders. The joint planning process for both peacetime and crisis situations is described in the four volumes of JOPS published by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Joint Pub 5-02 series.

(2) The **procedures** are the individual, often interrelated steps, actions, or methods that we perform to produce the plan. For deliberate planning the fundamental procedures are outlined in JOPS Volumes I, II, and III; for time-sensitive planning JOPS Volume IV describes the procedures. Each level of command that is responsible for writing plans may have developed its own procedures to expand or augment the JOPS volumes. These procedures may vary in certain respects from command to command, so newly assigned staff officers will have to adjust to the specifics of their own organization.

(3) Staff officers should keep clear the difference between "process," the method of planning, and "procedure," the individual steps, as they become immersed in joint planning. An abundance of detailed procedures accompanies the actual planning process, yet most of the published guidance seems very general in nature. We will try to amplify JOPS guidance.

d. Service Planning Systems

(1) The secretary of each military department is responsible for the efficiency of that Service and its preparedness for military operations. Each has designed a Service-unique planning system. Given strategic guidance in JCS documents and program and budget guidance sent through department channels, the military Service chiefs have developed a series of documents that support, direct, and guide Service component commanders.

(2) The following documents describe the Service-unique planning systems and have specific application in the development of joint OPLANs:

U.S. ARMY PUBLICATIONS

FM 34-1, *Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*

FM 100-5, *Operations*

FM 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations*

FM 101-40, *Armed Forces Doctrine for Chemical Warfare and Biological Defense*

Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System (AMOPS)

U.S. NAVY PUBLICATIONS

NWP 11, *Naval Operational Planning*

Navy Capabilities and Mobilization Plan (NCMP)

U.S. AIR FORCE OPERATIONS

AFR 28-3, *USAF Operation Planning Process*

AFR 28-4, *USAF Mobility Planning*

TAC Sup 1 to AFR 28-4, *USAF Mobility Planning*

USAF War and Mobilization Plan (WMP)

U.S. MARINE CORPS PUBLICATIONS

FMFM 2-1, *Intelligence*

FMFM 3-1, *Command and Staff Action*

Marine Corps Capabilities Plan (MCP)

Marine Corps Mobilization Management Plan (MPLAN)

(3) The Service component commanders receive direction and guidance from both the **operational chain of command** and the **Service support chain of command**; they are the common link in the two chains of command. They support the operational needs of the CINCs to the extent that their Services can support them. The components negotiate the proper balance between requirements planning and capabilities planning.

605. PHASES OF DELIBERATE PLANNING. The five formal phases of the deliberate planning process begin when a commander receives a task assignment and end when supporting plans have been approved by the supported commander. However, from the supported commander's perspective, the deliberate planning is never complete. It requires regular updating of plan information to ensure that it is ready for execution; some large plans have planners continuously updating elements of information. In fact, the plan is with us until either the plan task assignment is revised and the plan altered to meet the new conditions, or the plan is cancelled when it no longer applies, or, finally, the plan, or an element of it, is implemented. Figure 6-3 shows the five formal phases of the deliberate planning process.

a. In the **initiation phase** planning tasks are assigned, major combat forces and strategic transportation assets are apportioned for planning, and the groundwork is laid for planning to begin.

b. Several items are completed during the **concept development phase**. The mission is derived by the combatant commander from the assigned task. Planning guidance is issued to the combatant commander's staff and information on the enemy is collected and analyzed. From this, the staff proposes and analyzes tentative courses of action (COAs), the combatant commander selects the best COA, and the staff develops and documents a concept of operations. By the authority of CJCS, the Joint Staff reviews the concept and it is approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

c. In the **plan development phase** the combatant commander's staff and the staffs of Service components develop a detailed transportation-feasible flow of resources into the theater to support the concept. Forces are selected and time-phased, support requirements are determined, and the strategic transportation flow is computer simulated. The information that is required for the plan, that is, the combat and support units along with the equipment and supply support, is collected in the Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) file. This phase ends when the fully documented OPLAN, including the TPFDD, is forwarded to CJCS for review and approval.

d. The **plan review phase** is a formal element of the deliberate planning process. Even before this phase begins, the OPLAN has received a concept review; now all elements of the plan are submitted to CJCS for review of the concept for adequacy and feasibility.

e. In the **supporting plan phase**, each subordinate and supporting commander who is assigned a task in the CINC's plan prepares a supporting plan. The supporting commander submits these plans to the supported combatant commander for review and approval. The planning process is not complete until the employment plans and the supporting deployment plans are complete; only then is the CINC's plan ready for implementation.

f. The **planning cycle** for the deliberate planning process begins with the publication of the principal task-assigning document, the biennial *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* (JSCP), and ends in the last year of the JSCP. The approved OPLANs prepared as directed by the JSCP are considered effective until superseded. CJCS publishes the schedule for document submission dates, dates for the TPFDD refinement conferences held late in the plan development phase, and dates for the TPFDD maintenance conferences. The CINCs play a vital role in establishing the administrative

schedules as well as recommending to CJCS that current OPLANs are valid, need updating, or should be cancelled.




Figure 6-3

Reference: Joint Pub 5-02.1, JOPS Volume 1, "Deliberate Planning"

INITIATION PHASE

606. INITIATION PHASE OF DELIBERATE PLANNING

a. Background

(1) Of course, military action is not the only response to a situation that threatens U.S. interests. Diplomatic and economic responses are considered in the formulation of national policy. The preparation of a military plan using the deliberate planning process would be considered if military action in a hostile environment were a possibility. Of course, there are various military options available to the decisionmaker. These options may be considered in the original task assignment to the CINC or, more likely, as viable deterrent options to be used before force entry, for example, show of force, demonstration, blockade, etc. Deterrent options and the resources to support them are specifically identified in the CINC's operation plan.

(2) The nation's strategic direction is developed by the President and his advisers. The national strategy is staffed and prepared by the National Security Council (NSC). In the Reagan Administration, this strategy was published as a National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) signed by the President; the exact title of the President's decision document varies with the administration. After the national strategy is published, the worldwide military strategy is translated into specific regional strategic plans by the CJCS.

b. Task-assigning documents

(1) CJCS outlines the nation's military strategy in the biennial *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* (JSCP), which assigns preparation of specific contingency plans to the unified and specified combatant commanders.

(a) The JSCP assigns the CINCs the task of preparing operation plans in complete format (OPLANs) or in concept, or abbreviated, format (CONPLANs). The formats for both OPLANs and CONPLANs are described in detail in Joint Pub 5-02.2 (JOPS Volume II). Briefly, the CONPLAN does not require the detailed identification of units and preparation of movement schedules found in the OPLAN and its accompanying TPFDD file.

(b) The JSCP identifies major combat forces and strategic transportation for the operation plan. These are called **apportioned** resources since they represent the combatant commander's share of the total U.S. military capabilities that are expected to be available during the planning cycle for a plan. For that matter, apportioned resources may include any limited, crucial asset, such as combat forces, support forces, supplies, or strategic and theater transportation units. The JSCP generally apportions "major combat forces," a term that covers combat, not support, units and, generally, units the size of Army and Marine Corps brigades or larger, Air Force squadrons, and Navy carrier battle groups and surface action groups. It is important to recognize that these apportioned resources may differ from the numbers that may be furnished, or **allocated**, when the operation is actually executed.

(c) Priorities are established for OPLANs that compete for limited resources.

(2) The **Unified Command Plan (UCP)** gives basic guidance to the combatant commander on general responsibilities and identifies the geographic or functional areas of responsibility (AORs).

(a) The UCP is a classified JCS document issued irregularly but updated periodically. It is a task-assigning document and, therefore, specifically cites the authority granted by the Secretary of Defense through memorandum or DOD directive. The UCP is approved by the President.

(b) In broad terms, the UCP assigns the combatant commanders to be prepared to

- evacuate noncombatants,
- execute disaster recovery operations, and
- conduct "normal operations" within the assigned geographic and functional AOR.

"Normal operations" is a broad category that includes responsibilities for planning and executing operations in contingencies, limited war, and general war; planning and conducting operations other than contingencies; planning and administering the security assistance program; and maintaining the relationship and exercising authority prescribed in Joint Pub 0-2 (UNAAF), Joint Pub 4-01, *Joint Logistics Policy and Guidance*, and the Joint administrative publication 1.1, *Organization and Functions of the Joint Chief of Staff*.

(c) The UCP, then, is a general task-assigning document that covers many contingencies for which the CINC has to be prepared.

(3) Joint Pub 0-2, **Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)**, is also a task-assigning document. UNAAF is unclassified JCS guidance that defines the exercise of authority by the unified and specified commander.

(a) UNAAF discusses the principles and doctrines governing joint activities of the Armed Forces:

- restatement of the statutory guidelines and departmental directives that govern the functions of the entire Department of Defense;
- functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military departments;
- principles governing the unified direction and the joint activities of the Armed Forces;
- responsibility and authority of the combatant commander; and
- functions and responsibilities of joint staff divisions.

(b) By broad definition, UNAAF initiates deliberate planning by assigning the combatant commander the task to "maintain the security of the command . . . and protect its bases against attack or hostile incursion." Continuing operation of the command and basic self-defense of the command are contingency plans developed from that broad task assignment.

(4) On occasion, **CJCS may direct preparation** of additional plans not included in the current JSCP. This task assignment may come in the form of a message or other directive. The new task will normally be incorporated into the next edition of the JSCP.

(5) The CINC's planning tasks are not limited to those specified by higher authority. The **CINC may prepare plans** considered necessary to discharge command responsibilities described in the UCP and UNAAF but not specifically assigned. The CINC may also determine that a need exists to prepare OPLANs to cover contingencies not assigned by the JSCP. If the CINC expects to assign tasks to forces not currently under his operational command, JCS approval is necessary.

(6) The number of operation plans prepared by a CINC using deliberate planning procedures varies with each command depending on the geographic AOR.

c. **Products.** In the deliberate planning process, the initiation phase directs the CINC to produce **either** an operation plan in complete format (OPLAN) **or** an operation plan in concept or abbreviated format (CONPLAN).

(1) An **OPLAN** is a complete description of the CINC's concept of operations. It also identifies the forces and supplies required to execute the plan and a movement schedule of the resources into the theater of operations. The detailed planning essential in OPLAN development is normally required when the military response to a hostile situation

- is sufficiently critical to U.S. national security to justify the detail involved,
- contributes to deterring enemy aggression by showing U.S. readiness through planning, or
- would tax total U.S. capability in forces, supplies, or transportation.

(2) Developing an OPLAN demands much time and effort. In most situations the task does not require preparation of a detailed flow of resources. Instead, the process is followed only through the development of the concept, and a more abbreviated operation plan, called a **CONPLAN**, is prepared for review and approval by the CJCS. CONPLANS are normally prepared when

- the contingency is not sufficiently crucial to national security to require detailed prior planning,
- the situation would not place unacceptable demands on U.S. resources,
- the probability of occurrence during the JSCP planning cycle is low, or
- planning flexibility is desired.

(3) These are the basic differences between the OPLAN and CONPLAN:

(a) The OPLAN fully develops the CINC's concept of operations. The documentation includes annexes that describe the concept and explain the theater-wide support required in the subordinate commander's employment plan. The OPLAN concentrates on deployment of the resources and contains a TPFDD.

(b) The CONPLAN is less detailed in documented presentation of the CINC's plan. Computer support is not generally required for the CONPLAN, since detailed support requirements need not be calculated and strategic movements need not be simulated. The CONPLAN does not generally include the detail typically found in OPLAN annexes, but it may have selected annexes and a TPFDD if the CINC directs.

d. **JPEC coordination.** The Services also have an input during the initiation of planning. Since the CJCS apportions only major combat forces, the Services must give the CINC information about other combat, combat support, and combat service support forces that are available for planning. The Services forecast the availability of replacement and filler personnel, materiel, equipment, and facilities. They also inform the combatant commander on Service doctrine, guidance, and priorities.

CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT PHASE

607. INTRODUCTION

a. After the CINC has received the task assignment, the mission is analyzed and tentative military options are developed to satisfy the assignment. The concept development phase is an orderly series of five steps that takes the joint staff through a problem-solving process to develop the CINC's concept of operations. Although the steps, illustrated in Figure 6-4, are diagrammed and discussed individually, they are not clearly defined in actual practice. The dividing line between steps is sometimes hard to see, since they are often repeated, combined, or done concurrently. Staff work done in one step affects work being done in another.

b. Once the CINC's concept of operations has been developed, the **CONPLAN** is submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for final review and approval; the **OPLAN** is transmitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for concept review and approval for further planning.

NOTE: CHART 2 IN APPENDIX K ILLUSTRATES THE CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT PHASE IN AN EXPANDED DIAGRAM. THE CHART IS DESIGNED TO BE FOLDED OUT FOR REFERENCE WHILE READING THIS SECTION.




Figure 6-4

608. STEP 1—MISSION ANALYSIS

a. Before performing the assigned task, the combatant commander understands the objective, knows what resources are available to accomplish the task, analyzes the enemy and the physical conditions that affect the task, and learns the guidelines that have been given by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The first step in the development of a military concept of operations begins with a careful analysis of the task assignment. In the language of deliberate planning, the CINC and joint staff

- determine assigned, implied, and subsidiary tasks so they can develop a concise mission statement;
- consider the forces that are available to complete the assigned task, the capabilities of the enemy, the terrain, geographic features that support friendly and enemy forces, and weather; and
- incorporate controlling factors levied by others that will influence the military operation, such as diplomatic understandings, economic conditions, host nation issues, etc.

Finally, the CINC views the overall operation and then identifies tasks for the subordinate commanders to perform.

b. Until now, we have considered the task that has been assigned to the CINC by the JSCP or other directive. The transition from the assigned task to the CINC's mission must be made. Joint publications are not often clear on the distinction between task and mission, the terms often being used interchangeably.

(1) Both Joint Pub 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, and Joint Pub 0-2, *UNAAF*, define a **mission** as "the task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken **and** the reason for the action." Neither the DOD Dictionary nor UNAAF defines a task.

(2) Varying definitions are used in Service documents. Navy and Air Force glossaries do not define either task or mission, while AR 310-25, the *Dictionary of United States Army Terms*, defines task but not mission. The Army dictionary says that tasks are the "specific Army, Navy, and Air tasks which have to be done to implement successfully the phased concept of operations stemming from. . .the overall strategic concept."

c. For the purposes of deliberate planning, a clear distinction must be made between a task and a mission.

(1) AFSC defines a **task** as a job or function assigned to a subordinate unit or command by higher authority.

(2) Using the Joint Pub 1-02 definition, then, the subordinate's **mission** is derived from the **task** assigned by a higher authority **and** includes the **reason** for that task.

(3) This distinction between mission and task is consistent with joint planning documents. The task assigned by higher authority and its contribution to that higher echelon commander serve as the basis for developing the subordinate's mission.

d. The **product of Step 1** is the **mission statement**. The mission statement carries through the planning process and is included in the planning guidance, the planning directive, staff estimates, the Commander's Estimate, the concept of operations, and the completed CONPLAN or OPLAN.

(1) It is a clear, concise statement of the tasks to be accomplished by the command and the purpose to be achieved. Multiple tasks are normally described in the sequence in which they are to be done. Routine tasks or inherent responsibilities of the commander are not usually included in the mission statement.

(2) The mission statement in the planning guidance becomes the basis for Step 3, staff estimates, and Paragraph 1 of the Commander's Estimate, Step 4. It is also included as Paragraph 2 in both the OPLAN and CONPLAN. The elements of the mission statement are **who, what, when, where, why**, and, possibly, **how**. Normally, how the operation will be conducted is decided by the subordinate commander.

(3) An example of a mission statement is found in the operation plan for the Philippine Campaign in World War II leading to Okinawa: CANF SWPA No. 16-44 of 18 November 1944:

"[When this order is received] [t]he Pacific Fleet, including four carrier groups, will, in order to support the operation, have as its continuing task the destruction of enemy naval and air forces which threaten interference with the operation. Fast carrier task forces will effect carrier strikes on the Empire, Okinawa, Formosa, and northern Luzon. . . ."

609. STEP 2—PLANNING GUIDANCE

Reference: NWP 11, *Naval Operational Planning*

a. This step has two objectives: first, to give enough initial **planning guidance** to the supported CINC's staff for work to begin on development of the concept of operations, and, second, to communicate **planning guidance** to the subordinate commanders through a written planning directive or a planning conference.

b. **Initial guidance.** The following paragraphs describe the information that a supported commander may give a staff to understand the assigned task, derived mission statement, and restrictions or other considerations that will affect their planning.

(1) **Mission.** The mission statement was developed in Step 1 from the CINC's analysis of the task.

(2) **Assumptions**

(a) The DOD Dictionary defines an assumption as

"a supposition on the current situation or a presupposition on the future course of events, either or both assumed to be true in the absence of positive proof, necessary to enable the commander in the process of planning to complete an estimate of the situation and make a decision on the course of action."

(b) An assumption normally covers the issues over which the commander has no control and is used to fill in a gap in knowledge. It is stated as if it were a fact. Subordinate commanders and supporting commanders treat the assumptions of the higher echelon commander as facts and often do not plan for the possibility that they are not. Therefore, the statement of assumptions is a critical element in the development of the concept.

(c) Assumptions have a significant impact on the planning process. If the assumption is later discovered to be incorrect, an alternate operation plan is generally needed. Because of their influence on planning, the fewest possible assumptions are included in an operation plan. A valid assumption has three characteristics: it is **logical, realistic, and essential** for the planning to continue.

(d) Assumptions are made for both friendly and enemy situations. For example, planners can **assume** the success of friendly supporting operations that are essential to the success of their own plan, but **cannot assume** the success of their own operation. For instance, COM5THFLEET included this assumption in his OPLAN for the capture of Okinawa in 1945, ". . . that the assault shipping, supporting naval forces, and army troops to be used in the operation are released promptly from Philippine operations."

(e) Planners should **assume** the worst-case scenario. The planner should **not assume** that the enemy will not use every capability at its disposal and operate in the most efficient manner possible. To dismiss these enemy possibilities could

dangerously limit the depth of planning. Again, planners should not assume away an enemy capability.

(f) Planners **cannot** assume a condition simply because of a lack of accurate knowledge of friendly forces or a lack of intelligence about the enemy.

(g) As planning proceeds, additional assumptions may be needed, some early assumptions may prove to be faulty, and still others in the light of new information may be replaced with facts gained during the planning process. The use of assumptions is more prevalent for operations planned far into the future; the situation is less certain and assumptions must be made to complete the planning. In fact, an operation order (OPORD) that directs military operations in an actual contingency will not normally include any assumptions.

(3) **Nuclear and chemical warfare.** Planning for nuclear and chemical warfare is especially sensitive. The commander issues guidance as early in the planning process as possible. The planning for using these weapons is done by a highly specialized staff.

(4) **Political considerations**

(a) Planning for the use of military forces includes a discussion of the political implications of their transportation, staging, and employment. Political factors can have a significant effect on the prosecution of a military operation. Unfortunately, in peacetime planning they are extremely difficult to predict. Political considerations may have to be treated as assumptions.

(b) Most unified combatant commanders with a geographic area of responsibility have a Political Adviser (POLAD) as a member of their personal staffs. This is a representative from the Department of State experienced in the political and diplomatic situation in the theater. The POLAD is helpful in advising the CINC and staff on political or diplomatic issues crucial to the planning process, such as overflight and transit rights for deploying forces, basing and servicing agreements, etc.

(5) **Tentative courses of action**

(a) The CINC's preliminary thinking on specific military actions is given early in the planning process to focus the actions of the staff. These preliminary or tentative COAs are activities initially seen to be open to the military commander that will lead to successful accomplishment of the mission. Normally, these tentative COAs are not fully analyzed for feasibility and seldom contain all elements of a refined COA.

(b) Tentative COAs may include only **what** military action is to be accomplished, that is, amphibious or airborne assault, naval blockade, etc, and **where** the military action could take place. The refined COA contains who, what, when, where, and how.

(6) **Planning schedule**

(a) A planning schedule is usually issued with the commander's initial guidance, although practice varies from command to command.

(b) Normally drawn up by the chief of staff, the planning schedule sets milestones or deadline dates for completing staff estimates, submitting data from subordinate and supporting commands, and completing and distributing various elements of the plan.

(7) **Initial staff briefings**

(a) Initial briefings on such subjects as terrain and hydrography of the area of operations, enemy capabilities, forces available, logistics support, and others are vital to the staff early in the planning process. They help the J-5 staff formulate additional tentative COAs and focus the joint staff divisions as they analyze tentative COAs and develop recommendations for the CINC.

(b) In most cases, these initial briefings are prepared and presented by the appropriate staff directorates.

c. **Planning directive.** The CINC normally communicates initial guidance to the staff, subordinate commanders, and supporting commanders by publishing a planning directive to ensure that everyone is "reading from the same sheet of music."

(1) Generally, the head of the plans and policy directorate, J-5, coordinates staff action for deliberate planning. The J-5 staff receives the CINC's initial guidance and combines it with the information gained from the initial staff briefings; this information becomes the written planning directive issued by the CINC. The contents of a planning directive are not officially prescribed in deliberate planning procedures, but generally include the information discussed in paragraph b. preceding; a suggested format appears in Appendix A of this publication.

(2) The CINC, through the J-5, may convene a preliminary planning conference for members of the JPEC who will be involved with the plan. This is the opportunity for representatives to meet face-to-face. At the conference, the CINC and selected members of the staff brief the attendees on important aspects of the plan and may solicit their initial reactions. Many potential conflicts between organizations can be avoided by this early exchange of information. Minutes of the conference are normally prepared and distributed by the supported commander's staff. The record of these proceedings can also serve as the basis for a planning directive.

(3) It is absolutely vital to the success of the planning process that all members of the JPEC be kept informed. The ultimate success of the supported commander's mission will depend on the support and cooperation of each subordinate and supporting commander. A large measure of that success results from a clear understanding of the commander's intent. Of course, each new plan spawns supporting plans; early CINC guidance allows supporting commanders to begin concurrent planning.

610. STEP 3—STAFF ESTIMATES

a. **Introduction.** Staff estimates are the foundation for the CINC's decision to select a course of action. In this step, the staff divisions analyze and refine each COA to determine its supportability. The thoroughness of these staff estimates may determine the success of the military operation.

(1) Not every situation needs an extensive and lengthy planning effort. It is conceivable that a commander could review the assigned task, receive oral briefings, make a quick decision, and direct the writing of an OPLAN in message format. This would complete the process and might be suitable if the task were simple and straightforward.

(2) Most combatant commanders, however, demand the thorough, well-coordinated plan; that necessitates a complex staff estimate step. Although written staff estimates are not mandatory, most will be carefully prepared and coordinated and fully documented.

b. The CINC's staff is deeply involved in the deliberate planning effort. The J-5 normally coordinates the overall process of long-range planning, prepares the initial planning guidance, and coordinates the staff estimates step. As illustrated in Figure 6-5, staff estimates are prepared by the major joint staff divisions, J-1, J-2, J-4, and J-6; in addition, input may be solicited from the CINC's special staff on specialized or technical matters. The J-5 gathers information and, with the J-3, proposes and revises tentative COAs. In the later stages of staff analysis, the J-5 begins to focus on selecting information from the staff estimates to assist the CINC in preparing the Commander's Estimate.

c. The purpose of staff estimates is to determine whether the mission can be accomplished and to determine which COA can best be supported. This, together with the supporting discussion, gives the CINC the best possible information to select a COA.

(1) Each joint staff division

- reviews the mission and situation from its own perspective,
- examines the factors for which it is the responsible staff,
- analyzes each COA from its functional perspective,
- compares each COA based on its functional analysis, and
- concludes whether the mission can be supported and which COA can best be supported.

(2) Because of the unique talents of each joint staff division, their involvement is vital. Each staff estimate takes on a different focus that identifies certain assumptions, detailed aspects of the COAs, and potential deficiencies that are simply not known at any other level, but nevertheless must be considered. Such a detailed study of the COAs involves the corresponding staffs of subordinate and supporting commands; this coordination is essential, since they bring details of force support and employment not viewed at the theater level.




Figure 6-5

(3) The form and, possibly, the number of the COAs change during this step. These changes result in refined courses of action.

d. The **product** of this step summarizes the total efforts of the staff divisions. The existence of a summary document is both good and bad. The good news is that complete, fully documented staff estimates are extremely useful to the J-5 staff, since the staff extracts information from them for the Commander's Estimate. The estimates are also valuable to planners in subordinate commands as they prepare supporting plans. The bad news is that, when the staff estimates are printed in final form, neither the estimates nor the COAs are likely to be further refined. Although documenting the staff estimates can be delayed until after the preparation of the Commander's Estimate, they should be sent to subordinate and supporting commanders in time to help them prepare annexes for their supporting plans.

(1) The **principal elements** of the staff estimate are not JCS-directed, but normally include mission, situation and considerations, analysis of friendly COAs, comparison of friendly COAs, and conclusions. The details in each basic category vary with the staff performing the analysis. The principal staff divisions have a similar perspective—they focus on friendly COAs and their supportability. However, the J-2 estimate on intelligence concentrates on the enemy: enemy situation, enemy capabilities and an analysis of those capabilities, and conclusions drawn from that analysis. Incidentally, enemy capabilities are their COAs; this identifies what the enemy is capable of doing, such as attacking, withdrawing, defending, delaying, etc. The term "enemy capabilities" distinguishes them from friendly COAs.

(2) Guidance on the format for staff estimates is found in Joint Pub 5-02.1 (JOPS Volume I), Appendices B through E. Combatant commanders may direct that additional details be included in their particular staff estimates.

(3) An operations estimate, if it is required, has increased influence because of its emphasis on employment operations. That estimate is prepared in the format of the OPREP-1 Commander's Estimate of the Situation, because generally it will be the recommendation chosen by the CINC. Paragraph 5 of the operations estimate will be written as a recommendation of the J-3.

e. Often the steps in the concept development phase are not separate and distinct, as the evolution of the **refined COA** illustrates.

(1) During the initial guidance and early in the staff estimate step, the first COA may have resulted from initial impressions and been based on limited staff support. But as this step progresses, **refined COAs** evolve to include as many of the following as applicable:

- **what** military operations are considered,
- **where** they will be performed,
- **who** will be conducting the operation,
- **when** the operation is planned to occur, and,
- in very general terms, **how** the operation will be conducted.

(2) These refined COAs are developed by an iterative process of modifying, adding to, and deleting from the original, tentative list. The staff continually estimates and reestimates the situation as the planning process continues. Early staff estimates are frequently given as oral briefings to the rest of the staff. In the beginning, they emphasize information collection more than analysis. It is only in the later stages of the process that the staff estimates are expected to indicate which COAs can best be supported.

611. STEP 4—COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE

a. **Definition.** Joint Pub 1-02 defines the Commander's Estimate (of the Situation) as "a logical process of reasoning by which a commander considers all the circumstances affecting the military situation and arrives at a decision as to a course of action to be taken to accomplish the mission." In deliberate planning, it is the document that clearly states the CINC's decision and summarizes the rationale for that decision. The Commander's Estimate becomes a tool to communicate valuable guidance from the CINC to the staff and subordinate commanders. This is not a document to convince the reader of the wisdom of the selected COA; the CINC has already selected the COA to be developed into a concept of operations. Rather, it is a summary of the CINC's thought process. As such, it is a valuable planning tool for the staff and subordinate commanders.

b. Generally, after receiving direction from the CINC and drawing from information in the staff estimates, the J-5 assembles the staff estimates and drafts the documentation for the Commander's Estimate. It is prepared for the CINC to describe the chosen COA. In deliberate planning, the Commander's Estimate is a planning document used by the command. Appendix F to Joint Pub 5-02.1, JOPS Volume I, furnishes a Commander's Estimate format. The basic subdivision of information is shown in Figure 6-6; the five main paragraph headings outline steps to basic problem solving. A

COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE

1. MISSION
2. SITUATION AND COURSES OF ACTION
 - a. CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING THE POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION
 - (1) CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS
 - (2) RELATIVE COMBAT POWER
 - b. ENEMY CAPABILITIES
 - c. OWN COURSES OF ACTION
3. ANALYSIS OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES
4. COMPARISON OF OWN COURSES OF ACTION
5. DECISION

NOTE:

Description of Commander's Estimate is in Appendix F

Figure 6-6

more detailed guide to preparing a Commander's Estimate is contained in Figure 6-7, "A Primer on the Commander's Estimate."

612. STEP 5—CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

a. **Introduction.** The concept of operations is a greatly expanded version of the Commander's Estimate prepared in Step 4. It is a narrative statement of how the commander expects to conduct the operation. It serves two purposes:

- it clarifies the **intent of the commander** in the deployment, employment, and support of apportioned forces, and
- it identifies **major objectives** and **target dates** for their attainment.

b. **Format.** The concept of operations is written in sufficient detail to promote a clear understanding of the CINC's view of the conduct of the overall operation. The particular format of the documented concept is determined by the original task

A PRIMER ON THE COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE IN DELIBERATE PLANNING

The Commander's Estimate is an essential tool in deliberate planning. Using the staff work of the preceding steps, it documents the decision process used by the combatant commander (CINC) in choosing his course of action (COA). It becomes the foundation of the CINC's concept of operations and all future planning. The document is more than a collection of information from prior staff work; it is the statement of the CINC's decision process to select a COA. Often prepared by the J-5 for the CINC's signature, it is a definitive statement of the direction of subsequent deliberate planning.

A Commander's Estimate is used in both deliberate and time-sensitive planning. Its format in **deliberate planning** is not specified by Joint Publication. An outline recommended by AFSC and consistent with joint and Service procedures is shown in Appendix F. The estimate consists of five paragraphs.

PARAGRAPH 1--MISSION. The mission statement that was developed in the mission analysis step, written during planning guidance, and refined during the staff estimate step, is restated in Paragraph 1. This mission statement will be used throughout the operation plan.

PARAGRAPH 2--THE SITUATION AND COURSES OF ACTION. This information is limited to the significant factors that influence the CINC's choice of COA. Separate subparagraphs will describe enemy capabilities and list friendly COAs to be considered.

• **CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING THE POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION.** Under each of the selected headings in the format are facts that are known about the situation. If facts are not available, necessary assumptions are stated. Two categories of topics are discussed.

(1) **Characteristics of the area of operations.** This information is furnished by J-2. The topics suggested in Pub 1 Appendix F illustrate information that may be influential in selecting a COA. The list is neither mandatory nor exhaustive.

(2) **Relative combat power.** This is not simply a list of the numbers of combat troops and weapons. The planner also assesses the competence and characteristics of the forces, their composition, location, disposition, and information that measures combat effectiveness.

• **ENEMY CAPABILITIES.** Enemy capabilities are defined by Joint Pub 1-02 as "those courses of action of which the enemy is physically capable, and which, if adopted, will affect the accomplishment of our mission...." The planner discusses not only our adversary's general capabilities to attack, defend, delay, reinforce, and/or withdraw, but also more specific capabilities, if pertinent. Information for this paragraph can be taken from the intelligence staff estimate, including the probabilities of the enemy's exercising the capabilities, and the vulnerabilities that might result from those actions. It is important to make a statement of joint enemy capabilities, since the CINC will be opposed by the combined strength of ground, air, and naval forces.

TESTS FOR COURSE OF ACTION

SUITABILITY. Will the course of action actually accomplish the mission when carried out successfully? In other words, is it aimed at the correct objectives?

FEASIBILITY. Do we have the required resources, i.e., the personnel, the transportation, the resupply, the facilities, etc? Can the resources be made available in the time contemplated?

ACCEPTABILITY. Even though the action will accomplish the mission and we have the necessary resources, is it worth the cost in terms of possible losses? Losses in time, materiel, and position are weighed in addition to purely military losses.

VARIETY. There are military operations in which only one feasible course of action exists. Generally, in joint operations this is not likely. The Commander's Estimate analyzes and compares substantially different courses of action. Listing alternative, but only superficially different, COAs preempts the CINC's decision and eliminates an important and useful purpose of the Commander's Estimate.

COMPLETENESS. When the COAs have been reduced to a manageable number, a last check is given to confirm that they are technically complete. Does each retained course of action adequately answer

- **Who** (what forces) will execute it?
- **What** type of action is contemplated?
- **When** it is to begin?
- **Where** it will take place?
- **How** it will be accomplished?

There is no inhibition to clearly explaining how the COA will be executed. The refined COAs are used by the CINC in his final decision; they must be explicit to allow sound judgments to be made. Care is shown not to usurp the initiative and prerogative of subordinate commanders by including too much of the "how."

Figure 6-7A

Figure 6-7

- **OWN COURSES OF ACTION.** The friendly COAs that survived the staff estimate step are listed. In practice, the length and complexity of the staff estimate process dictate that the number of refined COAs has probably been reduced to two or three. These refined COAs all pass the tests described in Figure 6-7A.

PARAGRAPH 3--ANALYSIS OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES. The purpose of Paragraph 3 is to evaluate each proposed friendly course of action as though opposed by each enemy capability. This series of wargaming exercises illustrates that the commander considered the most significant and influential confrontations.

The comprehensive analysis that is documented in Paragraph 3 is sometimes difficult for new planners to begin. First, planners organize their thoughts: consider enemy capability #1 against friendly COA #1, e.g., consider the enemy's capability to defend against our amphibious assault. How will the terrain affect the match-up? What effect will the lines of communication have? What is the relative combat power of forces? How will this confrontation affect further operations? Comprehensive planning at this point does not restrict the flow of ideas under consideration. The process of selection comes later. No reasonable possibility should be overlooked.

The planner will note that certain features begin to appear dominant as the wargaming and analysis continue. Some of these factors will clearly favor friendly forces and others will favor the enemy. These dominant considerations are known as **governing factors**. They are used by the J-5 and the CINC to focus the evaluation of friendly COAs.

The total enemy capabilities may be numerous, yet the decisionmaker must focus on a small, manageable number to permit comprehensive analysis. Two methods have been developed to reduce the number of enemy capabilities under consideration without compromising the value of the wargaming exercise.

- **GROUPING.** While Service component forces operate in distinct environments, they mutually support one another and generally center on a major ground, air, or sea objective. It may be possible to focus staff analysis on an identifiable, pivotal operation, e.g., the initial battle to secure the beachhead in an amphibious operation. The planner may concentrate on the broad enemy capability most relevant and "group" all others in its support. For example, against our amphibious operation, group enemy air and naval capabilities as support and concentrate on analyzing enemy ground defense, the more significant issue, in opposition to our assault; or against our mission of sea control, recognize and group the supporting enemy capabilities in air and ground arenas to permit our indepth study of the enemy's pivotal naval capability. Obviously, extreme care must be exercised to avoid overlooking any significant enemy capability or misreading the contribution of other capabilities.

- **SELECTION.** This technique further reduces the workload by selecting for analysis only those enemy capabilities that uniquely affect the outcome of a particular friendly COA. Comparatively, there is little to gain by considering the enemy's capabilities that similarly affect all friendly COAs. For example, the enemy's air defense capability may affect the friendly air superiority mission regardless of which ground-based COA is used. If that is the case, that particular enemy capability is not likely to govern the commander's choice. Although an enemy capability may be unquestionably critical to our success, it may not contribute to the decisionmaker's choice of one COA over another.

- When further reduction in the number of enemy capabilities is needed, the planner analyzes enemy capabilities in the expected order of adoption identified in the intelligence estimate. The planner may elect to restrict analysis to only the most likely enemy capabilities. This selection process must be used very carefully. Enemy commanders, too, understand that surprise is important! **A critical enemy capability must not be overlooked** or arbitrarily excluded from consideration merely for the convenience of the planner.

PARAGRAPH 4--COMPARISON OF FRIENDLY COA'S. This paragraph weighs the advantages and disadvantages of each friendly COA in light of the **governing factors**, e.g., relative combat power, logistics support, terrain, mobility, etc. It is a narrative description of the advantages and disadvantages of each COA as seen by the CINC. In preparation, it may be useful for planners to summarize their analysis. In reality, the actual comparison may be a mental process that lacks documentation or a computer simulation weighing sensitivity of the COA to enemy capabilities. In this paragraph the CINC describes his method for comparing each COA measured in factors he considers important to the success of the operation. Normally, the supporting tools used in the analysis are not included in the final document. A clear picture is given of the results of the analysis that led to the decision of COA.

The final part of paragraph 4 is a statement that concludes, "Course of action # ___ is favored because"

PARAGRAPH 5--DECISION. In practice, the J-5 may prepare, coordinate, and submit to the CINC a recommended COA, but the final product, when signed by the CINC, gives the rationale used in the decision process. The document need not be the compelling argument as to the choice of a particular COA; it is, however, a statement of the CINC's decision for use by planners in understanding the rationale that went into the choice of the COA.

Figure 6-7

assignment; the OPLAN and the CONPLAN have different levels of detail. The elements that clearly convey the concept of operations include the following:

- (1) **situation**
 - probable **preconditions** for implementation of the plan
 - **deterrent options** included in the plan,
 - expected operations of other friendly commands that will influence the plan
 - **general tasks** of friendly forces
 - **assumptions**, including level of mobilization
- (2) **mission statement**
- (3) **execution**
 - **who** will be employed
 - **where** forces will be employed
 - **when** forces are to be phased into theater
 - general statement of **how** forces are to be employed
 - conventional, nuclear, deception, and other supporting operations
 - necessary **deployment** of forces
 - **tasks** of each subordinate
 - required **supporting plans**
- (4) **administration and logistics**
 - **transportation** during deployment and employment
 - **concept of logistics support**
 - .. stockage levels, pre-positioned war reserve materiel, consumption levels
 - .. mutual allies' support requirements and inter-Service support
- (5) **command and control**
 - **command relationships**
 - **command and control requirements**
- (6) **identified shortages in support and constraints in any area**

c. **The transmittal of the concept.** The commander must ensure that the concept of operations is accurately described both to members of the planning community so they can continue planning in support of the operation and to CJCS for approval. The document to convey this planning information is determined by the original task assignment, i.e., either an OPLAN or a CONPLAN.

(1) **OPLAN.** Specific guidance is given in JOPS Volumes I and II for the format and content of the OPLAN that will be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the end of the next phase, plan development. However, there is no prescribed format used to forward the concept of operations when the final product is an OPLAN. Because the format is not prescribed, practice varies at combatant commands. Letters of

instruction (LOIs), outline OPLANs, and plan directives are also used to convey the concept of operations. The plan directive is not to be confused with the planning directive issued in the initial guidance step.

(a) In the absence of DOD-wide guidance, AFSC recommends that the documentation for the OPLAN be prepared now in as much detail as time and circumstances allow. It follows the general form of an OPLAN and can be used as a foundation for the final product. Understandably, the level of detail will increase once the plan has been fully developed in the next phase. This transmittal document is called an Outline Plan.

(b) The major paragraphs of the outline plan match those of the OPLAN format in JOPS Volume II: situation, mission, execution, administration and logistics, and command and signal. The details of subjects covered in these paragraphs are shown in Appendix G. Annexes can be included, if completed, to explain the concept more thoroughly.

(2) **CONPLAN.** The document used to forward the concept of operations of the operation plan in abbreviated format is called the CONPLAN. Its format is prescribed in JOPS Volume II. It shows in broad outline form how the assigned mission is to be accomplished. The form is similar to that of an OPLAN; the document includes the following:

(a) **letter of transmittal** (not to be confused with the term "transmittal document") that

- refers to the **task assignment**
- considers the **coordination** that has already occurred
- assigns to supporting commanders the **preparation of necessary supporting plans**

(b) The **plan summary** for the abbreviated plan includes essentially the same elements and detail found in the OPLAN:

- purpose
- conditions for implementation
- operations to be conducted
- assumptions
- operational constraints
- time to begin operations
- command relationships
- logistics requirements
- implementation

The depth of development of the logistics summary is abbreviated in the CONPLAN, and its implementation requirements differ from the OPLAN's statement of shortages and limiting factors.

(c) The **basic plan** has five paragraphs: mission, situation, execution, administration and logistics, and command and control. Each subject is fully described in the body of the CONPLAN, because, without annexes and appendices, additional detail is

not documented. The mission, situation, assumptions, and concept of operations are fully developed in the CONPLAN. Summaries of key support features such as logistics, administration, and command and control are fully covered in the basic plan rather than in annexes as in the OPLAN.

(d) Generally, the CONPLAN contains no annexes.

d. **Concept Development Conference.** A concept development conference may be called by the CINC when additional work is required from subordinate and supporting commanders. This may be the situation either when the original task is to prepare an OPLAN and substantial subordinate commander involvement is required in the next phase, plan development, or when considerable effort will be required to prepare supporting plans for the CONPLAN. This conference is convened to ensure that adequate direction is given to subordinates. Further planning by subordinate and supporting commanders is based on guidelines in the transmittal document. The outline OPLAN or CONPLAN is forwarded to the JPEC at the same time that it is sent to CJCS for review.

613. REVIEW PROCESS. Once the concept of operations is documented, it is forwarded to CJCS for review. The review given an OPLAN differs from that given the CONPLAN, since the level of detail and degree of future development are different.

a. For a new OPLAN or an existing OPLAN with a changed concept of operations, the Joint Staff on behalf of CJCS conducts a concept review.

(1) The purpose of concept review is to determine **adequacy**:

- determine whether the planned scope and concept of operations are **sufficient** to accomplish the task assigned,
- assess the validity of the **assumptions**, and
- check **compliance** with JCS task assignment and guidance.

(2) The review is conducted under the appropriate JCS MOP procedures. The goal is to complete the review in 30 days. The concept is approved for "**continued planning only**."

b. For a **CONPLAN**, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conduct a **final review**. As illustrated in Figure 6-8, no further development of the operation plan by the CINC is required by the task-assigning authority. Therefore, this review for approval is the last the CONPLAN will receive.

(1) Final review is applicable to all operation plans. The CONPLAN receives the review now; the OPLAN receives it on completion of the next phase.

(2) The general criteria for final approval are **adequacy** and **feasibility**. A more detailed discussion of final review is given later in this chapter.




Figure 6-8

614. SUMMARY OF CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT

a. The deliberate planning process has progressed from receipt of the task assignment to development of the CINC's concept of how the assigned task will be accomplished. The CINC's plan has been documented in sufficient detail for the reviewing authority, CJCS, to understand fully the overall military operation. Moreover, the transmittal of the concept gives continuing guidance to subordinates as they begin more detailed planning. The procedures in concept development are not rigid. Through each step, factors that could adversely affect the accomplishment of the CINC's mission are identified and analyzed. This discovery and problem-solving process continues even while the concept of operations is being prepared; adjustments or revisions to the concept may occur any time. Shortages in types, quantities, or timing of forces or resources (called shortfalls) are among the most critical factors. The identification and resolution of shortfalls continue throughout the entire planning process.

b. **Joint Planning and Execution Community coordination.** The planning procedures during the concept development phase were conducted primarily by the CINC and joint staff. The Service component commanders, joint task force commanders, subordinate unified commanders, and functional component commanders have been involved. Outside the CINC's theater, supporting commanders, such as other combatant commanders, USTRANSCOM, and defense agencies, have attended coordination meetings, received the supported CINC's guidance, and given valuable insight on the concept.

c. The development of the CINC's concept of operations has been described as the most difficult phase of deliberate planning, because of the many subjective determinations that must be made. Now begins the detailed development of the flow of resources and the determination of whether that operation is possible with the apportioned forces and transportation. This next phase, plan development, is undoubtedly the most time-consuming phase.

PLAN DEVELOPMENT PHASE

615. INTRODUCTION

a. **Overview.** At the close of concept development, the CONPLAN was sent to CJCS for final review and approval. The transmittal document that is to become the OPLAN is sent for concept review. At this time, a copy is also sent to the subordinate and supporting commanders for plan development. In the plan development phase of the deliberate planning process, the CINC's concept of operations is expanded into a complete OPLAN. During the initial steps of this phase, the spotlight moves to the subordinate commanders; generally, in unified combatant commands, these are the Service component commanders. Planners on the staff of the Service component commands begin developing the total package of forces required for the operation. They start with the major combat forces selected from those apportioned for planning in the original task-assigning document and included in the CINC's concept of operations. Working closely with the staffs of their Service headquarters, other supporting commanders, and DOD agencies, they identify requirements for support forces and sustainment. The supported commander consolidates each component's forces and supplies, and phases their movement into the theater of operations. The resources are proposed for arrival in-theater and at the final destination using apportioned intertheater transportation, CINC-controlled theater transportation, and transportation organic to the subordinate command. The strategic movement is simulated in a computer model; reasonable assurances can then be given by the CINC that the operation is transportation-feasible. The later steps of the phase see the plan's hypothetical units and some supply entries replaced with actual ones. In the refinement step, movement of these units is again computer-simulated and movement tables are developed by USTRANSCOM. The final documentation for the transportation-feasible OPLAN is prepared. Two phases follow plan development in the deliberate planning process. The first presents the OPLAN package to CJCS for final review and approval, and the second sees subordinate and supporting commanders developing necessary supporting plans.

b. **Introduction to eight steps.** For clarity, the plan development phase will be described in eight sequential steps shown in Figure 6-9. In reality, these steps may overlap, be accomplished simultaneously, or repeat. The same flexibility displayed in the course of action refinement process of the preceding phase is seen again here, as shortfalls are discovered and eliminated. The sheer magnitude of the problem is enormous; tens of thousands of separate combat and support units and materiel shipments make up large OPLANs. Computer support makes the timely development of a realistic flow of manpower and supplies possible.

c. **WWMCCS ADP support.** The plan development phase produces huge amounts of information about the forces, the equipment and materiel support to those forces, and the time-phased movement of personnel and materiel to the area of operations. To manage this mountain of information, planners need ADP support. The Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) Standard ADP System gives this computer support to the JPEC. The Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS) ADP is commonly called **JOPS III**, a term that actually refers to Joint Pub 5-02.3, JOPS Volume III, that defines the ADP support and describes system operation. Using specialized application programs in JOPS III, planners create a **Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD)** computer file by entering data supplied by sources throughout the JPEC. Additional data are generated by other JOPS III programs and added to the TPFDD as planning continues.

NOTE: CHART 3, APPENDIX K, SHOWS THE PLAN DEVELOPMENT PHASE; THE CHART MAY BE FOLDED OUT FOR QUICK REFERENCE.

616. STEP 1—FORCE PLANNING

References: *JOPS Force Requirements Generator Users' Manual*
 JOPS Force Module Subsystem Users' Manual
 JCS Joint Planning Systems Newsletter

a. **Introduction.** The purpose of force planning is to identify all forces needed to accomplish the CINC's concept of operations and phase them into the theater of operations. Force planning is ultimately the responsibility of the supported commander, but most of the work is done by the Service components.

(1) Major combat forces are identified in the original task-assigning instrument, the JSCP or other such directive. Tasks assigned in the UCP and UNAAF generally use in-place forces already under the combatant command of the CINC. CJCS approval is required when CINC-initiated OPLANs cannot be supported with in-theater or assigned resources. The principal combat forces required by the concept of operations are clearly identified in the transmittal document.

(2) A total force list includes much more than just major combat troops. Combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) forces, as well as smaller units of combat forces, are essential to the success of any military operation. The most up-to-date guidance on combat and support capabilities and methods of employment is available in Service planning documents and directly from Service headquarters commands. Therefore, each Service component commander develops his own total force list composed of combat, combat support, and combat service support forces (C, CS, CSS) using Service planning documents: *Army Mobilization Operations Planning System (AMOPS)* in four volumes, *Navy Capabilities and Mobilization Plan (NCMP)* and fleet planning guidance, *Marine Capabilities Plan (MCP)*, and the *Air Force War and Mobilization Plan (WMP)* in five volumes. Essential combat and support forces that are available for planning may also be listed in the applicable JSCP annexes.




Figure 6-9

(3) The apportioned major combat forces may have been described in relatively large fighting units, such as Army division and brigade, Navy carrier battle group and surface action group, Marine expeditionary force and brigade, and Air Force wing and squadron. The final product for each Service component's total force list will include detail down to unit level, i.e., battalions, squadrons, detachments, teams, etc. The tools used by planners to build a total force list are discussed in this section. But first there are terms describing the movement of troops that are essential to understanding this step of the planning problem.

b. **Movement terms.** Forces move from their home location to a specified destination in the theater. This movement involves planning by several echelons of command, possibly stops at several intermediate locations en route, and a schedule constrained by a variety of operational requirements. These essential items of information are first considered and identified during the force planning step. Figure 6-10 illustrates the flow of resources.

(1) **Key locations** routinely used in deliberate planning include the following:

(a) The actual calculation of dates and the determination of locations used in deliberate planning begin with the **destination (DEST)**, the geographic location where the force is to be employed. It is the terminal geographic location for the movement of forces in the TPFDD. To reach the DEST may require strategic and theater transportation controlled by the CINC as well as theater transportation controlled by subordinate and supporting commanders. Arrival at the DEST is not to be




Figure 6-10

equated to coming into direct contact with an opposing force; rather, arrival at the DEST only satisfies the concept of operations envisioned by the CINC and subordinate commander. For example, the DEST for an Army terminal service company may be a transshipment point many miles from direct contact with the enemy.

(b) The **port of debarkation (POD)** is the airport or seaport within the theater of operations where the strategic transportation requirement for forces is completed, generally a large airport or seaport. It may or may not be the ultimate destination. For example, troops landing at an airfield in central Germany, the POD, may have to be transported many kilometers to their planned defensive position on the inner German border (DEST). In some cases, the POD and DEST are the same point, e.g., an airfield in the Federal Republic of Germany may be the POD and final destination for an Air Force squadron. The **port of support (POS)** is the geographic location within the objective area where strategic transportation ends for air-transported supplies, resupply, and replacement personnel; sealift ammo; sealift POL; and sealift supplies and resupply. This is expected to be a distribution point; intratheater transportation from this geographic point may be required. A POS file is created to help planners determine the point of strategic debarkation in the theater for such movements.

(c) The **port of embarkation (POE)** is the point where strategic air or sea transportation begins. Generally, it is the location in CONUS where strategic shipments begin. For reserve units, the POE probably will not coincide with the home location (HOME) or mobilization station. The **origin (ORIGIN)** is the beginning point for a deployment move. For active forces the ORIGIN and the POE will probably not be the

same geographic location. For instance, Fort Bragg is the ORIGIN and Pope AFB is the POE for the 82d Airborne Division. Transportation to the POE is the planning responsibility of the providing commander or Service, with either organic transportation or transportation arranged by a supporting commander, such as USTRANSCOM's Service component, the Army Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC).

(d) Several additional locations within the theater may also influence deployment: an **intermediate location (ILOC)** is a stopping point in the deployment movement that may be used for strategic staging, changing mode of transport, necessary cargo handling, training, or marrying forces and equipment that are being transported by split shipment. The ILOC can occur between ORIGIN and POE, between POE and POD, or between POD and DEST. A **marshalling area** is the location where troops are matched with pre-positioned war reserve materiel stocks (PWRMS) of equipment and supplies. These pre-positioned stocks may be either Army pre-positioned organizational materiel configured in unit sets (POMCUS) or afloat pre-positioned forces (APF) that make up the Marine maritime pre-positioned ships (MPS) and the Army and Air Force pre-positioned stocks (PREPO). Another ILOC may be a **strategic staging location** for holding forces not yet directly committed to the theater's military operation. Last, the **assembly area** is the location where units assemble before tactical employment.

(e) These locations all play important roles in the deployment of forces and supplies. Since the arrival at the DEST is the key to successful participation in the CINC's concept, readying forces and supplies at the ORIGIN or POE, scheduling intermediate stops, and scheduling theater transportation from POD to DEST influence the planning and timing of the movement.

(2) Timing is crucial. Times are important because they offer a method to track the movement of resources and measure attainment of the CINC's schedule for involvement of the forces and required arrival of supplies. In addition, the assignment of dates allows the computer to compare simulated movement with the CINC's desired movement schedule.

(a) The force must arrive and unload at its destination by the CINC's **required delivery date (RDD)** if it is to take a supportive part in the operation and contribute meaningfully to its outcome. It is not enough just to get a unit to its destination; it must arrive on or before the RDD. Arriving too early may create an unnecessary logistic support problem; too late may mean that the forces cannot affect the outcome of the operation. A comparatively new term, **CINC's required date (CRD)**, has been introduced in response to the administrative altering of the RDD that takes place throughout plan development to resolve simulated shortfalls. The initial date when the CINC requires the resources to arrive is now highly visible--the CRD is expected to be an unalterable date except by direction of the CINC.

(b) For the strategic move, planners begin with the RDD to determine some important interim dates. Deployment planners are interested in having units arrive at the POD between an **earliest arrival date (EAD)** and the **latest arrival date (LAD)**. The EAD is the earliest a planner can allow the first element of personnel or equipment to offload from strategic lift at the POD; the LAD is the latest date for the last element to arrive and complete the offloading. The unloading of the last unit is termed "closing the force." There may be transportation time required to move between the POD and DEST; this is the difference between LAD and RDD.

(c) At the other end of the route, the mobilization and intra-CONUS planners (the Services and the supporting transportation commands) are primarily concerned with preparing and scheduling the forces at the HOME, mobilization site, and ORIGIN. The **ready-to-load date (RLD)** is the earliest date a unit is available at the origin for onward transportation to the POE. The **available-to-load date (ALD)** is the earliest time that the unit can begin loading at the POE. An **earliest date of completion (EDC)** of loading is the scheduled time that all loading is completed at the POE. The **earliest departure date (EDD)** is the the earliest date after the ALD that the shipment is ready to depart from the POE. Theoretically, these dates would be calculated backward from the RDD after considering marshalling and assembly times, theater and strategic deployment transportation times, etc. In fact, there is seldom any slack early in the planning period; the RLD and ALD are generally the minimum time required to prepare the units and materiel and transport them to the POE. Delays here may adversely affect arrival time at DEST.

(d) In practice, planners calculate the arrival window at the POD by determining the time to complete each link in tactical, intratheater transportation. Beginning with the RDD (or CRD) set by the CINC, deployment planners determine the time it will take to get from the POD to the DEST--time both to match with split-shipped or PWRMS equipment and to perform necessary assembly. Since most units cannot fully arrive on one day, there is an EAD/LAD window from the **earliest arrival** of the units and/or equipment at the POD and the **latest departure** from the POD to the DEST that will still satisfy the RDD. In theory, subtracting the time to perform strategic lift between POE and POD from those dates would result in the time required to assemble at the HOME-ORIGIN-POE for onward shipment. In practice, planners realize that competing demands are being made to mobilize, prepare for movement, and transport forces, equipment, and supplies. An RLD/ALD window is generally given for the embarkation end of strategic transportation, and compromises begin to ease the impact on the final delivery date at the DEST. The possible loss of visibility of the original RDD that results from these compromises led to the introduction of an inviolate CRD.

(3) We discussed the **planning perspectives** in paragraph 601.

(a) It is easy to visualize a complicated movement of reserve units. They may require movement from their home location (HOME) to their mobilization site and, possibly, onward to an active base (ORIGIN) for training and marrying with equipment. Further movement may be required to the POE, where strategic transports will be met. These can become transportation planning problems even before troops and equipment leave CONUS. Such movement requirements are not limited to the reserves. Active-duty units may also require intra-CONUS transportation from ORIGIN to POE. This enormous field of planning is basically the responsibility of the Service and is executed through the USTRANSCOM component, MTMC. This is called **mobilization planning** and currently falls outside the procedures and ADP support available through JOPS III. Mobilization planning can significantly affect strategic lift and, ultimately, the arrival of combat units under the CINC's concept. Therefore, it does not lie totally outside the field of interest of supported commanders, nor can it lie beyond the capabilities of the ADP system that serves them. ADP support is being expanded to consider this crucial transportation link.

(b) **Strategic deployment planning** is the central focus of deliberate planning. It involves the strategic transportation from POE to POD for forces and POE to POS for supplies and replacement personnel. Transportation planning is by sea and air assets that are apportioned to the CINC. This lift is furnished by a supporting commander when the OPLAN is implemented.

(c) Within the theater, transportation may be required from the POD to the DEST. Transportation may be done in several ways, but of primary interest to the CINC is the requirement for limited theater airlift, a resource that may also be apportioned in the JSCP or limited by Service capabilities. This onward movement from POD to DEST is termed **theater deployment planning** and may be significant to the CINC if theater lift assets are required or if the simulated intratheater movement is not scheduled to meet the RDD. Arrival of the force at the right place and time (factors that are determined by an employment scheme and concept of operations) is the ultimate objective of the deployment. Current JOPS ADP does not support this leg of the deployment planning.

(d) **Employment planning** is another area vital to the successful execution of the CINC's concept of operations. It involves the actual use of personnel and materiel in the theater of operations. Detailed planning for employment is normally the responsibility of the subordinate commanders, such as Service component commanders and the joint task force commander.

(e) Overarching the mobilization, deployment, and employment planning processes is the Service's responsibility to sustain its forces. **Sustainment planning** is another vital area that is not completely within the current capabilities of deliberate planning and JOPS ADP. Sustainment involves the resupply of materiel and replacement of personnel lost in the operation.

(f) The current focus of deliberate planning is on strategic deployment. It is clearly within the joint planning arena for which planning procedures and ADP support currently exist. Developments in ADP hardware, application software, and planning procedures continue to expand the view and control of the CINC. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) is expected to consider the full planning spectrum from initial movement of forces in mobilization through monitoring of employment and sustainment. JOPES is discussed in Chapter 8.

c. **Building the force list.** Component planners may build a force list in several ways. Planners can create a force unit by unit starting with the apportioned combat forces and adding all necessary CS and CSS forces identified in Service doctrine. This is a time-consuming effort, since OPLANs may contain several thousand separately identifiable units, or force requirements, and scores of data elements for each entry are needed to plan the movement adequately. An alternative method uses **force modules**. These are groupings of C, CS, and CSS forces, as well as a calculated amount of sustainment. Using either method, the manual process would be extremely long; fortunately, JOPS ADP support greatly aids in building a plan.

(1) Understandably, each active-duty and reserve unit in the U.S. Armed Forces today differs from the others. Even seemingly similar units within a Service may have different unit performance characteristics, varying physical size of personnel and equipment assets, and even different unit readiness and combat capability. It is

impossible to distinguish each unit separately at this stage of our planning; no attempt is made to do so. Instead, a model is substituted, one that generally represents each different category of unit in each Service. It is a "notional," or type, unit--one that is representative of an operational capability. Today, nearly 8,500 such units are on file representing units ranging in size from a two-person Air Force personnel team unit to a 6,500-member nuclear-powered aircraft carrier.

(2) To build a force list line by line requires the following **unit descriptive information** about the forces to be listed:

- approximate physical characteristics listed in number of personnel, weight and volume of equipment and accompanying supplies;
- approximate movement characteristics in terms of self-deploying aircraft and operators, size of palletable material, and its ability to fit on current-inventory tactical and strategic aircraft;
- special characteristics of supplies, such as whether they are hazardous, explosive, etc., so special handling can be arranged; and
- unique operational characteristics that may aid in shipping less than the entire unit.

(3) The **unit movement information**, such as ORIGIN, POE, ILOC, POD, and DEST, is needed.

(4) In addition, suggested times are introduced for RLD at the ORIGIN, ALD at the POE, and EAD and LAD at the POD. These times are determined from the expected transportation modes using apportioned strategic and tactical lift assets, professional assessments by the planners of necessary loading and unloading times, marshalling and assembly times, final transport time to the DEST, and the RDD set by the CINC.

(5) In fact, when the necessary routing information is included, there are 96 separate identifiers that peacetime planners find useful in describing the movement and physical characteristics of an individual unit. Almost 75 percent of these must be entered individually.

(6) The process is further complicated by mixing the CS and CSS forces identified in Service doctrine with the combat forces. Their movement into the theater is phased to meet operational requirements of the fighting force as well as operational constraints levied by transportation.

d. **Force modules** are planning and execution tools that use current JOPS ADP and JDS software. Force modules link major Service-defined combat units with supporting units and sustaining supplies. Movement for the entire package is phased. The force module concept permits rapid construction of a combat force and satisfies the longstanding need to link support and sustainment requirements with each major combat force in both deliberate planning and the monitoring of execution. Many force and support requirements can be added to a plan's database with a three-character force module identifier (FMI). There are three types of force modules:

(1) The **Service/joint force module** is built using a doctrinal statement of combat force and its support. It is the basic building block to aid the planner in quickly creating a force list. It is built by a Service or command responsible for joint policy development and can be made available for use in JOPS via tape or permanent file. The Service/joint force module groups C, CS, and CSS components with their associated sustainment. The force modules contain type units and a Service-computed estimate of the sustainment required to support the unit. While the actual period of sustainment varies, the goal is to sustain the force for 30 days.

(2) The second type of force module is the **OPLAN-dependent force module**. Like the first type, this one groups combat, support, and sustainment elements, but it is developed by a CINC to meet the specific demands of a particular OPLAN. It may begin as a Service/joint force module that may be modified, or it can be created independently by the CINC or Service component to respond to a specific planning task. These force modules recognize theater-specific conditions: anticipated weather conditions, expected host-nation support contributions, intensity and nature of conflict, etc. Generally, these modules are sourced with actual units assigned against force requirements, since they have been developed in response to a CINC's actual task assignment. Often these force modules are created after the force requirements are identified in an OPLAN; in this situation, the planner goes through the TPFDD to organize into modules supporting groups of forces and supplies.

(3) The third type of force module is a **force tracking force module**. This force module is OPLAN-dependent and does not contain sustainment data. Force tracking force modules consist of major Service combat units and are required for all OPLANs.

(4) Administratively, these force modules are extremely convenient for identifying and monitoring groupings of forces. They are valuable because they are able to manipulate data in the module, display large amounts of information about the forces and cargo, retrieve and print records, and identify force modules in which units are contained. In fact, the JSCP for FY 87-88 required that all force requirements be grouped in characteristic force modules to identify deterrent options, JSCP-apportioned force packages, and other scenarios.

e. **Automatic data processing support.** The task before the planner is monumental when you consider the hundreds of force requirements that make up even a small OPLAN. JOPS ADP offers the mechanism for assisting in the creation of a force list. We will introduce the JOPS ADP system here. First, we will explain the key concepts, describing unit movement characteristics, timing of movements, and unique record entry identification; then we will describe the two application programs that use the data to build a force list.

(1) Unit movement characteristics

(a) Information on movement characteristics of a type (hypothetical) unit is contained in the **Type Unit Data File (TUCHA)**. The acronym TUCHA comes from the previous name of the file, Type Unit Characteristics File. The TUCHA describes the capabilities of each type unit in narrative form and defines the unit in terms of total personnel; numbers requiring transportation; categories of cargo in the unit; weight of equipment and accompanying supplies; volume of equipment categorized as bulk, outsize,

oversize, or non-air-transportable; and numbers and dimensions of individual units of equipment. The file is maintained by the Services and updated quarterly.

(b) Data in the TUCHA are accessed by using **unit type codes (UTCs)**. These are five-element alphanumeric codes that identify units of common functional characteristics. Units are listed in Service planning documents and automated files that show the number of units of each type available for planning. Figure 6-11 illustrates a typical listing of UTCs and the units they describe.

UTC	SERVICE	FORCE DESCRIPTION	NUMBER AVAILABLE FOR PLANNING
3FQAA	AIR FORCE	TFS 24 F-15, INDEPENDENT	XX
23YYY	ARMY	ARMED CAV SQUADRON ACR	XX
5CVNA	NAVY	AIRCRAFT CARRIER NUCLEAR (CVN)	XX
OGTAB	MARINE CORPS	INFANTRY BATTALION	XX

Figure 6-11

(c) The unit identified by UTC in the TUCHA is a **type**, or "notional," unit. It is a hypothetical unit with the approximate physical and movement characteristics of all the actual (real-world) units that it represents. It is, therefore, theoretical and average, a generic description of what the units should be. It is, for example, **an** infantry battalion as opposed to, say, **the** 2d Battalion, 11th Infantry; or **a** CVN as opposed to, say, **the** USS *Nimitz*; or **an** F-15 tactical fighter squadron as opposed to, say, **the** 94th Tactical Fighter Squadron.

(2) **Timing of movements.** Before development of each force requirement is finished, the key dates for required movement must be determined and entered for each force record. Beginning with the CINC's RDD or CRD, the supported commander and subordinate planners calculate the EAD/LAD window at the POD or POS in addition to the EADs and LADs at intermediate locations. Soon, more detailed planning is required and the Service, supporting commanders, and defense agency planners develop the RLDs and ALDs at the ORIGINS and POEs. Unfortunately, the determination of these dates is not automated, and they must be entered by the responsible planner.

(3) Unique force record descriptions

(a) After the force list has been finished and assembled, each separate force record, or line entry, in it will be assigned a plan-unique alphanumeric code called a **force requirement number (FRN)**. Characteristic blocks of FRNs are identified in JOPS Volume II for each supported commander, and each OPLAN uses a separate FRN to identify each unique force requirement. When an FRN has been assigned to a unit, it generally is not changed in the course of the plan. The FRN is

useful because it allows the planner to track a unit that may have changed sequence in the TPFDD. FRNs are two, three, four, or five alphabetic or numeric characters that identify a single force requirement.

(b) Two additional characters, called fragmentation and insert codes, may be added to the FRN in positions 6 and 7. These two additional characters identify a force entry that requires more than one iteration of the FRN to satisfy the force requirement, such as three individual brigades to satisfy the requirement for a division, etc. The resulting identifier becomes the **unit line number (ULN)**.

(4) The preceding descriptors are needed to explain force movements either in narrative form or computer jargon. The JOPS ADP programs use these terms to describe the CINC's concept of operations. The procedures that explain the computer support are outlined in Joint Pub 5-02.3 (JOPS Volume III) and discussed in detail in the numerous JOPS III users' manuals. The discussion is limited here to an overview of the application program within the JOPS ADP that specifically deals with force planning, the **Force Requirements Generator (FRG)**. The FRG assists the planner in creating a force requirements file, analyzing the data, and changing the data. These data will be used later to determine the gross feasibility of transportation. The codes and nomenclature of application programs are often confusing. Some JOPS abbreviations and acronyms will be introduced as necessary information in the force planning step. ADP support is introduced here because it includes the manual procedures and the rational process to assemble the force list just discussed.

(a) **Purpose.** The FRG supplies a formatted database, input to other automated files, working papers for staff analysis, and reports for attachment to the OPLAN. Some of the modules available to the planner are shown in Figure 6-12. The FRG allows the planner to operate in an on-line, interactive, time-shared environment.

(b) **Foundation.** The overall capability of the FRG can be divided into a series of modules to perform the countless clerical tasks facing the planner: administratively create or modify an OPLAN file; selectively create and print working files to analyze the force records; select, delete, or modify type units or force modules and modify the information defining movements and narrative descriptions; split the movement of a force record into air and sea shipment; assign movement parameters to individual units or groups of force records; reorder the list of movements, based on planner-selected descriptions; selectively create summaries of transportation requirements; identify for analysis a categorized listing of support forces; lay the groundwork to analyze the gross transportation feasibility of the force records; audit the file for format and content; and perform a miscellany of administrative functions, including the printing of a force list conforming to guidance in JOPS Volume II.

(c) **Files.** The application program draws information from numerous files: TUCHA; descriptions and characteristics of major equipment or cargo categories listed in the major equipment file (MEF); standard worldwide geographic locations (GEOFILE); characteristics of transportation resources (CHSTR); the permanent databases used for reference, including standard distance files (SDF), characteristics of airports (APORTS), and seaports (PORTS); transportation assets (ASSETS); and dimensions of equipment found in the type unit equipment detail file (TUDET). The OPLAN TPFDD and summary reference files (SRF) are created by the planner using these standard reference files; the TPFDD and SRF describe in detail the CINC's concept

DESCRIPTION OF SELECTED FRG MODULES

MODULE	NAME	DESCRIPTION
F10	OPLAN ID	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identifies the OPLAN • Stored in the Summary Reference File (SRF)
F11	Force Selection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Adds standard force requirements to TPFDD by UTC • Prints reports
F14	Non-Standard Force Selection/Modification	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Builds nonstandard force requirements • Uses submodules to modify SRF and nonunit records
F20	TPFDD Record Deletion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Deletes records from TPFDD
F21	Force Modification	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Updates data element of a single force record
F23	Unit, Cargo, and Personnel Tailoring	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Modifies personnel and cargo movement requirements
F24 SERIES	TPFDD Data Column Modification	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Modifies multiple data elements in a range of records, e.g., changes POD for 50 records with one entry, etc.
F50	TPFDD Audit	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Checks consistency of interrelated TPFDD fields
F70	Tape Transfer	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transfers tapes from one site to another using WIN
F71	TPFDD Merge	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Merges or updates data on a JOPS III TPFDD tape
F72	TPFDD Extract	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Creates an extract of an existing TPFDD
F80	Generalized Sort	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Resequences file for analysis
FILE PAGING		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Selectively pages any one of the JOPS III reference files

Figure 6-12

of operations. The planner may also call for standard or ad hoc printed formats for use in analysis and to satisfy administrative requirements of the OPLAN. A description of the JOPS standard reference files is summarized in Figure 6-13, and the WWMCCS standard reference files are shown in Figure 6-14.

(5) A much quicker way to identify and add large numbers of units to a plan uses the Service/joint force modules in the Force Module Library and the previously created OPLAN-dependent force modules. The **force module subsystem (FMS)** uses unique three-character alphanumeric codes to identify the complete force module that may include hundreds of force and nonunit records.

(a) **Purpose.** Force modules (FMs) already exist that include complete combat packages made up of C, CS, and CSS forces in addition to some nonunit cargo and personnel. By gaining access to this library, the planner may build a new TPFDD or modify an existing TPFDD quickly and effectively. The FMS also allows the planner to go into an existing TPFDD and group force entries into a new or existing FM. A very valuable secondary function of the FMS is that large groupings of force entries

JOPS ADP STANDARD REFERENCE FILES

APOINTS	AERIAL PORTS AND AIR OPERATING BASES FILE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Airfield planning factors, e.g., throughput capacities for free-world air facilities, runway length & width, weight-bearing capacity, A/C parking space, fuel & cargo storage capacity, etc.
ASSETS	TRANSPORTATION ASSETS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Time-phased availability of common-carrier air- & sealift • Types and source of military and commercial transportation assets • Created from data in JSCP
CHSTR	CHARACTERISTICS OF TRANSPORTATION RESOURCES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Standard planning factors for airlift available for deployment planning, e.g., utilization rate, passenger & cargo capacity, speed, range, load/off-load times, etc. • Standard planning factors for sealift available for deployment planning, e.g., ship category, cargo capacity, average speed, load/off-load times, etc.
PORTS	PORT CHARACTERISTICS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Information on physical and operating characteristics of selected free-world ports, e.g., size, depth, number of berths, beach data, categories & capacities of cargo-handling & storage facilities
SDF	STANDARD DISTANCE FILE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Distance between POE-POD pairs listing mode of transport, POE-POD, GEOLOC code, Suez/Panama Canal status, OPLAN identification, number of stops, computed distance
TUCHA	TYPE UNIT DATA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Movement characteristics for standard deployable units • Force descriptions for nondeployable unit types
TUDET	TYPE UNIT EQUIPMENT DETAIL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Descriptions & dimensions of <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • specific pieces of wheel/track equipment for TUCHA file type units • all hazardous cargo • non-self-deployable aircraft • floating craft • items measuring more than 35'
LFF	LOGISTIC FACTORS FILE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Standard logistic planning factors to compute resupply, determine ESI, and identify shortfalls
CEF	CIVIL ENGINEERING FILES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Description of deployable facility sets • Operational capability of Service construction units • Description of Service facility component systems
FM LIBRARY	FORCE MODULE LIBRARY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Collection of Service/joint force modules for C, CS, CSS forces plus 30 days sustainment

Figure 6-13

can be identified for ease of monitoring during plan execution or for use in executing deterrent options.

(b) **Foundation.** The FMS is an interactive computer system that allows the planner to seek FMs that are either already built and maintained by the Services or built by the CINC during prior OPLAN creation. The CINCs' existing OPLANs are especially useful because they have already been sourced and incorporate numerous planning factors and operating parameters that are unique to their areas of responsibility. Significant combinations of these forces and supplies have already been identified by a unique force module identifier in existing OPLANs for use in subsequent deliberate and crisis action planning. As a result of that work the CINC can now display and retrieve vast quantities of force module information.

WWMCCS STANDARD REFERENCE FILES

GEOFILE	STANDARD GEOGRAPHIC LOCATIONS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Worldwide geographic locations and sites listed by country & state, installation type, latitude and longitude coordinates, etc.
SORTS	STATUS OF RESOURCES AND TRAINING SYSTEM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Report of unit readiness in terms of <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • authorized/actual personnel strength • percent of assigned equipment ready for employment • shortages of assigned personnel or equipment, etc.
NACE / AUTODIN	NMCS AUTOMATED CONTROL EXECUTIVE AND AUTODIN	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Real-time system to automate the collection, routing, and initiation of message data processing from WWMCCS AUTODIN

Figure 6-14

(c) **Flexibility.** The FMS includes seven functions:

- **Maintenance** defines new force modules, modifies and deletes existing modules, and allows the planner to audit the files by Cargo Increment Number (CIN), Personnel Increment Number (PIN), and ULN.
- **Paging** allows display of FM title, description, and selected indexes.
- The **report** function furnishes a printed copy.
- **Data retrieval** permits the planner to include records in or exclude them from the TPFDD/SRF.
- The printed **TPFDD map report** selects linking force records, nonunit cargo records, and nonunit personnel records to identify those that are part of more than one FM and those that are not included in any FM.
- **Rollup** offers a quick look at what is to be moved and by what source; it displays the quantity of associated cargo and personnel in each FM by totals for force and separate totals for air and sea transport and source of lift.
- The **build** function permits the planner to create an OPLAN TPFDD by loading an FM library entry onto a file that already includes a plan identifier, classification, and starting FRN/CIN/PIN. Selected FMs can then be quickly added to the new file. The new TPFDD is limited to 600 force modules, each containing no more than 6,000 ULNs plus 6,000 CINs and 6,000 PINs. Each ULN/CIN/PIN can be duplicated in up to 28 FMs.

(d) **Files.** The planner has access to both the Service/joint FM library and previously created OPLAN TPFDD files when building a new OPLAN TPFDD. Once the TPFDD is built using the FMS it can be added to another TPFDD using JOPS ADP support.

(6) **Application.** A component planner uses the FRG and its standard reference files to create a total component force list. Given the mission, the planner reviews the type combat forces apportioned in the task-assigning document and determines applicable CS and CSS units from Service planning documents. The plan is built by selecting individual units by UTC or an entire force with FM. When UTCs are entered individually or collectively with FM into the TPFDD, the FRG automatically copies the unit's narrative description and its movement characteristics data from the TUCHA and adds them to the working TPFDD. If another unit or force of the same type is wanted, the planner simply enters the same UTC or FM again.

(a) The collection of the components' force lists becomes the CINC's consolidated force list. The database is called the OPLAN Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data file (TPFDD); numerous working papers can be printed that selectively display elements from the data file. A particular selection of nine broad categories of information, when printed, was formerly called the Time-Phased Force and Deployment List (TPFDL) and was a part of the final OPLAN. The TPFDL is not included as an appendix to the OPLAN when the information is available to the JPEC by electronic communication, i.e., WIN.

(b) The **summary reference file (SRF)** is created in the database along with the TPFDD. It includes administrative information on the plan identification number, date of the concept of operations, and number of records; force and nonunit record summaries describing numbers of unit and force records, fragmented forces, and aggregated cargo shipments; movement data for nonstandard units not included in the TUCHA; and descriptions of the planning factors and simulated environments used in the ADP support process.

(c) The components can use actual (real-world) forces, if they are known, to build their force lists. This obviously solves many problems early in planning by permitting actual data to be used in place of hypothetical sizes, locations, etc. Some Services list actual units in Service planning documents; others, like the Navy, are unable to identify specific units very far in advance because of their mobility. Eventually, the hypothetical units will have to be replaced with more accurate information before the completion of plan development. In the case of the Navy, the geographic locations of both combat and support forces change drastically month to month and most units are self-deploying. Type units are used for most Navy force requirements throughout the deliberate planning process.

f. **Supported commander's role.** The Service component force lists are developed with the full involvement of the supported commander. The subordinate commander submits the time-phased force list to the CINC for review and approval. The supported commander has been involved in the concept development and, now, in the details of force planning. By submitting the component force list, the supporting commander indicates **full understanding of the concept of operations** and that the **forces in the force list will support that concept**. The CINC's staff merges the component force lists and evaluates the resulting consolidated force list. This consolidated list is

analyzed to confirm that it is adequate to perform the mission. When the supported commander concurs with the consolidated force list, the components then add any missing information needed to deploy their Services' forces from origin to destination, such as mode and source of transportation, POD, EAD/LAD, priority of off-load at POD, DEST, and RDD.

617. STEP 2—SUPPORT PLANNING

a. **Overview.** The purpose of support planning is to identify the quantities of supplies, equipment, and replacement personnel required to sustain the forces identified in Step 1. Support planning determines the quantities of supply identified by broad category and converts these into weights and volumes. These are calculations of phased movements that become deployment movement requirements. The original intent was not to identify the detailed levels of particular supplies, but to identify and phase into the theater the gross quantities of needed sustainment. These quantities are based on the numbers and types of C, CS, and CSS units to be employed in the operation. Support planning is completed when all significant supply, equipment, and personnel requirements have been determined, consolidated by the supported commander, and then entered into the TPFDD file.

(1) Sustainment capability is a function of U.S. logistics capability, inter-Service and interallied support, Service guidance, theater guidance, and the resulting time-phasing. Information is exchanged between supporting defense and Service logistics agencies on the non-Service-controlled materiel.

(2) The actual support calculation uses consumption rates developed and maintained by the Services under their responsibility to supply, equip, and maintain their forces assigned to combatant commanders. This calculation is generally made by the Service component commanders, who refer to Service planning guidelines and Service doctrine. It is also possible for the supported commander to perform the calculations using component-supplied force lists and Service planning factors.

(3) Support requirements include supplies, equipment, materiel, and replacement personnel for the forces, as well as civil engineering, medical, and POW materials. They also include equipment and supplies to support the civil affairs effort.

(4) During the support planning step, planners are primarily concerned with how much strategic lift will be needed to move the support requirements. Thus, the gross estimates of supplies and replacement personnel do little more than initially determine the amount of space and number of passenger seats needed. Before the operation plan is complete, and definitely before it can be implemented, logistics and personnel planners will attempt to define the requirements in more detail.

b. **Guidance from the CINC.** The concept of support was developed during the concept development phase. Early in the planning the CINC gives guidance to the subordinate and supporting commands that defines the length of the operation, strategic lift availability, supply buildup policies, and anticipated supply shortages. The supported commander also gives guidance on transportation priorities, available common- and cross-servicing agreements between subordinate and supporting commands, personnel attrition factors, ports of support, etc.

c. **Calculations.** The computation of sustainment uses Service planning factors, or consumption rates, and the number of forces, or consumers, to be supported. The product of these factors becomes a total supply requirement as illustrated in Figure 6-15. This figure must be expressed as a gross strategic movement in barrels of petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL); short tons of equipment and materiel identified by broad supply class or subclass; and numbers of personnel. These calculations are generally made by the Service component commander.




Figure 6-15

(1) The actual calculations are usually done using planning factors from the Services. These planning factors can be applied to numbers of people, numbers of equipment types, or numbers of recurring UTCs, for instance, rations: 6.8 lbs per day per person; spare parts: 25 filters per 10-18 tractors per month operating in a dusty environment; or munitions: number of high-explosive rounds per day fired by 155mm battery in heavy rate of fire.

(2) Performed manually, the calculations would be overwhelming for the many force records in a TPFDD. Consumption rates vary as a function of class and subclass of supply, theater or area within the theater of operation, intensity of combat for different Services and time periods, etc. JOPS ADP is a great help in performing these calculations and adding the supplies to the TPFDD. Supplies are phased into the theater in increments to avoid overloading logistics support facilities and transportation. It is important to note that the key to successful support planning is in the prudent choice of planning factors.

d. **Definitions.** Before any detailed discussion of the ADP aids to support planning can begin, numerous terms used in support planning should be discussed. Support requirements for deploying forces are divided into two major categories: **unit-related** supplies and equipment and **non-unit-related** supplies and equipment. The relationships of the supply categories are shown in Figure 6-16.

(1) **Unit-related supplies and equipment** include a unit's organic equipment, basic load, and additional accompanying supplies specified by the CINC.

(a) The **basic load** is the quantity of supplies required to be on hand within a unit. This is the materiel that makes the unit capable of engaging the enemy immediately on arrival at the DEST. The Service determines this quantity, and it is included as a portion of the unit equipment list in the TUCHA file, indistinguishable without reference to Service documents. Some units carry no basic load, others may deploy with 15 or 30 days of supply. When a planner selects a unit from the TUCHA and enters it into the OPLAN TPFDD, those unit-related supplies already included are added automatically to the TPFDD as well. The planner must know the days of supply and the expected supply consumption that are considered basic load and already included in the TUCHA.

(b) To maintain effective contact with the enemy may require considerably more than the basic load. When a unit deploys, it is normally required to arrive with enough supplies to perform its mission without being resupplied for a stated period ranging from one to five days. The CINC defines in the concept of operations the length of time that the unit is self-sustaining. **Additional accompanying supplies** extend the period supported by the basic load. The amount of additional accompanying supplies that must be added to the TUCHA quantities varies from unit to unit; it depends on the unit's mission and its Service's doctrine. The quantity of additional accompanying supplies must be calculated and added to the OPLAN TPFDD for arrival with the unit.

(2) **Non-unit-related supplies and equipment** include all support requirements that are not in the TUCHA or augmented by accompanying supplies. These supplies are not identified for a specific unit, thus the designation non-unit-related. It is useful to further divide the broad category of non-unit-related supplies into subcategories.

(a) **Pre-positioned war reserve materiel stocks (PWRMS)** are a forward-deployed part of the nation's total war reserve stocks. Because strategic transportation assets are limited, especially in the early days of a deployment, the pre-positioning of supplies eliminates some of the competition for strategic lift. Pre-positioning is an essential sustainment asset that further bridges the time between when a unit begins to operate in a combat environment in the theater and when continuous resupply is established. The Army Pre-positioned Organizational Materiel Configured to Unit Sets (POMCUS) program in Europe, the Marine Corps Maritime Pre-positioning Ships, the Army and Air Force PREPO program in the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean, and Marine Expeditionary Brigade pre-positioning in Norway are examples of PWRMS that substantially reduce the near-term strategic lift requirement for unit equipment allowance, basic load, and additional accompanying supplies.

(b) **Sustaining supplies** are needed by forces to support them from the time their accompanying supplies and PWRMS run out until the continuous resupply




Figure 6-16

pipeline opens. This is especially true if forces have deployed over long distances. The continuous resupply pipeline largely depends on sealift. Sealift could take days or weeks to begin making regular deliveries, because of the loading and unloading time at the ports and the sailing time between them. Sustaining supplies, therefore, are normally delivered by airlift.

(c) **Resupply** includes all the materiel needed to sustain the forces. The computation of quantities is made to supply all in-place and deploying units in the theater. Resupply will be a continuous requirement as long as forces remain in an area of operations.

(d) **Supply buildup** includes all supplies above the consumption rate that can be delivered into the area of operations and stockpiled. The stockpile then acts as a shock absorber in the supply system that continues to sustain the forces even if the supply pipeline should be temporarily interrupted. Supply buildup policy is defined by the CINC in the concept of support in the transmittal document. For example, the policy may specify that a 15-day supply of all supply classes be in place at the end of 30 days.

(e) **Replacement personnel** are categorized as a non-unit-related requirement that is designed to return all units to 100 percent **combat effectiveness** on a daily basis. The requirement for replacement personnel is computed using Service attrition factors at various rates for noncombat losses and intensities of combat. Replacements are time-phased into replacement centers within the objective area at

regular intervals. On the other hand, **filler personnel** are individuals of suitable grade and skill **initially required** to bring a unit to its authorized strength.

(3) The ADP support for deliberate planning determines the strategic deployment of supply requirements to the **port of support (POS)**. A POS for supplies is essentially the same as a POD for forces, the terminus of strategic movement. The POS is also significant because some supplies, for instance, POL and ammunition, require special facilities or cannot be offloaded at some ports without significant disruption of port activity. From each POS, supplies will be made available to designated units. For each place where their forces will be located, component planners designate a POS for **air cargo, general sea cargo, POL, and munitions**. From the POS the responsibility for onward transport falls to the Service component.

(4) The term **classes and subclasses of supply** has been used. The hundreds of thousands of items in the Federal supply system are categorized in one of ten broad classes. Figure 6-17 illustrates these classes. It further indicates the magnitude of the planning problem that must calculate, even in general terms, the supplies required to first prepare an armed force for combat and then continue to sustain it. Deployment planning focuses on very broad categories, but it does subdivide the 10 classes into a total of just over 40 subclasses. For instance, ammunition is subdivided into ammo-air and ammo-ground; subsistence is divided into subclasses for in-flight rations, refrigerated rations, nonrefrigerated rations, combat rations, and water. The subclasses of supply separately identifiable in JOPS ADP are also listed in Figure 6-17. Even with these broad categories, critical sustainment items can be identified and vital planning is permitted using JOPS ADP.

e. **Automatic data processing support**

References: JOPS III "Movement Requirements Generator (MRG) Users' Manual"
 JOPS III "Civil Engineering Support Plan Generator (CESPG) Users' Manual"
 JOPS III "Non-unit Personnel Generator (NPG) Users' Manual"
 JOPS III "Medical Planning Module (MPM) Users' Manual"
 JOPS III "Logistic Capability Estimator (LCE) Users' Manual"

NOTE: The Version 2 release of JOPES simplified access to the following programs. Refer to Chapter 7, Figure 7-17 for a depiction of the current master menu screen.

(1) The **Movement Requirements Generator (MRG)** is the principal ADP tool used in support planning. This application program calculates the gross non-unit-related equipment and supplies to support the OPLAN. These calculations determine the nonunit movement requirements by using numbers of personnel, number and types of UTCs, Service planning factors, and user-supplied CINC planning guidance from the transmittal document. These gross determinations for supplies are translated into weights and volumes and added to the TPFDD.

(a) **Purpose.** The MRG allows the planner

- to use data from a reference file to create an OPLAN-dependent **ports of support file (POSF)** categorized by Service, supply destination, air and sea transport, and ammo and POL;

CLASSES AND SUBCLASSES OF SUPPLY

	SYMBOLS		SUBCLASSES
CLASS I SUBSISTENCE			A - NONPERISHABLE C - COMBAT RATIONS R - REFRIGERATED S - OTHER NONREFRIGERATED W - WATER
CLASS II CLOTHING, INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT, TOOLS, ADMIN SUPPLIES			A - AIR B - GROUND SUPPORT MATERIEL E - GENERAL SUPPLIES F - CLOTHING G - ELECTRONICS M - WEAPONS T - INDUSTRIAL SUPPLIES
CLASS III PETROLEUM, OILS, LUBRICANTS			A - POL FOR AIRCRAFT W - POL FOR SURFACE VEHICLES P - PACKAGED POL
CLASS IV CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS			A - CONSTRUCTION B - BARRIER
CLASS V AMMUNITION			A - AIR DELIVERY W - GROUND
CLASS VI PERSONAL DEMAND ITEMS			
CLASS VII MAJOR END ITEMS: RACKS, PYLONS, TRACKED VEHICLES, ETC.			A - AIR B - GROUND SUPPORT MATERIEL D - ADMIN VEHICLES G - ELECTRONICS J - RACKS, ADAPTERS, PYLONS K - TACTICAL VEHICLES L - MISSILES M - WEAPONS N - SPECIAL WEAPONS X - AIRCRAFT ENGINES
CLASS VIII MEDICAL MATERIALS			A - MEDICAL MATERIEL B - BLOOD / FLUIDS
CLASS IX REPAIR PARTS			A - AIR B - GROUND SUPPORT MATERIEL D - ADMIN VEHICLES G - ELECTRONICS K - TACTICAL VEHICLES L - MISSILES M - WEAPONS N - SPECIAL WEAPONS T - INDUSTRIAL MATERIALS X - AIRCRAFT ENGINES
CLASS X MATERIAL FOR NONMILITARY PROGRAMS			

References: FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Symbols
 JOPS III LCE Users Manual

Figure 6-17

- to use data from a JOPS ADP reference file to create **planning factor files (PFF)** and **UTC consumption factor files (UCFF)** based on Service-developed logistics factors; and
- to calculate the nonunit movement requirements.

The planner can also selectively aggregate the data to reduce the number of nonunit cargo records using the EAD/LAD window at each POS and, thus, better pattern the movement requirement for containerized cargos. Some of the modules available to the planner are described in Figure 6-18.

DESCRIPTION OF SELECTED MRG MODULES

MODULE	NAME	DESCRIPTION
M01	POSF Maintenance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Updates and edits the Ports of Support File (POSF) • Generates the POS Report or the TPFDD Destinations Extract report
M02	UCFF Initialization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Generates the Planning Factors File (PFF) and UTC Consumption Factors Files (UCFF) from the Logistics Factors File (LFF)
M03	UCFF Maintenance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Updates the UCFF • Creates UCFF report
M10	Create / Update Planning Factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Creates/updates the Planning Factors File (PFF), i.e., intensity rate, PWRMS cutoff, resupply category attrition factors, and supply buildup policies
M15 A, B, C	POSF / PFF / UCFF Paging	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Scans POSF (M15A), PFF (M15B), and the UCFF (M15C) • Creates formatted visual display for contents of each file
M20	Generation of Nonunit Movement Requirements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Generates nonunit resupply requirements using PFF, TPFDD, UCFF, and POSF
M30	Aggregation of Movement Requirements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Aggregates resupply records with same EAD - LAD window

Reference: *JOPS III "MRG Users' Manual"*

Figure 6-18

(b) **Foundation.** Planning parameters for the calculations are chosen from two sources: the UCFF uses resupply consumption factors for unit type codes (UTCs) and the PFF includes a wide variety of planning factors that are used throughout the MRG process. Daily consumption rates for the 43 subclasses of supply are computed by either pounds or gallons per UTC, or pounds or gallons per man per day. Fuel, ammunition, repair parts, and major end items are equipment-related supplies and are computed as a function of numbers of force records, for example, number of UTCs that describe 105mm artillery batteries. Other items of supply, such as food, clothing, and medical supplies, are better suited for planning factors listed in units of pounds per man per day. The **logistics factors file (LFF)** is a JOPS standard reference file that is the foundation for the UCFF and PFF. The LFF uses Service-developed consumption rates for UTCs, and origins for resupply. The LFF is used to initialize the PFF, which can then be updated and modified with user-supplied factors to describe more accurately the situation in the theater.

(c) **Flexibility.** The planner has great flexibility in using planning factors in the MRG. The planner can modify the following parameters:

- size of the **EAD-LAD** window
- beginning day of strategic **resupply by sea**
- period of time for **resupply by air** of specified supply subclasses
- up to ten **origins for each supply class**
- **buildup increments** by supply class
- rate of **consumption by supply subclass** modified by theater multiplier
- average **travel time from POD to DEST** in each of up to 26 objective area countries
- **safety level of supplies** in number of days to be maintained in-country
- **conversion of up to 35 subclasses of supply** from weight to volume
- **identification of fuel types** up to 15 types for each fuel resupply category
- percentage of **attrition of supplies** to combat loss for four time periods and 20 subclasses of supply
- specification of five **combat intensity levels** over four time periods

(d) **Information to execute the MRG.** To execute the MRG, a minimum of information is needed: the period of planning for the OPLAN, the increments in which resupply will be delivered, the supply class/subclass consumption factors for each UTC in the plan, the weight-to-volume multipliers for converting short tons to measurement tons, specification of the objective area for determining theater-specific multipliers, and the intensity rate for periods of planning.

(e) **Files.** The MRG uses information from various **standard reference files** available to all users: TUCHA, specified geographic location file (GEOFILE), and LFF. It uses and adds to the **unique, OPLAN-dependent files** that are prepared in the force development step: TPFDD and summary reference files (SRFs). The MRG **creates unique files** for use in its calculations: temporary working data files, POSF, UCFF, and PFF.

(f) Several noteworthy shortcomings of the MRG have come to light since its introduction. Planners have demanded more of the ADP support than was ever expected. Several new modules discussed in the following sections have now been added to assist with a more comprehensive calculation of sustainment.

(2) In addition to calculating supplies, the CINC must analyze civil engineering requirements of planned contingency operations. The resulting analysis is not precise, but is a tool the planner uses to analyze actual facility asset data, anticipate new facility requirements, project war damage, recognize actual and projected civil engineering forces, determine required civil engineering materials, and acknowledge available support from the host nation. The formal document, called a Civil Engineering Support Plan (CESP), generates, schedules, and analyzes construction projects associated with troop movements. The JOPS ADP software package to determine the adequacy of the CESP is the **Civil Engineering Support Plan Generator (CESPG)**. It is a series of computer programs and data collection procedures that

generate numerous reports giving an overview of the theater facility requirements. The reports can be used to identify facility deficiencies and shortfalls in engineering capability, information that is used by Service components for detailed planning. Normally, responsible Service component commanders are given the task of coordinating the CESP for their specific construction management areas. These area CESP's are then consolidated by the CINC into a single theater-wide CESP for the operation plan.

(a) **Purpose.** The modules used in the ADP support package offer the capability to **maintain** unit and facility information in the existing files; **analyze** troop and facility requirements data from the TPFDD; **determine** facility requirements based on forces employed, unit mission, and war damage; **schedule** existing engineering manpower; and **prepare** the necessary **reports** and **tabs** to identify facility and construction requirements and develop scheduling information.

(b) **Foundation.** The CESP uses the TUCHA to develop the master list of essential mission facilities for each separate UTC in the force list; the TPFDD file is used to build the TROOP file for determining units that have initial facility requirements; and numerous planning factor files are developed and maintained by the Services to define the support required.

(c) **Flexibility.** The planner uses the CESP to determine expected facility requirements that must be met with new construction and war damage repair. The planner can alter the following parameters: number of personnel, aircraft, and vehicles supported; amount of host nation assets that can be used by friendly forces; anticipated amount of war damage to existing facilities; priority of construction effort; conversion of engineering troop strength to engineering capability; decreased engineering unit efficiency during early operations; attrition of personnel, equipment, and construction products as a result of enemy action; required completion date for new construction; and circuitous routing of supplies from POS to DEST.

(d) **Files.** The CESP uses both Service-maintained files for basic planning guidance and the OPLAN-dependent TPFDD files to determine specific facility requirements. The Services define and set priorities for the facilities required for each UTC, the capabilities of engineering units, planning factors to convert personnel loading at a base to specific facility requirements, and the acceptability of existing facilities to meet contingency operations. Reports generated by the CESP

- summarize the difference between facility assets and requirements;
- give detailed requirement scheduling information;
- contain tabs and appendices to **OPLAN Annex D** reports for facility assets, requirements, and deficiencies;
- time-phase the schedule for construction;
- determine weight, volume, and time-phasing of required construction materials; and
- time-phase engineering forces into theater.

This information on construction materials is not automatically entered in the TPFDD. The nonunit cargo records may be added to the TPFDD later using a tape merge.

(3) The **Medical Planning Module (MPM)** is a menu-driven subsystem of JOPS ADP that predicts and evaluates medical requirements in support of the OPLAN. The process considers the population at risk, length of stay in hospital facilities, and Service-developed frequency data for injury and death. The result is a planning tool to determine patient load, requirements for patient evacuations, and both Service- and component-required medical planning requirements.

(a) **Purpose.** The system uses an interactive, on-line **time-sharing** mode to create working files and modify planning factors, and an off-line **batch** mode to spawn programs that use planning factors to perform calculations and print reports. The reports include theater-wide analysis and Service component planning details, such as number of several categories of physicians, operating room requirements, and whole blood and intravenous fluid requirements, and planning factors for use in the MRG and the logistics capability estimator (LCE) nonunit resupply calculation procedures. The products of the MPM are used as medical annexes to the OPLAN documentation, input to the MRG, input to the Non-unit Personnel Generator (NPG), input to sustainment planning modules, identification of possible medical planning deficiencies in the OPLAN, and analysis of the impact of COAs on medical requirements. The planning factors developed by the MPM for the MRG and LCE are in units of pounds/man/day for planning periods for supply subclass VIII-A, supplies other than fluids. The MPM factors are considered better than the factors found in the LFF because they are OPLAN-specific and are based on actual computations of patient load rather than just numerical factors applied to troop strength.

(b) **Foundation.** The population at risk (PAR) is developed from the TPFDD file. Batch processes are used to extract data from existing TPFDD and JOPS medical database files and to create OPLAN-unique data tables. The batch mode can then run without planner involvement, first, to create simulated admissions, flow patients through the medical system, and compute medical requirements, and second, to analyze the impact of using the standard 5-, 7-, 10-, 15-, 30-, 45-, and 60-day evacuation policies. The JOPS medical database is a collection of relatively constant planning factors categorized by Service-specified scenarios that focus on particular OPLANs, series of OPLANs, or specific geographic areas that consider varying enemy threats, tempos of operation, climates, and frequency of patient distribution. The medical database identifies wounded in action, killed in action, administrative loss, died of wounds, and evacuation rates and length of stay conforming to evacuation policies.

(c) **Flexibility.** The planner has the flexibility to modify the planning parameters as follows:

- create or modify the theater **force structure**;
- locate units by **geographical location** throughout the theater;
- identify units by UTC as **combat** or **support** forces as a function of exposure to combat risk;
- divide the force geographically into three **operations zones** (op-zones): CONUS, combat zone, or communications zone;
- specify **planning factors** applicable to combat or support force category and op-zone, including
 - 17 changes in five levels of combat intensity;
 - rate of personnel loss to killed in action, died in the hospital,

- missing in action, prisoners of war, medically evacuated, or administratively lost;
- admission rates resulting from disease and nonbattle injuries;
- beds available;
- evacuation policy; and
- patient care requirements identified for five specified categories of physicians, types of bed (medical or surgical), four patient categories (wounded, diseased, nonbattle, or outpatient), and unique command requirements; and
- modify on-line a **Service-approved scenario** to meet a NOPLAN situation in time-sensitive planning.

The result is a calculation of medical requirements using more definitive and more exacting planning factors than are available with the MRG.

(d) **Files.** A temporary medical working file (MWF) is created from reference files and planner-modified planning factors. The resulting detailed planning reports are for use by theater and Service planners:

- medical planning factors;
- personnel loading;
- requirements for physicians, hospital beds, operating rooms, blood and fluid supplies (JOPS supply subclass VIII-B), and all other medical supplies (JOPS supply subclass VIII-A); and
- graphic comparisons of capabilities and requirements for beds and evacuation.

(4) Since the MRG was developed, there have been significant improvements in the method of calculating nonunit replacement personnel. The **Non-unit Personnel Generator (NPG)** was developed to take advantage of the computations of personnel losses done during the MPM. The results of the NPG are formatted for addition to the TPFDD and are used in place of personnel replacement figures once calculated by the MRG.

(a) **Purpose.** The NPG offers an automated capability to generate TPFDD records for the movement of nonunit replacement personnel. Nonunit replacement personnel are required for all casualties, for example, those killed in action, taken as prisoners of war, missing in action, and administratively lost. Generally, the replacement is needed in-theater when the casualty occurs, and the NPG determines the simulated loss and identifies the replacement. Of course, there are Service variants of this guideline that must be considered by the NPG: Army and Air Force planners consider the loss of personnel from combat when they are evacuated from the combat zone, but also consider the return to combat of those intratheater evacuees who can be returned to duty. The Navy incorporates a ten-day slack period before the NPG generates replacement personnel.

(b) **Foundation.** Several files must be available before the NPG can run. The NPG (using both the interactive process for file updating and the batch process

for calculations) extracts data from the medical working file (MWF) created in the MPM for determining the population at risk and incorporating the scenario-dependent planning factors. A **ports of support file (POSF)** is created for the MRG for determining the POD for replacement personnel entering the theater. The Services and the theater CINC maintain the **JOPS medical database** for scenario-dependent planning factors. The **personnel working file (PWF)** created with NPG time-sharing contains the ORIGIN and POE for replacement personnel and detailed instructions for the aggregation and identification of personnel.

(c) **Flexibility.** The flexibility of the NPG is gained from the data files it uses in its computation. However, the planner may alter the number of days in the time increment that the replacement personnel are aggregated for transport, introduce up to 50 ORIGIN-POE pairs and the percentage of replacements flowing through each pair, and establish the starting number for the **personnel increment number (PIN)**. The PIN is a unique seven-digit force entry identifier assigned to aggregate POE-POD channel movements of personnel.

(d) **Files.** The PWF is created by the NPG planner from the preceding reference and OPLAN-dependent files. This file can be modified by the planner to better reflect the particular conditions of the OPLAN. The NPG produces personnel replacement figures, as do the MRG and MPM discussed earlier. However, both the format and content of the NPG differ from the other two systems. The differing categories of personnel reported and the effects of time-phasing of replacements result in a variance from the MPM. The format matches closely the POE-POD channels reflected in the MRG, but the numbers of replacements differ because of the more thorough method of calculation used by the NPG. The files produced by the NPG are entered directly by the planner into the OPLAN TPFDD file.

(5) The MRG has been used to compute requirements for 43 classes and subclasses of supply. However, the MRG does not consider the availability of supplies from Service and Defense Logistics Agency inventories. For logistics, therefore, joint operation planning with the MRG was not a true capabilities activity. Moreover, the MRG only aggregates resupplies into one of ten classes by POE-POS channel. A more accurate method of calculating resupply was needed. The **Logistics Capability Estimator (LCE)** was an attempt to answer this need. However, the LCE never achieved requirements. Although some LCE software was developed, the JPEC primarily still uses the MRG for support planning.

(6) The Logistics Sustainability Analysis Feasibility Estimator (LOGSAFE) is a prototype under development to replace the MRG and the LCE. It is a PC-based system with an estimated delivery date of late 1991. LOGSAFE will allow off-line sustainability requirement determination, and will interface with other prototypes under development (i.e., Force Module Logistics Sustainability Model--FMLSM). Basic capabilities of LOGSAFE will include the following:

- **Essential sustainment item modeling** uses specifically identified ULNs or FMs, **calculates** the requirement for resupply of specifically identified subclasses of resupply, called essential sustainment items, **compares** the requirement with available supplies, and **reports** the shortfall. This allows the planner to focus on a smaller segment of supplies that have a demonstrable impact on the operation.

- **General supply modeling** recognizes the remaining categories of supply identified in seven broad categories: containerized and noncontainerized general cargo, containerized and noncontainerized ammunition, bulk POL, water, and refrigerated cargo. Plan-specific planning factors are applied using theater specific planning files.

(7) **Summary.** The ADP support for sustainment planning is essential to determining feasibility of the CINC's concept of operations. The initial application program, the MRG, makes gross estimates of nonunit resupply and replacement personnel. Logistics planners have expanded the original scope of the sustainment calculation. It is now possible to calculate more accurately medical requirements for physicians, supplies, and facilities with the MPM; the number of required personnel replacements with the NPG; civil engineering requirements for construction of facilities and war damage repair using the CESP; and, with the LOGSAFE, supply requirements. Not all calculations of sustainment are automatically added to the OPLAN TPFDD; many of these programs must be run separately and their calculations must be added manually. Further, work remains in automating the calculation of requirements in support of civil affairs and enemy POW programs. Nevertheless, the rapid development of resupply calculations has greatly improved the planner's ability to develop a feasible OPLAN and to appraise the supportability of tentative COAs. This is especially useful in time-sensitive planning.

618. STEP 3—NUCLEAR/BIOLOGICAL/CHEMICAL (NBC) PLANNING

References: Joint Pub 5-02.1 (JOPS Volume I)
 Joint Pub 5-02.2 (JOPS Volume II)
 FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4, *Staff Officers' Field Manual: Nuclear Weapons Employment Doctrine and Procedures*
 Joint Pub 1-03.1, *JRS - SOP for Coordination of Atomic Operations*

a. Chemical/biological (CB) planning

(1) Chemical warfare weapons give the commander a capability to attack both point and area targets. These weapon systems have a wide variety of target effects, and they greatly increase the commander's flexibility to influence operations. U.S. biological operations, however, are strictly defensive measures to protect against biological weapons or agents employed by enemy forces. The enemy's CB weapons capability presents major defensive problems and requires indepth study and detailed planning.

(2) The component commands submit their chemical warfare requirements to the supported command. Service component commanders' plans for operations in an NBC environment are consolidated into a single joint stand-alone TPFDD file, separate from the OPLAN TPFDD. Guidance for chemical warfare and NBC defense operations is found in Appendix 2 to Annex C in Joint Pub 5-02.1 (JOPS Volume II). Planning considerations include the following: enemy CB capabilities, friendly CB capabilities, related assumptions, alternative missions the supported commander should be prepared to undertake if authorized by the President, chemical concept of operations, weapons allocations, subordinate tasks, storage and transportation, and release procedures.

b. Nuclear planning

(1) **Introduction.** The nuclear age presents the joint planner with new problems to solve. Nuclear planning considers the possibility that nuclear weapons may be introduced in combat; planners must assess the impact that will have on their operations. Because the use of nuclear weapons in any military operation would be so influential, there is a temptation to make one of two tacit assumptions during planning: nuclear weapons will not be used at all or nuclear weapons can be quickly employed by friendly forces if the need arises. Either assumption can be dangerous. The joint planner must work with a realistic appreciation both of the possibility of the employment of nuclear weapons and the CINC's lack of effective control over the decision for their initial use. Nuclear planning guidance issued at the unified or combined command level is usually based on political policies. It stems from national-level considerations, but is influenced by the military mission. Nuclear warfare planning can be defined in three broad categories:

(a) Planning for strategic retaliatory strikes in general war is conducted by the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) at Offutt AFB, Nebraska, in coordination with U.S. unified and specified combatant commanders and certain allied commanders. The product of this planning is the **Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP)**. JSTPS planning does not use JOPS.

(b) Planning may be done for operations in which tactical nuclear weapons are to be used. The planned use of nuclear weapons is directly related to all other operation planning and cannot be treated separately. The planned tactical use of nuclear weapons will affect deployments, the scheme of maneuver, the tasks assigned to subordinate commanders, the logistic support concept, command, control, and communications arrangements--in short, the entire concept of operations.

(c) Planning may be done for operations in which the tactical use of nuclear weapons is not intended, but where there exists the possibility of their introduction by either side. In this scenario, the planner's problem is extremely difficult. The only realistic course is to create a basic plan adaptable to nuclear operations. The basic OPLAN will follow the expected pattern for a conventional conflict, but alternate instructions will be available to offer a nuclear option.

(2) **Nuclear planning with JOPS.** Just as during CB planning, in nuclear planning the supported commander consolidates nuclear requirements as force records in a stand-alone TPFDD file. The nuclear TPFDD file is transmitted to U.S. Transportation Command for scheduling priority on lift and inclusion in the JDS. Guidance for documenting the planning for nuclear operations is found in Joint Pub 5-02.2 (JOPS Volume II) and appendix 1 to annex C in Joint Pub 5-02.1 (JOPS Volume I). There are several areas for consideration: nuclear initiation, assumptions, enemy nuclear capabilities and defense options, friendly nuclear assigned support tasks, missions, concept of nuclear operations, weapon allocations, targeting, subordinate tasks, limitations, supply, storage and transportation, support for allied forces, command and control, including release procedures, and nuclear options and reconnaissance operations to support nuclear options.

619. STEP 4—TRANSPORTATION PLANNING

References: Joint Pubs 5-02.1 and 5-02.3

a. Overview of transportation planning

(1) Transportation planning is done by the supported commander. This step and two others outline the procedures to solve the complex strategic movement problem. The task is to simulate the strategic movements generated by component planners during the force planning and support planning steps using the apportioned strategic transportation resources. The goal in transportation planning is to produce a feasible strategic transportation movement in support of the CINC's OPLAN, a very difficult thing to do. It is an iterative process: if the simulation indicates that the forces and nonunit supplies cannot be moved in time, planners identify the problems, evaluate their impact on the overall plan, incorporate solutions, and, if necessary, simulate the strategic move again. Figure 6-19 illustrates the relationships between the three steps: transportation planning, shortfall identification, and transportation feasibility analysis.

(2) As Figure 6-10 illustrates, the strategic movement is only part of a complex logistic problem: units must travel from home or ORIGIN to POE, supplies must be requisitioned and delivered on time to the POE, combat force loading must be done according to the type of offloading expected (amphibious assault, airdrop, administrative, etc.), and there are always competing demands for lift resources and support facilities. Transportation feasibility should not be confused with **overall** plan feasibility. Strategic transportation is only one element in the picture of overall plan feasibility; transportation from ORIGIN to POE, and POD to DEST must be available as well as the actual capability to furnish the nonunit supply requirements calculated in the support planning step.

b. The first step of the iterative transportation planning process is to complete the force and nonunit record entries.

(1) Service component commanders have already considered the **competing demands for limited strategic transportation; limitations of the support capabilities at intermediate locations along the route; limitations of the personnel processing, material handling, and materiel storage capabilities at the POE and POD; capabilities of theater transportation between the POD and DEST; and required transport time between POD and DEST, etc.** In concept development, Service component planners were determining key logistic elements, such as the size of forces, equipment, and nonunit supplies; probable ORIGIN, POE, POD, POS, marshalling and assembly requirements, and DEST; the expected timing to reach each stop along the way, etc. Phasing of movement was expected, and guidelines may have already been issued by the CINC to divide apportioned lift resources among the components.

(2) At this point in deployment planning, all available information is entered in the TPFDD.

(3) Before the supported command begins transportation planning, the component planners designate as many actual units as they can to replace the type units in the force list. This process is known as **sourcing**.




Figure 6-19

(a) In the Army, sourcing begins in force selection by Forces Command (FORSCOM).

(b) The Air Force distributes its apportioned force list to major commands and separate operating agencies to source combat and support units; the War Mobilization Plan, Volume 3, the Air Force planning document, identifies real-world forces available for deployment, employment, and redeployment in support of listed OPLANs. Sourcing of forces occurs when the combat and support forces are put into the TPFDD.

(c) At this stage in planning, the Navy sources only a few requirements. The OPLAN is a planning document covering the biennial JSCP planning cycle, while the specific Navy resources that would be used are highly mobile. For example, a carrier battle group that is in Norfolk today may be in the Indian Ocean a month later. Generally, the Navy will complete OPLAN sourcing only during time-sensitive planning.

(d) Real-world units are sourced in the force list by matching each ULN with a **unit identification code (UIC)**, a six-character, alphanumeric code that uniquely identifies each active, Reserve, and National Guard unit of the Armed Forces.

(e) After sourcing, the TPFDD file should contain actual unit data and actual movement requirements.

(4) When it is determined that the expected arrival of forces and supplies at the DEST does not conform to CINC requirements, a shortfall is said to exist. The shortfall may be attributed to many causes. These next steps deal with **transportation shortfalls**. The realization that a shortfall exists may come from a detailed computer simulation, manual calculations by skilled logisticians, or a "best guess" by an operation-oriented planner. The earlier a shortfall is discovered, the earlier solutions can be explored and corrections made. With a large OPLAN the details of the complex transportation movement over a typical period of 90 days are difficult to picture. For this reason, ADP support is essential.

c. **ADP support available for transportation planning.** The purpose of the three steps of transportation planning is to determine the gross strategic transportation feasibility of the CINC's OPLAN. The CINC compares each subordinate commander's transportation requirements and the total apportioned strategic transportation capabilities.

(1) **Introduction.** A JOPS ADP subsystem called the **Transportation Feasibility Estimator (TFE)** simulates strategic movement. Planners at the supported command run a computer simulation of both air and sea movements of the forces and their support requirements from POE to POD. The TFE uses the transportation assets identified in the JSCP for the OPLAN to "move" the forces and supplies. A computer program incorporates all the factors that influence the movement of force and nonunit requirements and calculates a computer-simulated **feasible arrival date (FAD)** at the POD illustrated in Figure 6-20. The feasibility of the OPLAN is determined when the FAD is compared with the CINC's **latest arrival date (LAD)**. The simulated deployment movement of a requirement that results in a calculated FAD that is **on or before** the LAD is considered by the CINC to be grossly transportation feasible. Numerous conditions are attached to this transportation simulation, since neither all transportation assets, OPLAN force records, nor resupplies may have been sourced. Therefore, even when simulated results indicate a FAD earlier than a LAD, a statement cannot be made with absolute certainty that the OPLAN will close. All that can be said is that the plan is **grossly feasible** when considering strategic transportation.

(2) **Purpose.** The TFE uses planner-specified parameters to determine whether the movement can be accomplished within the timeframe established by the CINC.

(3) **Foundation.** Information about the movement of forces and supplies has been created in the OPLAN-dependent computer files: TPFDD, files created by the JOPS ADP support programs, such as the FRG and MRG, and the miscellany of support programs and modules, for example, the LCE, MPM, NPG, CESP, MEDEVAC. The resulting file lists force and nonunit records by individual identifiers, i.e., ULN, CIN, PIN, that include the amounts to be moved, the timing, and the channel of flow for the




Figure 6-20

planned movement. The TFE is a system made up of four phases that each contain many programs called modules:

(a) The **TPFDD evaluation** phase allows the planner to display and analyze the information already included in the TPFDD, such as POE-POD channel data; offload and throughput capacities measured in personnel, tons of materiel, and barrels of POL; transport workload capacities; and aggregation of nonunit records.

(b) **Simulation preparation** is the phase when planning parameters are set. In this phase the movement information is extracted from the TPFDD, distance data are generated from reference files, port constraints are identified, strategic transportation assets are selected that match the apportioned forces from the JSCP or task-assigning document, the asset characteristics are defined, and the attrition rates are introduced.

(c) In **simulation execution** computer programs are spawned to model the transportation flow based on the identified parameters; the results are displayed in either summary or detailed form. Simulations of the movements are calculated using the ALD at the port of embarkation, travel time, and EAD at the port of debarkation. There

are two independent simulations, SEA and AIR; the TFE does not automatically select the best transportation mode, air or sea, nor does it optimize the transportation solution.

(d) **Post-simulation processing** produces reports that identify the computed **estimated departure date (EDD)** from the POE and FAD at the POD. Modules in this phase display information requested by the planner to analyze the movements, such as an exception report of unmatched records that did not close.

(e) Figure 6-21 describes some of the TFE modules available to the planner.

(4) The planner has wide latitude setting the planning parameters used in the phases of the TFE system:

(a) **Evaluation** - modify the offload and port clearance descriptions; establish load configurations to acknowledge administrative, combat, airdrop, and amphibious assault loading; and establish discharge constraints to recognize container shipping, helo discharge, opposed landing, LST, roll-on/roll-off, etc.

(b) **Preparation** - restrict generation of movement records by specifying POD or preferred mode of transportation, sealift vessel selection matrix, and separation by air and sea transport mode for simulation purposes; sort and display the information using 15 different fields of data; recognize great circle distances and possible sea routes, including the use of the Suez and Panama Canals; identify convoy assembly and dispersal areas and aircraft selection priorities; and exclude from the TFE units that deploy using their own organic transportation (naval ships, MAC airlift squadrons, etc.) and those already in-theater that do not require strategic transport.

(c) **Execution** - execute aerial movement from 50 POEs to 50 PODs, using up to 1,500 aircraft consisting of 24 different aircraft types; estimate attrition of aircraft, ships, and cargo using Monte Carlo technique; convoy or independently sail strategic sealift incorporating 40 POEs and 40 PODs, and using up to 1,500 ships described by 99 different ship types.

(d) **Post-simulation processing** - display TPFDD and simulated movement information by ULN, PIN, CIN, UTC, POE, POD, LAD, POD preferred mode, or TPFDD sequence number.

(5) **Files.** The TFE control file is a working file created from information that the TFE system draws from the **OPLAN-dependent files** shown in Figure 6-22, i.e., TPFDD, summary reference file, or **permanent files**, such as numbers and types of transportation assets (ASSETS), specified geographic locations (GEOFILE), characteristics of airlift and sealift resources (CHSTR), characteristics of seaports (PORTS) and aerial ports (APORTS), movement characteristics of standard deployable units (TUCHA), the JOPS ADP standard distance package (SDP), and a ship availability file.

(a) Administratively, the planning factor and situation description files can be altered either by changing elements in a movement line or changing elements for multiple movement requirements. Parameters used in the simulation are limited in magnitude to permit the execution of the TFE on the WWMCCS.

DESCRIPTION OF SELECTED TFE MODULES

MODULE	NAME	DESCRIPTION
TPFDD EVALUATION		
T04	Channel Aggregation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Analyzes port facilities for volume of cargo and passengers Creates aggregate POE-POD channel records
T09	Cargo Advisory Report	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Prepares sealift model Illustrates cargo configuration Aids creation of vessel selection matrix
SIMULATION PREPARATION		
T10	Movement Requirements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Generates total TFE movement requirements Can restrict to particular mode/source of transportation Produces report of rejected records
T10B	Movement Requirements Modification	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Adds, deletes, changes, and reorders TFE movement requirements Processes air and sea data separately
T10P	Movement Requirements Reports	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Produces reports that give individual movement requirements, channel summary, and daily movement requirements for airlift and sealift
T10T	Vessel Selection Matrix Modification	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Modifies the vessel selection matrix
T11	Distance Generation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Calculates required channel distances using great circle distances, land-avoidance routes, and availability of Panama/Suez Canal Designates convoy assembly and dispersal areas
T13	Port Characteristics and Constraints	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Uses PORTS and APORTS Files to retrieve port constraints Defines attrition factors
T14	Aircraft Characteristics and Availability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identifies aircraft characteristics, numbers, utilization rates, & availability Inputs made by planner or uses ASSETS and CHSTR Files
T15	Ship Characteristics and Availability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Establishes ship classes, quantities, and availability dates Defines convoy parameters
SIMULATION EXECUTION		
T20 AIRLIFT	Airlift Model	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Simulates movement of cargo and personnel by air
T20 SEALIFT	Sealift Model	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Simulates movement of cargo and personnel by sea
T21 AIRLIFT	Simulation Reports	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Produces results of simulated moves in user-selected formats
POST-SIMULATION PROCESSING		
T30	Simulation Parameters Report	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Summarizes transportation planning for airlift and sealift
T41	Movement Table Report & TPFDD Overlay	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Compares TPFDD and SRF data for POE and POD differences Produces SRF movement table reports, and overlays TPFDD data with SRF movement table data for POE, POD, ALD, EDD, and FAD
T45	TPFDD Movement Report	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Prints the daily air movement requirements and deliveries reports using the TPFDD and movement tables
T50	TFE Control File Review	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Prints or scans the TFE Control File for analysis
TFE CONTROL FILE	Control File	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Stores temporary working file on tape

Reference: JOPS III TFE Users Manual

Figure 6-21

OPLAN-DEPENDENT FILES

TPFDD	TIME-PHASED FORCE AND DEPLOYMENT DATA FILE	Description, routing, and aggregated cargo movement characteristics of forces defined for a specific OPLAN as well as the nonunit sustainment, i.e., supplies and cargo
SRF	SUMMARY REFERENCE FILE	Major repository for summarized or detailed information about specific records in the TPFDD file or other general information relating to the specific OPLAN, i.e., movement tables, cargo details for tailored and nonstandard units, etc.
PFF	PLANNING FACTORS FILE	Planning factors and parameters used in all phases of MRG processing, i.e., theater factors, lbs. of rations per man per day, etc.
PWF	PERSONNEL WORKING FILE	Used in the NPG to designate origins and APOEs for replacement personnel as well as percentages to be routed from each ORIGIN or POE
FREF	FORCE RECORD EXTRACT FILE	File created for LCE processing that contains cargo resupply factors, i.e., attrition factors for equipment based on threat level
POSF	PORTS OF SUPPORT FILE	Reference file to determine ports of support for the non-unit-related records
UCFF	UTC CONSUMPTION FACTORS FILE	Resupply consumption factors by UTC that are extracted from logistics factors file or introduced by the user, i.e., air defense ordnance used per day, etc.
TFECON	TFE CONTROL FILE	Transportation simulation parameters and results for the TFE model, i.e., port characteristics, POE-POD channel distances, types of aircraft and sealift, etc.
MWF	MEDICAL WORKING FILE	Population at risk records from OPLAN force list and planning factors entered by the medical planner, i.e., admission rates, evacuation policies, combat intensity, etc.

References: Applicable JOPS III users' manuals

Figure 6-22

(b) An early step in the TFE system is creation of a control file from which information can be extracted on the simulated move. The data may be **displayed** in a variety of planner-selected formats and **manipulated** to develop improved transportation closures without altering the original TPFDD.

(c) If they wish, planners can insert the results of the computations for EDD and FAD into the OPLAN TPFDD for the values of ALD and LAD. As we explained earlier, changes to the LADs and the resulting changes to the RDDs are fairly common, even performed automatically using a module of the TFE. The JOPS ADP system uses the CINC's Required Date (CRD) to give visibility to the **original** RDD.

(d) Reports produced by the TFE include

- POE/POD facility daily workload
- strategic lift requirements
- intratheater daily lift requirement, i.e., POD-DEST channel
- daily aircraft and ship use
- summaries of force and nonunit records delivered
- summary of planning factors

620. RETROGRADE, NEO, AND MEDEVAC PLANNING

References: JOPS III, "Medical Evacuation System Users' Manual"

a. **Introduction.** Although not included as a distinct step in plan development, the requirement to transport personnel and materiel from the theater of operations requires close coordination. The movement of equipment requiring repair, noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), and medical evacuation out of the combat theater are also concerns of the logistics planner. Recent experience with transportation simulation has demonstrated that the transportation requirements for these categories are far more of a problem than they were originally thought to be. The expectation of "more than enough planes to haul stuff back to the United States" no longer is accepted without considerable planning effort. To consolidate medical evacuation, noncombatant evacuation operations, and other retrograde requirements, a separate retrograde TPFDD is created.

b. The Department of State is primarily responsible for **noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO)**. The unified combatant commands are responsible for furnishing support. DOD Directive 5100.51, "Protection and Evacuation of U.S. Citizens and Certain Designated Aliens in Danger Areas Abroad," gives guidance on protection and evacuation of U.S. citizens.

(1) The joint planner preparing NEO plans works in coordination with the Department of State and the embassy in the country concerned. Biennially, the Department of State submits to the Department of Defense an estimate of the number of Americans in each country, their status, and transportation requirements at each alert condition. The Department of State alert system is graduated from warning to imminent unrest/hostile action.

(2) The Department of State has a crisis response organization to monitor and advise on NEO. The **operations center** keeps 24-hour watch on world conditions; the staff includes a military representative. The **regional bureaus and country desks** monitor specific activities within their geographic areas of responsibility. A **task force** working group of national agencies, called the Washington Liaison Group, may be established to plan and conduct operations during heightened alert conditions. The **embassy in-country team**, made up of the ambassador and staff, are the focal point for combatant command coordination of NEO planning.

(3) A Department of State request for assistance generally does not come until an alert condition of imminent unrest/hostile action exists or host nation and civil channels are not available to conduct NEO.

c. The **Medical Evacuation System (MEDEVAC)** is the JOPS ADP subsystem that focuses on the movement of medically evacuated personnel and cargo from the theater. The MPM generates the number of evacuees, and the data are received from MPM's medical working file.

(1) **Purpose.** The MEDEVAC system uses an interactive, on-line **time-sharing** mode to create and modify working files and an off-line **batch** mode to spawn programs that perform calculations and print reports. The product of the system is added to the OPLAN TPFDD.

(2) **Foundation.** MEDEVAC uses data from the **OPLAN TPFDD** for force record information, the **medical working file** created in the MPM for determining the population at risk and incorporating scenario-dependent planning factors, a **ports of support file** created for the MRG for determining the POD for replacement personnel entering the theater, and the **JOPS medical database** maintained by the Services and the theater CINC for scenario-dependent planning factors.

(3) **Flexibility.** The planner is allowed some latitude in the parameters used by the spawned calculation program:

- capacity of evacuation aircraft,
- number of aggregated days in each time increment of evacuation,
- up to 26 originating sites in each of two operation zones within the theater of operations,
- identification of primary and secondary hospitals to receive the evacuations, and
- percentage of evacuation cases using each hospital.

In addition, the medical planning factors used by the medical working file in the MPM and NPG offer considerable flexibility; these planning factors can be modified and are accessible by forms mode through a time-sharing program.

621. STEP 5--SHORTFALL IDENTIFICATION. Shortfall identification, like transportation planning, does not occur at only one point in deliberate planning. Shortfalls are identified and resolved throughout the planning process. This step, however, focuses on identifying and resolving transportation shortfalls that are highlighted by the TFE deployment simulation.

a. Shortfalls are identified in a variety of ways; the computer-simulated movement performed by the TFE, however, identifies the simulated **late arrival** of forces and nonunit records as a FAD later than the LAD. Reports from the TFE also identify reasons for the late arrival: shortage of lift resources, overloaded mobility support facilities, excessive requirements for intratheater lift, etc.

(1) Planners make reasonable corrections or adjustments to the movement requirements. For example, analysis might show that shortfalls are caused by inadequate materiel-handling capacity. A solution initiated by planners could include rescheduling shipments when the POE is not operating at full capacity or identifying an alternate POE for some TPFDD movement requirements. These adjustments should be restricted to those that will not affect the CINC's concept of operations or concept of support.

(2) Planners identify unresolved shortfalls for corrective action by higher-level decisionmakers, or those that must be resolved with other commanders by compromise or mutual agreement. The CINC alone approves changes that affect the concept of operations or the concept of support.

b. In conjunction with subordinate and supporting commanders, any one or a combination of the following alternatives may be used by the planner:

- change **priority** of force or nonunit cargo;

- adjust route or timing of movement, i.e., POE, POD, POS, ILOC;
- change the mode of strategic lift;
- adjust levels of pre-positioned resources, e.g., forces, nonunit supplies, etc.;
- enhance facility capabilities with new construction or upgrading;
- seek additional assets;
- conclude contractual agreements and inter-Service support agreements;
- arrange for host-nation support; or
- redefine the concept of operations.

c. Situations may occur when either the identified shortfall simply cannot be resolved (inadequate forces or transportation apportioned in the JSCP or furnished by the Services to accomplish the assigned task) or the alternative would result in an unsatisfactory solution.

(1) In such a situation, the **shortfall** and other critical limiting factors, the **associated risk** of not resolving the shortfall, the **threat level** that apportioned resources can meet, and any **recommended change in the task assignment** are submitted to CJCS for resolution.

(2) However, plan development based on apportioned resources continues. The OPLAN is submitted based on capabilities; the Plan Summary will **assess the impact** of the shortfalls and limiting factors and **list the tasks** that cannot be accomplished. A separate TPFDD is submitted identifying shortfall force and nonunit cargo records; these shortfalls are considered unsourced rather than just late closures.

(3) When planners identify a problem that adversely affects the OPLAN, they take immediate action either to correct it or to coordinate its resolution. Problems get more difficult to handle the longer they are ignored. If numerous shortfalls are left for resolution until this step in planning, the work required to resolve them may be complicated and frustrating.

d. The **plan development conference** is called by the CINC to develop initial closure profiles and to assess the feasibility of closure to meet the CINC's concept of operations. Here shortfalls unresolved by the planning staffs are considered, solutions are explored, and resulting risks are assessed. All subordinate and supporting commands attend the conference at the invitation of the supported commander. This is not the first time that the planning staffs of supporting commanders have coordinated on the development of the operation plan. It may be the first time that they make hard decisions to resolve crucial, seemingly impossible shortfalls.

622. STEP 6—TRANSPORTATION FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS

a. Transportation planning has been going on long before the planner reaches this step in plan development. Hasty analyses that manually simulated the transportation movement were performed as early as the staff estimate step in the concept development phase; repeatedly, shortfalls have been identified and resolved without fanfare. In the transportation planning and shortfall identification steps, planners collected and added information to the computer database, identified shortfalls, and illustrated the formal process for handling the unresolved shortfalls. Now, they analyze the transportation feasibility of the OPLAN. Early in transportation planning,

ADP support was introduced, because these three steps are intertwined. An understanding was needed then of the degree of detail required by the TFE, as well as the planners' expectations from ADP support.

b. Formal analysis of strategic transportation occurs in Step 6. The tools have been identified: a **computer simulation** and, if necessary, a **plan development conference** of key players to resolve the shortfalls or to assess their impact on the OPLAN. After the computer simulation and, possibly, several iterations of the transportation steps, the product is the conclusion by the CINC that the OPLAN is grossly transportation feasible.

623. STEP 7--TPFDD REFINEMENT

(The following material is adapted from JOPS Volume I.)

a. For both Base Case and regional OPLAN development, the process of TPFDD refinement consists of several discrete phases that may be conducted sequentially or concurrently, in whole or in part. These phases are concept development, plan development, and plan review. The plan development phase consists of several sub-phases: forces, logistics, and transportation, with shortfall identification associated with each phase. The **plan development phases are collectively referred to as TPFDD refinement**. The normal TPFDD refinement process consists of sequentially refining forces, logistics (non-unit personnel and sustainment), and transportation data to develop a TPFDD file that supports a feasible and adequate OPLAN. Database size and time constraints may cause overlapping of several refinement phases. The decision as to TPFDD refinement sequence and emphasis is made by the supported commander, unless otherwise directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For Base Case planning, refinement conferences are conducted by the Joint Staff in conjunction with USTRANSCOM. Regional planning conferences are conducted by the supported commander in conjunction with USTRANSCOM. NOTE: Base Case may become less viable with force reductions.

(1) **Forces refinement.** This initial phase of TPFDD refinement is conducted in coordination with supported and supporting commanders, Services, the Joint Staff, and other supporting agencies. USCINTRANSCOM normally hosts forces refinement conferences at the request of the Joint Staff or the supported commander. The purpose of forces refinement is to confirm that forces are sourced and tailored within JSCP, JCS, and Service guidance and to assess the adequacy of combat support and combat service support (CC/CSS) apportionment.

(a) Before any forces refinement conference, the supported commander updates force lists against the latest TUCHA file.

(b) Movement requirements to compensate for shortfalls of pre-positioned equipment are given to the supported commander by the appropriate Service component command before any forces refinement conference.

(c) Before any forces refinement conference, the Services ensure that the **Logistics Factors File** and the **Civil Engineering Support Planning File** reflect current data. The TUCHA file is updated quarterly per Joint Pub 1-03.16, Joint Reporting Structure (JRS), Joint Operation Planning System, to reflect current force

structure and data. The Services also ensure that the latest quarterly update of the Service force module library has been completed.

(d) Forces TPFDD files are sourced by Service sourcing agencies and returned to the supported commander at least 30 days (or as specified in coordinating instructions) before any forces refinement conference. USCINTRANSCOM monitors and facilitates the transfer data, as circumstances require.

(2) **Logistics refinement.** The second phase of TPFDD refinement is primarily conducted by the Service sourcing agencies, the Defense Logistics Agency, and CINC components under the overall direction of the Joint Staff and/or the supported commander. USCINTRANSCOM normally hosts logistics refinement conferences for the Joint Staff and the supported commander. The purpose of logistics refinement is to confirm sourcing of logistic requirements (nonunit personnel and cargo) per JSCP, JCS, and Service guidance and to assess (by the Joint Staff and the supported commander) the adequacy of resources furnished by support planning, including complete medical and civil engineering planning.

(a) The logistics community begins refinement of the TPFDD with a completely sourced (no dual-tasked units for OPLANs capable of concurrent execution) and adequate TPFDD produced by the supported commander.

(b) Before the start of the logistics phase, Services and supported commanders ensure that the appropriate planning factors are mutually agreeable and are used throughout the logistic refinement process.

(c) Before the logistics refinement conferences, the CINCs, Services, and defense agencies involved develop and/or source personnel, facilities, and materiel support requirements.

(d) During the logistic refinement conferences, the CINCs, Services, and defense agencies concerned resolve problems in non-unit-related personnel, cargo, retrograde, medical, and resupply records, including shortfalls.

(e) Before convening a logistics refinement conference, USCINTRANSCOM assesses initial common-user transportation feasibility in coordination with the supported commander and conference participants. At the conclusion of a logistics refinement conference, USCINTRANSCOM reassesses transportation feasibility for the supported commander to ensure that the TPFDD is ready for transportation component command flow.

(3) **Transportation refinement.** The purpose of transportation refinement is to adjust the flow of OPLANs to ensure that they are transportation feasible and are consistent with JSCP, JCS, and Service guidance. It is conducted by USCINTRANSCOM in coordination with the Joint Staff, Services, and CINCs. USCINTRANSCOM normally hosts transportation refinement conferences.

(a) Transportation refinement begins with the supported commander's sending a sourced TPFDD file to USCINTRANSCOM for transportation flow.

(b) During the transportation conference, participants resolve transportation-related problems, as well as coordinate joint transportation requirements and shortfalls. Movement tables are furnished, and the supported commander determines whether the closure profile is consistent with the concept of operations.

(c) At the completion of a transportation refinement conference, USCINTRANSCOM transfers the refined TPFDD file to the JDS database.

b. General refinement guidance regarding global plans may be published for specific OPLANs or families of OPLANs to meet current conditions or resolve particular problems. Normally, such guidance is issued by the Joint Staff, although USCINTRANSCOM may issue guidance for database construction, database accuracy, and data transfer and update.

(1) To enhance the flexibility and utility of the JDS database, TPFDD information is intensively managed and updated to ensure database accuracy for ready conversion to an OPORD. This intensive management includes scheduled replacement of UICs that are changed or deactivated, TUCHA and other standard reference files updates, and updates of force lists based on JSCP changes to Service force structure.

(2) Normally, refinement conferences are attended by representatives of the supported commander, supporting commanders, Joint Staff, Services, defense agencies, and Service components.

(3) Completed TPFDD files are normally made available to refinement participants through USCINTRANSCOM 30 days before refinement conferences. Medical working files, personnel working files, unit consumption factors files, and TFE control files are submitted with the TPFDD file.

(4) Submission of the TPFDD file to USCINTRANSCOM constitutes the supported commander's certification that the TPFDD file is ready for refinement.

c. **Documentation.** Following TPFDD refinement, the supported commander:

(1) prepares the basic plan and all required annexes in the format prescribed in Joint Pub 5-02.2, JOPS Volume II,

(2) produces an updated TPFDD including an update against the most recent TUCHA file, and

(3) submits the OPLAN, TPFDD file, and other files to USCINTRANSCOM for inclusion in the JDS to be available to the Joint Staff and Services for review.

d. **Base Case.** The Base Case plan was introduced in the FY 87-88 JSCP planning cycle to identify and resolve long-acknowledged problems with the assignment of multiple tasks to forces and nonunit cargo when several large OPLANs are simultaneously executed. Base Case recognizes the possible simultaneous execution of seven key OPLANs and their impact on limited resources in meeting the resulting worldwide commitment. The individual concepts of operations are examined for

conflicts; later, in the force and support planning steps, planners try to avoid using resources in more than one of these OPLANs.

(1) TPFDD refinement for the Base Case also takes place in three phases: forces, resupply, and transportation. Refinement conferences are held first to source forces and resolve force shortfalls; then, several months later, meetings are held with logistics representatives to consider resupply issues. Once these force and nonunit cargo records are sourced, multiple task-assignments eliminated, and risks assessed, transportation planners meet to prepare movement tables to satisfy the worldwide requirements.

(2) The procedures for the Base Case plan are comparatively new and were initially published by message. See Note para 623.a.

624. STEP 8—PLAN DOCUMENTATION

a. **Definition.** Plan documentation is the final step in the plan development phase. The objective is to document the operation plan in JOPS format for submission and distribution. The fully documented plan, including its refined TPFDD, is an operation plan in complete format (OPLAN).

(1) The OPLAN includes a summary, basic plan, a series of detailed annexes, and other administrative documents describing the CINC's concept in great detail. The basic plan describes the situation, mission, plan of execution, administration, and logistics concepts, and identifies the CINC's plan for command and control.

(2) The annexes give an exhaustive treatment of the basic subjects: commands supporting the plan (task organization), intelligence, operations, logistics, personnel, and a multitude of other vital subjects. The annexes are further expanded by a long list of appendices that contain an even more detailed statement of the CINC's concept for specific elements of the plan. Guidance for preparation of many of the classified annexes and appendices is found in Joint Pub 5-02.2, classified supplement to JOPS Volume II.

(3) Information gathered by the planning staff during the entire deliberate planning process is used for plan documentation. The actual writing of individual elements of the plan need not wait until this step; it begins when there is enough assembled information for the particular topic. The transmittal document prepared during the concept development phase may have been a substantial beginning to OPLAN documentation. Information on the details of particular annexes that was not included in the transmittal document is now developed and collected for the final OPLAN document.

(4) Administrative guidance and formats for the OPLAN are contained in Joint Pub 5-02.2 (JOPS Volume II). The major elements of an OPLAN and a list of annexes are shown in Figure 6-23.

(5) The documentation of the OPLAN reflects the latest changes to the TPFDD resulting from the refinement process. Planners often make changes that are absolutely necessary to close the force. While the CINC or members of the staff approved them, it is possible that these changes altered the original concept of

JOPS OPLAN FORMAT




Figure 6-23

operations. The documentation step is the final opportunity to meld the computer description of the operation with its written description.

b. The documentation step includes not only preparing the written package but also producing the TPFDD updated by the refinement process. Most supporting commands and defense agencies that receive copies of the completed OPLAN have access to the many OPLAN-unique files produced by the supported commander through their own WWMCCS computer terminals. The database is reviewed using their copies of the TPFDD tape or via the WWMCCS Intercomputer Network (WIN). Reviewers of the data can choose from the many available data elements and formats. If, however, the plan is sent to an organization that does not have access to the necessary JOPS ADP capabilities through WWMCCS, selected information can be extracted from the TPFDD and included in the written plan. The **Time-Phased Force and Deployment List (TPFDL)** is just such a printed computer product that displays extracts of specific data from the TPFDD file. The TPFDL may be included as Appendix 1 to Annex A of the OPLAN.

PLAN REVIEW PHASE

625. INTRODUCTION

Reference: Joint Pub 5-02.1, JOPS Volume I

a. **Introduction.** In this phase, the Joint Staff performs or coordinates a final review of operation plans submitted by the combatant CINCs. It is a formal review for **adequacy and feasibility** of the entire operation plan, whether that is in OPLAN or CONPLAN format. Approval of the plan is the signal to subordinate and supporting commands to develop their operation plans in support of the CINC's concept. The supporting commanders have been involved in doing this while the CINC has been building a plan.

b. **Sources of plans for review.** CJCS has statutory responsibility for reviewing contingency plans. By his authority, the Joint Staff reviews plans from the following sources:

- operation plans submitted by the CINCs:
 - new plans in response to JSCP or CJCS task assignments
 - changes to existing plans
 - existing plans recommended for continuation
 - existing plans recommended for cancellation
- bilateral military plans and planning studies
- military plans of international treaty organizations
- other operation plans, JCS-designated or requested by a Service Chief/CINC

c. **Types of review.** The Joint Chiefs of Staff conduct the following types of reviews (Figure 6-24):

(1) **Concept review.** This review is conducted following the concept development phase and is applicable to new operation plans or existing plans in which the concept has changed. Concept reviews may also occur when a CINC wishes to continue a plan concept unchanged. The **concept review determines whether the scope and concept of operations are sufficient to accomplish the task assigned, assesses the validity of the assumptions, and evaluates compliance with JCS task assignments and guidance.** JCS approval of the concept is "for continued planning only."

(2) **Plan review.** This review is conducted during the plan review phase and is applicable to all JSCP-assigned operation plans. It is a **formal review** of the entire operation plan, including TPFDD, deterrent option force modules, updated medical working file, and appropriate CESP files, if applicable. OPLANs, when approved, are **effective for execution when directed.**

d. **Criteria.** Approval during final review of the operation plan depends on whether it satisfies the JCS task assignment and demonstrates the effective use of apportioned resources. This is summarized as **adequacy and feasibility**:

(1) The review for adequacy determines whether the scope and concept of planned operations are capable of satisfying the JCS-assigned tasks. The review assesses




Figure 6-24

the **validity of the assumptions and compliance with JCS guidance**. The Joint Staff and Services conduct a legal review of the plan for compliance with domestic and international law, including the Law of War.

(2) The review for feasibility determines whether the assigned tasks **could be accomplished using available resources**. The primary factors considered are whether the resources made available for planning by the JSCP and Service planning documents are being used effectively or whether they are being exceeded.

e. **CJCS action.** Operation plans submitted to CJCS for review are referred to the JCS Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate, J-7, which conducts and coordinates the final plan review. Other Joint Staff directorates and defense agencies are consulted as required, as well as the Services.

(1) Review comments are categorized as follows:

- **execution-critical** - These are major deficiencies that negatively affect the capability of the plan to meet the JSCP objective and may prevent execution of the plan as written. Examples include such items as failure to meet assigned tasks, deviations from joint policy, and major logistic shortfalls.
- **substantive** - These comments concern less significant deficiencies that include deviations from JCS guidance, JOPS formatting, and/or significant errors involving the TPFDD. These deficiencies would not prevent execution of the plan.

- **administrative** - These are comments offered for clarity, accuracy, and consistency. They include such items as outdated references, improper terminology, and minor errors.

(2) Reviews are processed under the provisions of the appropriate JCS MOP. The review should be completed within 60 days of referral. The Director, Joint Staff, may extend the review period if circumstances warrant.

(3) Review results are forwarded to the supported commander by memorandum (or message) stating that the plan is either

(a) **approved** (effective for execution, when directed),

(b) **forwarded for continued planning** (This category is applicable for those plans containing critical shortfalls that cannot be resolved by the supported commander. Although these OPLANs cannot be fully approved because of the nature of the shortfalls, the OPLAN and its TPFDD should be considered current and effective for planning.), or

(c) **disapproved.**

f. **Post-review actions**

(1) Within 30 days of receipt of the JCS review results memorandum (or message), the supported commander sends a message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff stating his intentions concerning incorporation of **execution-critical** comments. A formal change incorporating JCS execution-critical comments to correct resolvable items is submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff within 60 days of review results receipt. **Substantive comments** must be incorporated into a change by the next JCS review.

(2) Within 15 days of receipt of the JCS review results, the supported commander sends a message to the component commands notifying them of

(a) OPLAN approval status,

(b) OPLANs replaced, and

(c) component commands' responsibility to notify supporting commands and agencies of OPLAN effectiveness and task assignments.

(3) Within 15 days of receipt of the supported command's OPLAN review notification message, component commanders send a message to all supporting commands and agencies that have been assigned tasks within the plan relaying OPLAN status and effectiveness.

(4) When a formal change is received, the Joint Staff reviews it to verify incorporation of JCS comments. The scope of the review is determined case by case.

(5) Supporting plans prepared by subordinate and supporting commanders and other agencies are normally reviewed and approved by the supported commander.

Supported commanders advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff when issues from these reviews cannot be resolved between the commanders concerned.

NOTE: CHART 4, APPENDIX K, ILLUSTRATES THE REVIEW PROCESS OF OPERATION PLANS THROUGHOUT DELIBERATE PLANNING; THE CHART MAY BE FOLDED OUT FOR QUICK REFERENCE.

SUPPORTING PLANS PHASE

626. INTRODUCTION

References: *Joint Pub 5-02.1, JOPS Volume I*

a. During this final phase of the deliberate planning process, the supported commander directs the preparation and submission of supporting plans. These deal with mobilization, deployment, and employment. The task assignments are clearly documented in paragraph 3 of the CONPLAN and paragraph 3 of the OPLAN and in the Plan Summary. As required by the CINC's task assignment, supporting plans are developed by Service component commanders, joint task force commanders, supporting unified or specified commanders, or other agencies. As shown in Figure 6-25, many of these commanders in turn assign their subordinates the task of preparing additional supporting plans. As an extreme example, a local unit-recall roster ordering an individual Service member to report for duty in case of a contingency can be considered a supporting plan.

b. A supporting plan that directly supports an OPLAN normally carries the **plan identification number (PID)** of the supported commander's plan; the plan summary identifies the OPLAN it supports. In some cases, however, a command is required to perform essentially the same actions to support two or more supported commanders' plans. In these situations, the commander prepares a single, omnibus plan rather than multiple supporting plans that restate identical material; the plan summary lists the OPLANs it supports.

c. Employment plans normally are the responsibility of the commander who will direct the forces when the OPLAN is executed. In many cases, however, the politico-military situation cannot be clearly forecast, so employment planning may be delayed until circumstances require it.

d. Supporting plans normally are submitted to the supported commander within 60 days after CJCS approval of the plan they support. The review of supporting plans is the responsibility of the commander they support. CJCS, however, may be asked to resolve issues that arise during the review of supporting plans. The Joint Staff, on behalf of CJCS, can review any supporting plan.




Figure 6-25

TPFDD MAINTENANCE

Reference: *Joint Pub 5-02.1, JOPS Volume I*

627. INTRODUCTION. TPFDD maintenance is a process designed to keep a contingency plan as up to date as possible. When an OPLAN is published at the conclusion of the deliberate planning process, it is considered to be **adequate** to accomplish the mission and **feasible** in light of apportioned resources. Since it is based on existing intelligence information, it is current. However, the situation described in the OPLAN changes; the real-world conditions that led to the response outlined in the CINC's concept may no longer apply, and the CINC's concept may no longer be the most effective response. For many reasons, the longer a TPFDD "sits on the shelf," the less likely it is to describe the

required deployment move accurately. The objective of TPFDD maintenance is to incorporate changes to deployment data that have occurred since refinement. Its aim is to reduce the amount of change needed to adapt the TPFDD if it is required in a time-sensitive situation. Although the supported commander is ultimately responsible for TPFDD maintenance, USTRANSCOM plays a key role in keeping the TPFDD current.

a. At the end of the TPFDD refinement step, the data contained in the TPFDD are converted to a form that can be used in JDS. JDS is a WWMCCS-supported ADP system developed to bridge the gap between the deliberate planning process that produced the OPLAN and the crisis planning process that will convert the OPLAN into an executable operation order (OPORD).

b. **Periodic TPFDD maintenance** is a relatively routine administrative job. Normally, TPFDD maintenance is conducted as frequently as the supported commander thinks necessary, starting after TPFDD refinement is completed. JOPS ADP currently is used for TPFDD maintenance, and updated information submitted by the JPEC is reformatted to the deployment database in JDS. Changes in sourcing, unit equipment, location, or state of unit readiness affect the plan, since they may change the amount of materiel to be deployed or the POE where it will be loaded. If a unit has been assigned to support another OPLAN, a substitute unit may have to be identified to satisfy the force record requirement in the TPFDD. The sources of information used to keep the deployment database current are as varied as the information itself. All members of the JPEC are responsible for keeping the JDS deployment database current, and regular reporting procedures have been established in Joint Pub 1-03, *Joint Reporting Structure*, and Joint Pub 1-03.21, *Joint Operation Planning System*.

c. It is highly unlikely that a plan would be implemented in its entirety without changes. Any changes made in early stages of the operation are likely to affect events taking place later on. Therefore, it makes sense to concentrate the planners' efforts on keeping the initial stages of a plan current. Normally, the first 30 days of air and sea movement requirements undergo **intensive management** by the JPEC to ensure continued database accuracy when converted to an OPORD. Different periods of intensive management can be specified by the supported commander. For example, in a very large and complex OPLAN, the commander may decide to have only the first five days of air movements intensively managed. When a plan is being implemented, later portions of the plan will be **incrementally updated** as earlier portions are being executed.

d. Being ultimately responsible for TPFDD maintenance, the supported commander is the final authority for approving changes to the OPLAN TPFDD.

628. JOPS ADP SUPPORT SUMMARY

Reference: *Joint Pub 5-02.3, JOPS Volume III*

JOPS Volume III states that JOPS ADP is "used in the deliberate planning process by the JPEC to develop, analyze, refine, review, and maintain joint operation plans and to prepare supporting plans." JOPS ADP is used primarily in the plan development phase by the Service components to build the force list, calculate the flow of nonunit cargo and personnel, and complete specialized planning such as civil engineering and medical support. Through this process the TPFDD grows as shown in Figure 6-26. When the




Figure 6-26

components complete this work, the CINC's staff merges the TPFDDs and tests gross transportation feasibility. Next, ADP is used to refine the database before and during refinement conferences. In the plan review phase JOPS ADP supports the review process, and, in the supporting plans phase, supporting commands may use JOPS ADP to analyze the supported command's TPFDD. Finally, during maintenance of the TPFDD JOPS ADP is used to make necessary updates.

Chapter 7

Crisis Action Planning

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- **CRISIS ACTION PROCEDURES** 7-7
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Crisis Action Planning

700. INTRODUCTION TO TIME-SENSITIVE PLANNING

a. **Overview.** In peacetime, **deliberate planning** procedures are used to evaluate a specific situation and plan a military response. **Eighteen to twenty-four months** may be required to identify adequate responses, conduct the evaluation to select the "best" course of action, and prepare a feasible deployment plan. It is noteworthy that the description of the potential situation is based on the **best available intelligence** but may be hypothetical in this stage of planning. Further, in the deliberate planning procedures, the **resources are apportioned only for planning**. While the forces and transportation assets may be sourced during deliberate planning, they may or may not be the units actually **allocated** by the National Command Authorities (NCA) when the operation is finally executed.

(1) Certainly there are situations when the time available to plan the operation is limited to only a few days; when timely identification of resources is necessary to ready the force, schedule transportation, and prepare supplies; and when actual movement and employment of U.S. Armed Forces is expected in the immediate future. In this crisis or time-sensitive situation, the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) uses **Crisis Action Procedures (CAP)**.

(2) In a crisis, the situation is dynamic, with the body of knowledge growing hour by hour from the latest intelligence reports. An adequate and feasible military response in a crisis demands flexible procedures keyed to the **time available**, to **communications that are rapid and effective**, and to the **use of previous planning**, whenever possible. The principal players need to know what others are doing, and they need to know what is expected of them.

(3) Crisis Action Procedures are used by the JPEC to plan, deploy, and employ U.S. military forces in time-sensitive situations. These procedures ensure

- following of **logical procedures** that begin with recognizing the problem and developing the solution, and progress to preparing and executing the operation order;
- **rapid and effective exchange of information** about the situation, its analysis, and alternative military responses;
- **timely preparation** of military courses of action for consideration by the NCA; and
- **timely relay** of the decisions of the NCA to the combatant commander to permit effective execution.

(4) The system is divided logically into separate phases illustrated in Figure 7-1; each has a definite start, a finish, and actions to be performed. The roles of the key

SUMMARY OF TIME-SENSITIVE PLANNING PHASES

PHASE I SITUATION DEVELOPMENT	PHASE II CRISIS ASSESSMENT	PHASE III COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT	PHASE IV COURSE OF ACTION SELECTION	PHASE V EXECUTION PLANNING	PHASE VI EXECUTION
EVENT					
•EVENT OCCURS WITH POSSIBLE NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS	•CINC'S REPORT/ ASSESSMENT RECEIVED	•CJCS PUBLISHES WARNING ORDER	•CJCS PRESENTS REFINED AND PRIORITIZED COA'S TO NCA	•CINC RECEIVES ALERT ORDER OR PLANNING ORDER	•NCA DECIDE TO EXECUTE OPORD
ACTION					
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •MONITOR WORLD SITUATION •RECOGNIZE PROBLEM •SUBMIT CINC'S ASSESSMENT 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •INCREASE AWARENESS •INCREASE REPORTING •JCS ASSESS SITUATION •JCS ADVISE ON POSSIBLE MILITARY ACTION •NCA-CJCS EVALUATION 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •DEVELOP COA'S •EVALUATE COA'S •CREATE/MODIFY JDS DATABASE •CINC ASSIGNS TASKS TO SUBORDINATES BY EVALUATION REQUEST MESSAGE •CINC REVIEWS EVALUATION RESPONSE MESSAGES •USTRANSCOM PREPARES DEPLOYMENT ESTIMATES •JCS REVIEW COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •CJCS GIVES MILITARY ADVICE TO NCA •CJCS MAY PUBLISH PLANNING ORDER TO BEGIN EXECUTION PLANNING BEFORE FORMAL SELECTION OF COA BY NCA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •ADJUST JDS DATABASE •IDENTIFY MOVEMENT REQUIREMENTS •IDENTIFY AND ASSIGN TASKS TO UNITS •CONVERT COA INTO OPORD'S & SUPPORTING OPORD'S •RESOLVE SHORTFALLS & LIMITATIONS •BEGIN SORTS REPORTING •JCS MONITOR OPORD DEVELOPMENT 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •CJCS PUBLISHES EXECUTE ORDER BY AUTHORITY & DIRECTION OF SECDEF •CINC EXECUTES OPORD •JDS DATABASE MAINTAINED •JPEC REPORTS EXECUTION STATUS
OUTCOME					
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •ASSESS THAT EVENT MAY HAVE NATIONAL IMPLICATIONS •REPORT THE EVENT TO NCA/CJCS 	•NCA/CJCS DECIDE TO DEVELOP MILITARY COA	•CINC PUBLISHES COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE WITH RECOMMENDED COA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •NCA SELECT COA •CJCS PUBLISHES COA SELECTION BY NCA IN ALERT ORDER 	•CINC PUBLISHES OPORD	•CRISIS RESOLVED

Figure 7-1

members of the JPEC are described both for use as a checklist and for other community members to view the overall process. The procedures begin when the **crisis develops**; the theater commander recognizes the potential significance of the event and reports it, along with his assessment, to the National Military Command Center. The **NCA assess** its diplomatic, economic, and political implications and decide that a possible military response should be prepared. The **CINC develops** courses of action in response to the situation. The **NCA select** the COA. By direction of CJCS, the **CINC prepares** the detailed operation order (OPORD) to support the selected COA. At the direction of the NCA, the **CINC executes** the OPORD. This is an academic description, of course. In reality, the process is flexible; it permits the steps to be done sequentially or concurrently, or skipped altogether. The exact flow of the procedures is largely

determined by the time available to complete the planning and by the significance of the crisis.

(5) Members of the JPEC are busy during the accelerated planning of a military response to a crisis. Figure 7-2 illustrates the primary responsibilities of the Joint Planning and Execution Community during crisis action.

ACTIVITIES OF THE JOINT PLANNING & EXECUTION COMMUNITY DURING CRISIS ACTION PROCEDURES

NCA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Approve the COA • Direct major actions to be taken, e.g., change deployment status, deploy forces • Authorize conduct of military operations against a potential enemy
JCS JOINT STAFF	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Manage planning process: review & analyze reports, direct CINCs to prepare COAs, resolve conflicts & shortfalls, monitor deployment/employment • Offer options and recommendations to the NCA • Convey NCA decisions
SUPPORTED COMMAND	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Respond to a crisis • Prepare Commander's Estimate • Develop COAs • Develop Operation Order for deployment/employment
SUBORDINATE COMMAND	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Determine the force and resource requirements • Develop employment plan
SUPPORTING COMMAND	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Generate and source force and support requirements • Make deployment estimates for organic lift assets
USTRANSCOM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coordinate deployment planning & execution • Make deployment estimates • Develop transportation-feasible schedules • Optimize use of transportation capability • Direct deployment activities during execution
SERVICES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Furnish additional support forces through subordinate component commanders • Identify and prepare reserve forces

Figure 7-2

(6) Military planners facing time-sensitive planning requirements must understand that diplomatic, political, economic, and military options are being considered by the NCA. The military option may initially be the least desirable option, and a decision to execute it may be made only after other, less severe options have been judged unsuitable. In reaching a decision to develop a military solution, the NCA may consider the possible range of military options described in Figure 7-3. Ultimately, **final responsibility and authority** in a crisis rest with the NCA, who must approve a COA and authorize the major actions to be taken, including the deployment, employment, or redeployment of forces.

MILITARY MISSION OPTIONS

Congress has legislated that the commanders of unified and specified combatant commands (CINCs) are the agents of the National Command Authorities (NCA) who are responsible for effective military action. The CINC, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), and the NCA have a wide range of possible military responses to a situation. The specific military option chosen is a single snapshot of the spectrum of force possibilities. When faced with an assigned task or a situation, the CINC looks at the most appropriate military action in light of his overall military capability. The CINC's regional view of the problem will be balanced by the global view of the NCA and the CJCS. Their perspective may be more sensitive to the political, diplomatic, and economic factors that influence the choice of a particular solution; consideration of military factors may not dominate their thinking. If military force is contemplated, the NCA may specify the level of military force envisioned, its impact on the world stage, and the application of military force in conjunction with other Presidential actions. On the other hand, the CINC will want to prepare for the worst case, even if a lesser application of force is to be applied. In light of what is to be accomplished and its desired impact, the following force options may be considered by the NCA, the CJCS, and the CINC:

PRESENCE

Presence is best visualized by the worldwide presence of unified combatant commands. The size or permanence of the force varies; presence could be a large forward-deployed force illustrated by EUCOM's contribution to NATO, or a port call by just one ship at a critical time. The timeliness of the appearance of the force may be more influential to the success of presence than its size. U.S. military presence is seen in MAAGs, missions, and security assistance operations around the world. These may reflect both our level of interest and our assessment of the threat. On a larger scale of presence, forward-deployed forces speak loudly of U.S. global influence and represent a strong U.S. initiative in maintaining that influence. Presence may be considered a "show of flag," and our military presence has been a significant source of international goodwill.

SHOW OF FORCE

A show of force is an extension of presence that stops short of bringing opposing forces together in conflict. It has been referred to as "muscle flexing" or "saber rattling." Properly applied and correctly timed, a show of force may be just the deterrent required to prevent any further escalation of hostilities. To be properly applied, the show of force must be credible in the eyes of our adversary. A training exercise that coincides with a troublesome international political situation might be a good example of this option.

DEMONSTRATION

A show of force and a demonstration are similar; they differ primarily in the degree of implied threat. The purpose of a demonstration is not to seek a decision. In fact, it may be a show of force on a front where a military decision is not sought. The demonstration actually employs force, but it does so in a manner designed to warn or threaten the adversary rather than to engage in combat. A demonstration can warn the potential aggressor that the United States has the military capability and the will to meet the situation. A demonstration can be staged to deceive the enemy. Feints or cover-and-deception movements are forms of demonstration. Normally, deception operations are used in conjunction with another action, such as an invasion. A recent example might be the destruction of the Iranian oil platforms in the Persian Gulf (1987) or Freedom of Navigation exercises.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

(PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS / UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE / CIVIL AFFAIRS)

The joint force commander plans for this option along with, and as part of, a major operation plan. In some situations, the commander may use these options independently. PSYOPs try to create attitudes and behavior favorable to achieving objectives of a friendly force. UW can be military and/or paramilitary operations. Psychological operations and unconventional warfare operations range from clandestine to overt actions. Civil affairs operations are those activities that embrace the relationship between U.S. military forces and the civil authorities and people in the objective area. Civil affairs operations normally support other operations. Special operations played an important role in assisting the organization and operations of irregular forces in WW II and Vietnam.

QUARANTINE

This term was introduced in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis to mean, "...a collective, peaceful process involving limited coercive measures interdicting the unreasonable movement of certain types of offensive military weapons and associated material by one state into the territory of another." In the classic sense, it means a period while a vessel is detained in isolation until free of contagious disease. When both definitions are combined, the meaning becomes "an act short of war designed to exclude specific items from movement into or out of a state." The United States has also used quarantine in Operation Market Time off the coast of North Vietnam.

BLOCKADE

There are different degrees of blockade. The objective of an **absolute blockade** is to cut off all enemy communications and commerce. It attempts to isolate a place or region and it can apply to all means of transportation. The international community considers an absolute blockade an act of war. The **pacific blockade** is a lesser degree of blockade. This type may not be perceived as an act of war. It is often limited only to carriers that fly the flag of the adversary state. A blockade may be a forceful method of bringing pressure to the opposition without risk to a large military force. Blockades were used effectively by the North against Southern ports in the Civil War, 1861-1865, and by the United States in the mining of Haiphong harbor in 1973.

FORCE ENTRY

This option involves the use of military forces in an objective area. It is the most extreme of the mission options available and requires extensive planning. In this option, U.S. forces are placed in harm's way with the intent to do battle, if necessary, to accomplish a military mission. Actual armed conflict is the result of the resistance met. Combat operations range from an administrative landing for police-type operations, e.g., the landing of Marines in Lebanon in 1958, to an outright invasion under a state of war, e.g., Operation Overlord in 1944. An invasion is a combat assault made against armed forces to gain entry into a hostile area. The armed conflict takes place at the point of entry. However, many U.S. plans anticipate situations that permit an administrative landing in support of a friendly government. If armed conflict were to result, the point of armed conflict might not be the same as the point of entry. The ultimate operation plan for force entry may employ as deterrent options the less drastic force options illustrated above.

It is not the intent of this insert to give an official definition to these terms but rather to suggest the spectrum of military force available when developing a mission statement for an operation plan and its deterrent options.

Figure 7-3

b. **Definition**

(1) JOPS Volume IV defines a crisis as "an incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, and possessions or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of U.S. military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives."

(2) Several characteristics of a crisis can be given: it may occur with little or no warning; it is fast breaking and requires accelerated decisions; and sometimes, a single crisis will spawn a crisis elsewhere. Whatever the nature or perceived magnitude of the situation, a commitment of U.S. military forces and resources is being considered as a solution. In the U.S. defense establishment, the use of military force requires a decision by the NCA.

c. **Available guidelines.** The procedures in Joint Pub 5-02.4 (JOPS Volume IV) are used to outline a military response in a crisis. The six phases of CAP are a logical sequence of events that lead to the timely preparation of a COA for a military response. Further, the procedures describe the flow of information from the combatant commander; the integration of CJCS military advice in the analysis of military options; the decision process by the NCA to begin detailed military planning, change deployment posture of the identified force, and execute the military option; and the mechanisms for monitoring the execution of the eventual operation order.

d. **Communications.** Timely, accurate communications are essential in exchanging information and transmitting directions during a crisis. Several means are available: oral transmission confirmed with record copy as soon as possible; narrative text messages to transmit the initial report, situation updates, CINC's assessment of the situation, and orders including decisions of the NCA; and deployment data transmitted via the WWMCCS Intercomputer Network (WIN). Only through rapid, accurate, and secure communication can the military response to a crisis be managed. Today, several means exist to heighten overall operations security of the planning and management of CAP: special category (SPECAT) of messages and close-hold procedures for the WIN Teleconference and data transfer procedures, and limited access to the JDS database. The reporting procedures to be followed in crisis action planning are defined in the Joint Pub 1-03 series, *Joint Reporting Structure*, and Joint Pub 6-04, "Joint Doctrine for Message Text Formatting." CAP uses the OPREP-3 PINNACLE COMMAND ASSESSMENT (OPREP-3PCA) format for the immediate reporting of serious incidents and events by the cognizant CINC. These reports establish the basis for crisis recognition and for the initiation of CAP.

e. **Available ADP support.** The rapid development of an adequate and feasible military response is the purpose of crisis planning. The planner must quickly evaluate the adequacy of proposed COAs, rapidly build a force list and calculate sustainment, and effectively determine transportation feasibility. The analysis of COAs can be performed with executive computer simulation called the Modern Aids to Planning Program (MAPP). Crisis Action Procedures use the ADP support defined by the Joint Deployment System (JDS). Through JDS, the crisis action planner may build a force list through access to plans prepared in deliberate planning as well as a force module library that includes packages of combat forces with necessary support and sustainment.

f. **Differences between deliberate & crisis action planning.** Figure 7-4 illustrates the significant differences between the deliberate planning procedures discussed in Chapter 6 and the CAP that will be discussed here.

COMPARING CRISIS ACTION PROCEDURES WITH DELIBERATE PLANNING PROCEDURES

	CRISIS ACTION PLANNING	DELIBERATE PLANNING
TIME AVAILABLE TO PLAN	HOURS OR DAYS	18-24 MONTHS
JPEC INVOLVEMENT	FOR SECURITY REASONS, POSSIBLY VERY LIMITED USING CLOSE-HOLD PROCEDURES	PARTICIPATES FULLY
PHASES	6 PHASES FROM SITUATION DEVELOPMENT TO EXECUTION	5 PHASES FROM INITIATION TO SUPPORTING PLANS
DOCUMENT ASSIGNING TASK	WARNING ORDER TO CINC; CINC ASSIGNS TASKS WITH EVALUATION REQUEST MESSAGE	JSCP TO CINC; CINC ASSIGNS TASKS WITH PLANNING OR OTHER WRITTEN DIRECTIVE
FORCES FOR PLANNING	ALLOCATED IN THE WARNING, PLANNING, ALERT, OR EXECUTE ORDER	APPORTIONED IN JSCP
EARLY PLANNING GUIDANCE TO STAFF	WARNING ORDER FROM CJCS CINC'S EVALUATION REQUEST	PLANNING DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY CINC AFTER PLANNING GUIDANCE STEP OF CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT PHASE
COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE	COMMUNICATES RECOMMENDATIONS OF CINC TO THE CJCS-NCA	COMMUNICATES THE CINC'S DECISION TO STAFF AND SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS
DECISION OF COA	NCA DECIDE COA	CINC DECIDES COA WITH REVIEW BY CJCS
EXECUTION DOCUMENT	EXECUTE ORDER	WHEN AN OPERATION PLAN IS IMPLEMENTED, IT IS CONVERTED TO AN OPORD, AND EXECUTED WITH AN EXECUTE ORDER
PRODUCTS	OPORD WITH SUPPORTING OPORD'S	OPLAN OR CONPLAN WITH SUPPORTING PLANS
ADP SUPPORT	JDS PROCEDURES MANUAL	JOPS VOLUME III

References: Joint Pubs 5-02.1 and .4 (JOPS Volumes I and IV)

Figure 7-4

701. CRISIS ACTION PROCEDURES

a. **History.** In the last 30 years over 200 world situations have met the definition of "crisis" cited in the last section. After a series of such crises in the early 1970s, the NCA became concerned that the military organization for responding to crises was ineffective. In addition, it was seen that the procedures of Joint Pub 1-03 series, *Joint Reporting Structure (JRS)*, were not furnishing adequate and timely information to support the decisionmaking process. A system for time-sensitive military planning was developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and put into effect in 1976. Today those procedures, modified by experience, are described in Joint Pub 5-02.4, *Joint Operation Planning System*, Volume IV, "Crisis Action Procedures."

b. **Concept.** Since each crisis is unique, it is not reasonable to expect to use a rigid set of rules in our response to every situation. JOPS Volume IV defines a coordinated process that includes people, procedures, communications, and ADP hardware and software, and that produces a detailed plan to best accomplish the military mission.

(1) Crisis Action Procedures give the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CINCs procedures for getting vital decisionmaking information up the chain of command to the NCA; they allow the NCA to communicate their decisions accurately down the chain of command through CJCS to the CINC and subordinate and supporting commanders, the Services, and supporting defense agencies; and they permit the key players in the JPEC to exchange essential deployment data rapidly and accurately.

(2) The result is an ability to develop an adequate and transportation-feasible military response during a time-constrained planning period. In addition, JDS, the ADP support package, offers the capability to the community to monitor strategic movement during execution of the plan.

(3) The procedures accommodate the need for different degrees of detail, given the different amounts of time available for planning among the many command levels. They describe actions to be performed by the JPEC from the beginning of a crisis either through the commitment of U.S. military forces or to the point where the need for military force is cancelled.

c. **Phases.** The procedures are categorized into six phases. Each phase of CAP begins with an event, such as the receipt of a report or order, and ends with a decision or resolution of the crisis. When the process moves into a new phase, the primary responsibility for taking action shifts between the NCA and CINC.

(1) Before beginning a full examination of CAP, it is important to understand that the time-sensitivity of certain critical situations may require so rapid a response that the normal procedural sequence may be altered significantly, i.e., CAP phases may be compressed, conducted concurrently, or eliminated. While there are detailed procedures to be followed in the process, circumstances may dictate that they may be abbreviated, that is, decisions may be reached in conference and initially communicated orally. The amount of time spent in each phase depends on the tasks to be done and the time available.

(2) Within the CAP sequence of events, there are several points where decisions must be made for planning to continue, further actions are placed on "hold," or planning reverts to a previous phase. Following each major decision reached by the NCA, CJCS issues a formal order implementing that decision.

NOTE: CHART 5 IN APPENDIX K ILLUSTRATES THE CRISIS ACTION PROCEDURES IN AN EXPANDED DIAGRAM. THE CHART IS DESIGNED TO BE FOLDED OUT FOR REFERENCE WHILE READING THIS SECTION.

702. CRISIS ACTION PROCEDURES - SINGLE-CRISIS ENVIRONMENT

Reference: Joint Pub 5-02.4, "Crisis Action Procedures" (JOPS Volume IV)

SITUATION DEVELOPMENT

a. Phase I

(1) **Introduction.** As a matter of routine, organizations of the U.S. government monitor the world situation. In the course of that monitoring, an event may occur that has possible security implications for the United States or its interests. The event is recognized, analyzed to determine whether U.S. interests are threatened, and reported to the National Military Command Center (NMCC). **The Crisis Action Procedures will generally begin once the event is reported to the NMCC.** The situation development phase contains four related variables--the day-to-day situation is monitored, an event occurs, the event is recognized as a problem, and the event is reported.

(a) **Situation monitoring** is the continuous review and analysis of events occurring worldwide. Many available resources are used ranging from strategic intelligence sources to routine observations by a member of the military attache staff to television news broadcasts. So diverse are the sources of observation that the report could come up through the chain of command from observer to supervisor to senior military officer to Service component command to unified command watch officer. Just as likely, though, an event may be first seen in the Pentagon by a watch team member monitoring a cable news report. It is through situation monitoring that an event comes to the attention of a U.S. official.

(b) An event is an occurrence that is assessed to be out of the ordinary and viewed as potentially having an adverse impact on U.S. national interests and national security.

(c) The recognition of the event as a problem or potential problem follows from the observation.

(d) A report of the event may come from various sources, e.g., CINC, subordinate unit such as an activity or unit commander, TV news, etc. However, regardless of the source, the focal point for reporting information crucial to the national security is the NMCC in Washington, D.C. Figure 7-5 illustrates the diversity of information sources that report to the NMCC. Joint Pub 1-03 series, *Joint Reporting Structure*, is the source of detailed instructions for reporting an event through military channels. Events may be reported initially to the NMCC by any means available, but the two most common means are the **Critical Intelligence Report (CRITIC)** and the **OPREP-3 PINNACLE (OPREP-3P)**. Sample OPREP-3 reports are contained in JOPS Volume IV as well as Joint Pub 1-03.6. Receipt of an OPREP-3 PINNACLE at the NMCC from a CINC is a likely way for CAP to be initiated. However, in this day of instant worldwide communications, it is realistic that the theater may learn of a crisis by means of a phone call from Washington.

- observation of an event with potential national security implications,




Figure 7-5

(2) Actions taken during situation development

(a) In Phase I the focus is generally on the CINC who will be responsible for the U.S. military action that may be taken within a theater. The activities of the JPEC during Phase I are summarized in Figure 7-6. The major occurrences in the combatant command include the following:

- an assessment by the CINC that the potential of the situation warrants higher-echelon awareness,
- reporting to the NMCC by CRITIC or OPREP-3 PINNACLE, and
- publishing the OPREP-3 PINNACLE/CINC ASSESSMENT, the CINC's assessment of action being considered or actions already taken. This is an important step and would be crucial to the CINC's influencing future decisions in a fast-breaking crisis.

THE JPEC DURING CRISIS ACTION PROCEDURES PHASE I -- SITUATION DEVELOPMENT

NCA	
JCS JOINT STAFF	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monitors situation • Evaluates incoming reports • Evaluates actions of CINC
SUPPORTED COMMAND	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reports significant event to NMCC • Publishes CINC's assessment: nature of crisis forces available major constraints action being taken COAs being considered
SUBORDINATE & SUPPORTING COMMANDS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gather intelligence information • Furnish information and support
USTRANSCOM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monitors developing crisis
SERVICES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monitor developing crisis

Figure 7-6

(b) The JCS Joint Staff monitors the situation, requests a report from the theater CINC, evaluates the CINC's actions being taken under the rules of engagement, orders additional intelligence gathering, if necessary, and advises the NCA as the situation develops.

(c) If possible, other members of the JPEC collect information on the situation and develop an accurate picture of the crisis.

(3) **Exchange of reports during Phase I.** The initial report of the event, which any individual can make, must be timely and accurate. The CRITIC or OPREP-3 PINNACLE reports are normally used. They can be issued orally with a record copy to follow. OPREP-3 PINNACLE (general) may be issued by any commander to report any incident or event where national-level interest is indicated. OPREP-3 PINNACLE/CINC ASSESSMENT may be issued by the commander of a unified or specified command to report the command's assessment of a developing or potential crisis. If the initial report of an event is not made by the CINC, the NMCC will make every effort to establish communications with the CINC and request a report. In this instance, the CINC will

normally send an OPREP-3 PINNACLE/CINC ASSESSMENT that would include the following information described in Joint Pub 1-03.6:

- information on the current situation,
- action being taken within the constraints of the current rules of engagement,
- forces readily available,
- expected time for earliest commitment of forces, and
- major constraints on the employment of forces.

(4) **ADP support.** During this phase the CINC's staff reviews applicable contingency plans. The JDS database holds all the files for current complete plans, and the CINC reviews plans through access to WWMCCS. If circumstances warrant, a **WIN Teleconference (TLCF)** may be established to allow a rapid exchange of information.

(5) **Conclusion of Phase I.** The situation development phase ends when the event is reported and the CINC's assessment is submitted to CJCS and NCA through the NMCC.

CRISIS ASSESSMENT

b. **Phase II.** In this phase, the NCA and Joint Chiefs of Staff analyze the situation to determine whether a military option should be prepared to deal with the evolving problem. The phase is characterized by increased information gathering and review of available options by the NCA.

(1) **Introduction.** The phase begins with the receipt of the CINC's report and assessment of the event. The CINC has categorized the event as a problem of potential national concern. The detail and frequency of reporting will increase to furnish to the Chairman and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff information that is needed to evaluate developments and allow them to offer sound military advice to the NCA.

(2) **Actions taken during crisis assessment.** The focus of Phase II is on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the NCA.

(a) The NCA identify the national interests at stake; the national objectives related to those interests; and possible diplomatic, political, economic, and military options to achieve the objectives. The NCA decide that a crisis exists and that military COAs will be developed by the CINC.

(b) CJCS assesses the situation from the military point of view including operations, logistics, and command and control implications. The JCS Joint Staff reviews and evaluates reports from the CINC. CJCS may recommend to the NCA that orders be published to prepare to deploy or to deploy forces.

(c) Having reported the event and offered an assessment of the situation in Phase I, the CINC continues to issue status reports, as appropriate, assesses the disposition of assigned and available forces, and takes appropriate military action under current rules of engagement.

(d) The other members of the JPEC continue to monitor the situation: the Services may improve readiness and sustainability of forces that could be used and identify possible Reserve components; USTRANSCOM improves the disposition and readiness of strategic lift assets, etc. The activities of the JPEC are summarized in Figure 7-7.

THE JPEC DURING CRISIS ACTION PROCEDURES PHASE II -- CRISIS ASSESSMENT

NCA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Decide to develop the military COA
JCS JOINT STAFF	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Gives military assessment to NCA Advises on possible military COAs Reviews existing OPLANs & CONPLANs for suitability Reviews & evaluates reports from CINC & other sources
SUPPORTED COMMAND	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Continues to report status of situation Evaluates event Reviews existing OPLANs & CONPLANs for applicability Evaluates disposition of assigned and available forces Evaluates status of theater transportation assets
SUBORDINATE & SUPPORTING COMMANDS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Continue to monitor the crisis
USTRANSCOM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reviews status of strategic lift assets Improves disposition & readiness of strategic lift assets Initiates update of JDS database
SERVICES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evaluate available military force Act to improve force readiness & sustainability Identify Reserve component requirement

Figure 7-7

(e) Because Crisis Action Procedures are flexible, the NCA and CJCS have the latitude to either **remain in this phase**, increase reporting, and gather additional information for study; **return to Phase I** and continue to monitor the situation without further planning action; or **progress to the next phase** of CAP.

(3) **Crisis response organizations.** During the crisis assessment phase, special teams are assembled at all levels where the problem and its resolution are being developed. These teams vary in size and composition, as well as in name. They may be called crisis action teams, crisis response cells, battle staffs, emergency response teams, operations action groups, or operation planning groups. Specially constituted crisis action organizations generally include representatives from all command staff divisions and may include representatives from a wide range of involved organizations. Figure 7-8 illustrates the variety of organizations that respond to crises.

(4) **Exchange of reports during Phase II.** At any time during CAP, the NCA may find it desirable to prepare selected units for possible military action. Unit readiness is increased by designating **alert conditions** or ordering a specified **deployability posture** to reduce the response time of selected forces. Increased readiness actions may be taken during any phase. Deployment Preparation Orders and Deployment Orders are used to increase or decrease deployability posture, deploy or redeploy forces, establish or disestablish joint task forces and their headquarters, or signal U.S. intent to undertake or

CRISIS MONITORING ORGANIZATIONS

	TITLE	PURPOSE	COMPOSITION OF RESPONSE ELEMENT
OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE	CRISIS COORDINATING GROUP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TIMELY DISSEMINATION OF CRISIS INFORMATION • FACILITATES COORDINATION WITHIN OSD • DRAWS ON PARENT OFFICES FOR SUPPORT, GUIDANCE, AND INFORMATION 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CHAIRED BY DUSD(P) • STAFFED WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF PRINCIPAL OSD STAFF OFFICERS, MILITARY DEPARTMENTS, DOD AGENCIES, & DEPARTMENT OF STATE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER	OPERATIONS TEAM (OT)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MONITORS OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES WORLDWIDE • GATHERS INFORMATION ON DEVELOPING SITUATIONS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ASSIGNED NMCC PERSONNEL
	AUGMENTED OPERATIONS TEAM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PERFORMS 24-HOUR MONITORING OF PARTICULAR SITUATIONS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • OT AUGMENTED AS NECESSARY WITH STAFF PERSONNEL
JCS JOINT STAFF <i>(activation based on level of crisis)</i>	RESPONSE CELL (RC)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FULL-TIME STAFFING BY QUALIFIED PERSONNEL • MAY OCCUPY NORMAL WORKSPACES • REVIEWS CURRENT STRATEGY & APPLICABLE OPLAN'S/CONPLAN'S • GATHERS INTELLIGENCE • REVIEWS STATUS OF FORCES • DEVELOPS BROAD COA'S • ASSEMBLES SITUATION BOOKS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FORMED BY J-3 • TEAM CHIEF IS AN O-6 • ASSIGNED REPRESENTATIVES FROM JOINT STAFF DIRECTORATES • USUALLY DOES NOT CONTAIN SERVICE REPS • SPECIFIC MANNING IS TAILORED TO FIT THE SITUATION
	or CRISIS ACTION TEAM (CAT)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ACTIVATED BY THE DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF, OR J-3 • HANDLES MATTERS THAT EXCEED THE OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY OF THE RC • PROPOSES COA'S 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TEAM CHIEF IS AN O-6 • AUGMENTED RC WITH SERVICE REPS, DOD AGENCIES
	or OPERATIONS PLANNERS GROUP (OPG)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COORDINATES WITH RESPONSE CELLS IN JCS DIRECTORATES, SERVICES, AND DOD AGENCIES • MAKES DECISIONS TO BE FORWARDED TO CJCS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CHAIRMAN IS J-3, DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS • FLAG/GENERAL OFFICER IS VICE CHAIRMAN • STAFFED WITH O-6-LEVEL PLANNERS, NOT ACTION OFFICERS
SUPPORTED COMMAND STAFF	BATTLE STAFFS OR CRISIS ACTION TEAMS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GENERATES, EXCHANGES, AND RECEIVES INFORMATION • DEVELOPS MILITARY OPTIONS, COA'S AND CONCEPTS OF OPERATIONS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • REGULARLY ASSIGNED AND AUGMENTING PERSONNEL • SPECIAL RESPONSE CENTERS FOR INTELLIGENCE LOGISTICS NUCLEAR OPERATIONS SPECIAL OPERATIONS
USTRANSCOM	CRISIS ACTION TEAM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ORCHESTRATES AND MONITORS DEPLOYMENT 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DEPLOYMENT DIRECTORATE PERSONNEL

Reference: MJCS 7-88, Crisis Staffing Procedures of JCS

Figure 7-8

terminate action. Changing the deployment posture of a unit is a strong statement that the United States is beginning action to conduct military operations. Both orders are issued by CJCS and specifically authorized by the Secretary of Defense. The stage of a unit's readiness is defined by the deployability posture.

DEPLOYABILITY POSTURE		STATUS
ND	NORMAL	• NO OVERT ACTION
ID	INCREASED	• PERSONNEL RECALLED
AD	ADVANCED	• UNIT PACKED AND POSITIONED
MD	MARSHALLED	• UNIT/TRANSPORT MOVED TO POE
LD	LOADED	• FIRST INCREMENT LOADED

(a) The Deployment Preparation Order and the Deployment Order are addressed to all combatant commanders and the National Security Agency/Central Security Services. Copies are sent to the Secretary of State, the White House Situation Room, and others, as appropriate.

(b) The format for both of these orders is in JOPS Volume IV. They include all necessary information to deploy the forces if it is not already given in other planning guidance documents from CJCS. The order takes the following overall outline:

- clear statement that it is a Deployment Preparation/Deployment Order issued under the authorization of the Secretary of Defense
- situation
- mission
- execution
- administration and logistics
- command and signal

(c) Note that, while these orders are designed to increase deployability posture, the positioning of forces or preparatory actions may signal U.S. intent to conduct military operations. This may not be the message that is desired, and CJCS and the NCA may consider the requirements for secrecy and surprise, and balance them against the need to ready selected Armed Forces for possible action. Operations security is vital and is practiced.

(5) ADP support. WIN TLECF should be established between crisis participants. The JPEC may review available JDS deployment databases.

(6) **Conclusion of Phase II.** The crisis assessment phase ends with the decision by the NCA to have military options developed for their consideration. These are added to the full spectrum of possible U.S. responses. The NCA decision may also include specific guidance on COAs to be developed. For this reason, the CINC's initial assessment has great influence. That assessment is an early, professional recommendation from the scene; lack of time may make the CINC's assessment the only alternative considered.

COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT

c. **Phase III.** Following the decision of the NCA to develop military options, CJCS publishes a Warning Order directing the development of COAs in response to the situation. The COA development phase shifts emphasis to the CINC, who develops and submits recommended COAs to CJCS and the NCA. The COAs are included in the Commander's Estimate, which is an abbreviated version of the type of information in the Commander's Estimate prepared during the concept development phase of deliberate planning.

(1) **Introduction.** Phase III begins when the NCA decide to develop possible military solutions to the crisis. The military response may be only one of many available options open to the NCA. In fact, the initial reluctance to use military forces may substantially alter the situation and thus limit the available military options when a final decision is made.

(2) **Actions taken during COA development.** As illustrated in Figure 7-9, the center of activity shifts to the supported commander:

(a) CJCS publishes a Warning Order to give initial guidance to the JPEC and requests that the CINC respond with a recommended COA to meet the situation.

(b) The supported commander develops COAs; this involves the subordinate and supporting commanders. With the Evaluation Request Message the CINC assigns those commands the task of identifying the forces and resources for the COAs being considered. If time and security considerations permit, subordinate evaluation of tentative COAs is valuable. Existing OPLANs and CONPLANs may prove useful in the rapid development of the COAs. The databases that outline the flow of forces and sustainment can be made available to the JPEC by the supported commander. Finally, the CINC prepares the Commander's Estimate, the recommended COA.

(c) The subordinate and supporting commanders respond to the CINC with an Evaluation Response Message. Alternative COAs are evaluated and forces are identified to support the operation. Existing plans in the JDS database can be used; a force list for this operation can be created in the JDS database. Sustainment planning begins with coordination between the Service headquarters and the theater Service component. The Services monitor deployment planning and force readiness.

(d) USTRANSCOM reviews the proposed COAs for supportability and prepares deployment estimates for each COA, as time permits.

THE JPEC DURING CRISIS ACTION PROCEDURES
PHASE III -- COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT

NCA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Give guidance to CINC via CJCS
JCS JOINT STAFF	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Publishes Warning Order <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • establishes command relationships • defines tasks, objectives, constraints • either allocates forces & lift or requests CINC requirements • sets tentative C-day & L-hour • directs CINC to develop COAs and submit Commander's Estimate • Monitors COA development with JDS • Reviews Commander's Estimate
SUPPORTED COMMAND	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Responds to Warning Order • Develops and evaluates COAs • Uses JDS and FMs to construct COAs • Coordinates involvement of subordinates • Releases Evaluation Request Message • Reviews existing OPLANs for applicability • Prepares & submits Commander's Estimate to CJCS
SUBORDINATE & SUPPORTING COMMANDS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Respond to Evaluation Request Message • Analyze COAs, as directed • Identify C, CS, CSS forces and generate movement requirement estimates • Create deployment database in JDS for each COA • Coordinate sustainment calculations & movement requirements • Prepare Evaluation Response Message
USTRANSCOM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reviews CINC's COAs • Activates Crisis Action Team • Assists in refining requirements • Prepares deployment estimate for each COA • Sends deployment estimate to supported commander
SERVICES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monitor COA development • Plan for sustainment • Monitor force readiness

Figure 7-9

(3) **Exchange of reports during Phase III.** Several orders/messages may be published during this phase.

(a) Following the decision of the NCA, CJCS normally authorizes the release of a **Warning Order**. If it contains force deployment preparation or deployment orders, Secretary of Defense approval is required.

The Warning Order equates to a planning directive in the deliberate planning process; an example is illustrated in JOPS Volume IV. This message **should**

- describe the **situation**;
- establish **command relationships**;
- state **mission, objectives, and assumptions**;
- refer to **applicable OPLANs and CONPLANs**;
- allocate **forces and transportation assets** or request that the CINC identify resource requirements;

- establish a **tentative C-day/L-hour** or solicit the CINC's recommendation;
- identify the **anticipated D-day** for planning purposes; and
- discuss **guidance** for administrative, logistic, public affairs, and C3 subjects.

The order will definitely **request that the CINC develop COAs** for review and approval by the NCA. In a fast-breaking crisis, the initial Warning Order could be communicated by a telephone conference with a follow-on record copy to ensure that the JPEC is kept advised. Additional information and guidance are transmitted by message referring to this initial order. The order may also discuss and **focus the CINC's attention toward COAs that have already been identified** or considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and NCA. However, the CINC has flexibility to determine how to **carry out the assigned tasks**. If a COA has already been selected by the NCA, direction to begin execution planning (Phase V of CAP) may be issued.

(b) The **Commander's Operational Reports System** is used by all echelons of command to exchange minimum essential information in free text format during this phase of crisis action planning. The basic Operations Planning Report (OPREP-1) describes the formats of four messages exchanged in this phase: **Commander's Evaluation Request**, subordinate/supporting commanders' **Evaluation Response**, USTRANSCOM's **Deployment Estimate**, and the **Commander's Estimate**. A general format for the OPREP-1 is discussed in Joint Pub 1-03.8, "JRS Situation Reporting," and shown in Figure 7-10. Flexibility is permitted with the recommended format; listed sections can be omitted or other paragraphs can be added to meet the situation.

(c) If time permits, the CINC issues a **Commander's Evaluation Request** in OPREP-1 format to his subordinate and supporting commanders. This communicates necessary planning guidance and assigns to members of the JPEC the task of evaluating the proposed COA, submitting force and support requirements, or supporting the CINC's recommended COA. This communication includes

- | | |
|-------------------------|---|
| • operation description | -- cite reference |
| • narrative | -- task, situation, factors affecting possible COAs, enemy capabilities, concept of operations, operational constraints |
| • objective | -- amplifying guidance for developing COA evaluations |
| • remarks | -- description of OPLAN file used and its location in the JDS database |

(d) The subordinate and supporting commanders reply with a component's **course of action Evaluation Response** message. The format is similar to the OPREP-1 reports already discussed: description, narrative, objective, and remarks.

(e) In addition, if time permits, the **USTRANSCOM preliminary Deployment Estimate** is sent to the supported commander. It is in OPREP-1 format and may include the following:

- operation description
 - narrative
 - remarks
- description of the closure estimate in days or hours for each COA
- identification of planning factors used in the simulation

(f) The final product of Phase IV is the **Commander's Estimate** prepared by the CINC. Its purpose is to give the Joint Chiefs of Staff information for consideration by the NCA in their selection of a military COA. It is the CINC's analysis of the COAs that were considered. Contents of the message vary, depending on the situation. A recommended format for the report is detailed in Joint Pub 1-03.8, "Joint

OPREP-1 PARAGRAPH DESCRIPTION

OPERATION DESCRIPTION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Free text paragraph describes the operation • Commander's Estimate of the Situation • Refers to previous messages
NARRATIVE IN 5-PARAGRAPH FORM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tersely written to give color to situation briefings, and contains informative or directive guidance • Mission, situation and COAs, analysis of opposing COAs (enemy capabilities), comparison of own COAs, decision or recommended course of action • Detailed deployment data are in the JDS database
OBJECTIVE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lists operational objectives or specific purpose of the report • May contain force-objective-results relationship
FORCE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identifies force involved in the operation
ROUTES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Describes routes that the force will take to and from the operation
SPECIAL TACTICS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Special activities that the forces will take, e.g., feints, deception, special defensive or offensive strategies
PROFILE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gives depth to tabular or statistical information
CARGO & PASSENGERS DELIVERED	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Illustrates disposition of cargo and passengers
LOSS OR DAMAGE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Describes causes of damage or loss
SEARCH AND RESCUE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Describes operations currently underway
CONDITIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identifies all constraints that may be applied to any phase of the operation, e.g., overflight, rules of engagement
STATISTICAL DATA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Offers statistical data, e.g., number and type of aircraft or vehicles in geographic area
LOGISTICS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Summarizes critical resupply requirements, personnel and cargo to be transported, etc.
CORRECTIONS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reports changes or corrections to preceding OPREP-1 reports
REMARKS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Additional comments or observations to enhance comprehension

Reference: Joint Pub 1-03.8, JRS, Situation Monitoring

Figure 7-10

Reporting Structure." It is an abbreviation of the CINC's total staff work and may have been developed in a matter of hours. The abbreviated guidelines are also found in JOPS Volume IV; it should contain the following:

- operation description -- cite references, description of military operations
- narrative -- five paragraphs described in JOPS
Volume IV: mission, situation and COAs, analysis of opposing COAs (enemy capabilities), comparison of own COAs, and decision or recommendation
- objective -- identify operational objective, object of reporting the information
- remarks -- planning factors, file within JDS where force list may be found, etc.

(4) **ADP support.** Time available to the CINC is a most critical variable during this phase. Vast amounts of planning data must be transferred rapidly among JPEC participants. The WWMCCS Intercomputer Network (WIN) and the JDS deployment database maintained by USTRANSCOM are the primary means for exchanging detailed planning information. The planning tasks require much time, as we have seen in deliberate planning, to develop tentative COAs, evaluate the adequacy of each COA, create force lists and support packages, estimate transportation feasibility of each COA, and begin to prepare deployment estimates for the recommended COA. Fortunately, there is ADP support to assist the crisis planner.

NOTE: CHART 6 IN APPENDIX K ILLUSTRATES THE ADP SUPPORT OF THE PLANNING PROCESS IN AN EXPANDED DIAGRAM. THE CHART IS DESIGNED TO BE FOLDED OUT FOR REFERENCE.

(a) **Develop tentative COAs.** An existing OPLAN may have been built and can be modified. An existing CONPLAN may be available and can be fully developed beyond the stage of an approved concept of operations. Both of these formats are stored in the JDS database and are available for planner review. For situations that have not been considered by prior planning, a NOPLAN situation is said to exist; timely creation of a concept of operations and the time-phasing of forces and support are required.

(b) **Determine adequacy of each proposed COA.** An objective, comprehensive evaluation of proposed COAs is difficult even without time constraints. Using Modern Aids to Planning Programs, computer simulations are being developed at some combatant commands to assist in measuring sensitivity of COAs to key parameters.

(c) **Develop force lists and support packages.** Using the force modules in JDS, the planner can rapidly build an effective combat force, add support forces, and calculate sustainment. Using force modules from current OPLANs reduces the planning time, because these force modules are already "sourced" with actual Army and Air Force units and some Sea Service units.

(d) **Prepare deployment estimates.** The USTRANSCOM components begin to build the deployment estimates from information exchanged on the WIN. USTRANSCOM integrates the deployment estimates and furnishes a consolidated deployment estimate to CJCS and the CINC via WIN TLCF and OPREP-1 message.

(5) **Conclusion of Phase III.** Course of action development concludes with the release of the CINC's Commander's Estimate. Emphasis once again shifts to CJCS and the NCA for the selection of a COA.

COURSE OF ACTION SELECTION

d. **Phase IV.** In this phase, CJCS and, by his authority, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the JCS Joint Staff review and analyze the Commander's Estimate and deployment estimates and, ultimately, present COAs in order of priority to the NCA for their decision. The activities of the JPEC are illustrated in Figure 7-11.

THE JPEC DURING CRISIS ACTION PROCEDURES PHASE IV -- COURSE OF ACTION SELECTION

NCA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Select COA • Direct execution planning
JCS JOINT STAFF	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reviews and evaluates Commander's Estimate • Develops additional COAs, as necessary • Presents COAs and recommends COA to NCA • Issues Planning Order to begin formal execution planning before NCA decision (if necessary) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • allocates forces and lift • identifies C-day & L-hour • Announces NCA decision • Issues Alert Order <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • describes COA • changes/amplifies guidance in Warning Order • directs execution planning to begin
SUPPORTED COMMAND	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Initiates execution planning on receipt of JCS direction • Refines estimates and resolves identified shortfalls
SUBORDINATE & SUPPORTING COMMANDS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continue planning • Monitor situation
USTRANSCOM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continues planning • Monitors situation
SERVICES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continue planning • Monitor situation

Figure 7-11

(1) **Introduction.** Phase IV of CAP begins when the **recommended COAs are presented to the NCA.** CJCS has received the Commander's Estimate from the CINC. The recommendation has been evaluated by the Joint Staff; the COAs may be refined or revised, or new COAs developed in light of a changing situation. In fact, when there is no clearly superior COA, a ranked list of recommendations may have to be given to the NCA.

(2) **Actions taken during COA selection.** The focus of activity is with CJCS and the NCA:

(a) CJCS performs his role as principal military adviser to the NCA. The Chairman and his staff evaluate the COAs recommended by the CINC or developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Depending on the recommendation to the NCA, CJCS may choose to issue guidance to the CINC and the JPEC with a **Planning Order**; this is used to speed up the execution planning and does not replace formal NCA approval of a COA.

(b) The NCA select a COA and direct that execution planning begin. On receipt of an NCA decision, CJCS issues an **Alert Order** to the CINC advising of the selected COA. With the authority of the Secretary of Defense, CJCS may issue a Deployment Preparation Order or Deployment Order.

(c) The CINC and the other members of the Joint Planning and Execution Community are continuing deployment and employment planning with the knowledge they have of the pending decision.

(3) **Exchange of reports during Phase IV.** Depending on the situation, either of two communications may be exchanged in this phase:

(a) The **Planning Order** is issued by CJCS before a decision is rendered by the NCA. The intent is to expedite execution planning and permit flexibility in responding to fast-breaking events as the crisis develops. It may be issued orally, by WIN message, or by AUTODIN to the CINC with copies to all members of the JPEC. It is conceivable that the Planning Order could be the first record communication between CJCS and the JPEC on the crisis. In this situation, vital planning information would be exchanged now. However, it is desirable to use this message merely to update CJCS guidance that was given earlier. The contents of the Planning Order may vary depending on the situation, but it should

- identify forces and resources for planning;
- define the objective, tasks, and constraints;
- contain further planning guidance by the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and
- give a deadline for submitting the operation order (OPORD).

JOPS Volume IV outlines an example of a Planning Order that illustrates a standardized format patterned after the OPREP-1 message in Joint Pub 1-03.8. The JOPS Volume IV example includes an **objective** announcing the Planning Order and a **multisection narrative** detailing situation, mission, details about the COA to be executed, resources allocated, and guidance for administration, logistics, PSYOPs, public affairs, etc.

(b) On receiving the NCA decision on the course of action, CJCS publishes an **Alert Order**. The order is a record communication that the NCA have

decided to develop in detail a military solution to the crisis. The contents of an Alert Order may vary. There is no mandatory information, and sections may be deleted if the information has already been published. The contents are similar in format to the Planning Order, except that the objective paragraph **clearly states that the message is an Alert Order**, and execution planning for the selected COA has been **authorized by the Secretary of Defense**.

(4) **Conclusion of Phase IV.** This phase ends with the **NCA selection of a COA and the decision to begin execution planning**. The Alert Order publishes that decision.

EXECUTION PLANNING

e. **Phase V.** In the execution planning phase, the supported commander transforms the NCA-selected COA into an **operation order (OPORD)**. Phase V is similar in function to the plan development phase of the deliberate planning process. In this phase the necessary detailed planning is performed to execute the approved COA when directed by the NCA. The actual forces, sustainment, and strategic transportation resources are identified, and the concept of operations is described in OPORD format.

(1) **Introduction.** The NCA select the military course of action that will be further developed. The execution planning begins when the CINC and members of the JPEC receive the Planning Order or the Alert Order.

(2) **Actions taken during execution planning.** The execution planning stage encompasses three major tasks: execution planning, force preparation, and deployability posture reporting.

- **Execution planning** is the timely development of the OPORD that can be executed when the NCA direct. The OPORD is developed by modifying an existing OPLAN, expanding an existing CONPLAN, or building an OPORD from scratch when no plan exists (NOPLAN). Understandably, the speed of completion is greatly affected by the amount of prior planning. Actions by the JPEC are the same whether an Alert Order or Planning Order initiates execution planning.

- **Force preparation** focuses on the actual units designated to participate in the planned operation and their readiness for deployment. The five categories for deployability posture describe the status of troops and equipment, the unit availability to deploy, positioning of units on strategic lift, positioning of transportation support units at intermediate and debarkation ports, etc. The deployment posture is changed by direction of the Secretary of Defense.

- **Deployability posture reporting.** After receiving the CJCS Alert Order, commanders issue situation reports (SITREPs) per Joint Pub 1-03.8, to report early attainment of, or deviations from, a specified deployability posture. Newly identified forces report the time that they anticipate attaining the directed deployability posture.

(a) Emphasis during the phase, particularly during the task of execution planning, rests with the **CINC and subordinate and supporting commanders**, as summarized in Figure 7-12. They review the Planning or Alert Order to gain the latest guidance on forces, timing, constraints, etc. Planning done in Phase III, COA development, is updated and adjusted for any new force and sustainment requirements; forces and lift resources are sourced. All members of the JPEC act to identify and resolve shortfalls and limitations. The Services and the CINC's component commanders are sourcing the forces that were identified for planning. Planning concentrates on the earliest deploying units. Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) described in Joint Pub 1-03.3 begins with the report of the readiness of units already identified. Execution planning results in the preparation of the OPORD by the CINC. Supporting OPORDs are prepared by the subordinate and supporting commanders.

THE JPEC DURING CRISIS ACTION PROCEDURES

PHASE V -- EXECUTION PLANNING

NCA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Decide to authorize deployment preparation / deployment
JCS JOINT STAFF	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Monitors execution planning Publishes Deployment Preparation or Deployment Order, as directed Evaluates situation and furnishes guidance to continue CAP Resolves conflicting materiel priorities & transportation shortfalls
SUPPORTED COMMAND	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Converts approved COA into OPORD Reviews force and unit-related support requirements Confirms first increment of movement requirements Resolves shortfalls and limitations Notifies JPEC that force requirements are ready for sourcing
SUBORDINATE & SUPPORTING COMMANDS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identify early-deploying forces, assign tasks Generate movement requirements Develop supporting OPORDs Begin SORTS reporting Identify forces Schedule movement for self-deploying forces Identify shortfalls
USTRANSCOM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ensures that adequate transportation is available to support approved COA Publishes coordinating instructions Develops feasible transportation schedules May have to focus on first increment of movement Coordinates changes caused by conflicts and shortfalls
SERVICES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Determine mobilization requirements Request authorization to mobilize, if necessary Calculate sustainment Identify shortfalls Furnish augmentation forces Schedule organic movements Improve industrial preparedness Begin SORTS reporting for identified forces

Figure 7 - 12

(b) **CJCS** monitors the development of the **CINC's** **OPORD** and resolves shortfalls that are presented. **CJCS** also reviews the final product and gives military advice to the **NCA** on the status of the situation.

(c) **USTRANSCOM** coordinates the changes to the forces and strategic lift that develop from shortfalls and limitations. The schedules for air and sea are created. Concentration is on the initial increment of movements, i.e., 7 days by air and 30 days by sealift.

(3) **Exchange of reports during Phase V.** The Planning/Alert Order is sent to the **CINC** as action addressee and also forwarded to subordinate commanders for their planning guidance. In addition, there are two important communications exchanged in this phase.

(a) The **USTRANSCOM JDS Coordinating Instruction** establishes suspense dates for selected members of the **JPEC** to update the **JDS** database, publishes the dates that movement requirements will be available for scheduling, and sets the latest dates for entering initial movement increment schedules in the **JDS**. Using **AUTODIN**, notification of key planning dates is given to the **JPEC**; the desired response is via the **TLCF**. Additional information is available in the **USTRANSCOM JDS Procedures Manual**.

(b) The **OPORD** is the product of the execution planning phase. It is defined in Joint Pub 1-02 as "a directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for effecting coordinated execution of an operation." The format for this **OPREP-1** report is in Joint Pub 1-03.8, and an abbreviated example is illustrated in Joint Pub 5-02.4 (**JOPS** Volume IV). The broad outline can include free-form narrative paragraphs. If these paragraphs are used, they should be in the following order and include the subparagraphs listed. See Appendix H of this publication for a more detailed description of the contents of an **OPORD**.

- operation description
- narrative
 - situation -- status of enemy and friendly forces, cite available reports if possible
 - mission
 - execution -- concept of operations or commander's intent, subordinate task assignments, coordinating instructions, anticipated D-day and H-hour, rules of engagement, etc.
 - admin and log guidance -- assumptions, transportation guidance
 - command and signal -- identification of supported **CINC**, command relationships, communications guidance
- objective -- objective of this report
- corrections
- remarks

The supported commander's OPOD is published with a major force list, instructions for the conduct of operations in the objective area, and the logistic and administrative plans for support of the operation. Movement data and schedules are entered into the JDS database for access by all members of the JPEC. Subordinate/supporting commands develop supporting OPODs as required by the CINC. When completed, a copy of the OPOD is transmitted by AUTODIN to CJCS; the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been monitoring the development of the OPOD. If it is contrary to the guidance contained in the JCS Alert Order, or if circumstances change, requiring an adjustment in the OPOD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff inform the CINC of the differences.

(4) **ADP support.** WWMCCS takes on greater significance during this phase of the crisis: WIN TLCF continues to be used for **communicating between JPEC participants**; rapid, accurate, and secure data transfer is allowed with WIN FTS; and access for **file update** is available with the WIN TELNET. The JPEC uses procedures contained in the *JDS Procedures Manual* and the *JDS Users Manual*. When access to the JDS computer files is not available to a planning participant, secure voice systems or AUTODIN communications can be used to exchange essential force and deployment data.

(a) **JPEC communications.** The WIN TLCF is a fast, secure means of exchanging narrative communication between JPEC participants.

(b) **File creation and transfer.** The supported commander performs detailed development of the OPOD by using JDS with substantial cooperation of subordinate and supporting commands. Existing information on forces, supplies, and transportation is accessed, the accuracy of the data is confirmed, sourcing is completed, and scheduling of resource movement begins. WIN FTS permits this exchange of entire files of information from one JDS site to another.

(c) **File Update.** As in Phase III, the JDS is the primary means for adding, changing, or deleting requirements in the deployment database and for communicating information to the JPEC. During execution planning, the supported, subordinate, and supporting commands and agencies must update or complete all known movement requirements before transportation movements are scheduled.

(5) **Conclusion of Phase V.** The phase ends with a **decision by the NCA** to execute the OPOD, place it on hold, or cancel it pending resolution by some other means.

(6) **Phase timing.** The procedures in the preceding discussion have been described as occurring sequentially. During a crisis they may, in fact, be conducted concurrently or even eliminated, depending on prevailing conditions. For example, the CINC's assessment in Phase I may serve as the recommended COA in the Commander's Estimate normally developed in Phase III. In some situations, no formal JCS Warning Order is issued, and the first record communication that the supported commander receives is the CJCS Planning Order or Alert Order containing the COA to be used for execution planning. It is equally possible that an NCA decision to commit forces may be made shortly after an event occurs, thereby compressing greatly Phases II through V. To appreciate fully the usefulness of CAP, it is important to recognize that no definitive length of time can be associated with any particular phase. Note also that severe time constraints may require crisis participants to pass information orally, including the decision to commit forces.

EXECUTION

f. **Phase VI.** This phase starts with the NCA decision to choose the military option and execute the OPORD. The Secretary of Defense will authorize CJCS to issue an **Execute Order** that directs the CINC to carry out the OPORD. The CINC then issues an **Execute Order** to subordinate and supporting commanders that directs the execution of their OPORDs.

(1) **Introduction.** The **Execute Order** is a record communication that may include further guidance, instructions, or amplifying orders. During execution, the supported and supporting commanders, Services, and defense agencies update information in the JDS deployment database. USTRANSCOM monitors and coordinates the deployment with guidance from CJCS and the supported commander. Members of the JPEC report movement of forces in the deployment database.

(2) **Actions taken during execution.** During the execution phase, changes to the original plan may be necessary because of tactical and intelligence considerations, force and nonunit cargo availability, availability of strategic lift assets, and POE and POD capabilities. Therefore, ongoing refinement and adjustment of deployment requirements and schedules, and close coordination and monitoring of deployment activities are required. The JDS deployment database should contain at least the following information at the time of OPORD execution: first, sourced combat, combat support, and combat service support requirements for assigned and augmentation forces; second, integrated critical resupply requirements identified by supply category, POD, and LAD; and third, integrated nonunit personnel filler and casualty replacements by numbers and day. Practical considerations require that planning concentrate on the first 7 days of air movement and the first 30 days of surface movement. Major changes to deployment plans with effective dates more than about seven days or so in the future will have very little impact on the scheduling process; however, changes with effective dates of seven days or less may adversely affect the timely development of the airlift flow schedule. Adding requirements now may cause delays in other scheduled movements.

(a) CJCS publishes the JCS **Execute Order** that defines D-day and the resource allocation and directs execution of the OPORD. Throughout execution, the staff monitors movements, assesses achievement of tasks, and resolves shortfalls as necessary.

(b) The CINC executes the order and transmits his own guidance to subordinates and supporting commanders. The CINC also monitors; assesses and reports achievement of objectives; ensures that data are updated in the JDS database; and replans, redeploys, or terminates operations as necessary.

(c) The subordinate and supporting commanders execute their CINC-directed OPORDs, revalidate the sourcing and scheduling of units, report movement of organic lift, and report deployment movements on the JDS database. These commanders conduct the operation as directed and fulfill their responsibilities to sustain their Service forces in the combat theater. USTRANSCOM components validate transportation movement planned for the first increment, adjust deployment flow and reschedule as required, and continue to develop transportation schedules for subsequent increments.

Both status of movements and future movement schedules are entered in the JDS database. The activities of the JPEC during this phase of CAP are summarized in Figure 7-13.

THE JPEC DURING CRISIS ACTION PROCEDURES PHASE VI -- EXECUTION

NCA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Authorize release of Execute Order
JCS JOINT STAFF	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Publishes Execute Order to <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • direct deployment & employment of forces • set D-day & H-hour (if necessary) • convey essential information not contained in the Warning & Alert Orders • Monitors deployment & employment of forces • Resolves or directs resolution of conflicts
SUPPORTED COMMAND	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Executes OPORD • Monitors force deployment • Validates movement requirements in increments • Resolves/reports shortfalls • Controls employment of forces • Issues Execute Order to subordinates • Updates deployment status on JDS
SUBORDINATE & SUPPORTING COMMANDS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Execute supporting OPORDs • Continue to furnish forces • Report movement requirements
USTRANSCOM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Controls transportation of forces and supplies • Reports progress of deployment to CJCS and CINC • Reports lift shortfalls to CJCS for resolution
SERVICES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sustain forces

Figure 7-13

(3) **Exchange of reports during Phase VI.** Two communications are exchanged in this phase: the **JCS Execute Order** addressed to the CINC with copies to the other members of the JPEC and the **CINC's Execute Order** addressed to subordinates and supporting commanders.

(a) **JCS Execute Order** is the authorization by the NCA to execute the military operation, i.e., the NCA-selected course of action detailed in the CINC's OPORD. Ideally, the execution will follow the procedures outlined in the preceding phases of CAP: information will have been exchanged in OPREP-1 CINC Assessment Reports and Commander's Estimates, guidance will have been received via the CJCS-published Warning and Planning Orders, preparation will have been permitted using the Deployment Preparation/Deployment Orders, and formal NCA direction will have been received in the Secretary of Defense-authorized Alert Order. Following these procedures, the most current guidance will have been given, periodic updates will have been received, and modifications reflecting changing conditions will have been issued as necessary. This is the preferred exchange of information.

(b) Unfortunately, in a fast-developing crisis the JCS Execute Order may be the first record communication generated by CJCS. The record communication may be preceded by a voice announcement. The issuance of the Execute Order is time-sensitive; the format may differ depending on the amount of previous record

correspondence and applicability of prior guidance. The format for the JCS Execute Order is found in Annex N to JOPS Volume IV. Information already communicated in the Warning, Planning, or Alert Orders is not repeated. Under these conditions, the Execute Order need only contain the authority to execute the operation and any additional essential guidance, such as the date and time for execution. The broad outline of information that has already passed to the JPEC in the preceding Warning, Planning, or Alert Orders includes the following:

- reference
- narrative
 - authority
 - situation
 - mission -- a refined statement of tasks and purpose
 - execution -- course of action, allocation of combat forces, coordinating instructions, C-day and D-day, expected duration, deployability status, etc.
 - admin and logistics -- allocation of strategic lift, load planning factors, OPSEC, deception guidance, etc.
 - PSYOPs guidance
 - public affairs guidance
 - command and control

(c) The recommended format for the CINC's Execute Order to subordinates and supporting commanders is in JOPS Volume IV. This follows the receipt of the JCS message; it may give the detailed planning guidance resulting from updated or amplifying orders, instructions, or guidance that the JCS Execute Order does not cover.

(4) **ADP support.** During execution the rapid exchange of information is necessary to allow a timely response to changing situations. WIN TELNET and WIN TLCP permit communication of deployment schedules and rapid information update, and give the JPEC the ability to monitor and report resource movement.

(5) **Conclusion of Phase VI.** The execution phase continues until the operation is complete or canceled.

703. CRISIS ACTION PROCEDURES—MULTIPLE-CRISIS ENVIRONMENT

Reference: Joint Pub 5-02.4 (JOPS Volume IV)

a. **Definition.** Multiple-crisis procedures apply when these conditions are met:

- Crisis Action Procedures are in progress for two or more crises;
- competing demands for resources exceed capabilities; and
- the CINC or CINCs involved are unable to resolve the issue.

b. **Guidelines.** The possibility exists that multiple crises can occur either within a single supported commander's theater of operations or in separate theaters that involve two or more CINCs and a conflicting impact on national security issues.

c. **Procedures.** JOPS Volume IV discusses multiple-crisis guidelines to supplement the CAP single-crisis procedures. The changes to single-crisis situations follow:

(1) **Phase I -- Situation Development.** There are no unique procedures in observing and reporting multiple crises.

(2) **Phase II -- Crisis Assessment.** The exchange of information between members of the JDC is essential early in the planning process when elements are exploring responses to dynamic situations.

(3) **Phase III -- COA Development.** The Warning Order allocates combat force and lift resources to supported commanders. To handle multiple crises within one theater, priorities will be stated and resolution mechanisms will be established within the supported command. For crises occurring in different theaters, the JCS Joint Staff has established mechanisms for resolving conflicts over resources, such as the **Joint Transportation Board (JTB)** and **Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board (JMPAB)**. Support forces generally will be allocated by the Services in rough proportion to the allocation of combat forces. The planning in Phase III can identify and resolve shortfalls and limitations early.

(4) **Phase IV -- COA Selection.** Criteria for selection of COAs by the NCA will include the impact of multiple deployments in support of the multiple crises. If necessary, crises can be given priorities and resources allocated to the highest priority.

(5) **Phase V -- Execution Planning.** Resolution of conflicts between CINCs in satisfying resource requirements is handled at the JCS level by JTB and JMPAB. Force and nonunit cargo requirements are sourced, conflicts from units assigned multiple tasks are resolved, and shortfalls from unfilled requirements are identified. USTRANSCOM will integrate transportation movement schedules.

(6) **Phase VI -- Execution.** The recognition during the execution of one OPORD of new threats from multiple crises may require the reallocation of resources.

d. **Summary.** The planning and executing of simultaneous military operations requires early identification of conflicts and shortfalls. Early resolution permits alternative COA development, earliest possible identification of allocated resources, and effective coordination between members of the JPEC. Mechanisms exist within supported commands and at the JCS Joint Staff to resolve resource allocation problems. Guidance from the NCA or the Joint Chiefs of Staff will ultimately establish priorities and determine allocations for overcommitted forces or resources. Late resolution may result in revising the mission statements and replanning or amending existing OPORDs.

704. ADP SUPPORT

a. **Introduction.** To summarize Crisis Action Procedures: the joint planner must

- analyze the situation,
- develop courses of action,
- assess the adequacy of COAs to meet the mission requirements,

- **create the detailed plan** to introduce forces and cargo into the theater,
- **test the feasibility** of the operation plan, and
- **translate the plan** into an operation order.

Concept development and plan creation can be lengthy, as seen in deliberate planning. The Joint Deployment System (JDS) furnishes the automated data support especially developed for planning in a time-constrained, crisis situation. It allows ready **access to available information, flexibility to tailor available information and update it, capability to monitor movement during execution, and the ability to limit the visibility of planning activities** in support of operations security. Figure 7-14 illustrates how JDS supports the JPEC during each of the phases of CAP. In the following sections, we will discuss the operation of JDS and its tie with automated command and control systems.

b. **History of JDS.** The Joint Chiefs of Staff established the Joint Deployment Agency (JDA) in 1979 to centralize mobilization and deployment planning, and directed development of an automated system to support deployment planning and execution. *The Joint Deployment System Functional Description* dated 1 February 1985 defines its objective:

"The JDS will support the JDC (Joint Deployment Community, now JPEC) during deliberate planning, course of action development, execution planning, and deployment execution and sustainment. It must bridge the gap between peacetime planning and crisis execution by ensuring joint operation plans with their associated time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) can be transitioned rapidly into executable OPORDs which can be monitored during execution." In April 1987, the U.S. Transportation Command assumed the mission of the former Joint Deployment Agency, including refinement, administration, and operation of JDS.

c. **System summary**

(1) **Description.** JDS is a real-time, transaction-oriented, distributed database system that allows the user to update the local database, which may then be transmitted to other sites over the WIN. It is a system of people, procedures, communications capabilities, and ADP equipment that manages the timely flow of deployment data within the JPEC. The JDS is part of WWMCCS and interfaces with other command and control systems.

(a) The JDS supports the JPEC during **deliberate planning** through its capability to build, refine, and maintain the Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data. JOPS may be used to add sustainment and test the feasibility of strategic transportation.

(b) But JDS is **predominantly a crisis planning tool** to review existing operation plans, develop and analyze COAs, and create an executable OPORD. As seen in Figure 7-15, it is used to bridge the gap between peacetime and crisis planning. It allows rapid translation of existing OPLANs and their associated TPFDDs into executable OPORDs, and it allows deployment movements to be monitored during execution.

JDS SUPPORT DURING CRISIS ACTION

PHASE	ACTION	FUNCTION SUPPORTED BY JDS
I		
II	JCS SERVICES <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Review existing OPLANs and CONPLANs CINC <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reviews existing OPLANs and CONPLANs • Initiates "close-hold or limited access" procedures SUPPORTING COMMAND <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enters crisis deployment TLCF when directed and monitor continuously USTRANSCOM <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assesses potential lift requirements based on major force listings for existing OPLANs 	
III	JCS SERVICES <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Review COAs as they are being developed • Determine shortfalls with user-requested information CINC <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develops COAs • Creates COA databases • Adjusts force record entries SUPPORTING COMMAND <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monitors status of COA development • Examines sourcing information USTRANSCOM <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develops deployment estimates 	
IV		
V	JCS SERVICES <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identify multiple task assignments • Review status of units assigned tasks • Monitor execution planning • Identify possible scheduling constraints CINC <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Adjusts OPLAN to match NCA decision • Reviews & adjusts deployment scheduling data SUPPORTING COMMAND <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Updates & sources force requirements • Identifies preliminary movement requirements • Updates movement dates USTRANSCOM <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develops movement schedules 	
VI	JCS SERVICES <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Update movement data • Project impact on transportation • Review deployment of particular units • Display information for problem identification & resolution CINC <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monitors deployment movement • Adjusts movement schedules to fit situation SUPPORTING COMMAND <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Validates sourcing & movement schedules • Reports movements • Monitors & adjusts movements USTRANSCOM <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monitors & reports movements 	

Reference: JDS Users Guide

Figure 7-14

(2) Information is entered into JDS at the user terminal using preformatted screens. Forms or menus are presented with the needed entries shown as "fill-in-the-blank" requirements. In addition, the database can be updated by computer disk or tape file input. Output from the system is received from video displays; single-page prints, or high-speed, predefined, or user-specified printed reports and graphics; automated scheduling messages (ASM); and specially created JOPS-formatted TPFDD tapes.

(3) **Capability.** The system can

- simultaneously build, maintain, and manage exercise and real-world deployment plans;
- establish OPLANs or COAs from JOPS-created deployment plans or force modules;
- create a JOPS-formatted deployment plan from the JDS database;
- add, change, or delete information by using computer terminals or automated system interfaces;
- schedule or monitor deployments;
- offer close-hold capabilities to develop OPLANs; and
- display deployment information:
 - automatically alert units and installations of scheduled deployments via AUTODIN,
 - monitor ongoing system performance,
 - integrate force module capabilities, and
 - improve timeliness and accuracy of deployment information.

(4) **JDS database.** The JDS is built around a centralized integrated deployment database established and maintained on the USTRANSCOM WWMCCS computer at Scott AFB, Illinois. Several sites duplicate the USTRANSCOM database and can serve as backup if it should become inoperative. Other JDS sites are tailored to support their own deployment responsibilities. The JDS database is the primary repository of deployment-related information and contains

- narrative information on plan concept, scope, and status;
- time-phased force and sustainment requirements that are either available from an existing plan, built line-by-line with force and cargo records, built with force modules, or created by a combination of these methods;
- hypothetical (notional) data that may be refined and updated; actual unit data that are sourced; and individual entries of CIN, PIN, and ULN data that may be updated and refined to improve visibility as the situation changes; and
- movement requirements that are visible and accessible for preparing the transportation schedule and building the manifest.

(5) **System operation.** Interactive user entries generate transactions that update the local database and may then be transmitted over the WIN to update the central deployment database at USTRANSCOM and, nearly instantaneously, all other affected sites in the JPEC.




Figure 7-15

(a) JDS uses the interconnection of WWMCCS to communicate to the JPEC. The **system support function** consists of programs intended to make the system efficient, responsive, and flexible.

(b) JDS supports the planner's functional requirements with the following **applications subsystems**:

- **plan information** - displays and updates narrative plan information
- **requirements** - enters, stores, updates, and retrieves force and sustainment information
- **unit information** - retrieves and updates selected unit data
- **force module** - using Service/joint or OPLAN-dependent force modules, rapidly builds and tailors requirements in support of OPLAN or COA
- **schedule and movement** - reviews, updates, schedules, and manifests movement information during planning and execution
- **retrieval** - retrieves and reviews database information
- **Information Resource Manager** - performs local database management functions
- **Automated Scheduling Message** - generates AUTODIN-format messages from JDS data


(c) **Access.** Because of its tie with WWMCCS, the system carries a Top Secret clearance. Access to WWMCCS is granted by the site WWMCCS ADP System Security Officer (WASSO) under established procedures and controlled with user identification codes. Access to the JDS is managed by the JDS Functional Database Manager (FDBM) at each host site. Normal access is typically granted to planners depending on operational requirements; with it hundreds of users worldwide can have simultaneous access to current information about the status of a plan or a deployment. If security considerations dictate, limited access is permitted as well as close-hold procedures outlined in the *JDS Users Manual*, Volume 5. Access to information in the system is granted through functional permissions as follows:

- query permission to view information using predefined and user-specified retrievals
- reports permission to print JDS information
- update permission to add, change, or delete information
- graphics permission to select and create displays of particular information
- site or network permissions to manage or support JDS:
 - Information Resource Manager (IRM) permission to perform site database management functions
 - Crisis Action Team permissions to perform network management functions
 - USTRANSCOM component permissions to schedule movements
 - Automated Scheduling Message permissions to generate and send messages
 - site permission to grant or withdraw the preceding functional authority or access

(d) Three means of communication used in a crisis are illustrated in

Figure 7-16:

JDS SYSTEM OPERATION



Reference: JOPES Volume I, General Reference, Users Manual

Figure 7-16

- The **WWMCCS Intercomputer Network (WIN)** was introduced in Chapter 5; it allows the crisis planner to use a direct computer-to-computer link.
- **AUTODIN** transmission is used in the absence of WIN to exchange formatted messages; this information is then **manually entered into the JDS database**.
- Automated Secure Voice Communication (**AUTOSEVOCOM**) is a last resort to pass critical information using secure voice systems for **manual entry into JDS by a crisis response organization**.

d. Figure 7-17 depicts the JOPES master menu through which a planner can perform the following functions:

- establish and maintain database,
- analyze COA,
- develop deployment schedules,
- monitor deployment, and
- support the system

JOPES MASTER MENU

DDHHMMZMMM
CF-001-8 (VERSION 1.0)

JOPES MASTER MENU SUBSYSTEM CODE ()
X = MENU, Z = EXIT JOPES OR FUNCTION CODE ()

OPLAN ()

DATABASE () (E-EXERCISE, R-REALWORLD)

SUBSYSTEM CODES

A - PLAN INFORMATION
B - REQUIREMENTS
C - UNIT INFORMATION
D - FORCE MODULE
E - SCHEDULE & MOVEMENT
F - RETRIEVAL / JPEG
G - DISPLY USERID PERM
H - INFO RESOURCE MGR
I - AUTO SCHED MESSAGE

K - MAC INTERFACE
L - MTMC INTERFACE
M - MONITOR SUBSYSTEM
N - NAVY INTERFACE
P - AF INTERFACE
U - TRANSACTION EDITOR
V - MSC INTERFACE
W - ARMY INTERFACE

1 - FORCE REQUIRE (FRG)
2 - FORCE MODULE (FMS)
3 - MOVEMENT REQ (MRG)
4 - LOGISTICS CAP (LCE)
5 - NON-UNIT PERS (NPG)
6 - MEDICAL PLAN (MPM)
7 - REFERENCE FILE (REF)
8 - TRAN FEASBLTY (TFE)
9 - CVL ENG PLAN (CESPG)
0 - JNT OP GRAPH (JOGS)

(NOTE - JSIT MAY BE ENTERED FROM THIS SCREEN)

Reference: JOPES Volume I, General Users Manual

Figure 7-17

e. **Relationship with other systems.** The JDS primarily supports **crisis action planning**. Accessing various databases and reference files, planners can quickly create TPFDDs to support proposed COAs.

- JDS is accessed via JOPES and is hosted by **WWMCCS**. JDS uses the capabilities of that system for ADP support, WWMCCS reference files, communications, etc. Access to JDS is gained at the WWMCCS terminal, and system products are produced on equipment available at the site.

- JDS supports the **National Military Command System** through the timely development of OPLANs and OPORDs. The availability of rapid plan development by the Joint Planning and Execution Community better supports the decisionmaking process of the NCA.

DESCRIPTION OF SERVICE AND USTRANSCOM PLANNING FILES

DESCRIPTION		
MAC	FLOW GENERATOR SYSTEM (FLOGEN)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Schedules aircraft against movement requirements • Summarizes movement by deployment period, POE, & POD
	MILITARY AIRLIFT INTEGRATED REPORTING SYSTEM (MAIRS)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monitors aircraft arrivals and departures
MTMC	MTMC MOBILITY ANALYSIS AND PLANNING SYSTEM VERSION II (MAPS II)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Initiates movement schedules of MTMC CONUS movements
	AUTOMATED SYSTEMS FOR PROCESSING UNIT REQUIREMENTS (ASPUR)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Manages support deployment by receiving and transmitting unit movement data with JDS
	CRISIS ACTION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (CAMS)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Validates movement requests and returns schedule information • Interfaces with MTMC systems to allow contingency response
MSC	MSC STRATEGIC SEALIFT CONTINGENCY PLANNING SYSTEM (SEACOP)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Initiates MSC sealift movement tables (used for deliberate planning only)
	CRISIS MANAGEMENT SUPPORT SYSTEM (CMSS)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Furnishes automated support to MSC command and control center • Ship-oriented, on-line, near-real-time database integrates ship position; ship, materiel, & equipment status; weather; etc.
FORSCOM	DEPLOYMENT, EMPLOYMENT, AND MOBILIZATION STATUS SYSTEM (DEMSTAT)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Furnishes selected availability & movement data for existing Army units
	COMPUTERIZED MOVEMENT PLANNING AND STATUS SYSTEM (COMPASS)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Summarizes detailed unit movement data
AIR FORCE	CONTINGENCY OPERATION/MOBILITY PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM (COMPES)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Standardizes and automates AF procedures to select, deploy, and monitor contingency forces
NAVY	NAVY COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM (NCCS)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Furnishes command and control information on Navy units
MARINE CORPS	MARINE AIR/GROUND TASK FORCE (MAGTF II)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Computes generic and real-time lift requirements • Creates & updates time-phased requirements

Figure 7-18

- JDS also interfaces with the **Service- and command-unique systems** described in Figure 7-18. These automated system interfaces are needed to keep the database current and to support the requirement for timely, accurate, and usable data throughout the JPEC.
- Similarly, a TPFDD created in JDS can be accessed by the **Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS)** to support deliberate planning. The JOPS is used for calculating sustainment and simulation of strategic movement for feasibility testing. Figure 7-19 illustrates the files that JDS can automatically access. Many of these were discussed in Chapter 6.

SYSTEM INTERFACES WITH JDS	
JOPS STANDARD REFERENCE FILES	
APORTS	TUCHA
ASSETS	TUDET
CHSTR	LFF
PORTS	FM
SDF	
WWMCCS STANDARD REFERENCE FILES	
GEOFILE	
SORTS	
OPLAN-UNIQUE FILES	
TPFDD	
SRF	
SERVICE FILES	
FLOGEN	MAIRS
DEMSTAT	MAPS II
COMPASS	ASPUR
COMPES	CAMS
NCCS	SEACOP
MAGTF II	CMSS

Reference: *JDS USERS MANUAL VOLUME 1*

Figure 7-19

705. JOINT PLANNING SUMMARY. Figure 7-20 illustrates the relationship between deliberate planning and Crisis Action Procedures. OPLANs developed in deliberate planning are entered into the Joint Deployment System database. When detailed OPLANs are developed, the forces and supplies identified in the plan development phase are also entered into the database after refinement is complete. This information is now available to crisis action planners for developing both COAs and OPORDs in an actual crisis.

a. **Deliberate planning.** During peacetime, joint planners use the deliberate planning process to develop CONPLANs and detailed OPLANs for contingencies identified in the JSCP. OPLANs with their associated TPFDDs are completed in detail for large-scale operations that would strain the nation's resources in forces, support, and




Figure 7-20

strategic lift. This would permit a timely response to a major contingency when there might not be enough time available otherwise for planners and operators to create an acceptable and feasible response. The development of an OPLAN with its detailed force and sustainment identification and the necessary phased introduction into the theater may take up to 24 months. Detailed OPLANs are developed using the deliberate planning process, created with JOPS ADP support, approved by CJCS, and stored in the JDS database to permit rapid retrieval and modification to meet a crisis.

b. **Time-sensitive planning.** In a crisis the luxury of time available for planning is gone. For a contingency considered in JSCP, the JPEC may build an OPORD using or adapting an existing OPLAN or CONPLAN. For contingencies not anticipated by deliberate planning, joint planners and operators are likely to be in a NOPLAN situation and must develop COAs, a concept of operations, and a deployment database using force modules. Throughout the time-sensitive planning process, planning information is exchanged over the WIN, on secure phone, and by OPREP messages. The product of execution planning using CAP is the OPORD published by the supported commander. The NCA exercise the ultimate authority over the selection of the COA and execution of an operation order.

Chapter 8 Other Systems, Future Systems

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Other Systems, Future Systems

800. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

a. In this concluding chapter, it seems appropriate that we look at other systems and into the future of joint operation planning and focus on initiatives to improve these systems. Currently, we are making the transition from two separate systems for war planning and execution, JOPS and JDS, to an integrated process called JOPES (Joint Operation Planning and Execution System). Unfortunately, JOPS and JDS grew through a series of compromises designed to preserve the best of the numerous systems that had been being used throughout the joint planning community. The result has been the development of systems that are not capable of performing all desired functions.

b. In May 1981 the Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff, in an effort to correct planning- and execution-related deficiencies, formed a committee under the direction of the OJCS J-3 and assigned it the task of overseeing a review of the planning and execution process. In July 1982 the Operation Planning Steering Group (OPSG) was formed to give permanent flag and general officer direction to the development of the follow-on systems to JOPS, JDS, and WWMCCS. These two follow-on systems are known by the acronyms JOPES and WAM, for the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System and the WWMCCS ADP Modernization.

c. Figure 8-1 illustrates the concept of an integrated planning and execution C2 system. JOPES will be an integrated system, replacing JOPS, JDS, and a major part of the Joint Reporting Structure (JRS). This system will cover mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment at all levels during peace and war. WAM will evolve out of WWMCCS and WIN. WAM development efforts are intended to exploit fully the ongoing efforts to design and implement JOPES.

d. As a result of the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986, the JCS J-7, Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate, was formed and is now the proponent for JOPES. The OPSDEPs serve as the principal policy guidance body, replacing the OPSG. The new USTRANSCOM will act as the implementing agency for CJCS/JCS-approved JOPES policy, as well as a conduit for user input. Defense Communications Agency is the executive agent for WAM.

801. JOINT OPERATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM (JOPES)

a. **Background.** Several major exercises have documented significant, fundamental problems in our ability to furnish and analyze the information required by senior decisionmakers. Numerous working groups were established to study the problem and identify the user requirements. The JOPES Required Operational Capability (ROC)




Figure 8-1

dated 5 July 1983, one of the products of these efforts, is the JCS-approved source document for identifying the general target capabilities necessary to resolve operational deficiencies. The ROC remains valid today and is the link to the subsequent development of the JOPES Concept of Operations in 1986 and the evolution of a JOPES Procedures Description in 1988. The Joint Pub 5-03 series, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System*, contains the detailed system description.

b. **Scope of JOPES.** JOPES will be an integrated, conventional command and control (C2) system designed primarily to satisfy the information needs of senior-level decisionmakers in conducting joint planning and operations. JOPES will be used to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment activities. The system will support the national, theater, and supporting organizational levels, Figure 8-2, in both peacetime and wartime. The system will give collateral support to the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) and the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) in identifying and analyzing force requirements and capabilities. The primary emphasis is on procedures, supported by modern ADP, to replace the time-consuming machinery of current systems (JOPS and JDS). JOPES will not cause events to happen during execution, but will give senior-level decisionmakers the tools to monitor, analyze, and control events during execution.




Figure 8-2

802. JOPES PLANNING AND EXECUTION FUNCTIONS

a. The JOPES concept can be visualized as seven interrelated functions: monitoring, threat identification and assessment, strategy determination, course of action development, execution planning, implementation, and simulation and analysis. The first and last functions support each of the five traditional planning and execution functions as seen in Figure 8-3. The JOPES functions encompass the planning phases of the current deliberate and time-sensitive planning systems outlined in JOPS Volumes I and IV, and are illustrated in Figure 8-4.

b. **Monitoring.** By this function users obtain current and accurate information concerning friendly, enemy, and neutral forces and resources. It supports each of the other JOPES functions. Types of information processed are consumption data, attrition and utilization data, deployment and procurement status, mobilization status, force status, facilities status, etc. Most of these data originate at base, unit, and command levels. Source data are captured, and interrelated databases are updated automatically as data are entered into the system. The ability to monitor all essential aspects of military operations and support functions at the level of detail needed and to assemble information in formats that will facilitate decisionmaking is an essential element of the JOPES concept.




Figure 8-3

c. **Threat identification and assessment.** This function involves detecting actual and potential threats to national security, alerting decisionmakers, and then determining the specific nature of the threats. Particular emphasis is placed on defining enemy capabilities and intentions. This function supports all organizational levels during planning and execution. It gives information for strategic planning and resource allocations at the national level, developing courses of action and detailed planning at the theater level, and monitoring and adjusting operations during execution. It supports each of the other JOPES functions.

d. **Strategy determination.** This function furnishes direction from the national level to the theater level for developing courses of action. It assists the NCA and Joint Chiefs of Staff in formulating suitable and feasible options to counter the threat. The function involves formulating politico-military assessments, developing strategic concepts and options, apportioning forces and other resources, and formulating planning




Figure 8-4

guidance. Significant enhancements include improved capabilities to develop the politico-military estimate, develop and test major military options for suitability and feasibility, and simulate and analyze the effects of alternate resource allocations.

e. **Course of action (COA) development.** COA development support helps the supported commander develop and test alternative COAs based on NCA/JCS guidance and resource allocation. Capabilities that must be developed include force-on-force analysis and force, sustainment, and transportation feasibility analysis. Products of this function include the Commander's Estimate and a concept of operations for the selected COA.

f. **Execution planning.** This function supports the rapid preparation of the approved COA for implementation. It permits (1) development and time-phasing of detailed force lists; (2) development of directives, schedules, and orders; (3) determination of support requirements such as medical, civil engineering, air refueling, host nation, and transportation needs; and (4) identification and resolution of force and resource shortfalls and constraints. This process permits development of a detailed, fully integrated schedule of mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment activities based on the approved COA. A fully detailed plan need only be developed when required by the NCA, Joint Chiefs of Staff, or supported CINC, since the minimum essential plan detailing will have been done during COA development. The rapidity of execution planning will alleviate the need to transform every approved COA into a detailed plan.

g. **Implementation.** This function gives decisionmakers the tools to monitor, analyze, and control events during execution. The ability to monitor and compare actual with scheduled events is crucial to our ability to assess the other JOPES functions and make adjustments in controlling, directing, monitoring, planning, redirecting, and terminating operations.

h. **Simulation and analysis.** This function offers various automated techniques that enhance each of the other JOPES functions. Examples of simulation and analysis applications are (1) force-on-force assessment (suitability); (2) generation of force requirements; (3) comparison of requirements to capabilities (feasibility); (4) sourcing of force listings; (5) generation of mobilization and sustainment requirements based on employment needs; (6) comparison of planned versus actual events to identify problems and constraints; and (7) integration of mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment schedules.

803. DEVELOPMENTAL STRATEGY

a. JOPES today is being developed as a unified planning and execution system that will capture and integrate current planning capabilities, particularly those found in JOPS and JDS. Building on this foundation, JOPES will add new capabilities dealing with deployment, employment, mobilization, and sustainment. When fully developed, JOPES will encompass the entire spectrum of planning and execution, and will be the single system that forms the foundation of the U.S. conventional command and control system. It's important to recognize that JOPES is not simply an ADP program or system. It is much more than that. JOPES furnishes new procedures and policies supported by upgraded or modernized ADP. It encompasses the procedures for both deliberate and crisis planning now handled separately by JOPS and JDS. When complete, JOPES will offer one set of procedures using a single ADP system that supports the Joint Staff, Services, supported and supporting commanders, their components, and appropriate defense agencies.

b. A major objective of JOPES, when fully implemented, is to reduce the deliberate planning cycle and crisis response cycle. This translates to reducing OPLAN and OPORD development times to 45 and 3 days respectively.

c. Figure 8-5 depicts the expected status of JOPES at its initial operation capability date. Versions of JOPES have been and will continue to be released at about six-month intervals. Release of Version 4 will coincide with the Initial Operation Capable (IOC) date. Additional releases are planned. Versions 1 through 4 form the foundation for the evolution of the JOPES program and for expanding into the mobilization, employment, and sustainment mission areas. JOPES Version 1 was the first step toward a true "joint operation planning and execution" system. It started the process of bringing together JOPS and JDS into a single system. This integration of JOPS and JDS will be completed at Version 4. In addition to the integration of JOPS and JDS by Version 4, new capabilities to manipulate force information will be available. These first four versions of JOPES will allow for full data sharing between previously separate databases, and will speed the process of producing accurate plans, estimates and courses of action. With one set of procedures, operator/user proficiency will be greatly improved, and training and maintenance costs will be reduced significantly.

JOPES VERSIONS

VERSION 1	VERSION 2	VERSION 3	VERSION 4	FUTURE
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - SINGLE VIEW (ONE SCREEN) - JOPS FILES ON-LINE - JDS/JOPS FIXES - JDS DATA INTERFACES TO JOPS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - JOPS DATA INTERFACES TO JDS - FIRST PROTOTYPES - JDS/JOPS FIXES 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - INITIAL NEW PLAN BUILD (SELECTED SITES) - MORE PROTOTYPES - JDS/JOPS FIXES - WWS CAPABILITIES (INITIAL) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - NEW PLAN BUILD (COMPLETE) - MORE PROTOTYPES - NEW DATABASE - WWS CAPABILITIES (COMPLETE) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MOB. - EMP. - SUS.
NOV 89	MAR 90	OCT 90	NOV 91	

Figure 8-5

d. JOPES Version 1, released in November 1989, started the process of bringing JOPS and JDS together into a single system. Functionally, it gave the user a single entry point to access either JOPS or JDS. Some JOPS files are on-line, and there is one-way interface between JOPS and JDS.

e. JOPES Version 2, released in April 1990, made possible the crosslink between systems. It allowed users to sign on to one system (JOPS or JDS) and use data resident in the other, use applications programs in the other, or transfer control to the other without having to go through sign-on/sign-off procedures.

f. JOPES Version 3, scheduled for release in the fall of 1990, is to introduce the new WWMCCS workstation. Version 3 includes initial development and test of the New Plan Build function, faster construction and analysis of plans required to support specific COAs, and new and quicker force build capability. In the spring of 1991, JOPES Version 3.1 will be fielded. It will contain improvements resulting from engineering change proposals as well as enhancements to the new F6 retrieval and graphics system. Some

prototypes may also be added. Shortly thereafter, a JOPES New Plan Build (NPB) Beta version will be installed at selected sites.

g. JOPES Version 4 is regarded as the initial operating capability (IOC) of JOPES. Version 4 will include the initial integrated JOPES database and the completion of the New Plan Build function. It will establish one set of policies and procedures and speed up the process of producing timely and accurate plans, estimates, and COAs.

h. Cumulative Effects of Versions 1-4

- (1) Foundation for continued development and evolution of JOPES
- (2) Better/faster Commander's Estimates and COAs achieved via new capability to rapidly construct and analyze forces required to support specific COAs
- (3) Initial integrated deliberate/crisis planning capability achieved at Version 4; full data sharing between previously separate databases (JOPS and JDS)
- (4) One set of planning procedures applicable in deliberate and crisis situations
- (5) Increased confidence level of plans, estimates, and COAs

i. For JOPES Version 5 and beyond, new versions should be released at six-month intervals. The precise content of Versions 5 and beyond is still subject to the requirements refinement process; however, the general content has been defined. For JOPES Versions 5 through 11, the development of new capabilities and improvements to existing capability will (1) improve COA development, analysis, evaluation, and selection; (2) achieve a fully integrated deliberate/crisis planning system; (3) furnish improved execution capabilities via a new integrated database; (4) offer initial threat identification and assessment and strategy determination capabilities, and (5) enhance plan implementation via new comparative analysis tools.

j. Cumulative Effects of Versions 5-11 (Figure 8-6)

- (1) Greatly improved capabilities for CINCs to develop, analyze, evaluate, and select COAs
- (2) Improved/enhanced forces and transportation feasibility estimations
- (3) Major increase in sustainment analysis capabilities and estimates (logistics, transportation, medical, materiel, munitions and POL), with capability to project sustainment requirements, determine where and when support can be furnished, and schedule activities needed to establish and support infrastructure and resource flow, as well as monitor support operations

CUMULATIVE EFFECTS FY91-FY94




Figure 8-6

(4) Mobilization planning and execution capability, including capability to determine whether mobilization actions are required; capability to analyze advantages, costs, and risks associated with military responses involving mobilization; and capability to monitor the process of mobilization

(5) Initial NEO planning and execution capabilities

(6) Fully integrated deliberate and crisis planning system

(7) Improvements in execution planning capabilities

(8) New fully integrated and relational database, which offers a single operation/planning data source, enhances data accuracy, and improves the capability to access data and produce reports

(9) Interface with Department of Defense Intelligence Information System (DODIIS) information for threat analysis, e.g., threat identification, intelligence collection management, area characteristics analysis, and enemy COA analysis, as well as better access to finished analysis




Figure 8-7

(10) Initial simulation and analysis tools to support strategy determination, e.g., determine most effective response to threat, allocate forces and resources, develop viable military options

(11) Enhanced OPLAN/OPORD implementation capability

(12) Enhanced capability to monitor events in near-real time, replan when necessary, and adjust the course of operations

k. Even with the completion of Version 11, less than half of the JOPES ROC will have been completed. Considerable effort will still be required in the mobilization, employment and sustainment mission areas. With the completion of the WAM program, of which JOPES is a part, in the mid-1990s, a follow-on program will be required for JOPES to continue until the full JOPES ROC is developed (Figure 8-7).

804. WORLDWIDE MILITARY COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM (WWMCCS) AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING (ADP) MODERNIZATION (WAM)

a. **Purpose.** The WAM program's purpose is to modernize the existing WWMCCS standard ADP and its directly related telecommunications, because the existing processing does not meet current operational requirements and cannot readily accommodate the addition of new capabilities. Although the applications software undergoes constant improvement, the need to restructure around modern software capabilities, such as the latest database management systems and intelligent workstations, is recognized for future evolution. The high cost of operating and maintaining current standard systems has further highlighted the need to modernize the existing software program. The modernization focuses on WWMCCS Standard ADP, which supports command and control functions based on Honeywell H6000 systems. The current WWMCCS Standard ADP community consists of numerous CINC/Service/agency sites, each having one or more H6000 or related processors purchased since the early 1970s. These processors have all been upgraded to the Distributed Processing System-8 (DPS-8). WWMCCS Standard ADP performs a limited number of applications that are "standard throughout the community." Each site performs additional functions specifically designed to support the local CINC/Service/agency. The WWMCCS Standard ADP community today is a confederation of interests that requires many organizations to participate in its modernization effort.

(1) Modernization of the WWMCCS Standard ADP will produce an automated modern information system that supports the current and future capabilities needed to satisfy operational requirements identified in a number of general and specific documents. The WAM program supports the command and control requirements of the NCA, unified and specified commands and their Service components, Service headquarters, subordinate unified commands, and other DOD agencies.

(2) The objective of WAM is to improve our nation's ability to formulate an effective, credible, executable military response to world events that threaten our national interest. Improvements will be achieved by applying modern information systems tools and technology to the tasks of planning, mobilizing, deploying, employing, sustaining, and monitoring a conventional military operation.

b. **Background.** The Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) Automatic Data Processing (ADP) Modernization (WAM) program is the result of a 10 February 1989 Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) decision to transfer the original WWMCCS ADP modernization activities from the Air Force to the Defense Communications Agency (DCA). The DAB met to consider an OSD Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence (C3I) Systems Committee-endorsed strategy for the modernization of WWMCCS ADP. As a result of this meeting, executive agency responsibility was transferred from the Air Force to DCA and the program renamed WWMCCS ADP Modernization (WAM). On 6 March 1989 the Deputy Secretary of Defense signed an Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) approving this transfer. Approval includes WAM program integration and implementation strategy emphasizing the integration of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS), nondevelopmental items (NDIs); public and government domain capabilities; standard requirements contracts; and early, incremental fielding of improved capabilities. WAM is designed to remedy existing deficiencies in current command and control systems, e.g., lack of efficient standard

force status monitoring capability, lack of automated support for no-plan and multiplan situations, and lack of an on-line plan modification system.

(1) WAM will support information processing, storage, retrieval, reporting, and display functions in the areas of

(a) conventional planning and execution of joint mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment operations and exercises, and

(b) resources and unit monitoring supporting conventional planning and execution under

(c) Joint Reporting Structure (JRS) and WAM data standards.

(2) WAM will interface to the extent necessary with the Nuclear Planning and Execution System and Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment Systems.

c. Organizational Strategy

(1) The WAM implementation approach for JOPES streamlines the modernization process, making the Joint Data Systems Support Center (JDSSC) the system designer, writer of new code, integrator, and maintainer. United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) will reengineer parts of the Joint Deployment System (JDS) for inclusion in JOPES. JDSSC and USTRANSCOM have a full understanding of the uses of the system's data. JDSSC will be the system integrator and, with the exception of the USTRANSCOM-developed software, will be integrating software that it already controls. JDSSC will also be the overall system integrator for user-developed prototypes.

(2) The WAM implementation strategy focuses primarily on the modernization of the applications software in WWMCCS by giving priority to fielding of JOPES capabilities. Modernization of other parts of the WWMCCS Standard ADP systems will initially target those elements that permit the operational users to take advantage of the JOPES capabilities.

(3) The JOPES requirements are the principal focus of the WAM effort. The JOPES requirements will be satisfied through new applications software, new procedures, an integrated database, and improvements to the installed WWMCCS Standard ADP baseline as approved by the WAM management structure. The initial focus of the program will be on the crisis, deliberate, and conventional deployment planning and execution tasks. The software development has been modularized into a series of versions, the first of which will tie together the existing Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS) and the Joint Deployment System (JDS) with a common-user interface.

(4) The command and control community that is affected by WAM includes the Service-, agency-, and command-unique applications in WWMCCS ADP, as well as the joint WWMCCS Standard Applications (WSA). Each Service and agency has its own modernization effort for the Service- and command-unique applications. The relationship of the Joint WAM program to the Service- and command-unique programs is

in qualification of hardware and software elements and furnishing an architectural roadmap to an open system and interoperability.

d. Workstations

(1) The workstation is not a separate element of the WAM program, but is the hardware platform for parts of the WAM program. The workstation will support distributed processing of the JOPES programs targeted for it and will interface the user with all host-based services. Early operational assessment of JOPES Version 4, using the workstation, will determine its suitability as WWMCCS Standard ADP.

(2) As directed by the WAM Management Structure, the WAM program will also qualify a "family" of workstations with varying capabilities. The "family" concept recognizes that there are various Service and agency contracts in place for workstations that meet a primary need outside of WWMCCS.

(3) Security. WAM will satisfy DOD Directive 5200.28 Trusted Evaluation Criteria and Joint Pub 6-03.7 by maintaining a Top Secret system-high environment. Use of TEMPEST equipment in WWMCCS Standard ADP will be determined per procedures of Joint Pub 6-03.7 Chapter XIII. Vendor products qualified for use in WWMCCS will have profile data available to the field. WAM will continue to furnish information security as required by Joint Pub 6-03.17 and use products evaluated by the National Computer Security Center (NCSC) and placed on the Evaluated Products List (EPL).

(4) Survivability. Survivability for equipment identified in this program is the same as for currently installed WWMCCS Standard ADP at each individual site. Sites must offer facilities for the survivability needs associated with the installation of commercial products qualified for use as WWMCCS Standard ADP.

e. WAM-JOPES relationship (Figure 8-8). There is no doubt that the operational requirement exists for an agile and responsive joint planning and execution system. The need is clear for an integrated system to support peacetime, crisis, and wartime planning, monitoring, and execution activities. The system must include procedures and ADP support to ensure the execution of senior leaders' decisions in a timely manner, achieve rapid strategic force concentrations where necessary, and permit flexibility in resource allocation. At present WAM-JOPES offers the best option to attain agility through an integrated system.

WAM-JOPES RELATIONSHIP




Figure 8-8

805. GLOBAL TRANSPORTATION NETWORK (GTN)

a. USTRANSCOM's mission of global mobility management requires a responsive transportation system. The key to this is the development of the GTN. The GTN is not another transportation database. It is a network of systems and has been described as a capability integrating hardware, software, and communications as well as people, policies, and procedures. In other words, GTN ties together existing transportation-related databases; it does not create a new database. The GTN is a means to access the collection of command, control, computer, and communications (C4) systems that support global transportation management. Those systems can be divided into three functional categories:

- (1) First, the systems required to support the planners as they gather the transportation requirements of the supported CINCs, develop operational plans, and evaluate the effectiveness of those plans

(2) Second, the systems for command and control that principally support mobilization and deployment

(3) The third category of systems support in-transit visibility (ITV). ITV is the near-real-time monitoring/tracking of unit and nonunit cargo and personnel from transportation origin to destination. This is the area in which USTRANSCOM has focused most of its efforts during the development of both the demonstration prototype and the operational prototype.

b. To build this ITV prototype, USTRANSCOM needed to develop information requirements by focusing on questions the CINC would ask:

- (1) Where are my units/ammunition/critical items?
- (2) When and where will they arrive?
- (3) Are there any special handling problems associated with them?
- (4) What's on a ship/plane? (manifest information)
- (5) What's in a specific container?

c. This GTN/ITV operational prototype (Figure 8-9) focuses on the CINC-level J-3/J-4. It uses a Zenith model 248 personal computer terminal connected to a minicomputer that accesses databases, using the existing communications channels and queries, to extract the specific information needed to answer a question. This technique allows use of existing commercial and DOD systems, thus eliminating the need for a database. Another key feature of this technology is that the person at the terminal does not need any special knowledge of the individual systems. The user selects a menu item and enters qualifying data elements. The system then connects to the appropriate database, initiates a query, and returns the data. These data are manipulated and integrated within the minicomputer and presented on a user-defined screen. The entire process is transparent to the user. The prototypes have since been consolidated into one effort for fielding to 25 locations worldwide.




Figure 8-9

806. AUTO FORCE GENERATOR (AFG)

a. This system gives the community an automated planning capability that allows planners to rapidly build Timed-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) on a stand-alone workstation. AFG is designed with Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps subsystems that encompass each Service's unique way of planning. Planners are able to select combat forces and tailor corresponding combat support and service support forces through a "rules-driven" automated software system to fit any global, regional, or contingency scenario. The "rules" are the heart of the system. Through a series of AFG templates, each functional area planner can develop sets of rules that represent the thought process required in packaging support forces to build a TPFDD that fits any scenario. These include, but are not limited to, combat support packaging rules, command-unique rules, theater-specific rules, priority rules, and distribution rules.

b. **Status.** AFG has been fully developed as a prototype. Fielding of AFG, accompanied by training, has been completed. All CINCs and their components possess and are using the prototype.

807. FORCE MODULE LOGISTICS SUSTAINABILITY MODEL (FMLSM)

a. FMLSM quickly determines the munitions sustainability of forces by linking the principal factors affecting consumption and comparing the results to assets availability. Sustainability may be determined for both threat and level-of-effort critical munitions (essential sustainability items). This state-of-the-art model adheres to JOPES screen standards, and is user friendly. Initial calculations are made rapidly using default data, which may then be overridden by user-entered data.

b. Force composition and armament, weapon inventories and expenditures per role, sortie rates, intensity, attrition, battle damage repairable, substitute munitions, threat profiles (including probability of kill and load), and environment are the major inputs used in determining consumption. Assets are entered for sustainability determination.

c. Tabular and graphical outputs are available. Consumption graphs compare cumulative consumption to assets inventory by day over the length of the COA. Additional graphs are available that display threat profiles and shooter survivability. Graphs are available by Service or for all Services consuming COA munitions and Services. Reports list cumulative consumption, total assets, and remaining assets by day and over the length of the COA. A report is available that includes all parameters used in COA calculations. Outputs are available on screen and/or in printed form, depending on the output selected.

808. TRANSPORTATION COORDINATORS' AUTOMATED INFORMATION FOR MOVEMENTS SYSTEM (TC-AIMS) (Figure 8-10)

a. The Department of Defense requires an automated capability to support rapid deployment of U.S. forces from CONUS bases and to furnish accurate and timely data to manage that deployment process. Transportation Coordinator's Automated Information for Movements System (TC-AIMS) is the generic term for the computer hardware, software, procedures, and other systems to be used by transportation coordinators throughout the joint planning and execution community to automate the processes of planning, organizing, coordinating, and controlling unit-related deployment activities supporting the overall deployment process.

b. The purpose of TC-AIMS is to improve base-level transportation activities through applying proven modern automation techniques. By performing activities common to both unit and nonunit movements with TC-AIMS equipment, transportation personnel can improve overall productivity while maintaining proficiency on the unit deployment system. Because TC-AIMS offers more timely and accurate information to the JDC, movement planning and execution can be far more efficient than is currently possible. The Services are progressing with their unique system developments as follows:

Army	"TC ACCIS" (<u>T</u> ransportation <u>C</u> oordinators <u>A</u> utomated <u>C</u> ommand and <u>C</u> ontrol Information <u>S</u> ystem)
Air Force	"COMPES" (<u>C</u> ontingency <u>O</u> peration/ <u>M</u> obility <u>P</u> lanning and <u>E</u> xecution <u>S</u> ystem)
Marines	MAGTF Life Model II
Navy	"TC-AIMS"

c. Unit-level deployment readiness is increased because there is a constantly updated database, and unit responsiveness to set or changed plans is increased through automation of transportation documentation. The local C2 is improved with ad hoc query and automatic reporting capabilities. TRANSCOM responsiveness is improved because of availability of current, detailed requirements early in execution planning. The major command will have more precise TPFDD refinements and easier TPFDD maintenance because of better information currency, automation of the processes, and more timely deployment coordination. The JPEC will have enhanced deployment capability by using a synchronized deployment-related database.




Figure 8-10

809. WARTIME HOST NATION SUPPORT INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (WHNSIMS)

a. The principal objective of the WHNSIMS is to offer an automated capability to track and manage host nation support information. The system summarizes data in common units of measure that can be sorted for specifics in the areas of combat support, combat service support, facilities, and services. Specific benefits to be realized from WHNSIMS are the following:

- (1) Visibility of WHNS capabilities for planning and execution purposes
- (2) Possible reduction of early strategic lift requirements
- (3) Improvement of coalition logistics cooperation and support

(4) Effective incorporation of WHNS into OPLAN development through WHNSIMS interaction with JOPS modules and the use of JOPS files to determine and display planning objectives and projected results

(5) Support of WHNS information requirements for commanders in chief (CINCs) (including Service components), Department of Defense (DOD) agencies, Joint Staff, and Services

b. To meet these objectives, the WHNSIMS will satisfy the following major performance requirements:

(1) Ensure the identification, timeliness, and availability of WHNS

(2) Constitute an automated source of WHNS information for use by functional area managers/JOPS planners

(3) Act as a management tool for WHNS negotiators

(4) Furnish an automated source of WHNS information for senior managers.

810. FORCE AUGMENTATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM (FAPES)

a. **System Description.** The Force Augmentation Planning and Execution System (FAPES) is being developed as a military mobilization planning and execution system to capture and integrate manpower planning capabilities for both deliberate planning situations and crises. FAPES is designed to determine whether force augmentation is necessary to satisfy time-phased requirements specified in deployment, employment, and sustainment planning. Monitoring the status of manpower mobilization is of key importance to this process. FAPES requires data from numerous systems to compile force augmentation information. Interface is required with other systems (JOPES, SORTS, etc.) on the WWMCCS network. When complete, FAPES will furnish the manpower mobilization module for the functional area of mobilization.

b. **Planned Enhancements.** Currently, plans are underway to develop FAPES into a full-scale working model. Planned future development to determine the impact of force augmentation on functions both within and outside the DOD infrastructures includes the following areas:

- materiel/equipment
- medical
- facilities
- training base
- transportation
- industrial preparedness
- communications
- host nation support

Further, a mapping capability will be added to display the CONUS locations of major Reserve component mobilization stations, home stations, training bases, etc. Unique information requirements for CINCs, Services, OSD, and non-DOD agencies can readily be adapted to FAPES.

811. JOINT CENTER FOR LESSONS LEARNED (JCLL)

a. The Joint Center for Lessons Learned (JCLL) operates a computerized search and retrieval system to extract relevant lessons from a large database of existing knowledge acquired in previous operations and exercises. The database has been built mostly from after-action reports and is continuously updated. It contains over 8,000 entries. The search capability is extremely sophisticated and capable of supporting short- or no-notice crisis planning.

b. New Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS) software is operational. Users will find it more versatile than the old software in that it allows a wide variety of search combinations. Classified files extracted from the JULLS database can now be transmitted using STU IIIs (JS 082114Z Nov 89).

812. JOPES TRAINING ORGANIZATION (JTO)

a. **Background.** The Joint Chiefs of Staff chartered the JOPES Training Program on 22 June 1989. The mission of the JTO is to give the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chiefs of the Services, CINCs, component commanders, and other Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) members JOPES functional ADP and procedures training to enhance the readiness and capabilities of their forces to plan and execute joint warfare. The JTO is chartered to furnish instructional materials and assistance as requested by formal Professional Military Education (PME) schools.

b. The establishment of a JOPES Long-term Training Program and the JTO will greatly enhance JOPES training by furnishing standardized instructional material and instructor proficiency and centralized management and control. The JOPES long-term training will be accomplished with USTRANSCOM traveling teams and resident instruction. The traveling teams will conduct resident training at CINC-sponsored training centers and JPEC sites as required. The curriculum will be designed to meet the requirements of the JPEC and conform to the procedures and the applicable JOPES ADP available to accomplish those procedures at Version 4. The approach to the development of a JOPES long-term training program will be transitional and evolutionary to ensure that the program meets the needs of the JPEC and grows as JOPES evolves and matures. It will be coordinated with the JOPES Transition Training that is being developed by the JOPES Project Group (JPG) and the WWMCCS ADP Modernization (WAM) Program. Since the transition training is designed for experienced joint planning and execution system users, the long-term effort must be designed for the new user who has no familiarity with JOPES or its predecessor systems. This approach will allow for the expenditure of resources to be consistent with the requirements identified.

813. MODERN AIDS TO PLANNING PROGRAM (MAPP)

a. **Introduction.** The Modern Aids to Planning Program (MAPP) is a JCS and CINC initiative to acquire state-of-the-art hardware and employ modern simulation analysis software to assist planners in improving the quality of joint operation plans. MAPP responds to a critical void in the joint planning process: the CINCs have not had the analytical tools available to assist in analyzing force employment--the critical phase from which all other requirements and planning activities stem. To fill this void, MAPP permits alternative courses of action and force mixes to be rapidly analyzed to determine the sensitivity of assumptions in executing a course of action. Further, it permits the combatant commanders to better identify and document critical warfighting requirements. MAPP is designed to give the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CINCs an efficient, modern planning and analysis aid to improve joint operation planning.

b. **Capabilities.** Supported by commercially available hardware and software, MAPP consists of war games, simulation models, and support software that

- give wargaming capability to the CINCs,
- field a simulation and analysis system for the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, and
- furnish a basis for resource procurement and allocation decisions.

MAPP planning and analysis capabilities apply to deliberate and crisis action planning. When time permits, MAPP planning and analysis aids may be applied to the deliberate planning process with participation of the supported CINC and staff, component commands, and supporting commands. MAPP analysis aids translate simulated force and support shortfalls into budgetary requirements that are used by the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System. During a crisis, MAPP permits rapid and flexible response.

(1) **Joint Theater Level Simulation (JTLS).** This model offers a capability to analyze theater campaigns for the deliberate planning process. It is a computer-assisted wargaming system that simulates air, ground, and naval combat. JTLS can test courses of action for warfare training and doctrinal analysis, store decisions and results of force employment throughout a game, and keep track of force status and stock level of supplies at selected points during a game run. These data can later be analyzed for insights concerning plan concepts, force beddown options, and potential plan deficiencies. JTLS is distinctive because it mirrors the operational experience and expert tactical judgment of the players. JTLS gives the CINC a rapid analytical tool to simulate execution of an OPLAN, analyze the results, and then revise the concept of operations to improve its effectiveness.

(2) **State-of-the-Art Contingency Analysis (SOTACA).** SOTACA is a computer-based analytical aid designed primarily for use in the crisis planning process. It considers forces and logistics at a gross level of detail. The analysis is characterized by friendly and enemy forces' moving toward objectives over a network that represents the operating area. Conflict occurs automatically when opposing forces meet. SOTACA analysis allows comparison of alternative COAs using force attrition, movement rate through the network, and expenditures of fuel and ammunition as measures of

effectiveness. While JTLS requires many players representing the CINC, staff, and components to interact over several days, once the database is available, SOTACA requires only one player experienced in joint operations who can evaluate several COAs at a terminal workstation in a few hours.

(3) **Computer hardware.** To complement the new application software, Digital Equipment Corporation's powerful new VAX 8650 computer was selected as the heart of MAPP's hardware. TEMPEST peripheral devices consist of terminal workstations, color graphics printers, laser disk players, Digi-Pad tables, and light-sensing pens. The unique hardware capability of the VAX 8650 offers future growth potential in local area networks, remote intertheater access, data exchange, and multitheater gaming.

c. **MAPP's development strategy.** CINCs need planning and analysis aids to assist in mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment planning. The initial development strategy for MAPP was directed at force employment, as seen in the SOTACA and JTLS models. The program manager for MAPP is the JCS Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate (J-8). MAPP hardware and software have been fielded at all combatant command headquarters; future developments will continue to focus on joint analysis to support CINCs requirements.

814. LOGISTICS SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS FEASIBILITY ESTIMATOR (LOGSAFE). LOGSAFE is a prototype system being developed to replace the MRG and the LCE. (Effort on further development of the LCE has ceased.) The LOGSAFE prototype is scheduled to be delivered in late 1991. It is being designed to interface with other systems (e.g., the Force Module Logistics Sustainability Model) and to offer a rapid capability to determine sustainability.

Appendix A

Planning Directive

Adapted from Joint Pub 5-02.1.

Planning guidance is given as early in the planning process as possible. After the CINC has received initial briefings from the staff and has responded with planning guidance, a planning directive is prepared that formally documents that information and guidance for the staff and for the rest of the Joint Planning and Execution Community. This form is suggested for the planning directive.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Copy Number _____

Issuing Headquarters

Place of Issue

Message Reference/Number (Date-time Group,

Month, Year)

PLANNING DIRECTIVE FOR (Plan designation)

REFERENCES:

- a. Maps or charts
- b. Pertinent documents

1. () MISSION ()

- a. () Write a clear and concise statement of the mission for the command.
- b. () A subparagraph should list the tasks, including
 - (1) () those assigned by higher headquarters and
 - (2) () deduced or implied tasks that must be described to convey a clear understanding of the overall mission.
- c. () If the analysis of the mission or tasks has not progressed to the point where it can be formally stated, present the commander's best estimate of the mission.

2. () COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS ()

- a. () This paragraph contains the commander's analysis of the mission and, in broad terms, how he expects the mission to be carried out.

- b. () Outline, in broad terms, the phasing of the operation.

3. () **ASSUMPTIONS ()**

a. () State assumptions necessary to continue planning. They will be treated as facts by subordinate commands.

- b. () The list is not final; assumptions may be added or dropped during planning.

4. () **FORCES APPORTIONED ()**. Give information on the type and availability of major combat forces.

a. Assigned forces

b. Augmenting forces

5. () **PROPOSED COURSES OF ACTION ()**

a. () List courses of action to be considered by the staff. Include the tentative courses of action that were suggested by the commander in the initial planning guidance, as well as those proposed by the J-5 for consideration.

b. () Any of these courses of action may be discarded and/or refined and new ones identified and proposed as the planning process continues.

6. () **GUIDANCE ()**

a. () **Nuclear and Chemical Weapons**

(1) () Include a brief statement by the commander that outlines the conditions under which nuclear and chemical weapons might be used.

(2) () If their encounter or use is considered a reasonable possibility, include preliminary estimates of allocations, priorities, and restraints.

b. () **Political Considerations**

(1) () Include guidance from higher authority.

(2) () List Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) or basing rights that affect the operation.

c. () **Mobility Resources**

(1) () Identify strategic or tactical lift assets apportioned for planning.

(2) () Highlight priorities or constraints for transportation assets.

d. () **Supporting/Subordinate Commands and Agencies**. Give preliminary information about support from adjacent and lower echelons.

e. () Command and Control. State the command and control organization selected by the commander.

f. Other. Include guidance that the commander determines to be necessary.

7. () TASKS ()

a. Delineate staff responsibilities to begin development of staff estimates.

b. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Joint board requirements

(2) Adjacent/subordinate command and agency coordination required

(3) Uni-Service, common, and cross-servicing coordination required

8. () ADMINISTRATION ()

a. Planning schedule

(1) Planning conferences scheduled

(2) Plan completion suspense

(3) Annex completion suspense

(4) Other milestone events determined to be necessary

b. Interstaff liaison instructions

c. Coordination

(1) Action officer designation

(2) Reports known or anticipated

Appendix B

Personnel Estimate

This description is adapted from Joint Pub 5-02.1.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Originating Section, Issuing Headquarters*
Place of Issue
Date-time Group, Month, Year

PERSONNEL ESTIMATE NUMBER _____ **

REFERENCES: a. Maps and charts
b. Other pertinent documents

1. () **MISSION ()**. State the mission of the command as a whole, taken from the commander's mission analysis, planning guidance, or other statement.

2. () **SITUATION AND CONSIDERATIONS ()**

a. () **Characteristics of the Area of Operations**. Summarize data about the area, taken from the intelligence estimate or area study, with specific emphasis on significant factors affecting personnel activities.

b. () **Enemy Forces**

(1) () **Strength and Dispositions**. Refer to current intelligence estimate.

(2) () **Enemy Capabilities**. Discuss enemy capabilities, taken from the current intelligence estimate, with specific emphasis on their impact on personnel matters.

c. () **Friendly Forces**

(1) () **Present Disposition of Major Elements**. Furnish an estimate of their strengths.

* When this estimate is distributed outside the issuing headquarters, the first line of the heading is the official designation of the issuing command, and the ending of the estimate is modified to include authentication by the authoring section, division, or other official according to local policy.

** Normally, these are numbered sequentially during a calendar year.

(2) () Friendly Courses of Action. State the proposed courses of action under consideration by the operations or plans division.

(3) () Probable Tactical Developments. Review major deployments necessary in initial and subsequent phases of the proposed operation.

d. () Logistic Situation. State known logistic problems, if any, that may affect the personnel situation.

e. () Command, Control, and Communications Situation. State the command, control, and communications situation and emphasize problems that may affect the personnel situation.

f. () Assumptions. State assumptions about the personnel situation made for this estimate. Since basic assumptions for the operation already have been made and will appear in planning guidance and in the plan itself, they should not be repeated here. State the personnel assumptions that may have been made in preparing this estimate.

g. () Special features. List anything not covered elsewhere in the estimate that may influence the personnel situation.

h. () Personnel Situation. State known or anticipated personnel problems that may influence selection of a specific course of action.

3. () PERSONNEL ANALYSIS OF OWN COURSES OF ACTION (). Make an orderly examination of the personnel factors influencing the proposed courses of action. Determine the manner and degree of that influence and identify the personnel implications that should be weighed by the commander in the Commander's Estimate of the Situation.

a. () Analyze each course of action from the personnel point of view. The detail in which the analysis is made is determined by considering the level of command, scope of contemplated operations, and urgency of need.

b. () The personnel factors described in paragraph 2 establish the elements to be analyzed for each course of action under consideration. Examine these personnel factors realistically and include appropriate considerations of climate and weather, terrain, hydrography, enemy capabilities, and other significant factors that may have an impact on the personnel situation as it affects the courses of action.

c. () Throughout the analysis, keep personnel considerations foremost in mind. The analysis is not intended to produce a decision but to ensure that all applicable personnel factors have been considered and to be the basis of paragraphs 4 and 5.

4. () COMPARISON OF FRIENDLY COURSES OF ACTION ()

a. () List the advantages and disadvantages of each proposed course of action--from the J-1's point of view.

b. () It probably will not be necessary to use a worksheet as in the Commander's Estimate, but it can be employed.

5. () CONCLUSIONS ()

a. () State whether or not the mission set forth in paragraph 1 can be supported from a personnel standpoint.

b. () State which course of action under consideration can best be supported from a personnel standpoint.

c. () Identify the major personnel deficiencies that must be brought to the commander's attention. Include recommendations of methods to eliminate or reduce the effects of those deficiencies.

(Signed) _____
J-1

ANNEXES: (By letter and title) Use annexes when the information is in graphs or is of such detail and volume that inclusion in the body makes the estimate too cumbersome. Annexes should be lettered sequentially as they occur throughout the estimate.

DISTRIBUTION: (According to procedures and policies of the issuing headquarters)

Appendix C

Intelligence Estimate

Adapted from Joint Pub 5-02.1.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Originating Section, Issuing Headquarters*
Place of Issue
Day, Month, Year, Hour, Zone

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION
INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER _____ **

REFERENCES: a. Maps and charts
b. Other relevant documents

1. () **MISSION ()**. State the assigned task and its purpose. The mission of the command as a whole is taken from the commander's mission analysis, planning guidance, or other statement.
2. () **ENEMY SITUATION ()**. State conditions that exist and indicate effects of these conditions on enemy capabilities and the assigned mission. This paragraph describes the area of operations, the enemy military situation, and the effect of these two factors on enemy capabilities.

a. () **Characteristics of the Area of Operations**. This paragraph discusses the effect of the physical characteristics of the area of operations on military activities of both combatants. If an analysis of the area has been prepared separately, this paragraph in the intelligence estimate may simply refer to it. Discuss the effects of the existing situation on military operations in the area.

(1) () **Military Geography**

(a) () **Topography**

1. () **Existing Situation**. This describes relief and drainage, vegetation, surface materials, cultural features, and other characteristics in terms of their effect on key terrain, observation, fields of fire, obstacles, cover and concealment, avenues of approach, lines of communication, and landing areas and zones.

* When this estimate is distributed outside the issuing headquarters, the first line of the heading is the official designation of the issuing command, and the ending of

the estimate is modified to include authentication by the authoring section, division, or other official according to local policy.

**** Normally these are numbered sequentially within a calendar year.**

2. () Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Discuss the effect of topography on broad enemy capabilities such as attack and defense. Describe generally how the topography affects each type of activity. Discuss the effect on employment of nuclear and CB weapons; amphibious, airborne, or airlanded forces; surveillance devices and systems; communications equipment and systems; electronic warfare; tactical cover and deception; logistical support; and other appropriate considerations.

3. () Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Discuss the effects of topography on friendly forces' military operations (attack, defense, etc.) in the same fashion as for enemy capabilities in the preceding subparagraphs.

(b) () Hydrography

1. () Existing Situation. Describe the nature of the coastline; adjacent islands; location, extent, and capacity of landing beaches and their approaches and exits; nature of the offshore approaches, including type of bottom and gradients; natural obstacles; and surf, tide, and current conditions.

2. () Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Discuss the effects of the existing situation on broad enemy capabilities.

3. () Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Discuss the effects of the existing situation on broad courses of action for friendly forces.

(c) () Climate and Weather

1. () Existing Situation. Give a descriptive summary of temperature, cloud cover, visibility, precipitation, light data, and other climate and weather conditions and their general effects on roads, rivers, soil trafficability, and observation.

2. () Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Discuss the effects of the existing climate and weather situation on broad enemy capabilities.

3. () Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Discuss the effects of the existing climate and weather situation on broad courses of action for friendly forces.

(2) () Transportation

(a) () Existing Situation. Describe roads, railways, inland waterways, airfields, and other physical characteristics of the transportation system; capabilities of the transportation system in terms of rolling stock, barge capacities, and terminal facilities; and other pertinent data.

(b) () Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Discuss the effects of the existing transportation system and capabilities on broad enemy capabilities.

(c) () Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Discuss the effects of the existing transportation system and capabilities on broad courses of action for friendly forces.

(3) () Telecommunications

(a) () Existing Situation. Describe telecommunications facilities and capabilities in the area.

(b) () Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Discuss effects of the existing telecommunications situation on broad enemy capabilities.

(c) () Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Discuss the effects of the existing telecommunications situation on broad courses of action for friendly forces.

(4) () Politics

(a) () Existing Situation. Describe the organization and operation of civil government in the area of operations.

(b) () Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Consider the effects of the political situation on broad enemy capabilities.

(c) () Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Consider the effects of the political situation on broad courses of action for friendly forces.

(5) () Economics

(a) () Existing Situation. Describe industry, public works and utilities, finance, banking, currency, commerce, agriculture, trades and professions, labor force, and other related factors.

(b) () Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Discuss the effects of the economic situation on broad enemy capabilities.

(c) () Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Discuss the effects of the economic situation on broad courses of action for friendly forces.

(6) () Sociology

(a) () Existing Situation. Describe language, religion, social institutions and attitudes, minority groups, population distribution, health and sanitation, and other related factors.

(b) () Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Discuss the effects of the sociological situation on broad enemy capabilities.

(c) () Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Discuss the effects of the sociological situation on broad courses of action for friendly forces.

(7) () Science and Technology

(a) () Existing Situation. Describe the level of science and technology in the area of operations.

(b) () Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Discuss the effects of science and technology on broad enemy capabilities.

(c) () Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Discuss the effects of science and technology on broad courses of action for friendly forces.

b. () Enemy Military Situation (ground, naval, air, service)

(1) () Strength. Describe the number and size of enemy units committed and enemy reinforcements available for use in the area of operations. Consider ground strength, air power, naval forces, nuclear and CB weapons, electronic warfare, unconventional warfare, surveillance potential, and all other strengths that might be significant.

(2) () Composition. Detail the structure of enemy forces (order of battle) and describe unusual organizational features, identity, armament, and weapon systems.

(3) () Location and Disposition. Describe the geographical location of enemy forces in the area, including fire support elements, command and control facilities, air, naval, and missile forces, and bases.

(4) () Availability of Reinforcements. Describe enemy reinforcement capabilities in terms of ground, air, naval, missile, nuclear, and CB forces and weapons, terrain, weather, road and rail networks, transportation, replacements, labor forces, prisoner of war policy, and possible aid from sympathetic or participating neighbors.

(5) () Movements and Activities. Describe the latest known enemy activities in the area.

(6) () Logistics. Describe levels of supply, resupply ability, and capacity of beaches, ports, roads, railways, airfields, and other facilities to support supply and resupply. Consider hospitalization and evacuation, military construction, labor resources, and maintenance of combat equipment.

(7) () Operational Capability to Launch Missiles. Describe the total missile capability that can be brought to bear on forces operating in the area, including characteristics of missile systems, location and capacity of launch or delivery units, initial and sustained launch rates, size and location of stockpiles, and other pertinent factors.

(8) () Serviceability and Operational Rates of Aircraft. Describe the total aircraft inventory by type, performance characteristics of operational aircraft, initial and sustained sortie rates of aircraft by type, and other pertinent factors.

(9) () Operational Capabilities of Combatant Vessels. Describe the number, type, and operational characteristics of ships, boats, and craft in the naval inventory; base location; and capacity for support.

(10) () Technical Characteristics of Equipment. Describe the technical characteristics of major items of equipment in the enemy inventory not already considered (such as missiles, aircraft, and naval vessels).

(11) () Electronics Intelligence. Describe the enemy intelligence-gathering capability using electronic devices.

(12) () Nuclear and CB Weapons. Describe the types and characteristics of nuclear and CB weapons in the enemy inventory, stockpile data, delivery capabilities, nuclear and CB employment policies and techniques, and other pertinent factors.

(13) () Significant Strengths and Weaknesses. Discuss the significant enemy strengths and weaknesses perceived from the facts presented in the preceding subparagraphs.

c. () Enemy Unconventional and Psychological Warfare Situation

(1) () Guerrilla. Describe the enemy capability for, policy with regard to, and current status in the area of guerrilla or insurgent operations.

(2) () Psychological. Describe enemy doctrine, techniques, methods, organization for, and conduct of psychological operations in the area of operations.

(3) () Subversion. Describe enemy doctrine, techniques, methods, organization for, and conduct of subversion in the area of operations.

(4) () Sabotage. Detail enemy organization and potential for and conduct of sabotage in the area of operations.

3. () **ENEMY CAPABILITIES** (). Furnish a separate listing of each enemy capability that can affect the accomplishment of the assigned mission. Each enemy capability should contain

WHAT the enemy can do,
WHERE it can do it,
WHEN it can start it and get it done, and
WHAT strength it can devote to the task.

In describing enemy capabilities, tell the commander what the enemy can do using its forces in a joint effort. First, of course, assess the enemy's ground, naval, and air forces. It is customary to enumerate separately the enemy's nuclear, CB, and unconventional warfare capacities. Hypothetical examples follow.

a. () Ground Capabilities

(1) () The enemy can attack at any time along our front with an estimated 6 infantry divisions and 2 tank divisions supported by 24 battalions of artillery.

(2) () The enemy can defend now in its present position with 7 infantry divisions supported by 2 tank divisions and 16 battalions of medium and light artillery.

(3) () The enemy can reinforce its attack (or defense) with all or part of the following units in the times and places indicated:

UNIT	PLACE	TIME
315th Airborne Div	Vicinity RESOGA	8 hrs after starting
41st Motorized Rifle Div	Vicinity CARDINAL	6 hrs after starting

b. () Air Capabilities

(1) () Starting now, and based on an estimated strength of 300 fighter and 100 medium bomber aircraft, the enemy can attack in the area of operations with 240 fighter sorties per day for the first two days, followed by a sustained rate of 150 sorties per day, and 60 bomber sorties per day, for one day followed by a sustained rate of 48 sorties per day.

(2) () Using airfields in the vicinity of _____ the enemy has sufficient transport sorties to lift one regiment in a single lift to airfields in the vicinity of _____, _____, and _____ within four hours' flying time.

c. () Naval Capabilities. Starting now, the enemy can conduct sustained sea and air operations in the entire area with 6 DDs, 4 FFs, 1 CV, 7 SSNs, a mine force of 20 craft, and 70 gunboats and smaller craft now on station in the area.

d. () Nuclear Capabilities. The enemy can employ at any time and in any part of the area of operations an estimated 40-60 nuclear weapons of yields from 2 to 50 KT delivered by tube and rocket artillery, guided missile, and aircraft.

e. () CB Capabilities. The enemy can employ the CB agents _____, _____, and _____ in the area of operations at any time delivered by air, tube, and rocket artillery, and guided missile.

f. () UW Capability. The enemy can conduct UW operations in the area within ten days after starting the operation using dissident ethnic elements and the political adversaries of the current government.

g. () Joint Capabilities. The enemy can continue to defend in its present position with 6 infantry divisions, supported by 16 artillery battalions, and reinforced by 3 mechanized divisions within eight hours after starting movement; enemy defense also can be supported by 150 fighter sorties daily for a sustained

period and by continuous naval surface and air operations employing 6 DDs, 4 FFs, 7 SSNs, and 1 CV.

4. () **ANALYSIS OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES ()**. Analyze each capability in light of the assigned mission, considering all applicable factors from paragraph 2 above, and attempt to determine and give reasons for the relative order of probability of adoption by the enemy. Discuss enemy vulnerabilities. In this paragraph each enemy capability is examined in a discussion of the factors that favor or militate against its adoption by the enemy. When applicable, the analysis of each capability should also include a discussion of enemy vulnerabilities attendant to that capability, i.e., conditions or circumstances of the enemy situation that render the enemy especially liable to damage, deception, or defeat. Finally, the analysis should include a discussion of any indications that point to possible adoption of the capability, for example, the following:

a. () *Attack now with forces along the forward edge of the battle area*

(1) () *The following factors favor the enemy's adoption of this capability:*

(a) ()

(b) ()

(2) () *The following factors militate against the enemy's adoption of this capability:*

(a) () *Road and rail networks will not support large-scale troop and supply movements necessary for an attack in the area.*

(b) () *Terrain in the area does not favor an attack.*

(3) () *Adoption of this capability will expose the enemy's west flank to counterattack.*

(4) () *Except for minor patrol activity in the _____ area, there are no indications of adoption of this capability.*

b. () *Delay from present positions along the _____ River line*

(1) () *The following factors favor the enemy's adoption of this capability:*

(a) () *There are several excellent natural barriers between the _____ River and the _____ Mountains.*

(b) () *The effectiveness of the water barriers will improve, and trafficability on the upland slopes of the terrain barriers will deteriorate when the monsoon begins.*

(2) () *The following factors militate against the enemy's adoption of this capability:*

(a) ()

(b) ()

(3) () *In the adoption of this capability the enemy's lines of communication will be restricted by a limited road and rail network that can easily be interdicted.*

(4) () *The following facts indicate adoption of this capability:*

(a) () *Aerial photography indicates some preparation of barriers in successive positions.*

(b) () *Considerable troop movement and pre-positioning of floating bridge equipment along the water barriers have been detected.*

5. () **CONCLUSIONS ()**. State conclusions resulting from discussion in paragraph 4 above and include, when possible, a concise statement of the effects of each capability on the accomplishment of the assigned mission. Cite enemy vulnerabilities where applicable. This paragraph contains a summary of enemy capabilities most likely to be adopted, listed in the order of relative probability if sufficient information is available to permit such an estimate. If appropriate, it should also include a concise statement of the effects of each enemy capability on the accomplishment of the assigned mission. Exploitable vulnerabilities should also be listed, where applicable. For example:

a. () *Enemy Capabilities in Relative Probability of Adoption*

(1) () *Defend in present locations with*

(2) () *Delay from present positions along*

(3) () *Reinforce the defense or delay with*

(4) () *Conduct UW operations in the area*

b. () *Vulnerabilities*

(1) () *Enemy left (west) flank is open to envelopment by amphibious assault*

(2) () *The enemy's air search radar coverage is poor in the left (west) portion of their defensive sector*

(Signed) _____
J-2

(The staff division chief signs the staff estimates produced by that division. If the estimate is to be distributed outside the headquarters, the heading and signature block must be changed to reflect that fact.)

ANNEXES: (By letter and title) Annexes should be included when the information is graphic or of such detail and volume that including in the body makes the estimate cumbersome. They should be lettered sequentially as they occur throughout the estimate.

DISTRIBUTION: (According to procedures and policies of the issuing headquarters)

Appendix D

Logistic Estimate

Adapted from Joint Pub 5-02.1.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Originating Division, Issuing Headquarters*
Place of Issue
Date-time Group, Month, Year

LOGISTIC ESTIMATE NUMBER _____ **

REFERENCES: a. Maps and charts
b. Other pertinent documents

1. () **MISSION ()**. State the mission of the command as a whole, taken from the commander's mission analysis, planning guidance, or other statement.

2. () **SITUATION AND CONSIDERATIONS ()**

a. () **Characteristics of the Area of Operations**. Summarize data about the area, taken from the intelligence estimate or area study, with specific emphasis on significant factors affecting logistic activities.

b. () **Enemy Forces**

(1) () **Strength and Dispositions**. Refer to the current intelligence estimate.

(2) () **Enemy Capabilities**. Discuss enemy capabilities, taken from the current intelligence estimate, with specific emphasis on their impact on the logistic situation.

* When this estimate is distributed outside the issuing headquarters, the first line of the heading is the official designation of the issuing command, and the ending of the estimate is modified to include authentication by the authoring section, division, or other official according to local policy.

** Normally, these are numbered sequentially during a calendar year.

c. () Friendly Forces

(1) () Present Dispositions of Major Elements. Include an estimate of their strengths.

(2) () Own Courses of Action. State the proposed courses of action under consideration, obtained from operations or plans division.

(3) () Probable Tactical Developments. Review major deployments and logistic preparations necessary in all phases of the operation proposed.

d. () Logistic Situation. State the known personnel problems that may affect the logistic situation.

e. () Command, Control, and Communications Situation. State the command, control, and communications situation; emphasize known command, control, and communications problems that may affect the logistic situation.

f. () Assumptions. State assumptions about logistic aspects of the situation made for this estimate. Since basic assumptions for the operation already have been made and will appear in planning guidance and in the plan itself, they should not be repeated here. State logistic assumptions that may have been made in preparing this estimate.

g. () Special features not covered elsewhere in the estimate but that may influence the logistic situation may be stated here.

h. () Logistic Situation

(1) () Supply and Service Installations. Describe and locate key supply and service installations that will be used to support the operation.

(2) () Supply. State availability of PWRMS, authorized levels of supply, known deficiencies of supply stocks and supply systems, and responsibilities and policies regarding supply.

(3) () Transportation. List air, sea, and surface transportation availability, coordination, regulations, lift capability, responsibilities, and policies regarding supply.

(4) () Medical Services. Describe availability of evacuation and hospital facilities and medical responsibilities and policies, including the anticipated evacuation policy.

(5) () Civil Engineering Support. List responsibilities for civil engineering support, limiting features, and other appropriate considerations.

(6) () Miscellaneous. Include other logistic matters not considered elsewhere that may influence selection of a specific course of action.

3. () **LOGISTIC ANALYSIS OF OWN COURSES OF ACTION ()**. Make an orderly examination of the logistic factors influencing the proposed courses of action to determine the manner and degree of that influence. The objective of this analysis is to determine whether the logistic requirements can be met and to isolate the logistic implications that should be weighed by the CINC in the Commander's Estimate.

a. () Analyze each course of action from the logistic point of view. The detail in which the analysis is made is determined by considering the level of command, scope of contemplated operations, and urgency of need.

b. () The logistic factors in paragraph 2 are the elements to be analyzed for each course of action under consideration. Examine these factors realistically from the standpoint of requirements versus actual or programmed capabilities, climate and weather, hydrography, time and space, enemy capabilities, and other significant factors that may affect the logistic situation of each course of action.

c. () Throughout the analysis, keep logistic considerations foremost in mind. The analysis is not intended to produce a decision, but to ensure that all applicable logistic factors have been properly considered and to serve as the basis for the comparisons in paragraph 4.

4. () **COMPARISON OF OWN COURSES OF ACTION ()**

a. () List the advantages and disadvantages of each proposed course of action--from the J-4's point of view.

b. () A worksheet probably will not be necessary as in the Commander's Estimate, but it may be used.

5. () **CONCLUSIONS ()**

a. () State whether or not the mission set forth in paragraph 1 can be supported from a logistic standpoint.

b. () State which course of action under consideration can best be supported from a logistic standpoint.

c. () Identify the major logistic deficiencies that must be brought to the commander's attention. Include recommendations concerning the methods to eliminate or reduce the effects of those deficiencies.

(Signed) _____
J-4

ANNEXES: (By letter and title) Use annexes when the information is in graphs or of such detail and volume that including them in the body of the estimate makes it too cumbersome. They should be lettered sequentially as they occur throughout the estimate.

DISTRIBUTION: (According to procedures and policies of the issuing headquarters)

Appendix E Command, Control, and Communications Systems Estimate

Adapted from Joint Pub 5-02.1.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Originating Division, Issuing Headquarters*
Place of Issue
Date-time Group, Month, Year

COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS ESTIMATE NUMBER**

REFERENCES: a. Maps and charts
 b. Other related documents

1. () **MISSION ()**. State the mission of the command as a whole, taken from the commander's mission analysis, planning guidance, or other statement.

2. () **SITUATION AND CONSIDERATIONS ()**

 a. () Characteristics of the Area of Operations. Summarize data about the area, taken from the intelligence estimate or area study, with specific emphasis on significant factors affecting command, control, and communications activities.

 b. () Enemy Forces

 (1) () Strength and Dispositions. Refer to the current intelligence estimate.

 (2) () Enemy Capabilities. Discuss enemy capabilities taken from the current intelligence estimate with specific emphasis on their impact on the command, control, and communications situation.

* When this estimate is distributed outside the issuing headquarters, the first line of the heading is the official designation of the issuing command, and the ending of the estimate is modified to include authentication by the authoring section, division, or other official according to local policy.

** Normally, these are numbered sequentially during a calendar year.

c. () Friendly Forces

(1) () Present Disposition of Major Elements. Include an estimate of their strengths.

(2) () Own Courses of Action. State the proposed courses of action under consideration obtained from the operations or plans division.

(3) () Probable Tactical Developments. Review major deployments and command, control, and communications preparations necessary in all phases of the operation proposed. Command, control, and communications countermeasures against enemy capabilities should be included.

d. () Personnel Situation. State known personnel problems that may affect the command, control, and communications situation.

e. () Logistic Situation. State known logistic problems that may affect the command, control, and communications situation.

f. () Assumptions. State assumptions about command, control, and communications aspects of the situation made for this estimate. Since basic assumptions for the operation already have been made and will appear in planning guidance and in the plan itself, they should not be repeated here. State command, control, and communications assumptions that may have been made in preparing this estimate.

g. () Special features not covered elsewhere in the estimate that may influence the command, control, and communications situation may be stated here.

h. () Command, Control, and Communications Situation. Consider line-of-sight communications, satellite communications, UHF satellite communications, ground mobile command post, the Defense Satellite Communications System Ground Mobile Segment, and Defense Communications System Interface.

*** (1) () Command and Control Communications**

*** Each subparagraph analyzes systems requirements, identifies capability and availability of equipment, and identifies facilities, installations, and units needed to satisfy requirements and furnish adequate support for the subject of that subparagraph.**

*** (2) () Administrative Communications**

*** (3) () Communications Intelligence**

*** (4) () Communications Security**

*** (5) () Communications Support for Combat Operations**

(a) () Joint Tactical Air Operations

(b) () Air-to-ground Operations (CAS and BAI)

(c) () Naval Gunfire Operations

*(6) () Communications Control and Aids for Supporting Arms

*(7) () Communications Requirements for Other Activities

3. () **COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS ANALYSIS OF OWN COURSES OF ACTION ()**. Examine the command, control, and communications factors influencing the proposed courses of action to determine the manner and degree of that influence. The objective of this analysis is to isolate the command, control, and communications implications that should be weighed by the CINC in the Commander's Estimate.

a. () Analyze each course of action from a command, control, and communications point of view. The detail in which the analysis is made is determined by considering the level of command, scope of contemplated operations, and urgency of need.

b. () Analyze command, control, and communications factors in paragraph 2 for each course of action under consideration. Examine these factors realistically and include appropriate considerations of climate and weather, hydrography, time and space, enemy capabilities, and other significant factors that may affect the command, control, and communications situation.

c. () Throughout the analysis, keep command, control, and communications foremost in mind. The analysis is not intended to produce a decision, but to ensure that applicable command, control, and communications factors have been properly considered and to serve as the basis for the comparisons in paragraph 4.

4. () **COMPARISON OF OWN COURSES OF ACTION ()**

a. () As in the Commander's Estimate, list the advantages and disadvantages of each proposed course of action--from the command, control, and communications point of view.

b. () A worksheet probably will not be necessary as in the Commander's Estimate, but it may be used.

5. () **CONCLUSIONS ()**

a. () State whether or not the mission set forth in paragraph 1 can be supported from a command, control, and communications standpoint.

b. () State which course of action under consideration can best be supported from a command, control, and communications standpoint.

c. () Identify the major command, control, and communications deficiencies that must be brought to the commander's attention. Include recommendations concerning the methods to eliminate or reduce the effects of those deficiencies.

(Signed) _____
J-6

ANNEXES: (By letter and title) Use annexes when the information is in graphs or of such detail and volume that inclusion in the body of the estimate makes it too cumbersome. They should be lettered sequentially as they occur throughout the estimate. Subject areas that should be discussed are communications security; command, control, and communications systems protection (including identification of initial nodes); and communications planning.

DISTRIBUTION: (According to procedures and policies of the issuing headquarters)

Appendix F Commander's Estimate of the Situation

Adapted from Joint Pub 5-02.1.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Issuing Headquarters
Place
Day, Month, Year, Hour, Zone

COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

References: a. Maps and charts
 b. Other pertinent documents

1. () **MISSION** (). State the assigned or deduced task and its purpose. If the mission is multiple, determine priorities. List any intermediate tasks, prescribed or deduced, necessary to the accomplishment of the mission.

2. () **THE SITUATION AND COURSES OF ACTION** ()

a. () Considerations Affecting the Possible Courses of Action. Determine and analyze those factors that will influence the choice of a course of action as well as those that affect the capabilities of the enemy. Consider such of the following and other factors as are involved, and include under each a statement of each fact (or an assumption if necessary) and a deduction of the probable influence on enemy or friendly actions.

(1) () Characteristics of the area of operations, including the following:

(a) () Military Geography

1. () Topography. Factors of relief, drainage, vegetation, surface materials, and similar characteristics should be given consideration as they affect such elements of an operation as observation, maneuver, fire support, concealment, cover, air and surface movement, lines of communication, avenues of approach, key terrain, nuclear and C-B weapons employment, electronic emissions of all types, and unconventional, psychological, and other significant activities.

2. () Hydrography. Included after this heading are the characteristics of offshore sea areas, approaches to the beaches, currents, tides, the beaches themselves, ports, docks, and similar maritime considerations.

3. () Climate and Weather. Extremes of temperature, wind velocities, cloud cover, visibility, precipitation, and other such factors that can affect military operations must be determined and presented. Sunrise, sunset, and twilight data are normally given in this subparagraph.

(b) () Transportation. Characteristics of roads, railways, inland waterways, and airfields, including such factors as size, capacity, conditions, and other facts that affect enemy capabilities and friendly courses of action, are given here.

(c) () Telecommunications. Radio, cable, landline, and other communications facilities in the area of operations that might aid in the exercise of command over military forces are listed. Facilities considered by this subparagraph are not those in the organic capability of the opposing forces, but rather those present in the area.

(d) () Politics. Political factors include such considerations as political stability, alliances, relations with other countries, aspects of international law, control over subversion and dissidence, and similar factors that may influence selection of a course of action. Neutrality or non-neutrality of neighboring states in the area is often listed here.

(e) () Economics. Economic factors include the organization of the economy and sometimes its mobilization capacity, the industrial base of the antagonists to support hostilities, finance, foreign trade, and similar influences as they affect selection of a course of action.

(f) () Sociology. Social conditions run a wide range from the psychological ability of the populace to withstand the rigors of war to health and sanitation conditions in the area of operations. Language, social institutions and attitudes, and similar factors that may affect selection of a course of action must be considered.

(g) () Science and Technology. Although little immediate military impact may result from the state of science and technology in a target area, the long-range effects of such factors as technical skill level of the population and scientific and technical resources in manpower and facilities should be considered in cases where they may affect the choice of a course of action.

(2) () Relative Combat Power

(a) () Enemy

1. () Strength. Give number and size of enemy units committed and those available for reinforcement in the area. This is not intended to be a tabulation of numbers of aircraft, ships, missiles, or other military weaponry. Rather, it is a study of what strength the enemy commander can bring to bear in the area in terms of ground units committed and reinforcing, aircraft sortie rates, missile delivery

rates, unconventional, psychological, and other strengths the commander thinks may affect the balance of power.

2. () Composition. This includes order of battle of major enemy combat formations, equivalent strengths of enemy and friendly units, and major weapon systems and armaments in the enemy arsenal and their operational characteristics.

3. () Location and Disposition. Geographical location of enemy units; fire support elements; command and control facilities; air, naval, and missile forces; and other combat power in or deployable to the area of operations are shown here.

4. () Reinforcements. Estimate the enemy reinforcement capabilities that can influence the battle in the area under consideration. This study should include ground, air, naval, and missile forces; nuclear, C-B, and other advanced weapon systems; and an estimate of the relative capacity to move these forces about, to, and in the battle area.

5. () Logistics. This subparagraph summarizes enemy ability to support the capabilities with which they have been credited and includes such considerations as supply, maintenance, hospitalization and evacuation, transportation, labor, construction, and other essential logistic means. Broadly speaking, it is a feasibility test for enemy capabilities.

6. () Time and Space Factors. Estimate where and when initial forces and reinforcements can be deployed and employed. Such a study will normally include distances and travel times by land, sea, and air from major bases or mounting areas into the battle area.

7. () Combat Efficiency. This subparagraph is an estimate of enemy state of training, readiness, battle experience, physical condition, morale, leadership, motivation, tactical doctrine, discipline, and whatever significant strengths or weaknesses may appear from the preceding paragraphs.

(b) () Friendly. The appraisal of the commander's own force should, in general, follow the same pattern just used for analysis of the enemy. The descriptions of what to consider and the approach to the problem outlined in paragraph 2.a.(2)(a) are applicable to this analysis of friendly forces.

1. Strength
2. Composition
3. Location and Disposition
4. Reinforcements
5. Logistics
6. Time and Space Factors

7. Combat Efficiency

(3) () Assumptions. Assumptions are intrinsically important factors on which the conduct of the operation is based and must be noted as such in paragraph 2 of the Commander's Estimate.

b. () Enemy Capabilities.* State the enemy capabilities that can affect the accomplishment of the commander's estimate.

c. () Own Courses of Action. State all practicable courses of action open to the commander that, if successful, will accomplish the mission.

3. () ANALYSIS OF OPPOSING COURSES OF ACTION (). Determine the probable effect of each enemy capability on the success of each of the commander's own courses of action.

4. () COMPARISON OF OWN COURSES OF ACTION (). Weigh the advantages and disadvantages of each of the commander's courses of action with respect to the governing factors. Decide which course of action promises to be the most successful in accomplishing the mission.

5. () DECISION (). Translate the course of action selected into a concise statement of what the force as a whole is to do, and as much of the elements of when, where, how, and why as may be appropriate.

(Signed) _____
Commander

ANNEXES: (As required: by letter and title)

DISTRIBUTION: (According to policies and procedures of the issuing headquarters)

* Obtained from the Intelligence Estimate of the Situation

Appendix G

Outline Plan

Adapted from Joint Pub 5-02.2.

This format is similar to that of the JOPS OPLAN. The Outline Plan may be used as a transmittal document to convey the concept of operations, apportioned major combat forces, planning direction and guidance, task assignments, and inter-Service support agreements to subordinate and supporting commands for their use in plan development. It also can be used to seek JCS approval of the concept of operations before detailed plan development begins.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Issuing Headquarters
Place of Issue
Date-time Group of Signature
Msg Ref Number

(Command) Outline Plan for OPLAN (number)

REFERENCES: a. Maps and/or charts
 b. Relevant documents

Time zone used throughout the order

1. () SITUATION ()

a. () General. Describe the general politico-military environment that would establish the probable preconditions for execution of the plan.

b. () Preconflict Actions. Delineate preconflict actions desired and prioritize specific units and resources in terms of LAD relative to C-day.

c. () Enemy. Identify the opposing forces expected on execution and appraise their general capabilities. This subparagraph should include the information essential to a clear understanding of the magnitude of the hostile threat.

d. () Friendly

(1) () Describe the operations of unassigned forces, other than those assigned the task of supporting this operation, that could have a direct significant influence on the operations envisaged in this plan.

(2) () List the specific tasks of friendly forces, commands, or governmental agencies that would directly support OPORD execution (e.g., USCINCTrans, CINCSAC, DIA).

e. () Assumptions. List the necessary assumptions on which the plan is based, i.e., those contingent conditions the absence of which will have a significant impact on this plan or supporting plans. Assumptions normally state expected conditions over which the commander has no control. Assumptions included must be directly relevant to the development of this plan and supporting plans and should express conditions that, should they not occur as expected, would invalidate the entire OPLAN or its concept of operations. Additional assumptions relevant to specific aspects of the operation are included in appropriate annexes. Assumptions must specify the degree of mobilization assumed (e.g., full, partial, or none) and applicability of the Presidential 200,000 Selected Reserve callup authority.

2. () **MISSION ()**. State concisely the task and purpose to be accomplished. The mission stated should be that of the commander originating the plan. The mission is always stated in full. There are no subparagraphs to paragraph 2.

3. () **EXECUTION ()**

a. () Concept of Operations. The entire concept of operations should be included in the basic plan.

(1) () General. The concept of operations is based on the Commander's Estimate of the Situation. The estimate states how the commander intends to accomplish the mission, including the forces involved; the time-phasing of operations; the general nature and purpose of operations to be conducted; and the interrelated or cross-Service support, coordination, and cooperation necessary to successful execution. The concept of operations should be sufficiently developed to include an estimate of the level and duration of conflict to give supporting and subordinate commanders a basis for preparing adequate supporting plans. The concept should show how security against enemy actions will be maintained and how superiority and surprise will be achieved. Requirements to maintain secrecy and to use tactical military deception initiatives during the planning preparatory phases, during movement to objective areas, and after operations are over should be briefly outlined.

(2) () OPLAN Structure. The concept of operations should include a separate description for each stage of deterrence and warfighting as depicted in the JSCP.

(3) () Employment. Without encroaching on the authority of component and supporting commanders, the concept describes how the forces are to be employed. The concept should clearly outline plans for the use of nuclear weapons and chemical munitions or agents, if any. Plans to conduct supporting operations (e.g., EW PSYOP, SO, SAR, deception, and reconnaissance) are indicated by reference to appropriate

appendixes of Annex C. When a nuclear or deception appendix is not prepared for Annex C, a statement to that effect is made in this paragraph.

(4) () Deployment. The requirements to deploy forces from their normal peacetime locations to the area of operations are summarized. Such deployments may include those to be carried out within the command area, as well as deployments of augmentation forces. Particular attention should be given to expected deployments that may be required in order to implement and support the plan when directed. Consideration should be given to the deployment of rapid reaction forces as a partial implementation of the plan and to deception measures required to furnish security, mislead the enemy, and achieve surprise.

b. () Tasks. In separate numbered sub-subparagraphs, list the tasks assigned to each element of the supported and supporting command. Each task should be a concise statement of a mission to be performed either in future planning for the operation or on execution of the OPORD. The task assignment should encompass all key actions that subordinate and supporting elements must perform in order to fulfill the concept of operations, except deception actions, which must be assigned separately. When the plan requires the establishment of a subordinate joint force, tasks are assigned to the component commanders, supporting commanders, and subordinate joint force commanders, as appropriate. The support that each component is expected to give another is stated.

c. () Coordinating Instructions. List the instructions applicable to the entire command or two or more elements of the command that are necessary for proper coordination of the operation but are not appropriate for inclusion in a particular annex. Coordinating instructions establish, in particular, the conditions for execution. Terms on the timing of execution and deployments should be explained, as should other operational terms that appear in the plan but that are not defined in Joint Publications.

4. () ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS ()

a. () Concept of Support. The major part of guidance on Service support normally is contained in a series of detailed annexes. To give a general understanding of the requirements for logistic support, personnel policies, and administrative plans, this subparagraph includes broad guidance on how such support is to be furnished. Additional subparagraphs refer to the annexes that contain detailed guidance on each major aspect of support.

b. () Logistics, Annex D.

c. () Personnel, Annex E.

d. () Public Affairs, Annex F.

e. () Civil Affairs, Annex G.

f. () Environmental Services, Annex H.

g. () Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy, Annex M.

5. () **COMMAND AND CONTROL**

a. () **Command Relationships, Annex J.**

b. () **Command Posts.** List the designations and locations of each major headquarters involved in execution. When headquarters are to be deployed or the OPLAN provides for the relocation of headquarters to an alternate command post, indicate the location and time of opening and closing of each headquarters.

c. () **Succession to Command.** Designate in order of succession the commander responsible for assuming command of the operation in specific applicable circumstances.

d. () **Command, Control, and Communications Systems.** Include a general statement concerning the scope of C3 systems and procedures required to support the operation. Highlight any C3 systems or procedures requiring special emphasis. Refer to Annex K for details.

Signed Commander in Chief

Annexes: (List only those actually used)

A--TASK ORGANIZATION*
B--INTELLIGENCE*
C--OPERATIONS*
D--LOGISTICS*
E--PERSONNEL
F--PUBLIC AFFAIRS
G--CIVIL AFFAIRS
H--ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES
J--COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
K--COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS
L--OPERATIONS SECURITY
M--MAPPING CHARTING AND GEODESY
N--SPACE OPERATIONS
P--WARTIME HOST NATION SUPPORT
X--EXECUTION CHECKLIST
Z--DISTRIBUTION

* For an outline plan, these would probably be the minimum required.

ANNEX A TO OUTLINE PLAN FOR OPLAN _____**TASK ORGANIZATION****ORGANIZATION**

List command and control organizations responsible for deployment and execution, allocation of major combat forces to be used in planning, and the source of these forces. State whether assigned or augmentation.

ANNEX B TO OUTLINE PLAN FOR OPLAN _____**INTELLIGENCE**

Furnish plan-unique intelligence data for use in planning at the component level. The intelligence estimate used in the decisionmaking process probably will suffice.

ANNEX C TO OUTLINE PLAN FOR OPLAN _____**OPERATIONS**

This annex should be used for specific concept information that is inappropriate for inclusion in the body of the Outline Plan. Such information includes the following: major phasing of the operation, area of operations, rules of engagement, air operations, and nuclear or chemical considerations. Operational limitations should be listed if not given elsewhere. As in paragraph 3a of the basic plan, all information required by the components in plan development must be included without unduly encroaching on the authority of component and supporting commanders.

The format should be similar to that of Annex C, JOPS Volume II.

ANNEX D TO OUTLINE PLAN FOR OPLAN _____**LOGISTICS**

Transmit logistic information and data required by the component commanders for detailed and specific support planning. It will include the planning guidance, policies, procedures, and planning factors to be used and will assign responsibilities and tasks to the components. JOPS Volume II, Annex D, should be used as a guide to ensure that all the functional areas of logistics are adequately covered. Wherever the annex gives examples of requirements, the outline plan will state them as tasks for component commands.

Appendix H

Operation Order

This section is based on Joint Pub 1-03.8, Joint Pub 5-02.4, U.S. Army FM 101-5, U.S. Marine Corps FMFM 3-1, U.S. Navy NWP 11, U.S. Air Force AFM 28-3, and STANAG 2014 (4th edition).

TRANSMISSION INFORMATION. Immediate precedence will be used unless otherwise specified in the implementing directive.

1. () **FROM ().** Command originating or updating the information.
2. () **TO ().** Action addressees will be appropriate planning participants directly concerned as identified by the originator. Specific action addressees may be designated in the implementing directive.
3. () **INFO ().** Information addressees will be all other interested planning participants, as identified by the originator. Specific INFO addressees may be designated in the implementing directive.
4. () **DISTRIBUTION ().** By policy and procedure of the issuing headquarters.

BEGINNING TEXT. The beginning text, or first line, is structured as follows:

1. () The first line of text always contains the highest security classification of the message information as determined by the originator.
2. () The exercise term (e.g., PRIME RATE) is used only for exercises.
3. () The next line of text contains the following items separated by virgules (/):
 - a. () **OPREP-1.** Message title entry "OPREP-1" identifies the message as an Operations Planning Report.
 - b. () **UIC.** Unit identification code of command submitting report; e.g., DJJ010 (six characters).
 - c. () **SERIAL NUMBER.** Reports by each reporting command will be numbered serially, starting with 001 (three digits) for the duration of a particular planning sequence or operation. Data in the most recent report, as determined by the serial number, will have precedence over the same data item reported in previous messages.

d. () **PID OR CODE WORD OR NICKNAME.** Plan Identification Number (PID) of the OPLAN/COPLAN supported or code word or nickname assigned to the operation, if available, e.g., 4000, or **REPLAY** (15 characters maximum). Include security classification of the code word, if used.

OPERATION DESCRIPTION. This free text paragraph briefly describes the specific military operation for which the present plan was developed. Once defined and until changed, this paragraph may be used for citing references to previous messages. References to applicable maps, charts, and time zones are also included in this section. For the initial entry, include such information as the target areas, role to be played by U.S. forces, and other significant characteristics necessary to identify adequately the operation being supported. Ordinarily, the initial description by the supported command will be sufficiently comprehensive to apply to all commands. Thereafter, only substantial modifications in the nature or dimensions of the operation (e.g., expansion in scope or scale, deletion, or addition of tasks) need be reported to update the operation description.

NARRATIVE. This free text paragraph can be used to amplify the Operation Description, or to give informative or directive guidance. Normally, such a narrative would only be prepared by the supported command. However, when warranted, any participant command may enter command-unique aspects of the operation having significance for other commands but not reflected elsewhere. In all cases, narrative information must be kept as brief as possible and to the point. When used, the content of the narrative is to be structured as follows:

1. () **SITUATION ().** Give briefly the general picture, so that subordinate commanders will understand the current situation, under the following headings:

a. () **Enemy Forces.** Give composition, disposition, location, movements, estimated strengths, identification, and capabilities. Summarize the enemy situation in the intended area of operations. This section may be prepared as an annex, in which case it should be referred to here.

b. () **Friendly Forces.** Give information on friendly forces other than those covered by the operation order that may directly affect the action of subordinate commanders. These forces include those not attached or organic to the command for the contemplated operation but whose presence on a flank or other adjacent area is of interest. Information on such forces is limited to what subordinate commanders need to know to accomplish their tasks.

c. () **Attachments and detachments.** When they are not given under Task Organization, list here units attached to or detached from the issuing unit (or formation) by this order together with the times they are effective. If already indicated in the task organization description preceding paragraph 1, or indicated in the task organization annex, appropriate reference here will suffice.

d. An operation order is based on the prevailing situation and does not contain assumptions.

2. () **MISSION ().** Make a clear, concise statement of the task of the commander and its purpose. The mission of the command as a whole for the contemplated operation

is always stated here in full even though it may be expressed on an overlay or by some other means. There are no subparagraphs in paragraph 2.

3. () **EXECUTION ()**. In the first subparagraph give a summary of the overall course of action intended. In subsequent subparagraphs, assign specific tasks to each element of the command charged with the execution of tactical duties, and give details of coordination and the task organization/grouping, if not already included under the heading "Task Organization." If desired, instructions applicable to two or more elements of the command may be placed in a final subparagraph headed "Coordinating Instructions."

a. () **Concept of Operations**. Describe, in brief, how the commander visualizes the execution of the operation from start to completion. Accurately convey to subordinates the commander's intent so that mission accomplishment is possible in the time available and in the absence of additional communications or further instructions.

(1) () The concept should set forth the phases of the operation as they are anticipated from the commander's decision.

(2) () Schemes of maneuver for major subordinate task elements should state precisely what the commander expects to be done.

(3) () The general plans for the employment of supporting fire and weapons should be stated, including nuclear and chemical weapons.

(4) () In an amphibious operation, the general plan for the landing force should be included.

(5) () In large-scale operations, the concept of operations may be so long as to require its inclusion as an annex. In such case, it should be briefly summarized here and the annex referred to.

b. () **(Name of first tactical grouping.)** This and subsequent lettered subparagraphs of paragraph 3 assign specific tasks to each element of the command charged with the execution of tactical missions.

c. () Instructions to the reserve forces of the command appear in the next to last subparagraph of paragraph 3.

d. () **Coordinating Instructions**

(1) () The last subparagraph of paragraph 3 contains coordinating instructions pertaining to two or more tactical groupings of the command. Typically, such instructions might include boundaries, objectives, beaches, lines of departure, time and direction of attack, and other specifics needed to coordinate the activities of two or more tactical groupings.

(2) () Tentative dates for D-day and H-hour are usually given in this subparagraph. In the case of an operation order that is not effective on receipt, this subparagraph should indicate the date and time the order will become effective.

4. () **ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS** (). Include a statement of the administrative and logistical arrangements applicable to the operation. (If lengthy, or not ready for inclusion in the operation order, it may be issued separately and referred to here.) This paragraph sets forth the manner of logistic support for the contemplated operation. For large operations, it is almost always necessary to prepare a separate logistic and personnel annex or plan. In any event, enough information should be included in the body of the order to make clear the basic concept for logistic support. For paragraph 4 of the order, an appropriate sequence of presentation follows.

a. () **Concept of Combat Service Support.** Briefly summarize, as with subparagraph 3a, the overall operation, this time from the combat service support point of view. In some cases, this subparagraph and a reference to the logistic and personnel annex or plan may be all that is stated.

b. () **Materiel and Services.** List materiel and services for supply, maintenance, transportation, and construction, and allocation of labor for logistic purposes.

c. () **Medical Services.** List plans and policies for hospitalization and evacuation of both military and civilian personnel.

d. () **Personnel.** List unit strengths, replacements, and personnel policies and procedures, including those pertaining to civilians and prisoners of war.

e. () **Civil Affairs.** Describe control of civil populations, refugees, and related matters.

f. () **Miscellaneous**

5. () **COMMAND AND SIGNAL** (). Include signal, recognition, and identification instructions, electronic policy, headquarters locations and movements, code words, code names, and liaison.

a. () **Command, Control, and Communications.** This gives information about pertinent command, control, and communications nets, operating procedures, recognition and identification procedures, electronic emission constraints, and so on. A separate annex may be required.

b. () **Command**

(1) () **Joint operations,** by their nature, have complex command relationships. Joint operation orders must be specific concerning these arrangements, including shifts that may take place as the operation progresses from one phase to another. It is usually advisable to set these relationships out in chart form and to include them as an annex to the operation order. (See Joint Pub 5-02.2, Chapter II, Annex J for format.)

(2) () **Command posts, alternate command posts, flagships, and alternate flagships** along with their times of activation and deactivation should be included in this paragraph.

OBJECTIVE. This free text paragraph can be used to identify the particular operational objective (or a discrete increment) to which the reported information pertains. It is especially useful for furnishing functional context in OPREP-1 messages where Operational Description and Narrative paragraphs are omitted.

CORRECTIONS. Report changes or corrections to preceding OPREP-1 reports. Refer to a message and specific subparagraph to be changed or corrected.

REMARKS. Add remarks as appropriate to identify location of deployment data; to enhance comprehension of this Operations Planning Report, including an estimate of when a more detailed report (if any) may be expected; and to identify broad assumptions, planning factors, GEOLOCs, etc.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT INSTRUCTIONS. (NOTE: Normally, the single word "Acknowledge" is sufficient, indicating that the recipient is to acknowledge receipt and understanding of the order by sending the message reference number in the heading to the originator. If other measures are to be used, they should be prescribed here.)

ANNEXES: (By letter and title)

DISTRIBUTION: (By policy and procedures of the issuing headquarters)

AUTHENTICATION: (According to local staff practice--normally the J-3/5)

ENDING TEXT: For exercise messages, the last line of text should repeat the exercise term. If the message is classified, downgrading and declassification instructions must be included, e.g., DECL OADR.

H-6

Appendix I

Definitions

The following is a list of commonly used terms and definitions to assist the reader in better understanding the material used in this guide. Where possible, the most descriptive source is shown.

ADEQUACY

Operation plan review criterion that evaluates the scope and concept of planned operations for sufficiency to accomplish the task assigned. (adapted from Joint Pub 5-02.1 (JOPS Volume I))

ADMINISTRATIVE LANDING

An unopposed landing involving debarkation from vehicles that have been administratively loaded, i.e., using a loading system that gives primary consideration to achieving maximum use of troop and cargo space without regard to tactical employment. Equipment and supplies must be unloaded and sorted before use. (adapted from Joint Pub 1-02)

AERIAL PORT

An airfield that has been designated for the sustained air movement of personnel and materiel and to serve as an authorized port for entrance into or departure from the country where it is located. (Joint Pub 1-02)

AIRCRAFT BLOCK SPEED

True airspeed in knots under zero wind conditions adjusted in relation to length of sortie to compensate for takeoff, climbout, letdown, instrument approach, and landing. (Joint Pub 1-02)

AIRHEAD

A designated location in a hostile or threatened territory, which, when seized and held, ensures the continuous airlanding of troops and materiel and furnishes the maneuver space needed for projected operations. Also, a designated location that is used as a base for supply and evacuation by air in an area of operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

AIR MOVEMENT

Air transport of units, personnel, supplies, and equipment, including airdrops and air landings.
(Joint Pub 1-02)

ALERT ORDER

A formal directive issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that follows an NCA decision that U.S. military forces may be required; gives essential guidance for planning in the prevailing situation, and marks the outset of CAP, Phase V, execution planning.
(JDS Users Manual Volume 1)

ALERT STATUS

The level of preparedness directed by competent authority to be attained by deploying units.
(Joint Pub 5-02.4 (JOPS Volume IV))

ALLOCATION

The resources furnished to the commander of a unified or specified command by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for execution planning or actual execution.
(adapted from Joint Pub 5-02.1 (JOPS Volume I))

ANNEX

A document appended to an operation order or other document to make it clearer or to give further details.
(Joint Pub 1-02)

APPORTION

To make resources available to the commander of a unified or specified command for deliberate planning. Apportioned resources are used in the development of operation plans and may be more or less than those allocated for execution planning or actual execution.
(Joint Pub 5-02.1 (JOPS Volume I))

APPORTIONMENT

The funds appropriated by Congress that are allocated by the Office of Management and Budget to a federal department.
(adapted from the GAO glossary)

APPROPRIATION ACT

An act of Congress that permits federal agencies to incur obligations and make payments out of the treasury for a specified period of time and purpose. (adapted from the GAO glossary)

ASSEMBLY AREA

An area where a command is assembled in preparation for future action.
(adapted from Joint Pub 1-02)

ASSIGN

To detail individuals to specific duties or functions where such duties or functions are primary and/or relatively permanent. (Joint Pub 1-02)

ASSIGNED FORCES

Forces in being that have been placed under the combatant command or operational control of a commander. (adapted from Joint Pub 0-2)

ASSUMPTION

A supposition about the current situation or a presupposition about the future course of events, either or both assumed to be true in the absence of positive proof, necessary to enable the commander in the process of planning to complete an estimate of the situation and make a decision on the course of action. (Joint Pub 1-02)

ATTACHED FORCES

Units or personnel placed in an organization where such placement is relatively temporary. (Joint Pub 5-01.2)

**ATTACHMENTS TO AN
OPERATION PLAN OR
ORDER**

Separately identifiable amplifications of a basic plan or order. The hierarchy of attachments to a plan is **annexes, appendices, tabs, enclosures, and maps.** (adapted from Joint Pub 5-02.2 (JOPS Volume II))

AUGMENTATION FORCES

Forces to be transferred to the operational control of a supported commander during the execution of an operation. (Joint Pub 5-02.1 (JOPS Volume I))

AUTHORIZING LEGISLATION

Congressional legislation that sets up or continues the legal operations of a federal program or agency. (adapted from the GAO glossary)

**AVAILABLE-TO-LOAD DATE
(ALD)**

A date specified for each unit in a TPFDD indicating the day planned as the earliest time the requirement can begin loading at the POE. (*JDS Users Data Element Dictionary*)

BASE CASE

A method of planning that attempts to resolve in advance possible conflicts over use of resources in more than one OPLAN.

BASIC LOAD

The quantity of supplies required to be on hand within, and that can be moved by, a unit or formation. It is expressed according to the wartime organization of the unit or formation and maintained at the prescribed levels. (Joint Pub 1-02)

BASIC PLAN

The part of an operation plan that forms the base structure for annexes and appendices. It consists of general statements about the situation, mission, execution, administration and logistics, and command and control.
(adapted from Joint Pub 5-02.2 (JOPS Volume II))

BEACHHEAD

A designated area on a hostile shore that, when seized and held, ensures the continuous landing of troops and materiel, and furnishes maneuver space for subsequent projected operations ashore.
(Joint Pub 1-02)

BREKKBULK CARGO

Any commodity that, because of its weight, dimensions, or noncompatibility with other cargo, must be shipped by mode other than MILVAN or SEAVAN. (AR 55-9/NAVSUPINST 4600.79/AFR 75-10/MCO 4610.31)

**BUDGET AUTHORITY
(BA)**

Authority conferred by law to enter into obligations, that is, appropriations, authority to borrow, or contract authority, that will result in immediate or future outlays involving Government funds.
(adapted from the GAO glossary)

**BUDGET ESTIMATES SUBMISSION
(BES)**

Service and DOD agency budget estimates based on approved programs in the Program Decision Memorandums and the most recent fiscal and monetary guidelines and assumptions.
(adapted from DOD Instruction 7045.7)

BULK CARGO

Materiel generally shipped in volume where the transportation conveyance is the only external container, such as liquids, ore, or grain.
(Joint Pub 1-02)

Also, in JOPS ADP or JDS, cargo with dimensions less than oversize cargo; cargo that will fit on a 436L pallet. (adapted from *JDS Users Data Element Dictionary*)

CAMPAIGN PLAN

A plan for a series of related military operations aimed to accomplish a common objective, normally within a given time and space.
(Joint Pub 1-02)

CAPABILITIES PLANNING

Planning that attempts to meet the threat based on the forces and support that have been funded by Congress in the current budget cycle. This level of forces, equipment, and supplies is available now or expected to be available in this planning cycle.
(adapted from CJCS MOP 7, 30 Jan. 1990)

CARGO

Commodities and supplies in transit.
(Joint Pub 1-02)

**CARGO INCREMENT NUMBER
(CIN)**

A seven-character alphanumeric field that uniquely describes a nonunit cargo entry in a TPFDD. The first two characters identify the Service and the type of cargo; the last five are the CIN assignment.
(adapted from *JDS Users Manual* Volume 1)

CASUALTY

Any person who is lost to the organization by reason of having been declared dead, wounded, injured, diseased, interned, captured, retained, missing, missing in action, beleaguered, besieged, or detained. (Joint Pub 1-02)

C-DAY

The unnamed day on which the first movement from any ORIGIN in support of a specific OPLAN/OPORD begins or is to begin. The deployment may be movement of troops, cargo, weapon systems, or a combination of these elements using any or all types of transportation. For execution, the actual C-day is established under the authority and direction of the Secretary of Defense.
(adapted from Joint Pub 5-02.1 (JOPS Volume I))

CINC'S REQUIRED DATE

The original date specified by the CINC for arrival of forces or cargo at the destination; shown in the TPFDD to assess the impact of later arrival.
(*Joint Planning Systems Newsletter*, Jan. 1988)

**CIVIL ENGINEERING SUPPORT
PLAN (CESP)**

The part of an operation plan that deals with the construction, improvement, or repair of resources and facilities in the area of operations.
(adapted from Joint Pub 5-02.2 (JOPS Volume II))

CLOSE-HOLD ACCESS

Extremely limited availability of OPLAN information to specific personnel and terminals at WWMCCS sites as the plan is being developed.
(adapted from *JDS Users Manual* Volume 1)

COMBATANT COMMAND

Exercised only by commanders of unified and specified combatant commands, COCOM is the authority of a combatant commander to perform the functions of command over assigned forces that involve organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. COCOM should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations; normally this authority is exercised through the Service component commander. COCOM gives full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the CINC considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. COCOM includes the authority of OPCON. (Joint Pub 0-2)

COMBAT FORCES

Forces whose primary missions are to participate in combat. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
(CSS)**

The assistance furnished to operating forces primarily in the fields of administrative services, chaplain services, civil affairs, finance, legal services, health services, military police, supply, maintenance, transportation, construction, troop construction, acquisition and disposal of real property, facilities engineering, topographic and geodetic engineering functions, food service, graves registration, laundry, dry cleaning, bath, property disposal, and other logistic services. (Joint Pub 1-02)

COMBAT SUPPORT (CS)

Units or organizations whose primary missions are to furnish operational assistance for the combat forces. (adapted from Joint Pub 1-02)

COMBINED

Describing a military activity, operation, or organization composed of elements of two or more allied nations.
(adapted from Joint Pub 1-02)

**COMMAND, CONTROL, AND
COMMUNICATIONS
SYSTEMS (C3S)**

The facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, and personnel essential to a commander for planning, directing, and controlling operations of assigned forces to accomplish assigned missions. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**COMMAND, CONTROL, AND
COMMUNICATIONS
COUNTERMEASURES (C3CM)**

The integrated use of operations security, military deception, jamming, and physical destruction, supported by intelligence, to deny information to, influence, damage, or destroy adversaries' command, control, and communications (C3) capabilities and to protect friendly C3 against such actions. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE
OF THE SITUATION**

A document reflecting the logical process of reasoning by which a commander considers all the circumstances affecting the military situation and decides on a course of action to be taken to accomplish the mission.
(adapted from Joint Pub 1-02)

COMMON SERVICING

That function performed by one Service in support of another for which reimbursement is not required from the Service receiving the support.
(Joint Pub 1-02)

COMMON SUPPLIES

Supplies common to two or more Services.
(Joint Pub 1-02)

**COMPONENT COMMAND
(or SERVICE/FUNCTIONAL
COMPONENT COMMAND)**

The Service command, its commander, and all its individuals, units, detachments, organizations, or installations that have been assigned to the unified command. (Joint Pub 0-2)

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

A verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of a commander's assumptions or intent in regard to an operation or series of operations. The concept of operations is often embodied in campaign plans and operation plans. The concept of operations is designed to give an overall picture of the operation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

CONPLAN

An operation plan in concept format that would require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN or OPORD.
(Joint Pub 5-02.1 (JOPS Volume I))

CONSTANT DOLLARS

A dollar value adjusted by dividing the current dollar amount by the appropriate price index that results in prices and transactions that are equivalent to the base year.
(adapted from the GAO glossary)

CONTINGENCY PLAN

A plan for major contingencies that can reasonably be anticipated in the principal geographic subareas of a command.
(Joint Pub 1-02)

COORDINATING AUTHORITY

A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Services or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. If essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter will be referred to the appointing authority. (Joint Pub 1-02)

COURSE OF ACTION

A plan recommended by the CINC to the NCA that would accomplish, or is related to the accomplishment of, a mission.
(adapted from Joint Pub 5-02.4)

**CRISIS ACTION PROCEDURES
(CAP)**

A system specified in Joint Pub 5-02.4 that gives guidance and procedures for joint operation planning by military forces during emergency or time-sensitive situations. The procedures are designed to give the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff information to develop timely recommendations to the National Command Authorities for decisions involving the use of U.S. military forces.
(adapted from *JDS Users Manual* Volume 1)

CRITICAL RESUPPLY

Items that are needed to sustain the initial combat capability or that compete for transportation assets while the force module including combat support and combat service support is still closing on the objective area.
(Joint Pub 5-02.4 (JOPS Volume IV))

CROSS-SERVICING

That function performed by one Service in support of another and for which the receiving Service may be charged.
(adapted from Joint Pub 1-02)

CURRENT DOLLARS

The dollar value of goods or services in terms of prices current at the time the goods or services were sold, as contrasted to constant dollars.
(adapted from the GAO glossary)

CURRENT FORCE

The force, identified in the JSCP, that exists today. The current force represents actual force

structure and/or manning that will be available to meet contingencies during a specified JSCP planning period. It is the basis for operation and contingency plans and orders.
(adapted from Joint Pub 1-02)

DATA ELEMENT

A basic unit of information having a unique meaning and subcategories (data items) of distinct units or values. Examples of data elements are military personnel grade, sex, race, geographic location, and military unit.
(Joint Pub 1-02)

D-DAY

The unnamed day on which a particular operation, that is, a land assault, air strike, naval bombardment, parachute assault, or amphibious assault, begins or is to begin. H-hour is the specific hour on D-day at which a particular operation begins or is to begin.
(adapted from Joint Pub 1-02)

DEBARKATION

The unloading of troops with their supplies and equipment from their ship or aircraft.
(Joint Pub 1-02)

DECISION

In an estimate of the situation, a clear and concise statement of the line of action the commander intends to follow as the one most favorable to the successful accomplishment of the mission. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**DEFENSE PLANNING GUIDANCE
(DPG)**

The Secretary of Defense's guidance to the Services and defense agencies on the development of their Program Objective Memorandums.
(DOD Instruction 7045.7)

**DEFENSE READINESS CONDITIONS
(DEFCON)**

A uniform system of progressive alert postures for use between the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of unified and specified combatant commands and for use by the Services. Defense Readiness Conditions are graduated to match situations of varying military severity or status of alert. They are identified by short title: DEFCON (5), (4), (3), (2), and (1), as appropriate. (Joint Pub 1-02)

DELIBERATE PLANNING

Operation planning tasks as assigned by JSCP or other directive and performed using procedures outlined in Joint Pubs 5-02.1, .2, and .3 (JOPS Volumes I, II, and III).
(Joint Pub 5-02.1 (JOPS Volume I))

DEPLOYABILITY POSTURE

The state or stage of a unit's preparedness for deployment to participate in a military operation, defined in five levels as follows: (adapted from Joint Pub 5-02.4 (JOPS Volume IV))

Normal Deployability Posture (ND)

Unit is conducting normal activities. Commander is monitoring the situation in an area of tension and reviewing plans. No visible overt actions being taken to increase deployability posture.

Increased Deployability Posture (ID)

Unit is relieved from commitments not pertaining to the mission. Personnel recalled from training areas, pass, and leave to meet the deployment schedule. Preparation for deployment of equipment and supplies initiated. Predeployment personnel actions completed. Essential equipment and supplies located in CONUS or at overseas installations identified.

Advanced Deployability Posture (AD)

All essential personnel, mobility equipment, and accompanying supplies checked, packed, rigged for deployment, and positioned with deploying unit. Unit remains at home station. Movement requirements confirmed. Airlift, sealift, and intra-CONUS transportation resources identified, and initial movement schedules completed by TCCs.

Marshaled Deployability Posture (MD)

First increment of deploying personnel, mobility equipment, and accompanying supplies marshaled at designated POEs, but not loaded. Sufficient strategic aircraft or sealift assets positioned at, or en route to, the POE either to load the first increment or to sustain a flow, as required by the plan or directive being considered for execution. Adequate supporting ALCEs, stage aircrews (if required), and support personnel positioned to sustain the airlift flow at onload, en route, and offload locations.

Loaded Deployability Posture (LD)

All first increment equipment and accompanying supplies loaded aboard ships and prepared for departure to designated objective area. Personnel prepared for loading on minimum notice. Follow-on increments of cargo and personnel en route or

available to meet projected loading schedules. Sufficient airlift positioned and loaded at the POE to move the first increment or to initiate and sustain a flow, as required by the plan or directive being considered for execution. Adequate supporting ALCEs, stage aircrews (if required), and support personnel positioned to sustain the airlift flow at onload, en route, and offload locations.

DEPLOYMENT DATABASE

The JDS database containing the necessary information on forces, materiel, filler personnel, medical evacuees, noncombat evacuees, and replacement personnel movement requirements to support plan execution. The database reflects information (1) contained in the refined TPFDD or (2) developed during the various phases of the crisis action procedures, and (3) the movement schedules or tables developed by the USTRANSCOM components to support the deployment of required forces, personnel, and materiel.

(adapted from Joint Pub 5-02.4 (JOPS Volume IV))

DEPLOYMENT ESTIMATE

The estimated time required for all ULNs, CINs, and PINs of a JDS deployment database to arrive at the PODs expressed C-days and L-hours from the time of notification to deploy.

(Joint Pub 5-02.4 (JOPS Volume IV))

DEPLOYMENT PLANNING

That part of operation planning concerned with relocation of forces to the desired area of operation. (*JDS Users Manual* Volume 1)

DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION/ DEPLOYMENT ORDER

An order issued by competent authority to prepare forces for movement or to move forces, for instance, to increase deployability posture of units. (Joint Pub 5-02.4 (JOPS Volume IV))

DESTINATION (DEST)

The terminal geographic location in the routing scheme for forces only. (Resupply and replacement personnel are routed to a port of support.) The destination identifies the station or location in the objective area where the unit will be employed. For some units, the destination may be the same as their POD.

(*JDS Users Manual* Volume 1)

DETERRENT OPTION

A course of action, developed on the best political and military judgment, designed to dissuade an adversary from a current course of action or contemplated operation.

(Joint Pub 5-02.1 (JOPS Volume I))

DIRECTIVE AUTHORITY FOR LOGISTIC MATTERS

A CINC's authority to issue directives, including peacetime measures, to subordinate commanders necessary to ensure effective execution of operational plans, economy of operation, and prevention of unnecessary duplication by the Service component commands. Where differences between the CINC and the Service component commander arise, and cannot be settled in a timely manner, these differences will be forwarded up the chains of command to the Secretary of Defense for resolution.

(Joint Pub 0-2)

DOCTRINE

Fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative, but requires judgment in application. (Joint Pub 1-01)

EARLIEST ARRIVAL DATE (EAD)

A day, relative to C-day, that is specified by a planner as the earliest date when a unit, a resupply shipment, or replacement personnel can be accepted at a port of debarkation during a deployment. Used with the latest arrival date (LAD), it defines a delivery window for transportation planning.

(JDS Users Manual Volume 1)

EMBARKATION

The loading of troops with their supplies and equipment into ships or aircraft. (Joint Pub 1-02)

EMPLOYMENT ESTIMATE

The expected time expressed in hours, and based on the deployment estimate, when combat forces or portions of combat forces can be employed in an objective area. The estimate is reported by the supported commander as part of the Commander's Estimate.

(Joint Pub 5-02.4 (JOPS Volume IV))

EMPLOYMENT PLANNING

That part of operation planning concerned with the strategic or tactical use of forces and materiel within the area of operations.

(JDS Users Manual Volume 1)

ENEMY CAPABILITIES

Courses of action of which the enemy is physically capable, and that, if adopted, will

**ESTIMATED DEPARTURE DATE
(EDD)**

affect accomplishment of our mission, such as attack, defense, withdrawal, etc. (Joint Pub 1-02)

In TFE simulation, an estimate of the earliest date after the available-to-load date (ALD) on which each movement requirement could leave the port of embarkation.
(JDS Users Manual Volume 1)

EXECUTE ORDER

An order issued by competent authority to initiate operations.
(Joint Pub 5-02.4 (JOPS Volume IV))

EXECUTION PLANNING

The phase of CAP planning in which an approved operation plan or other NCA-designated course of action is adjusted and refined, as required by the prevailing situation, and converted into an OPORD that can be executed at a designated time. Execution planning can proceed on the basis of prior deliberate planning, or it can take place under a NOPLAN situation.
(JDS Users Manual Volume 1)

FEASIBILITY

An operation plan review criterion to ensure that the assigned tasks could be accomplished using available resources.
(adapted from Joint Pub 5-02.1 (JOPS Volume I))

**FEASIBLE ARRIVAL DATE
(FAD)**

In TFE simulation, the earliest computer-forecast date after the designated earliest arrival date (EAD) when each movement requirement would be unloaded at the port of debarkation (POD). When the FAD is later than the latest arrival date (LAD), a transportation shortfall exists.
(JDS Users Manual Volume 1)

FILLER PERSONNEL

Individuals of suitable grade and skill initially required to bring a unit or organization to its authorized strength. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**SIX-YEAR DEFENSE PROGRAM
(SYDP)**

The forces and resources associated with programs approved by the Secretary of Defense for the Department of Defense; residing in an automated database, it is updated and published at least three times each budget cycle.
(adapted from DOD Instruction 7045.7)

FORCE LIST

A total list of forces required by an operation plan, including assigned forces, augmentation forces, and other forces to be employed in support of the plan. (Joint Pub 1-02)

FORCE MODULE

A grouping of combat, combat support, and combat service support forces, and their appropriate non-unit-related personnel and supplies, for a specified period of time, usually 30 days. The elements of force modules are linked together or uniquely identified so that they may be extracted from or adjusted as an entity in the TPFDD to enhance flexibility and usefulness of the operation plan during a crisis. See **Service Force Modules** and **OPLAN-dependent Force Modules**.

(adapted from the *JDS Users Manual* Volume 1)

FORCE RECORD

A description of the TPFDD unit composed of three parts:

(1) force requirement **routing data** composed of force description information, such as FRN, UTC, unit level code (ULC), personnel strength, ILOC, POD, DEST, load configuration, movement dates, preferred mode and source of transportation;

(2) force unit **identification** incorporating UIC, unit name, ORIGIN, RLD, POE, ALD, preferred transportation mode; and

(3) force movement **characteristics**, including passengers and cargo of a type unit defined by TUCHA file data for the standard UTC.

(Joint Pub 1-03.16)

**FORCE REQUIREMENT NUMBER
(FRN)**

The alphanumeric code used to uniquely identify force entries in a TPFDD. The first of three parts of a Unit Line Number (ULN).

(adapted from the *JDS Users Manual* Volume 1)

**FORCE REQUIREMENTS
GENERATOR (FRG)**

The JOPS ADP application program that is used by the planner to originate, analyze, delete, or change a time-phased force list.

(adapted from Joint Pub 5-02.4 (JOPS Volume IV))

**FRAGMENTARY ORDER
(FRAGORD)**

An abbreviated form of an operation order, usually issued on a day-to-day basis, that eliminates the need for restating information contained in a basic operation order. It may be issued in sections. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**FRAGMENTATION CODE
(FRAG)**

A one-character code, the second of three parts of a unit line number (ULN). It is used to uniquely identify subordinate units, fragmentations, or increments of a single force requirement.
(adapted from the *JDS Users Manual* Volume 1)

**FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT
COMMAND**

A command normally, but not necessarily, composed of forces of two or more Services, which may be established in peacetime or war to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time.
(Joint Pub 1-02)

**GROSS TRANSPORTATION
FEASIBILITY**

A determination made by the supported commander that a draft OPLAN can be supported with the apportioned transportation assets. This determination is made by using the TFE to simulate movement of personnel and cargo from POE to POD within a specified timeframe.
(Joint Pub 5-02.1 (JOPS Volume I))

H-HOUR

The specific hour on D-day at which a particular operation commences.
(Joint Pub 1-02)

HOST NATION SUPPORT

Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, times of crisis/emergency, or wartime under agreements mutually concluded between the nations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

INSERT CODE

A one-character code that is the third of three parts of a unit line number (ULN). It is used to show another level of unit fragmentation below that indicated by the FRAG code.
(*JDS Users Manual* Volume 1)

INTEGRATED PRIORITY LIST

A list of high-priority needs given by each CINC to the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered by priority across Service and functional lines and with consideration of reasonable fiscal constraints.
(DOD Instruction 7045.7)

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

The appraisal, expressed in writing or orally, of available intelligence relating to a specific situation or condition with a view to determining the courses of action open to the enemy or potential enemy and the order of probability of their adoption. (Joint Pub 1-02)

INTENSIVE MANAGEMENT

The continuous process by which the Joint Planning and Execution Community ensures that movement data in the JDS (JOPES) deployment database for the initial days of deployment and mobilization are current to support immediate execution for the first 30 days.

(adapted from Joint Pub 5-02.1 (JOPS Volume I))

**INTERMEDIATE LOCATION
(ILOC)**

An intermediate stopping point in the deployment routing of a unit, used to lay over the force for a specified time, normally longer than one day. It is often used to unite the personnel and cargo of split shipments. This point may occur between the ORIGIN and POE, the POE and POD, or the POD and DEST. The TFE can accept only one intermediate location during the deployment of a unit. (*JDS Users Manual* Volume 1)

INTER-SERVICE SUPPORT

Action by one Service or element to furnish logistic and/or administrative support to another. Such action may be recurring or nonrecurring in character on an installation, area, or worldwide basis. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**ISSUE BOOKS
(IB)**

The collection of major issues resulting from OSD staff review of Program Objective Memorandums. (adapted from DOD Instruction 7045.7)

JOINT PUBLICATION

A publication of joint interest prepared under the cognizance of Joint Staff directorates and applicable to the military departments, unified and specified commands, and other authorized agencies. (Joint Pub 1-01)

**JDS INFORMATION TRACE
(JSIT)**

A generalized JDS retrieval system that displays JDS information directly to the display terminal. (*JDS Users Data Element Dictionary*)

**JOINT INTEROPERABILITY
OF TACTICAL COMMAND
AND CONTROL SYSTEMS
(JINTACCS)**

The JCS-directed program to ensure interoperability among joint or combined tactical command, control, and intelligence systems using standard message formats for six discrete mission areas, that is, operations control, fire support, air operations, intelligence, maritime operations, and combat service support. (adapted from Joint Pub 6-04)

**JOINT DEPLOYMENT
SYSTEM
(JDS)**

Personnel, procedures, directives, communication systems, and electronic data processing systems that directly support time-sensitive planning and execution and complement peacetime deliberate planning by disseminating deployment information. (adapted from *JDS Users Manual* Volume 1)

JOINT DOCTRINE

Fundamental principles issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that guide the employment of forces of two or more Services in coordinated action toward a common objective. (adapted from Joint Pub 1-02)

JOINT FORCE

A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements of the Army, the Navy and/or the Marine Corps, and the Air Force, or two or more of these Services, operating under a single commander authorized to exercise unified command or operational control over joint forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**JOINT OPERATION PLANNING
AND EXECUTION SYSTEM
(JOPES)**

The system that forms the foundation of the U.S. conventional command and control system consisting of policies, procedures, and reporting systems supported by automation used to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment activities in peace, exercises, crises, and war. (adapted from Joint Pub 5-03)

**JOINT OPERATION
PLANNING SYSTEM (JOPS)**

The DOD-directed, JCS-specified system to be used in both deliberate and time-sensitive planning of joint operations. (adapted from Joint Pub 5-02.1 (JOPS Volume I))

**JOINT OPERATIONAL
PLANNING PROCESS**

A coordinated joint staff procedure used by a commander to determine the best method of accomplishing assigned tasks and to direct the action necessary to accomplish the mission. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**JOINT PLANNING AND
EXECUTION COMMUNITY
(JPEC)**

The headquarters, commands, and agencies involved in training, preparation, movement, reception, employment, support, and sustainment of military forces assigned or committed to a theater of operations. The JPEC usually consists of the Joint Staff; Services and certain of their major commands, for example, the Service wholesale logistic commands; unified and specified combatant commands and their subordinate commands, that is, joint task forces, component

commands, subordinate unified commands, etc.; and the defense agencies, such as DLA, DIA, etc. as may be appropriate to a given scenario. Previously known as the Joint Deployment Community (JDC).

(adapted from Joint Pub 5-03.2)

JOINT SERVICING

That function performed by a jointly staffed and financed activity in support of two or more military Services. (Joint Pub 1-02)

(A) JOINT STAFF

The staff of a commander of a unified or specified combatant command or of a joint task force that includes members from the several Services comprising the force. (Joint Pub 1-02)

(THE) JOINT STAFF

The staff assigned or detailed to permanent duty under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as provided for under the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, to assist the Chairman, Vice Chairman, and JCS members in carrying out their responsibilities.

(adapted from the 1986 DOD Reorganization Act)

JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM (JSPS)

The formal means by which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff carries out his responsibility to furnish strategic plans and strategic direction for the Armed Forces. It complements the DOD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System and interacts with other specialized management and planning systems. (adapted from CJCS MOP 7)

It includes the following:

Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA)

The JMNA fulfills the Secretary of Defense's statutory duty to submit to Congress an annual comprehensive net assessment of the defense capabilities and programs of the Armed Forces of the United States and its allies as compared with those of their potential adversaries.

Joint Strategy Review (JSR)

The Joint Strategy Review (JSR) initiates the strategic planning cycle. The JSR is the JSPS process for gathering information, raising issues, and facilitating the integration of the strategy, operational planning, and program assessments. During the JSR process deliberations, a series of papers and briefings (intermediate products) is developed by the Joint Staff, staffed with the Services and unified and specified combatant commands, and presented to the Chairman and the

other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These papers and briefings, along with the views of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CINCs, are consolidated into a single document by the Joint Staff. The final product of the JSR process is the Chairman's Guidance (CG).

Chairman's Guidance (CG)

The Chairman's Guidance (CG) is the final product of the Joint Strategy Review and contains guidance to the Joint Staff and information for the Secretary of Defense, the CINCs, and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the framework for building the National Military Strategy Document (NMSD). The CG serves as a bridge between the initial assessments and views developed during the Joint Strategy Review (JSR) process and the specific process that builds the NMSD.

National Military Strategy Document (NMSD)

The National Military Strategy Document (NMSD) contains the advice of the Chairman, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CINCs, to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense as to the recommended national military strategy and fiscally constrained force structure required to support the attainment of the national security objectives during the defense planning period covered by the next Defense Planning Guidance (DPG).

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)

The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) conveys strategic guidance, including apportionment of resources, to the CINCs and the Chiefs of the Services, to accomplish assigned strategic tasks based on military capabilities existing at the beginning of the planning period. The JSCP offers a coherent framework for capabilities-based military advice to the NCA.

Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA)

The Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA) includes the Chairman's assessment of the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) force to assist the Secretary of Defense in decisions on the defense program after receipt of the POMs.

JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES (JTTP)

The actions and methods published by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that implement joint doctrine and describe how forces will be employed in joint operations.
(adapted from Joint Pub 0-2)

JOINT TASK FORCE (JTF)	A force composed of assigned or attached elements of the Army, the Navy and/or the Marine Corps, and the Air Force, or two or more of these Services, that is constituted by the Secretary of Defense or by the commander of a unified or specified command, subordinate unified command, or an existing joint task force. (adapted from Joint Pub 1-02)
JOPS ADP	The WWMCCS standard computer-based system consisting of standard data files, standard ADP programs, and instructions for the reporting and exchange of data used to develop, analyze, refine, review and maintain joint operation plans. (Joint Pub 5-02.3 (JOPS Volume III))
L-HOUR	The specific hour on C-day at which a deployment operation begins or is to begin. L-hour is 0001Z unless otherwise specified. (Joint Pub 5-02.4 (JOPS Volume IV))
LATEST ARRIVAL DATE (LAD)	A day, relative to C-day, that is specified by a planner as the latest date when a unit, a resupply shipment, or replacement personnel can arrive at the port of debarkation and support the concept of operations. (JDS Users Manual Volume I)
LEVEL OF SUPPLY	The quantity of supplies or materiel authorized or directed to be held in anticipation of future demands. (Joint Pub 1-02)
LIMITED ACCESS	Selective access to OPLAN data granted to designated personnel and specific WWMCCS terminals. (adapted from JDS Users Manual Volume 1)
LIMITING FACTOR	A factor or condition that, either temporarily or permanently, impedes mission accomplishment, for example, transportation network deficiencies, lack of in-place facilities, malpositioned forces or materiel, extreme climatic conditions, distance, transit/overflight rights, political conditions, etc. (adapted from Joint Pub 5-02.1 (JOPS Volume I))
LINES OF COMMUNICATION	All the routes, land, water, and air, that connect an operating military force with a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move. (adapted from FM 100-5)

LODGEMENT AREA

A designated area in a hostile territory that, when seized and held, ensures the continuous and uninterrupted landing by air or sea of troops and materiel and offers necessary maneuver space for subsequent projected joint operations.

(See airhead and beachhead.) (Joint Pub 1-02)

LOGISTIC ESTIMATE

An appraisal resulting from an orderly examination of the logistic factors influencing contemplated courses of action to permit conclusions to be drawn concerning the degree and manner of that influence. (adapted from Joint Pub 1-02)

LOGISTICS

The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, the aspects of military operations that deal with design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and acquisition or furnishing of services. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**MAJOR DEFENSE PROGRAM
(MDP) or
MAJOR FORCE PROGRAM
(MFP)**

A category of Program Elements that represents a major force, mission, or support function, e.g., strategic forces, intelligence and communications, research and development, supply and maintenance, etc.

(adapted from DOD Instruction 7045.7)

MAJOR FLEET

A principal, permanent subdivision of the operating forces of the Navy with certain supporting shore activities. At present there are two such fleets: the Pacific Fleet and the Atlantic Fleet.

(Joint Pub 1-02)

MAJOR NATO COMMANDERS

Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT), Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), and Allied Commander in Chief Channel (ACCHAN).

(Joint Pub 1-02)

**MAJOR SUBORDINATE
COMMANDERS**

The designation assigned to NATO commanders operationally responsible to SACEUR and SACLANT for an allocated geographical area or function, for example, Commander, Allied Forces Central Europe, under Supreme Allied Commander Europe. (Joint Pub 1-02)

MARSHALING AREA

The geographic location where a deploying unit will assemble, hold, and organize supplies and/or equipment for onward movement.
(adapted from Joint Pub 1-02)

MASTER FORCE LIST (MFL)

A file that contains the current status of each requirement for a given operation plan. The MFL is made available for transfer by the File Transfer Service to other WWMCCS activities from a file produced from the JDS deployment database.
(Joint Pub 1-02)

MATERIEL

All items, excluding real property, installations, and utilities, needed to equip, operate, maintain, and support military activities without distinction as to their application for administrative or combat purposes. (Joint Pub 1-02)

M-DAY

The term used to designate the day on which mobilization is to begin. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**MEASUREMENT TON
(MTON)**

The unit for volumetric measurement of equipment associated with surface-delivered cargo. Measurement tons equal total cubic feet divided by 40.
(1 MTON = 40 cubic feet)
(JDS Users Manual Volume 1)

MEDICAL PLANNING MODULE

The JOPS ADP application program used to determine the impact of an operation on the total medical system, including the amount of medical support needed, such as bed, medevac, and blood/fluid requirements.
(adapted from Joint Pub 5-02.3 (JOPS Volume III))

**MEMORANDUM OF
POLICY (MOP)**

A statement of policy approved by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and issued for the guidance of the Services, the unified and specified commands, and the Joint Staff. (Joint Pub 1-01)

MILITARY CAPABILITY

The ability to achieve a specified wartime objective measured in terms of
force structure--numbers, size, and composition of defense forces;
modernization--technical sophistication of forces' units, weapon systems, and equipment;
readiness--ability of forces, units, weapon systems to deliver the designed output; and
sustainability--the staying power of forces, units, and weapon systems.
(adapted from Joint Pub 1-02)

MISSION

The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for taking it. (Joint Pub 1-02)

MOBILIZATION

The process by which the Armed Forces or part of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. This includes activating all or part of the Reserve components, as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**MOBILIZATION-DEPLOYMENT
PLANNING**

The act of using authorized systems and measures for planning, coordinating, and monitoring movements and deployments of mobilized forces and materiel necessary to meet military objectives. (*JDS Users Manual* Volume 1)

MODULE

A collection of one or more software programs that accomplishes major functions in an application program or subsystem. For example, JOPS module F10 is a collection of software programs F10, F10A, F10B, and F10C, each of which accomplishes a specific function and contributes to the overall function of the module F10, OPLAN identification. (adapted from Joint Pub 5-02.3 (JOPS Volume III))

**MOVEMENT REQUIREMENTS
GENERATOR (MRG)**

The JOPS ADP application program that computes and time-phases non-unit-related requirements for resupply based on the size of the force to be supported and the duration of the planned operation.

(adapted from Joint Pub 5-02.3 (JOPS Volume III))

MOVEMENT SCHEDULE

A schedule developed to monitor or track a separate identity, whether a force requirement, cargo/personnel increment, or lift asset. The schedule shows the assignment of specific lift resources to move the personnel and cargo included in a specific movement increment. Arrival and departure times at POE, etc., are detailed to show a flow and workload at each location. Movement schedules are detailed enough to support plan execution. (Joint Pub 1-02)

MOVEMENT TABLE

A table prepared by USTRANSCOM components giving detailed instructions for each force requirement and each non-unit-related cargo or personnel increment of the TPFDD concerning the scheduled movement from ORIGIN or POE to intermediate location, POD, or DEST. The table is

based on the estimated or planned availability of lift resources; it is not an execution document. (adapted from the *JDS Users Manual* Volume 1)

MULTI-SERVICE DOCTRINE

Fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more Services of the same nation in coordinated action toward a common objective. (Joint Pub 1-01)

NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITIES (NCA)

The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. (Joint Pub 1-02)

NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND SYSTEM (NMCS)

The component of the Worldwide Military Command and Control System designed to support the National Command Authorities in the exercise of their responsibilities. (Joint Pub 0-2)

N-DAY

An unnamed day before C-day when a unit is notified for deployment or redeployment. N002 means two days before C-day. (Joint Pub 5-02.4 (JOPS Volume IV))

NON-AIR-TRANSPORTABLE CARGO

Cargo that exceeds any of the following dimensions: 1,453" x 216" x 156", or has a height between 114" and 156" and a width that exceeds 144". (*JDS Users Data Element Dictionary*)

NONCOMBATANT EVACUEES

DOD-sponsored personnel, Department of State personnel, other U.S. Government-sponsored personnel, and U.S. citizens and designated aliens who must be moved from a threatened geographic area or theater of operations. (Joint Pub 5-02.1 (JOPS Volume I))

NONORGANIC TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENT

Unit personnel and cargo for which the transportation source must be an outside agency, normally a component of USTRANSCOM. (adapted from the *JDS Users Manual* Volume 1)

NONSTANDARD UNIT

A force requirement identified in an OPLAN for which movement characteristics have not been described in the TUCHA file. The planner is required to submit detailed movement characteristics for these units. (*JDS Users Manual* Volume 1)

NONUNIT RECORD

A TPFDD file entry for non-unit-related cargo and personnel; characteristics include using and providing organization, type of movement, routing data, cargo category, weight, volume, area

NON-UNIT-RELATED CARGO

required, and number of personnel requiring transportation. (adapted from Joint Pub 1-03.16)

All equipment and supplies other than those identified as the unit equipment or accompanying supplies of a specific unit requiring transportation to an area of operations, for example, resupply, military support for allies, and support for nonmilitary programs such as civil relief. A cargo increment number (CIN) is assigned to a non-unit-related cargo element for movement requirement identification.

(adapted from the *JDS Users Manual* Volume 1)

NON-UNIT-RELATED PERSONNEL

All personnel requiring transportation to or from an area of operations, other than those assigned to a specific unit, for example, filler personnel, replacements, temporary duty/temporary additional duty personnel, civilians, medical evacuees, and retrograde personnel. A personnel increment number (PIN) is assigned to a non-unit-related personnel element for movement requirement identification.

(adapted from the *JDS Users Manual* Volume 1)

NOPLAN

A contingency for which no operation plan has been published.

(*JDS Users Data Element Dictionary*)

NORMAL ACCESS

The availability of OPLAN information to most JDS users; however, functional access is limited to individuals and based on operational requirements of the job.

(adapted from *JDS Users Manual* Volume 1)

NORMAL OPERATIONS

Generally and collectively, the broad functions that the commander of a unified combatant command undertakes when assigned responsibility for a given geographic or functional area. Except as otherwise qualified, "normal operations" of a unified command commander include planning for and execution of operations in contingencies, limited war, and general war; planning and conduct of cold war activities; planning for and administration of military assistance; and maintaining the relationships and exercising the directive or coordinating authority prescribed in Joint Pubs 0-2 and 4-01, and Admin Pub 1.1.

(Joint Pub 1-02)

OBLIGATIONS

Amounts of orders, contracts, services, and similar transactions that must be paid during a particular period. (adapted from the GAO glossary)

ON-LINE

Having direct and immediate connection to the computer. (*JDS Users Data Element Dictionary*)

**OPERATIONAL CONTROL
(OPCON)**

Control exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. OPCON is inherent in COCOM and is the authority to perform the functions of command over subordinate forces that involve organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. OPCON includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. OPCON should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations; normally, this authority is exercised through the Service component commanders. OPCON normally gives full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. OPCON does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. (Joint Pub 0-2)

OPERATION ORDER (OPORD)

A directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for effecting coordinated execution of an operation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

OPERATION PLAN

Any plan, except the SIOP, prepared for the conduct of military operations in a hostile environment by the commander of a unified or specified command in response to a requirement established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(Joint Pub 5-02.1 (JOPS Volume I))

**OPERATION PLAN IN
COMPLETE FORMAT
(OPLAN)**

An operation plan for the conduct of joint military operations that can be used as a basis for development of an OPORD.

(Joint Pub 5-02.1 (JOPS Volume I))

**OPERATION PLAN IN
CONCEPT FORMAT
(CONPLAN)**

An operation plan in an abbreviated format that would require considerable expansion to convert it into an OPLAN or OPORD.
(Joint Pub 5-02.1 (JOPS Volume I))

**OPLAN-DEPENDENT
FORCE MODULE**

An actual Service force module that has been tailored by the supported commander and components to fit a specific planning task. OPLAN-dependent force modules usually include sustainment based on theater planning factors and sourced force records.

(adapted from *JDS Users Manual* Volume 1)

ORGANIC TRANSPORTATION

Transportation resources that are assigned to a unit and can give the lift capability for all or part of that unit's movement requirements.

ORIGIN (ORG)

The beginning point of a deployment. The point or station at which a movement requirement is located. For hypothetical requirements, the origin will be the most likely station at which the requirement will originate.

(*JDS Users Manual* Volume 1)

OUTLAYS

Obligations that are liquidated when checks are issued or cash disbursed.

(adapted from the GAO glossary)

OUTLINE PLAN

A transmittal document used to convey the supported commander's concept of operations and concept of support, apportionment of major combat forces, planning direction and guidance, task assignments, and inter-Service support agreements for use to begin the plan development phase of the deliberate planning process.

(adapted from Joint Pub 1-02)

OUTSIZED CARGO

Cargo that exceeds 1,090" x 117" x 105", that is, too large for C-130/C-141 aircraft.

(*JDS Users Data Element Dictionary*)

OVERSIZED CARGO

Cargo that exceeds the usable dimension of a 436L pallet, 104" x 84" x 96", or a height set by the particular model of aircraft.

(*JDS Users Data Element Dictionary*)

PERMANENT FILE (PRMFL)

This is a term used to identify disk storage that remains part of the computer resources at all times. JOPS ADP files that are stored on permanent files include APORTS, PORTS, GEOFILE, TUCHA, ASSETS, and CHSTR.

(*JDS Users Manual* Volume 1)

**PERSONNEL INCREMENT
NUMBER (PIN)**

A seven-character alphanumeric field that uniquely describes a nonunit entry in a TPFDD. (Joint Pub 5-02.1, (JOPS Volume I))

PLAN SUMMARY

A required element of an operation plan that gives a brief description of the mission, the general situation, the concept of operations, the major forces required, command arrangements, and the commander's appraisal of logistic feasibility. (JDS Users Manual Volume 1)

PLANNED RESUPPLY

The shipping of supplies in a regular flow as envisaged by existing preplanned schedules and organizations, which will usually include some form of planned procurement. (Joint Pub 1-02)

PLANNING FACTOR

A properly selected multiplier used in planning to estimate the amount and type of effort involved in a contemplated operation. Planning factors often are expressed as rates, ratios, or lengths of time. (Joint Pub 1-02)

PLANNING FORCE

The force level required to give reasonable assurance of successful execution of the national strategy. It is sized for a specific scenario presented in the JSPD-Planning Guidance and is keyed to the projected threat in the last year of the planning period. It is developed from the Minimum Risk Force by establishing mission priorities, sequencing force employment, and accepting a higher level of risk. It is not constrained by fiscal, manpower, logistics, mobility, basing, or similar limitations. (adapted from Joint Pub 1-02)

PLANNING ORDER

An order issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to initiate execution planning. The order normally will follow a **COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE** and will precede the **ALERT ORDER**. NCA approval of a selected course of action is not required before a **PLANNING ORDER** can be issued. (Joint Pub 5-02.4 (JOPS Volume IV))

**PLANNING, PROGRAMMING,
AND BUDGETING SYSTEM
(PPBS)**

The cyclic process that produces the DOD portion of the President's budget submission to Congress. (adapted from DOD Instruction 7045.14)

**PORT OF DEBARKATION
(POD)**

The geographic point (port or airport) in the routing scheme where a movement requirement will complete its strategic deployment.
(*JDS Users Manual Volume 1*)

PORT OF EMBARKATION (POE)

The geographic point (port or airport) in the routing scheme where a movement requirement will begin its strategic deployment.
(*JDS Users Manual Volume 1*)

PORT OF SUPPORT (POS)

The geographic point (port or airport) in an objective area that is the terminal point for strategic deployment for non-unit-related supplies and replacement personnel. Each component designates ports of support for four categories of resupply: general cargo, ammunition, POL, and air deliveries.
(adapted from the *JDS Users Manual Volume 1*)

**PRE-POSITIONED WAR RESERVE
REQUIREMENT (PWRR)**

The part of the war reserve materiel requirement that current Secretary of Defense guidance dictates to be reserved and positioned at or near the point of planned use or issue to the user before hostilities to reduce reaction time and to ensure timely support of a specific force or project until replenishment can be effected. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**PRE-POSITIONED WAR RESERVE
STOCK (PWRS)**

The assets that are designated to satisfy PWRR.
(Joint Pub 1-02)

**PRESIDENT'S BUDGET
(PB)**

The document sent to Congress each January estimating Government receipts and outlays for the next fiscal year and recommending appropriations in detail.
(adapted from *GAO Glossary of Budget Terms*)

**PRINCIPAL SUBORDINATE
COMMANDER (PSC)**

The designation assigned to NATO commanders operationally responsible to Major Subordinate Commanders for an allocated geographical area or function, for example, Commander, Allied Air Forces Central Europe, under Commander, Allied Forces Central Europe. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**PROGRAM CHANGE DECISION
(PCD)**

The document that transmits the Secretary of Defense's decisions on the Program Change Requests. (adapted from DOD Instruction 7045.14)

**PROGRAM CHANGE REQUEST
(PCR)**

A request by a Service or DOD agency to change the Six-Year Defense Program other than at the time for Program Objective Memorandums, Budget

Estimates Submission, or President's Budget.
(adapted from DOD Instruction 7045.14)

**PROGRAM DECISIONS
MEMORANDUM (PDM)**

Secretary of Defense decisions on the Program Objective Memorandums that are distributed to DOD components and OMB as the basis for the Budget Estimates Submission.
(adapted from DOD Instruction 7045.7)

PROGRAM ELEMENT

A primary data element in the Six-Year Defense Program that represents (1) missions of the DOD or (2) units and their resources.
(adapted from DOD Instruction 7045.7)

PROGRAMMED FORCES

The forces that exist for each year of the Six-Year Defense Program. They are the major combat and tactical support forces approved by the Secretary of Defense for procurement to execute the national strategy within manpower, fiscal, and other constraints.
(adapted from DOD Instruction 7045.7)

**PROGRAM OBJECTIVE
MEMORANDUM
(POM)**

The recommendations of the Service secretaries and heads of DOD agencies to the Secretary of Defense on the allocation of resources for proposed programs to achieve assigned missions and objectives.
(adapted from DOD Instruction 7045.7)

**PROGRAM REVIEW GROUP
(PRG)**

A working group subordinate to the Defense Resources Board composed of DOD staff members who prepare papers and briefings for Defense Resources Board deliberations.
(adapted from DOD Instruction 7045.7)

PROJECTED CLOSURE DATE

The date when a unit moving by organic transportation expects to arrive and complete unloading at its destination.
(JDS Users Manual Volume 1)

**PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
(PSYOPs)**

Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign government, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of PSYOPs is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives.
(Joint Pub 1-02)

QUERY

As applied to JDS permissions, "query" is one of the ten functional permissions granted JDS users. The permission is limited to retrieving and viewing information on the terminal display screen. The other primary functions allow JDS users to update, perform database management and scheduling functions, and print charts and reports.
(adapted from *JDS Users Manual Volume 1*)

**READY-TO-LOAD DATE
(RLD)**

The date when a unit will be ready to move from origin. (*JDS Users Manual Volume 1*)

RECORD

A collection of data elements pertaining to one logical subject. In JOPS, for example, all the data elements used to describe a force requirement and its routing are stored in the "force record." For resupply and replacement personnel, all the data elements are stored in non-unit-related cargo records and non-unit-related personnel records.
(*JDS Users Manual Volume 1*)

REDEPLOYMENT

The transfer of a unit, an individual, or supplies deployed in one area to another area, to another location within the area, or to the zone of interior for the purpose of further deployment.
(*JDS Users Manual Volume 1*)

REPLACEMENTS

Personnel required to take the place of others who leave the unit. (adapted from Joint Pub 1-02)

**REQUIRED DELIVERY DATE
(RDD)**

A date, relative to C-day, when a unit must arrive at its destination and complete offloading to properly support the concept of operations.
(*JDS Users Manual Volume 1*)

RESERVE COMPONENTS

Reserve components of the Armed Forces of the United States are the Army National Guard of the United States; the Army Reserve; the Naval Reserve; the Marine Corps Reserve; the Air National Guard of the United States; the Air Force Reserve; and the Coast Guard Reserve. Within each Reserve component a reservist is placed in one of three reserve categories, i.e. Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, and Retired Reserve.
(adapted from Joint Pub 1-02)

RESOURCES

The forces, materiel, lift, or other assets and capabilities apportioned or allocated to the commander of a unified or specified command.
(Joint Pub 5-02.1 (JOPS Volume I))

RESPONSE TIME	The estimated or actual time necessary for a unit, when alerted, to achieve the directed deployability posture. (Joint Pub 5-02.4 (JOPS Volume IV))
RETROGRADE	The movement of personnel and/or cargo out of the area of operations back to their points of origin. (adapted from the <i>JDS Users Manual</i> Volume 1)
RISK EVALUATION FORCE	The Risk Evaluation Force is the force that would be necessary to achieve U.S. national military objectives with a reasonable assurance of success. (CJCS MOP 7, 30 Jan 1990)
SAFETY LEVEL OF SUPPLY	The quantity of materiel, in addition to the operational level of supply, required to be on hand to permit continuous operations in case of minor interruption of normal replenishment or unpredictable fluctuations in demand. (Joint Pub 1-02)
SERVICE FORCE MODULES	A hypothetical force module built per Service doctrine composed of C, CS, and CSS forces and sustainment for an estimated period, e.g., 30 days. (adapted from the <i>JDS Users Manual</i> Volume 1)
SHORTFALL	The lack of forces, equipment, personnel, materiel, or capability identified as a plan requirement that would adversely affect a command's ability to accomplish its mission. (<i>JDS Users Manual</i> Volume 1)
SHORT TON (STON OR S/T)	The unit of measure (2,000 lbs.) for equipment or supplies other than Class III. (<i>JDS Users Manual</i> Volume 1)
SOURCING (FORCE)	The identification of the actual units, their origins, POEs, and movement characteristics to satisfy the hypothetical force requirements in the TPFDD. (<i>JDS Users Manual</i> Volume 1)
SOURCING (LOGISTICS)	The identification of the origin and determination of the availability of the non-unit-related logistics requirements in the TPFDD. (<i>JDS Users Manual</i> Volume 1)
SPECIAL OPERATIONS	Operations conducted by specially trained, equipped, and organized DOD forces against strategic or tactical targets in pursuit of national objectives. Conducted during either hostilities or peace, they can support conventional operations, or

they may be prosecuted independently when conventional force is inappropriate or infeasible.
(Joint Pub 1-02)

SPECIFIED COMMAND

A command that has a broad continuing mission and that is established and so designated by the President through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It normally is composed of forces from one Service.
(adapted from Joint Pub 1-02)

STANDARD UNIT

A type unit whose UTC and movement characteristics are described in the TUCHA file.
(JDS Users Manual Volume 1)

STRATEGIC RESERVE

An external reinforcing force that is not committed in advance to a specific NATO MSC, but that can be deployed to any region for a mission decided at the time by the MNC.
(Joint Pub 1-02)

STRATEGIC SEALIFT FORCE

Common-user sealift assets of the MSC force, including fast sealift ships and pre-positioned ships on completion of their mission and release, that furnish the capability to deploy and sustain military forces. The normal peacetime force may be augmented by shipping from the Ready Reserve Fleet and National Defense Reserve Fleet and from U.S. and allied merchant fleets.
(Joint Pub 1-01)

SUBORDINATE COMMAND

Command consisting of the commander and all individuals, units, detachments, organizations, or installations that have been placed under the command by the authority establishing the subordinate command; in JOPS, normally a Service component command, a subordinate unified command, or subordinate joint task force.
(adapted from Joint Pub 0-2)

SUMMARY REFERENCE FILE (SRF)

A JOPS III file containing information that expands requirements data contained in a JOPS TPFDD.
(JDS Users Manual Volume 1)

SUPPORTED COMMANDER

The commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) or other authority. The term also refers to the commander who originates

operation plans in response to requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
(adapted from Joint Pub 5-02.1 (JOPS Volume I))

SUPPORTING COMMANDER

A commander who furnishes augmentation forces or other support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan.
(Joint Pub 5-02.1 (JOPS Volume I))

SUPPORTING FORCES

Forces stationed in or to be deployed to an area of operations to support the execution of an OPORD. Operational command of supporting forces is not passed to the supported commander.
(adapted from Joint Pub 5-02.1 (JOPS Volume I))

SUPPORTING PLAN

An operation plan prepared by a supporting commander or a subordinate commander to satisfy the requests or requirements of the supported commander's plan.
(Joint Pub 5-02.1 (JOPS Volume I))

SUSTAINING SUPPLY

Materiel required to support a unit after arrival in-theater from the time accompanying supply and PWRS are anticipated to run out until regular resupply begins. (adapted from Joint Pub 1-02, "sustaining stocks")

TASK

A job or function assigned to a subordinate unit or command by higher authority. (adapted from Joint Pub 1-02)

THROUGHPUT

The estimated traffic expressed as an average daily capability of measurement tons, short tons, and/or passengers that can be moved into and through a port/aerial port. The total port/aerial port movement capability is a function of reception, discharge, and clearance; the smallest of these is the estimated throughput.
(adapted from Joint Pub 5-02.1 (JOPS Volume I))

TIMES

**SEE C-DAY, L-HOUR
D-DAY, H-HOUR
M-DAY
N-DAY**

TIME-PHASED FORCE AND DEPLOYMENT DATA (TPFDD)

The computer-supported database portion of an operation plan that contains time-phased force data, non-unit-related cargo and personnel data, and movement data for the operation plan. Information includes in-place units, prioritized arrival of units deployed to support the OPLAN,

**TIME-PHASED FORCE
AND DEPLOYMENT LIST
(TPFDL)**

routing of forces to be deployed, movement data associated with deploying forces, estimates of non-unit-related cargo and personnel movements to be conducted concurrently with the deployment of forces, and estimates of transportation requirements. (adapted from Joint Pub 1-02)

A computer listing of selected data in the TPFDD that specifically includes the information required in Appendix 1 to Annex A of the OPLAN, that is, types and/or actual units required to support the OPLAN, ORIGIN, POD or ocean area, cargo, non-unit-related personnel, and nonunit cargo requirements, etc., as outlined in JOPS Volume 1. (adapted from Joint Pub 5-02.1 (JOPS Volume I))

**TOTAL OBLIGATION AUTHORITY
(TOA) or
OBLIGATION AUTHORITY
(OA)**

The sum of (1) budget authority conferred for a given fiscal year, (2) balances of amounts brought forward from prior years that remain available for obligation, and (3) amounts authorized to be credited to a specific fund or account during that year. (adapted from the GAO glossary)

TPFDD MAINTENANCE

The process that allows a supported commander to incorporate changes to Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data that have occurred since TPFDD refinement.

(adapted from Joint Pub 5-02.1 (JOPS Volume I))

TPFDD REFINEMENT

A two-phased process that identifies specific forces, incorporates accurate movement requirements for the first 90 days of a TPFDD, and ensures that the deployment transportation requirements for the TPFDD are within the capabilities defined in JCS guidance.

(JDS Users Manual Volume 1)

TRANSMITTAL DOCUMENT

A general term for the document published at the conclusion of the concept development phase of deliberate planning to convey the CINC's concept of operations, concept of support, and other planning information to the JDC. The format is not specified but may take one of several forms: an outline plan, a letter of instruction (LOI), a plan directive, or a draft OPLAN.

(adapted from Joint Pub 5-02.1 (JOPS Volume I))

**TRANSPORTATION
FEASIBILITY ESTIMATOR
(TFE)**

The JOPS ADP application program that simulates the strategic deployment of movement requirements in the TPFDD on the common-user lift assets apportioned for the operation.

(JDS Users Manual Volume 1)

TYPE UNIT

A hypothetical organizational entity established by the Armed Forces and described by the approximate physical and movement characteristics of all real-world units of a similar type that it represents. It is identified by a unique five-character alphanumeric unit type code (UTC) and is included in the Type Unit Data File (TUCHA).

(adapted from the *JDS Users Manual* Volume 1)

TYPE UNIT DATA FILE (TUCHA)

A file that gives standard planning data and movement characteristics for personnel, cargo, and accompanying supplies associated with deployable type units of fixed composition. The file contains the weight and volume of selected cargo categories, physical characteristics of the cargo, and the number of personnel requiring nonorganic transportation.

(*JDS Users Manual* Volume 1)

UNIFIED COMMAND

A command with a broad and continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Services, and which is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or, when so authorized by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by a commander of an existing unified command established by the President.

(adapted from Joint Pub 1-02)

**UNIT DESIGNATION LIST
(UDL)**

A list of actual units by UIC designated to fill requirements of a force list.

(*JDS Users Manual* Volume 1)

**UNIT IDENTIFICATION CODE
(UIC)**

A six-character alphanumeric code that uniquely identifies each active, reserve, and National Guard unit of the Armed Forces.

(*JDS Users Manual* Volume 1)

**UNIT LINE NUMBER
(ULN)**

A seven-character alphanumeric code that uniquely identifies each force requirement in the TPFDD. It is made up of three elements: a force requirement number (FRN), a fragmentation code (FRAG), and an insert code (INSERT).

(*JDS Users Manual* Volume 1)

**UNIT TYPE CODE
(UTC)**

The five-character alphanumeric code that is associated with each type unit and allows the organization to be categorized into a kind or class having common distinguishing characteristics. (*JDS Users Manual Volume 1*)

**UNIT-RELATED EQUIPMENT
AND SUPPLIES**

All equipment and supplies that are assigned to a specific unit or that are designated as accompanying supplies. The logistic dimensions of these items are contained in the TUCHA standard reference file. (*JDS Users Manual Volume 1*)

**VISUAL INFORMATION
PROJECTION (VIP) TERMINAL**

A remote work station that allows a user to communicate through a keyboard and a cathode-ray tube (CRT) with a computer. (*JDS Users Manual Volume 1*)

WARNING ORDER

A directive used by commanders to advise subordinates of impending action. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may use the warning order as a planning directive to initiate Phase III of the Crisis Action Procedures, course of action development. (*JDS Users Manual Volume 1*)

Appendix J Acronyms & Abbreviations

The following is a list of selected acronyms that are frequently used in joint/combined operations planning. Generally, acronyms and abbreviations should be avoided in writing joint/combined plans and orders. If a long title or term must be used repeatedly, the acronym or abbreviation may be employed provided the first time it is used the long title is spelled out fully along with its related acronym or abbreviation.

AAFCCE	Allied Air Forces, Central Europe (NATO)
AAFIF	Automated Air Facilities Information File
ACCHAN	Allied Command Channel (NATO)
ACE	Allied Command Europe
ACL	allowable cabin load
ACLANT	Allied Command Atlantic (NATO)
ACR	Armored Cavalry Regiment
AD	advanced deployability posture
ADP	automatic data processing
AEC	Atomic Energy Commission
AFCENT	Allied Forces Central Europe (NATO)
AFG	Auto Force Generator
AFM	Air Force Manual
AFNORTH	Allied Forces Northern Europe (NATO)
AFSOUTH	Allied Forces Southern Europe (NATO)
AIASA	Annual Integrated Assessment of Security Assistance
AIF	Automated Installation Intelligence File
ALCON	all concerned
ALD	available-to-load date (at POE)
AMC	Army Materiel Command
AMHS	automated message handling system
AN or A/N	alphanumeric
ANMCC	Alternate National Military Command Center
AOR	area of responsibility
APF	afloat pre-positioning force (NTPF + MPS)
APOD	aerial port of debarkation
APOE	aerial port of embarkation
APORTS	Aerial Ports and Air Operating Bases File
ARCENT	U.S. Army Forces, U.S. Central Command (Third U.S. Army)
ARRDATE	arrival date
ARRS	Aerospace Rescue & Recovery Service
ASAP	as soon as possible
ASM	automated scheduling message
ASSETS	Transportation Assets File
ASW	antisubmarine warfare
ATAF	Allied Tactical Air Force (NATO)

AUTODIN	Automatic Digital Network
AUTOSEVOCOM	Automatic Secure Voice Communications
BA	Budget Authority
BBLS/CBBLs	barrels/hundreds of barrels
BCCI	Base Case Coordinating Instructions
BES	Budget Estimate Submission
BULK	bulk cargo
BY	Budget Year in SYDP
C&D	cover and deception
C2S	command and control systems
C3S	command, control, and communications systems
C3CM	command, control, and communications countermeasures
C3I	command, control, communications, and intelligence
C3MP	Command Control and Communications Master Plan
C3SYS DIR	Command, Control, and Communications Systems Directorate
C4	command, control, communications, and computers
CAP	Crisis Action Procedures
CAT	crisis action team
CB	chemical, biological
CBO	Congressional Budget Office
CEF	Civil Engineering File
CENTAF	U.S. Air Forces, U.S. Central Command (9th AF)
CENTAG	Central Army Group, Central Europe (NATO)
CEP	circular error probable
CESP	Civil Engineering Support Plan
CESPG	Civil Engineering Support Plan Generator
CFC	Combined Forces Command (Republic of Korea/U.S.)
CG	Chairman's Guidance
CGNSE	Changes in Global National Security Environment
CHOP	change of operational command
CHSTR	Characteristics of Transportation Resource File
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIN	cargo increment number
CINC	commander in chief (of unified or specified command)
CIR	continuing intelligence requirement
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CNASP	Chairman's Net Assessment for Strategic Planning
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
COA	course of action
COBOL	Common Business Oriented Language
COCOM	Combatant Command
COI	communications operating instructions
COMINT	communications intelligence
COMJTF	Commander, Joint Task Force
COMSEC	communications security
CONOPS	concept of operations
CONPLAN	operation plan in concept format
CONUS	Continental United States
COP	Contingency Operation Plan
COS	Critical Occupational Specialties
CPA	Chairman's Program Assessment

CPFL	contingency planning facilities list
CPG	Contingency Planning Guidance
CRAF	Civil Reserve Air Fleet
CRITIC	Critical Intelligence Report
CRITICOMM	Critical Intelligence Communications System
CRS	Congressional Research Service
CS	combat support
CSPA	CINC's Strategic Priorities Assessment
CSPAR	CINC Preparedness Assessment Report
CSS	combat service support or Central Security Service
CY	Current Year in SYDP
CW	chemical warfare
DAB	Defense Acquisition Board
DAE	Defense Acquisition Executive
DCA	Defense Communications Agency
DCID	Director of Central Intelligence Directive
DCP	Decision Coordinating Paper
DCS	Defense Communications System
DDN	Defense Data Network
DEFCON	Defense Readiness Condition
DEST	destination
DFE	division force equivalent
DFSC	Defense Fuel Supply Center
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DIP	Defense Intelligence Plan
DIRLAUTH	direct liaison authorized
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DMA	Defense Mapping Agency
DMAAC	Defense Mapping Agency Aerospace Center
DNA	Defense Nuclear Agency
DNBI	disease and nonbattle injury
DOD	Department of Defense
DODI	Department of Defense Instruction
DODIC	DOD Identification Code
DODIIS	Department of Defense Intelligence Information System
DOS	Department of State/Days of Supply
DOT	Department of Transportation
DPC	Defense Planning Committee (NATO)
DPG	Defense Planning Guidance
DRB	Defense Resources Board
DSARC	Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council
DSSCS	Defense Special Security Communications Systems
DRUN	deferred processing
DTG	date-time group
E&E	evasion and escape
EAD	earliest arrival date (at POD)
EAP-JCS	emergency action procedures of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
ECCM	electronic counter-countermeasure
ECM	electronic countermeasure
EDC	estimated date of completion of loading (at POE)
EDD	estimated departure date or earliest delivery date

EDP	emergency defense plan
EEFI	essential elements of friendly information
EEI	essential elements of information
EIC	Equipment Identification Code
ELINT	electronic intelligence
EMCON	emission control
EOP	Executive Office of the President
ERT	execution reference time
ESC	Electronic Security Command
ESI	essential sustainment items
ETA	estimated time of arrival
EW	electronic warfare
FAD	feasible arrival date, or force activity designator
FAPES	Force Augmentation Planning and Execution System
FCDNA	Field Command Defense Nuclear Agency
FAT	fatalities
FDESC	force description
FIC	Force Indicator Code
FIDP	Foreign Internal Defense Plan
FLOGEN	Flow Generator (MAC)
FM	Field Manual, or Force Module
FMFM	Fleet Marine Force Manual
FMI	force module identifier
FML	Force Module Library
FMLSM	Force Module Logistics Sustainability Model
FMS	Force Module Subsystem
FOC	full operational capability
FORSCOM	Forces Command
FRAG/FRAGO	Fragmentary Order
FREF	Force Record Extract File
FRG	Force Requirements Generator
FRN	force requirement number
FTS	File Transfer Service
FY	Fiscal Year
GAO	General Accounting Office
GDP	general defense plan
GELOC/GEOLoc	Standard Specific Geolocation Code
GENSER	general service (message)
GEOFILE	Standard Specified Geographic Location File
GEOREF	Geographic Reference System
GFOAR	Global Family of OPLANs Assessment Report
GIPSY	Graphic Information Presentation System (JDS)
GNP	Gross National Product
GSA	General Services Administration
HAC	House Appropriations Committee
HASC	House Armed Services Committee
HAZ	hazardous cargo
HNS	host-nation support
HQ	headquarters
HUMINT	human intelligence
IA	Intelligence Assessment

IB	Issue Book
ICOD	intelligence cutoff date
ICP	inventory control point
ICR	intelligence collection requirement
ID	increased deployability posture
IES	Illustrative Evaluation Scenario
ILS	Integrated Logistics Support
IMINT	imagery intelligence
INCNR	increment number
INS	insert code
I/O	input/output
IP	Initial Production
IPL	Integrated Priority List
IPS	Integrated Program Summary/Illustrative Planning Scenario
IPSS	Initial Pre-planned Supply Support
JANAP	Joint Army, Navy, Air Force Publication
JA0	joint area of operations
JCC	Joint Coordination Center
JCGRO	Joint Central Graves Registration Office
JCLL	Joint Center for Lessons Learned
JCMC	Joint Crisis Management Capability
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCSM	Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum
JDA	Joint Duty Assignment
JDAL	Joint Duty Assignment List
JDS	Joint Deployment System
JDSSC	Joint Data Systems Support Center
JINTACCS	Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systems
JLPPG	Joint Logistics and Personnel Policy and Guidance
JLRSS	Joint Long-Range Strategic Study
JMNA	Joint Military Net Assessment
JMPAB	Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocations Board
JMSNS	Justification for Major System New Start
JMRO	Joint Medical Regulating Office
JOPES	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JOPS	Joint Operation Planning System
JOPSREP	JOPS Reporting System
JPA0	Joint Public Affairs Office
JPEC	Joint Planning and Execution Community
JPME	Joint Professional Military Education
JPP	joint planning process
JRC	Joint Reconnaissance Center
JRS	Joint Reporting Structure (JCS Pub 6)
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSPS)
JSEAD	joint suppression of enemy air defense
JSO	Joint Specialty Officer
JSO NOM	Joint Specialty Officer Nominee
JSOTF	Joint Special Operations Task Force
JSPS	Joint Strategic Planning System
JSR	Joint Strategy Review

JSTPS	Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff
JTB	Joint Transportation Board
JTF	joint task force
JTO	JOPEs Training Organization
JTTP	Joint Tactics Techniques and Procedures
JULLS	Joint Universal Lessons Learned Systems
JUWTF	joint unconventional warfare task force
LAD	latest arrival date (at POD)
LAN (IU)	local area network (interface unit)
LAT	latitude
LCE	Logistics Capability Estimator
LCN	load classification number
LD	loaded deployability posture
LERTCON	alert condition
LFF	Logistic Factors File
LOC	line of communication
LOGSAFE	Logistics Sustainability Analysis Feasibility Estimator
LOI	letter of instruction
LONG	longitude
MAAG	military assistance advisory group
MAC	Military Airlift Command
MACE	Military Airlift Capability Estimator
MAGTF	Marine air-ground task force
MAP	Military Assistance Program
MAPP	Modern Aids to Planning Program
MAPS	Mobility Analysis & Planning System (MTMC)
MAW	Marine air wing
MBPO	Military Blood Program Office
MC	Military Committee (NATO)
MCCP	Marine Corps Capabilities Plan
MD	marshalled deployability posture
MDQS	Management Data Query System (JDS)
MEB	Marine expeditionary brigade
MEDEVAC	medical evacuation
MEF	Major Equipment File or Marine expeditionary force
MEU	Marine expeditionary unit
MFL	Master Force List (JDS) or Major Force List (JOPS)
MFP	Major Force Programs
MHE	materials handling equipment
MIA	missing in action
MIJI	meaconing, interference, jamming, and intrusion
MILCON	military construction
MILGP	military group
MNC	Major NATO Command
MODE	transportation mode
MODEM	modulator/demodulator
MOP	memorandum of policy (CJCS)
MPM	Medical Planning Module
MPS	maritime pre-positioning ships
MRG	Movement Requirements Generator

MSC	Military Sealift Command or major subordinate command (NATO)
MTMC	Military Traffic Management Command
MTON or M/T	measurement ton
MWF	Medical Working File
NAC	North Atlantic Council (NATO)
NAT	non-air-transportable cargo
NAVFOR	naval forces
NBC	nuclear, biological, and chemical
NCA	National Command Authorities
NCAA	NATO Civil Air Augmentation
NCMP	Navy Capabilities and Mobilization Plan
NCPS	Nuclear Contingency Planning System
ND	normal deployment posture
NEACP	National Emergency Airborne Command Post
NEO	noncombatant evacuation operation
NIPS	NMCS Information Processing System
NISP	NUWEP Intelligence Support Plan
NMCC	National Military Command Center
NMCS	National Military Command System
NMS	National Military Strategy
NMSD	National Military Strategy Document
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NOFORN	Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOP	nuclear operations
NOPLAN	no plan available or prepared
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defense Command
NORTHAG	Northern Army Group, Central Europe (NATO)
NPE(S)	Nuclear Planning and Execution (Service)
NPG	Nonunit Personnel Generator
NRC	non-unit-related cargo
NRP	non-unit-related personnel
NSA/CSS	National Security Agency/Central Security Service
NSC	National Security Council
NSCID	National Security Council Intelligence Directive
NSDAB	non-self-deployable aircraft and boats
NSDD	National Security Decision Directive
NSN	national stock number
NSP	Navy Support Plan
NSWTG	Naval Special Warfare Task Group
NTPF	Near Term Pre-positioned Force
NUWEP	policy guidance for the employment of nuclear weapons
NWP	Naval Warfare Publication
NWS	National Weather Service
O&M	Operations and Maintenance
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OMC	Office of Military Cooperation
OPCOM	operational command
OPCON	operational control
OPLAN	operation plan in complete format
OPORD	operation order

OPPA	Operation Plan Package Appraisal
OPREP	commander's operational report (JRS)
OPREP-1	message format used for OPORD (JRS)
OPREP-3	message format used for event/incident report (JRS)
OPSEC	operations security
OPSG	Operation Plans Steering Group
OR	operational readiness
ORG	origin
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OUT	outsize cargo
OVR	oversize cargo
PAM	Procurement Aircraft and Missiles
PAO	Public Affairs Office
PAX	passengers
PB	President's Budget
PBD	Program Budget Decision
PCD	Program Change Decision
PDD	Package Designation and Description File
PDM	Program Decision Memorandum
PE	Program Element
PFF	Planning Factors File
PIC	Parent Indicator Code
PID	plan identification number
PIN	personnel increment number
PKG-POL	packaged POL
POD	port of debarkation
POE	port of embarkation
POL	petroleum, oils, and lubricants
POLAD	political adviser
POM	Program Objective Memorandum (PPBS)
POMCUS	pre-positioning of materiel configured to unit sets (JOPS), or pre-positioned overseas materiel, configured to unit sets (DOD), or pre-positioned organizational materiel, configured to unit sets (USA)
PORTS	Port Characteristics File
POS	port(s) of support or peacetime operating stocks
POSF	Ports of Support File
POW/PW	prisoner of war
PPBS	Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
PRG	Program Review Group
PRI	priority
PROVORG	providing organization
PSC	principal subordinate command (NATO)
PSYOP	psychological operations
PWF	Personnel Working File
PWRMR	pre-positioned war reserve materiel requirement
PWRMS	pre-positioned war reserve materiel stocks
PWRS	pre-positioned war reserve stocks
PY	Prior Year in SYDP
QTY	quantity
R&D	Research and Development

RC	reserve component
RDD	required delivery date (at DEST)
RDF	rapid deployment force
RD&E	Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation
REDCON	readiness condition
REF	Risk Evaluation Force
RLD	ready-to-load date (at ORG)
ROC	Required Operational Capability
ROE	rules of engagement
RO/RO	roll-on/roll-off
RRF	Ready Reserve Fleet
RUM	Resource and Unit Monitoring
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SAF	special action force
SAG	Surface Action Group
SAR	search and rescue
(S)SARC	Service System Acquisition Review Council (where (S) = A for Army, N for Navy, or AF for Air Force)
SASC	Senate Armed Services Committee
SDDM	Secretary of Defense Decision Memorandum
SDF	Standard Distance File
SDP	standard distance package
SEACOP	Strategic Sealift Contingency Planning System (MSC)
SEAL	Sea/Air/Land
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense (abbreviation used for messages only)
SEP	Selective Employment Plan
SERE	survival, evasion, resistance, and escape
SERV/SVC	service
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (NATO)
SI	special intelligence
SIG	Senior Interdepartmental Group
SIGINT	signals intelligence
SIOP	Single Integrated Operational Plan
SITREP	situation report (JRS)
SITSUM	Situation Summary
SLOC	sea line of communication
SM	System Monitor
SNL	standard nomenclature list
SO	special operations
SOAS	special operations ADP system
SOC	special operations command
SOD	Strategy and Options Decision (PPBS)
SOF	special operations force
SOLOG	Standardization of Operations and Logistics
SOP	standing operating procedure
SOR	Strategy and Options Review (PPBS)
SORTS	Status of Resources and Training System
SOUTHAF	U.S. Air Forces, U.S. Southern Command (12th AF)
SPECAT	special category messages
SPIREP	Spot Intelligence Report

SPOD	sea port of debarkation
SPOE	sea port of embarkation
SRC	source
SRF	Summary Reference File/Secure Reserve Force
SSP	SIGINT Support Plan
STANAG	Standardization Agreement (NATO)
STON or S/T	short ton
STR	strength
TAC	Tactical Air Command
TADIL	Tactical Digital Information Link
TC-AIMS	Transportation Coordinator's Automated Information for Movement System
TCC	Transportation Component Command
TELNET	Telecommunications Network
TFE	Transportation Feasibility Estimator
TLCF	WIN teleconference
TO	table of organization
TOE	table of organization and equipment
TPFDD	Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data
TPFDL	Time-Phased Force and Deployment List
TUCHA	Type Unit Data File
TUDET	Type Unit Equipment Detail File
TW/AA	Tactical Warning/Attack Assessment
UCFF	UTC Consumption Factors File
UCI	Updated Coordinating Instructions
UCP	Unified Command Plan
UDL	unit designation list
UIC	unit identification code
ULC	unit level code
ULN	unit line number
UNAAF	Unified Action Armed Forces (Joint Pub 0-2)
UNC	United Nations Command (Korea)
USBRO	U.S. Base Requirements Overseas
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
USCINCCENT	Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command
USCINCEUR	Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command
USCINCLANT	Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command
USCINCPAC	Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command
USCINCSOUTH	Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command
USCINCSOCOM	Commander in Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command
USCINCSpace	Commander in Chief, U.S. Space Command
USCINTRANSOM	Commander in Chief, U.S. Transportation Command
USEUCOM	United States European Command
USFJ	United States Forces Japan
USFK	United States Forces Korea
USIA	U.S. Information Agency
USLANTCOM	United States Atlantic Command
USMTF	United States Message Text Format
USPACOM	United States Pacific Command
USSOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command

USSPACECOM	United States Space Command
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
USSS	U.S. SIGINT system
UTC	unit type code
UW	unconventional warfare
VEH	vehicular cargo
VIP	visual information projection
WAM	WWMCCS ADP Modernization
WHNSIMS	Wartime Host Nation Support Information Management System
WIA	wounded in action
WIN	WWMCCS Intercomputer Network
WITS	WSGT Intelligent Terminal System
WMP	War and Mobilization Plan (USAF)
WRM	war reserve materiel (USAF)
WSGT	WWMCCS Standard Graphics Terminal
WT	weight
WWMCCS	Worldwide Military Command and Control System

Appendix K

CHART 1 PPBS AND JSPS RELATIONSHIP

CHART 2 CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT PHASE


CHART 3 PLAN DEVELOPMENT PHASE

CHART 4 PLAN REVIEW AND SUPPORTING PLANS

CHART 5 CRISIS ACTION PROCEDURES (CAP)


CHART 6 ADP SUPPORT OF THE PLANNING PROCESS

PPBS AND JSPS RELATIONSHIP *(SEE BELOW)




ACRONYM	DOCUMENT	PREPARER	TIME	MAIN INPUT DOCUMENTS
AIASA	Annual Integrated Assessment of Security Assistance	CINC	JUN	
BES	Budget Estimate Submission	MILDEP	SEP	POM, IPL
C3MP	Command, Control, and Communications Master Plan	C3MP	1 JAN	NCA's Policy guidance, JSR intermediate products, JMNA
CG	Chairman's Guidance	J5	15 DEC	
CGNSE	Changes in Global National Security Environment	J5	JUN	
CNASP	Chairman's Net Assessment for Strategic Planning	CJCS	1 JUL	
CPA	Chairman's Program Assessment	J8	15 MAY *	DPG, CSPAR, GFOAR, JMAN, POMS, IPLS
CPG	Contingency Planning Guidance	SECDEF	SEP	
CSP	CINC's Strategic Priorities	CINC	DEC	
CSPA	CINC's Strategic Priorities Assessment	CINC	DEC	GFOAR, CSPAR, IPL, Global C3MP
CSPAR	CINC's Preparedness Assessment Report	CINC	DEC	
DPG	Defense Planning Guidance	SECDEF/OSD	1 OCT	
GC3A	Global Command, Control, and Communications Assessment	J6	FEB	
GFOAR	CJCS Global Family of OPLANs Assessment Report	J7	OCT	
IA	Intelligence Assessment	DIA	MAR	
IES	Illustrative Evaluation Scenario	J8	OCT	

* Remer not y: presur




UN INPUT DOCUMENTS
nce, JSR intermediate products, JMNA, GFOAR
JAR, JMAN, POMS, IPLS
PL, Global C3MP

ACRONYM	DOCUMENT	PREPARER	TIME	MAIN INPUT
IPL	CINC's Integrated Priority List	CINC	8 OCT	
IPS	Illustrative Planning Scenario	J8	15 OCT	
JMNA	Joint Military Net Assessment	J5	DEC	
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan	J5 / J8	15 FEB	NMSD, DPG, CPG, UCP, C3MP
JSR	Joint Strategic Strategy Review	J5	DEC	IA, CSP, CGNSE
NMS	National Military Strategy	CJCS	JUN	
NMSD	National Military Strategy Document	J5 / J8	1 JUL	
OPLANS	Operation Plans	CINC	JUL	
PB	President's Budget	OMB	JAN	
PBD	Program Budget Decision	OSD	DEC	
PDM	Program Decision Memorandum	PDM	JUL	
POM	Program Objective Memorandum	POM	MAR	
REF	Risk Evaluation Force	J8	DEC	
				* CPA TO BE PUBLISHED ACTUAL POM SUBMISS




ACRONYM	DOCUMENT	PREPARER	TIME	MAIN INPUT DOCUMENTS
IPL	CINC's Integrated Priority List	CINC	8 OCT	
IPS	Illustrative Planning Scenario	J8	15 OCT	
JMNA	Joint Military Net Assessment	J5	DEC	
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan	J5 / J8	15 FEB	NMSD, DPG, CPG, UCP, C3MP, GFOAR
JSR	Joint Strategic Strategy Review	J5	DEC	IA, CSP, CGNSE
NMS	National Military Strategy	CJCS	JUN	
NMSD	National Military Strategy Document	J5 / J8	1 JUL	
OPLANS	Operation Plans	CINC	JUL	
PB	President's Budget	OMB	JAN	
PBD	Program Budget Decision	OSD	DEC	
PDM	Program Decision Memorandum	PDM	JUL	
POM	Program Objective Memorandum	POM	MAR	
REF	Risk Evaluation Force	J8	DEC	
				* CPA TO BE PUBLISHED WITHIN 45 DAYS OF ACTUAL POM SUBMISSIONS

CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT PHASE





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


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
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
PLAN REVIEW AND SUPPORTING PLANS



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
PLAN REVIEW PHASE 4

SUPPORTING PLANS





HASE 4

SUPPORTING PLANS PHASE 5




CRISIS ACTION PROCEDURES (CAP)






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CHART 5



AFSC PUB

ADP SUPPORT OF THE PLANNING PROCESS



* THE RETROGRADE TPFDD WILL BE DEVELOPED SEPARATELY, BUT WILL FOLLOW THE SAME PATH AS THE OPLAN TPFDD

①

DELIBERATE PLANNING


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
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UNITY OF EFFORT

The effective use of military power of the Nation requires that the efforts of the separate Military Services be closely integrated. Unity of effort among the Military Services at the national level is obtained by the authority of the President and the Secretary of Defense exercised through the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the strategic planning and direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and by common, joint, and cross-servicing by the Military Departments. Unity of effort among Military Service forces assigned to unified or specified commands is achieved by exercise of operational command, by adherence to common strategic plans and directives, and by sound operational and administrative command organization. (UNAAF 1-1)



"With limited forces, nearly everything that happens nowadays is a joint operation. No one Service plays a paramount role."

Lord Mountbatten